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Abstract
This dissertation studies the economic history of South Africa’s industrial decentralisation
policies, which led to greater trade and foreign investment with Taiwan during the closing
phases of apartheid. These large industrial schemes sought to increase exports of finished
goods, diversify manufacturing from urban centres, and develop the African homelands,
while continuing the status quo of racial segregation. In examining (1) bilateral trade,
(2) foreign investment and (3) business network agglomeration, I illustrate the role
Taiwanese firms played in fulfilling important aims of the industrial decentralisation
policy. The three interrelated topics explain how the diplomatic relationship developed,
the effects to bilateral trade, and why Taiwanese investors came to be the largest group
of industrialists in the apartheid-era homelands. However, the research agenda presented
in this thesis is not merely a narrow analysis of trade and investment. It also provides a
broader perspective of key questions in South Africa’s economic history: specifically, the
rise and fall of apartheid, the contradictory forces of regional industrial decentralisation,
which shaped Africa’s most industrialised economy, and the roots of persistent inequality
stemming from the homeland system. The period between 1975 and 1994 was turbulent
with both countries facing different degrees of political and economic isolation. Prior
scholarship has focused on the diplomatic relationship between the two countries, as
international sanctions made quantitative data difficult to access. The introduction of new
qualitative and quantitive data on the apartheid economy highlights the economic motives
for this large wave of Asian foreign investment, especially those in the rural African
homelands. Moreover, it draws lessons from the historical patterns of apartheid industrial
and spatial development, which are analogous to current African special economic zone
policies.
Terminology
Racial terminology in South Africa is a complicated matter. As with other recent
economic history scholarship, I have reserved the term ‘African’ for the indigenous dark
skinned, Bantu-speaking inhabitants of South Africa. The word ‘Bantu’, which has
subsequently been interpreted as derogatory, having widespread currency as an apartheid
term, used to refer to African or Black people. Derivatives of the term include Bantustan
or Bantu Reserves; land set aside for the exclusive use by Africans after the 1913 Native
Land Act. The term Bantustan subsequently fell out of favour and was replaced by
the term Homeland in the 1970s, though they were often used interchangeably. ‘White’
is adopted as the generic term for those who came to South Africa from Europe, with
‘Afrikaners’ used to refer to the Afrikaans-speaking descendants of those that came from
Holland, France and Germany, and ‘English’ for those from Britain. The group referred
to as ‘Coloured’ include the descendants of the slaves, native Khoisan, and children of
interracial marriages, while the Asian population was created by the decision to bring
indentured labourers from India to work in the sugar plantations in Natal. The Chinese,
whose ancestors came to South Africa throughout the early 20th century, were a distinct
group, until Chinese immigration was banned under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904.
Occupying a unique cultural space in South Africa, Taiwanese immigrants were racially
referred to as Chinese, but cultural and legal distinctions were made between the groups.
The terms ‘Republic of China’ (ROC) and ‘Taiwan’ are used interchangeably to describe
their country of origin.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines South African industrial policy under apartheid between 1950 and
1994. In particular, it studies the role these policies played in attracting Taiwanese foreign
investment to rural African homelands, increasing exports to Asia during sanctions, and
fulfilling the aims of a failing industrial programme by generating firm clustering. Previous
scholarship has focused on diplomatic motives for co-operation between South Africa
and Taiwan, neglecting the economic incentives. However, investment flows reveal that
diplomatic agreements coincided with Taiwanese offshore expansion and South African
industrial decentralisation. These, in turn, contributed to an increase in the scale and
diversification between these two regions. Moreover, Taiwanese investment in African
homelands was also shaped by economic geography and global business networks. My
study advances three research fields: the economic history of South Africa’s industrial
decentralisation policies, the economic geography of apartheid, and the history of Asian
business networks in South Africa. I have utilised both quantitative and qualitative
sources assembled from previously inaccessible archives in South Africa, Britain, United
States and Taiwan.1
For the last 30 years, politicians, historians and economists have viewed relations between
South Africa and Taiwan through a narrow lens, focusing on this episode as merely the
collaboration of isolated pariah states. However, the role of ethnicity as a determinant
of trade, investment and therefore a firm’s performance have become central to major
debates in apartheid economic and business history. In my thesis I therefore assemble new
data and methods in the analysis of trade and investment. This allows me to challenge
the conventional assessment of Taiwanese investment as a result of state-led diplomatic
agreements, lucrative incentives, and cheap labour.
1In Section 1.3, on page 12 I provide a complete overview of the data, sources and methods used to
examine each dimension of trade, migration and investment. For a bibliographical catalogue of Archival
Sources refer to page 275 of the Bibliography.
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Following chronologically through each chapter, my thesis makes the following contri-
butions: (A) First I have reconstructed three phases of apartheid industrial policy in
Chapter 2, examining the regional development outcomes. This provides context to
my thesis, showing how South Africa undertook one of the largest Regional Industrial
Development Programmes (RIDP) on the continent, building special economic zones over
40 years, which subsequently gave rise to Taiwanese labour-intensive manufacturing.2
(B) Second I discuss the economic motives for cooperation between Taiwan and South
Africa during a turbulent period in both countries’ histories. In Chapter 3 I first
contextualise the political landscape following the rise of apartheid in the 1950s while
making special reference to the concurrent economic and diplomatic changes in both
countries. Assessing South African Reserve Bank data, I then discuss how economic
factors prompted Taiwanese investors to hold long-term South African assets which
challenges existing literature on the period. My findings argue that enhanced diplomatic
protection, reduced trade quotas, globalisation of labour-intensive manufacturing and
lower domestic investment yields may have accounted for greater Taiwanese engagement.
Expanding on this in Chapter 4 I then collate new trade, migration and investment
data showing that the volume of Taiwanese trade swelled as western partners abandoned
South Africa. This dissertation is one of the first works to bring together comprehensive
trade data for this period; as a result of international sanctions, South African data on
trade and migration was often embargoed by public institutions, constraining scholarship
during the apartheid period.3 Using my new data I find that the share of South African
exports to Taiwan was both greater, but importantly, more diversified in the sectors
in which migrants invested. Known as the ‘migrant-trade effect’, the results suggest
that Taiwanese entrepreneurs may have increased trade by forming business networks
and supply chains, linking them to Asian markets. For scholars and policy makers
interested in these topics, South Africa is probably one of the most compelling examples
contemporary history can provide for the migrant-trade effect in an African context.4
(C) Finally, very little is known about the spatial distribution of the Taiwanese firms
across South Africa. In Chapter 5 I ask why Taiwanese investors clustered in only a
few locations. Using a location choice methodology to disentangle the agglomeration
process, I demonstrate that existing production linkages interacted with firm-specific
(i.e. assembly networks) and location-specific factors (i.e. economic geography & market
access). By constructing a new data set and using archival accounts, I challenge historical
and development scholarship by showing that both economic geography and co-ethnic
production networks played an important role in attracting foreign investment.
2Although a large body of literature on the efficacy of this apartheid programme exists, these have
tended to neglect the long-run view of state-led planning. These prior studies will be explored in greater
detail throughout Chapter 5, but notable authors include Addleson and Tomlinson (1986), Bell (1973a,b,
1987), Houghton (1956), Wellings and Black (1986a,b).
3The only meaningful contribution to trade statistics during sanctions came from Garner (1994).
4This contributes to the historical literature such as Rauch (2001), Greif (2006) and Gould (1994) to
mention only a select range which has shown how co-ethnic networks increase trade across borders.
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1.1 MOTIVATION
This thesis uses the case study of economic relationships between South Africa and
Taiwan to address broader themes of trade diversification, economic geography and
industrial policy in apartheid South Africa. Earlier efforts to look beyond international
diplomacy were hindered by inaccessible statistics on trade, investment and migration,
which were kept secret because of UN trade sanctions. As a result, no in-depth studies
have been produced from South Africa’s official RIDP records and governmental trade
archives. However some notable scholars have touched on different themes, either directly
or indirectly, providing a foundational departure point to studying apartheid economic
geography, co-ethnic trade and investment. For example Hart (2002a) was the first to
recognise Taiwanese kinship networks in KwaZulu Natal. Pickles and Woods (1989) &
Geldenhuys (1991) studied the international relations of political isolation questioning
whether it would have an impact on the patterns of trade and investment. Later, Garner
(1994) embarked on a study of trade during sanctions but was limited by a lack of data,
and therefore unable to ascertain whether the change was linked to Taiwanese activities.
Examining foreign investment, Rogerson (1987) was the first to document the location
of Asian multinational firms in South Africa’s industrial decentralisation programme,
but stopped short of investigating the possibility of agglomeration dynamics. Naude´ and
Krugell (2006) finally examined the spatial elements of poverty and inequality stemming
from the homelands and industrial policies of apartheid.
Expanding on these studies, my thesis assembles novel data and uses new methods in
the analysis of ROC - RSA trade and investment. In doing so, I also contribute to an
international body of scholarship on migration, trade, investment and agglomeration.
For example, Rauch and Casella (2001) found that ethnic Asian business networks had
a significant impact on the volume of trade across borders. By enabling traders to
overcome informational trade barriers, these migrant networks matched opportunities in
international markets. However, very little is known about how Taiwanese investment
may have had an impact on South Africa’s exports, and to what degree diversification
was driven by migration. In addition, a vast empirical literature shows the contribution
of export diversification to economic growth, which is especially beneficial to develop-
ing countries in Africa. Gutie´rrez de Pin˜eres and Ferrantino (1997) explain that the
progression from ‘traditional’ to ‘non-traditional’ exports is an important component of
export-led growth.5 A varied export production structure which includes new, but also
higher value products enables positive manufacturing spillovers, making countries less
susceptible to commodity shocks.6 However South Africa struggled to develop export-led
5South Africa, and Africa in general terms export commodities. As such, Gutie´rrez de Pin˜eres and
Ferrantino (1997, p. 376) note that ‘non-traditional’ industries are presumed to be in manufacturing.
6Reis and Farole (2012, p. 11 - 28)
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manufacturing with commodities crowding out consumer goods and the continued failure
of import substitution.7 The migration of Taiwanese firms to South Africa provides a
rare historical opportunity to examine empirically how foreign manufacturing investment
may have increased and diversified trade with Asia when import substitution incentives
had failed.
Historically, business networks have been fundamental in the development of trade.
Notable authors such as Greif (1994) and Gould (1994) have shown that informal
and formal business networks play an increasing role in economic activities, providing
alternatives to organised markets. Buyers and sellers establish personal links, and conduct
trade on a bilateral basis, expanding international trade through a greater knowledge of
local market preferences and ensuring contract enforcement. This has been a growing
topic in economic history with Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996) showing how expatriate
Chinese entrepreneurs, using the ‘bamboo network’, created a trade superpower in Asia.8
These connections improved communication, knowledge, and the transfer of capital,
especially in regions where the businesses may be in the minority and rule of law remain
undeveloped, such as apartheid South Africa. More recently Ve´zina and Parsons (2016)
used the the Vietnamese boat people in the United States as a natural experiment,
showing how these immigrants fostered international trade between the US and Asia by
reducing trade costs and increasing exports. However Bra¨utigam (2003) notes that very
limited research has been done on [co-ethnic] Chinese business networks in Africa. As
such, my case studies of Taiwanese migration and the growth in trade with Asia are the
first examples of ‘bamboo shoots’ which have established trade networks in South Africa.
Finally, a growing body of literature has examined the role of industrial agglomeration
in economic growth. Famously Marshall (1920) suggested that sharing of inputs, labour
market pooling, and the spillovers in knowledge account for agglomeration and the
subsequent economic gains. Evidence from Krugman (1991) or Porter (1990), to mention
only two, supports the presence of all three of these forces. Furthermore, significant
research from Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) examined the role of ethnicity on co-
location of firms, with informal networks explaining their spatial agglomeration. As such,
unique Taiwanese production networks provide an additional variable in studying the
economic geography of South Africa, its special economic zones and the subsequent rise
of Taiwanese manufacturing agglomeration.
7Moll (1991, p. 283) explains that the export of mining machinery did not take place. Dietz (1992,
p. 236) noted that the inability to develop a capital goods sector meant that once mining declined and
sanctions took hold very little new investment occurred in South African manufacturing.
8The bamboo network is traced to the 16th century, and can be thought of as a Chinese Commonwealth.
The concept has been used to describe how businesses which are operated by overseas Chinese act as
conduits for trade which are then guided by family ties and personal relationships as opposed to formal
relationships.
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 5
1.2 CONTEXT
Economically, the ROC - RSA co-operation was curious for several reasons. Prior to the
late apartheid period, neither country had trade treaties in place, while Asians had been
prohibited from owning land or businesses in South Africa. In the province of the Orange
Free State they couldn’t even traverse the territory without legal authorisation.9 Some
20 years later 50,000 Taiwanese entrepreneurs and their families had migrated between
the two countries bringing capital, business networks and market knowledge.10 By the
end of the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) in 1996, designed to
generate economic clustering within African homelands, more than 600 Taiwanese firms
were operating across South Africa.11 Emblematic of this odd, newfound relationship,
was the establishment of the largest Buddhist temple in Africa.12 Aptly named ‘Cultura
Park’ it was situated on the outskirts of the capital city Pretoria, known to be Calvinist
and conservative, yet allowed its construction.
Figure 1.1: Nan Hua Chinese Buddhist cultural and educational centre (Cultura Park). The
largest such complex in the southern hemisphere, located near Pretoria (Bronkhorstspruit).
Source: Nan Hua Website.
9Van der Watt and Visser (2008, p. 17) explain how people of Asian descent were forbidden from
entering the colony of the Orange Free State in terms of Section XXXIII of 1891. The restrictive
legislation had persisted after the Union of South Africa was formed, and into the apartheid period.
10The estimation of migratory flows between ROC & RSA is discussed in Chapter 4 on pg. 101.
11The clustering of these firms is a unique contribution discussed in Chapter 5 on pg. 123
12Fo Guang Shan order (南華寺) situated in Cultura Park, a suburb of Bronkhorstspruit established
by Afrikaans-speaking white settlers in 1858.
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I will discuss how the Taiwanese firms that migrated to the rural homelands benefited
from the networks in which they were embedded in Taiwan, forming closely linked
supply-chain clusters. Socially connected, and willing to take risks, these new migrants to
South Africa were at the vanguard of an international production diaspora spreading out
from Taiwan. As a result, bilateral trade also rapidly intensified, reaching R 3 billion per
annum, surpassing South Africa’s traditional western trade partners. Although “Isolated
State Geo-Politics”13 cannot be discounted in the transformation of trade-flows away
from the West towards the East, it is not the only explanation for these persistent shifts.
Given the intensity of migration and diversity of firm investment by Taiwanese in South
Africa, very little is known about the political economy under which it was directed.14
However, the research agenda presented in my thesis is not merely a narrow view of
migration, trade and investment, but requires a broader perspective of South Africa’s
economic history. Thus two fundamental themes require contextualisation and periodi-
sation. The first concerns the historical role foreign investment played in developing
a modern mining and manufacturing economy between the late 19th and 20th century.
This had been critical in South Africa’s balance-of-payments (B.o.P) and therefore the
subsequent constraint sanctions placed on the country.15 The second concerns African
segregation and land dispossession during the industrialisation of South Africa which
came to shape the economic geography during apartheid. Land dispossessions of the
colonial and apartheid eras formed the foundation for the complexities of a 40-year
industrial-decentralisation programme. Originally conceived in the 1950s to industrialise
rural reserve areas, it was intended to employ Africans trapped in the homelands by the
brutally coercive apartheid legislation.16 The confluence of these constraints and policies
is discussed next.
1.2.1 Economic Development in South Africa, 1867 - 1996
South Africa’s modern economy depended on access to foreign trade and capital.17 A
period of significant inflows of capital, migrants and increasing foreign trade ensued
following the discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1884). Gold became South Africa’s
export staple, which shackled the economy to the vicissitudes of international finance and
global business cycles.18 However, Nattrass and Seekings (2011) explain that, “if gold
mining was the engine of the economy, it was an engine that required constant assistance
13Geldenhuys (1991) uses this phrase as the title of his book “Isolated States: a comparative analysis”
in which he compares the trade and geo-political strategies of ROC, RSA, Chile & Israel in the 1980s.
14Lin (2001, p. 47) believes the secretive nature of ROC - RSA military and nuclear cooperation
programmes is to account for this.
15Historically, South Africa required foreign investment to develop mines, the main source of exports.
Sanctions restricted investment and therefore exacerbated the B.o.P deficit when mineral markets were
weak in the 1980s. The finer details of this are discussed in Chapter 4 on pg. 101.
16Industrial decentralisation policies have received almost no research attention since the 1980s. As
such, Chapter 2 on pg. 33 is dedicated to chronologically examining this interesting historical episode.
17South Africa received in excess of 60 per cent of Africa’s total capital inflows between 1900 & 1930.
18Roux (2005, p. 32) explains that the fortunes of the South Africa economy were beyond its control.
Fluctuations in mineral prices, droughts and international economic trends had an impact on the open
economy.
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from the state.”19 Extracting the ore required substantial long-term investment and risk
to both capital and labour, making the economy vulnerable to external forces.20 The
only cost component that could be controlled was unskilled black labour. To guarantee
continued investment, the state intervened in many aspects of this early industry, but
notably in the suppression of African wages.21 Denoon (1980) then Feinstein (2005)
highlight how doubling the very low African wages would have decimated dividends and
taxes by two thirds. Investors would not have invested in South African gold mining if
profitability had not been underpinned by an implicit government commitment to control
costs. It is therefore important to note the relationship between foreign investment
returns and the effects on the demand for unskilled African labour which remained
pivotal for Taiwanese investment a century later. High wages for both black and white
workers were simply incompatible with profitability, resulting in coercive labour practices
and capital-intensive mining.
Moreover, the British origins of South Africa’s gold mining capital are also worth
mentioning in the context of future investment flows. As a result of inherent risks, large
mining-finance houses that could raise the massive capital necessary for commissioning and
operating these deep level mines prevailed.22 Six mining and finance houses dominated
the industry with no reason to compete given the fixed price of the precious metal.23
These firms were intrinsically linked to British investment and manufacturing. As such,
later periods of trade and investment came to reflect South Africa’s colonial and historic
relations with the west, making Taiwan an outlier in the 1970s and 1980s when sanctions
reorientated both trade and investment diversification.
A desire to reduce South Africa’s dependence on the west was not unique to the apartheid-
era decentralisation programme. For example Paul Kruger, who had led the Transvaal in
the late nineteenth century, granted monopoly concessions to industrialists. Early state
interventions included a dynamite monopoly, while later examples are especially evident
in the large number of parastatals, or state corporations.24 However the companies that
held the financial risk on the Transvaal mines and in South Africa’s broader economy
were mainly controlled abroad and heavily dependent on foreign capital.25
Before 1920, manufacturing had been largely limited to light industry and a growing
chemical industry supplying the mines. Subsequently, the state moved towards more
19Nattrass and Seekings (2011, p. 522)
20For a history of early development and mineral wealth see Lipton (1986), Frankel (1935), Richardson
and van Helten (1984), Smith (1996), and Thompson (2001).
21This will be dealt with in greater deals in Chapter 2.2 on pg. 37 and again in Chapter 5.3 on pg. 130.
22Nattrass and Seekings (2011, p. 523) note that the distinctive economics of gold mining and price
setting, encouraged the emergence of large mining-finance houses that could raise the massive capital.
23Cecil John Rhodes established Consolidated Gold Fields. The Albu family controlled General Mining,
Eckstein managed Rand Mines, Wernher and Beit grew into Central Mining, Goerz became the Union
Corporation, and Barnato established Johannesburg Consolidated Investments.
24Among the first such enterprises were the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) and the South
African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), both founded in the 1920s to support mining.
25For further details on the rise of gold mining conglomerates in the Transvaal see Richardson and van
Helten (1984). For a history of capitalism in gold mining in the Transvaal see Denoon (1980).
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interventionist import substitution policies. Nattrass and Seekings (2011) note how a
“desire to develop domestic industry would reduce dependence on Britain, demonstrate
that South Africa was as modern as the other British dominions and promote and protect
employment and high wages for white workers.”26 The linkages between mining and
the manufacturing sector were an important constituent of economic growth. As gold
declined and mineral demand vacillated, the role of manufacturing consumer goods for
both domestic and export markets had grown in importance. Moreover, manufacturing
had become central in attracting foreign investment and generating foreign exchange
earnings during mineral downturns and was therefore severely affected by sanctions.27
However, even after decades of policy shifts designed to spur development and diversifica-
tion, South Africa’s economy in the 1970s still relied primarily on the gold mining industry
and exports to the west.28 This left the country exposed to fluctuations in demand for
gold and other mineral commodities.29 Importing capital and equipment, while relying
on minerals resulted in a number of short-term cyclical crises, but also a long-term
structural disequilibrium.30 The failure to create a domestic export-led economy meant
that South Africa experienced a persistent and growing balance-of-payments deficit as
import demand outstripped exports.31 Under United Nations sanctions, South Africa
could no longer compensate for these structural imbalances by attracting either private
or official capital from overseas. Starting in the 1970s, a period of economic desperation
ensued. It was under these conditions that Taiwanese investment could substitute for
dwindling western capital inflows.32 In a purely economic context, Taiwan and South
Africa’s national interests coincided at this point.33 Taiwan could provide foreign in-
vestment and South Africa could provide cheap homeland labour, industrial incentives
in the RIDP, and export capacity to sunset industries.34 Gary Lin (2001), a former
Taiwanese diplomat to South Africa confirms this view, noting that the two economies
were basically complementary, leading each country to pursue common economic and
strategic interests.35
26Nattrass and Seekings (2011, p. 524)
27Schneider (2000, p. 414)
28Freund (2011) noted that South African dependence on Britain as its export market increased again
very substantially to reach almost 80 per cent in 1933.
29Bell and Cattaneo (1997) measure how manufacturing had been determined largely by variations in
the price and volume of these mining exports.
30Saul and Gelb (1986). The crises followed the Sharpeville massacre when foreign capital streamed
out the country from 1960 to 1963. The second major crisis started in 1976 with the Soweto uprising.
From 1977 to 1980, despite a rising gold price, there was a net outflow of capital, culminating in the final
debt crisis of 1985.
31The importance and interaction of these factors is the focus of Chapter 4.
32Although a small component of trade and investment, ROC came to represent a much larger share
as the relationship developed. This transition from a small peripheral trade partner to 5th the largest
one by 1996 is the core theme of Chapter 4.
33The history, chronology and trade costs of these sanctions are discussed in Chapter 3 starting on p.
76.
34Following withdrawal of state support for specific industries and the imposition of the MFA, Taiwan
no longer based its economy on labour-intensive exporting in low-cost, low value-added consumer goods.
35Lin (2001, p. 78) explains that “South Africa is rich in natural resources, but its manufacturing
sector was not as competitive as that of the ROC. The ROC needed access to South Africa’s markets as
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1.2.2 Economic Geography
From the very first days of the Dutch VOC in the 1660s until the end of Apartheid
in 1994, Africans were subjected to treaties, concessions and forced to cede land in a
process that would shape the outcome of the country today. This process of dispossession
continued across the colonies, not as a single, act but as a gradual process, which
accelerated after the 1870s. The most potent and persistent source of conflict was the
new settlers’ desire for pasture land and arable farming. Once diamonds were discovered,
and then gold, fierce commercial interests fuelled this competitive pursuit to acquire
land for speculation.36 This process is demonstrated in Appendix A, Figure A.2 showing
how African land tenure was reduced as mining and agriculture expanded. Squeezed
into smaller reserves, these areas would later become formalised as Bantustans and the
domicile for 80 % of Africans on only 13 % of the land.37
A second dimension to land dispossession is less well understood. It arose from the relative
abundance of land and a scarcity of labour, specifically for the labour intensification of
deep-level mining. Under the well-known Domar thesis38, as long as free land existed
elsewhere, hired labour would be unwilling or unavailable to enter the labour market.
Independent African peasants on free land would have little incentive, because the
minimum wage was lower than the “reservation wage”39 generated from the land at
their disposal. The more land that European settlers could alienate and bring under
their dominion, the greater the African deprivation. This in turn drove Africans into the
labour markets as arable land diminished, facing no choice other than the sale of their
labour to white farmers and later mining capitalists.
Settler alienation of land was not unique to South Africa. Colonial governments across
Africa alienated land for the sole use of Europeans, a process that would become a
distinctive feature of settler economies. For example, Mosley (1983) showed how very
little attractive land within the European areas in Kenya remained unalienated. While
in Southern Rhodesia two-thirds of the land was alienated to Europeans. Across the
continent, legislation for African reserves was established along ancestral and tribal
lineage. The same was true in South Africa where the Department of Native Affairs
“took it for granted that, [...] the ideal to be arrived at is the territorial separation of the
races.”40 An accelerating process of land dispossession ensured a steady flow of African
labour to the mines, with wage remittance supporting the swelling reserves.
well as its maize, wood pulp, coal, gold, basic metals and minerals, including uranium, to develop the
ROC’s economy. On the other hand, the RSA needed the capital, expertise, and investments from the
ROC, in particular its extensive and diversified manufacturing industries, to create jobs for its massive
unemployed black population.”
36Denoon (1980, p. 327)
37See the historic concentration of the African population in Figure 6.1 on pg. 186.
38Domar (1957) used this proposition to explain the introduction of slavery or serfdom with particular
reference to serfs in Russia
39This refers to both the wage earned in the homeland, i.e. ‘African reservation’ but also the labour
economics definition, i.e. The lowest wage at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular job.
40Davenport (1991, p. 3)
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However the 1913 Land Act is widely held as the catalyst for legislated racial segregation
which provided the foundation for the subsequent Group Areas Act. Promulgated in
1950 under the Apartheid government, it was the forerunner of the Bantustan homeland
areas. Historically black South Africans were members of Bantu-speaking tribes, which
had customary geographic and language affiliations highlighted in Figure 1.2. The
acts assigned racial groups to different residential and business areas in a system of
“separate development through an attempt at carving out ethnically homogenous areas.”41
Formalising tribal homelands, (or Bantustans) the act divided the population into
ethnic groupings. For example, native Zulu speakers were assigned to KwaZulu, Xhosa
speakers to the Ciskei and Transkei, IsiVenda to Venda while the IsiTswana speakers
to the northern regions of Bophuthatswana. Legislating racial separation through a
self-governed Bantustan system would require the industrialisation of the homelands
to reduce African migration into the Republic, thus impacting the long-run economic
geography of South Africa.
Boputhatswana
Kwa-Ndebele & 
Venda
KwaZulu
Transkei
Ciskei
Qwaqwa
Cape Town
Johannesburg
Bloemfontein
Durban
Mbabane
Maseru
Gaborone
Figure 1.2: South Africa circa 1955, indicating the creation of ‘ethnolinguistic’ Bantustans.
Source: Digitised by the author, applying the 1976 boundary definitions extracted from archival
maps, with Bantu Investment Corporation (1975) and Bureau for Economic Research (1976).
Note: Certain homelands were expanded in subsequent periods, e.g. Botshabelo in the 1970s.
41Suzman (1948, p. 18)
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After coming to power in the late 1940s, the apartheid state set about reconfiguring the
economic geography of South Africa through industrial decentralisation policies designed
to direct manufacturing enterprises to the labour-abundant homelands.42 Due to the sheer
scale of the task, this was a remarkable period in South Africa’s business history, however
the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) occupied fewer than three lines
in the recent economic history literature.43 In Chapter 2, these policies are reframed
against three distinct apartheid episodes of rapid growth (1960), industrial development
(1970) and subsequent stagnation (1980). In the final period, when facing declining
unskilled employment and exacerbated by increasing capital intensification, South Africa
aggressively attempted to attract manufacturing employment to the homelands using
tax incentives, transport infrastructure and the promise of cheap labour.44
Traditionally, research from the period was divided on the impact of regional industrial
policies. Framed by the “Liberal versus Radical” debates on apartheid as a method
for development, the industrial decentralisation research was often contentious.45 The
Liberals contended that the apartheid regime’s systematic racial discrimination had a
retarding effect on the development of capitalism. While the Radicals maintained that
by forcibly creating a suppressed, cheap labour supply, apartheid served the benefits of
capitalism in South Africa. On the one hand, the liberal debate focused on the narrow
political motives of industrial decentralisation intended to reverse the flow of Africans
to the ‘White’ metropolitan areas.46 While others, forming a more radical view, held
that decentralisation’s economic goals were aimed at allowing South African industries
to compete more effectively with those in the low-wage, newly industrialised countries.47
Some truth resides on both sides of the divide and is exposed by the inflow of ROC
citizens and investment. Delving into the chronological changes to the RIDP provides
long-run context for the policies and incentive used to “Push and Pull”48 Taiwanese
investment to specific homelands in the 1980s. Moreover, economic geography, incentives
and networks generated the first foreign agglomeration in labour-intensive manufacturing,
and the lessons they provide to current African industrial policy have not been examined.
42The basis of Chapter 2 is a chronological study of these policies ending with the influx of Taiwanese
entrepreneurs.
43The outstanding economic history of South Africa by Feinstein (2005) only briefly mentions the
decentralisation regime, designed to “anchor blacks on the rural homelands.”
44For seminal work on South African labour see Mariotti (2012) or Seekings and Nattrass (2005).
See Van Onselen (1996), De Klerk (1984) and Lewis (1984) for further details on farm mechanisation
and the process of change in the structure of agriculture in Southern Africa, and Marcus (1989) on
labour-intensive forms of production and the consequent dependence on African labour in mining and
agriculture.
45For a synopsis on the relationship between apartheid and capitalism see three detailed summaries by
Lipton (1985, 2007) and Nattrass (1991).
46See publications by Dewar, Todes and Watson (1984), Wellings and Black (1986a,b) and Zille (1983)
which viewed the programme as a means to maintain the apartheid political status quo of urban Whites
and rural Africans, thus continuing the migrant labour system.
47On the other side of the debate were scholars such as Bell (1986, 1987) and later Hart (1996),
who had pragmatic views that came to be known as “spontaneous decentralisation” based on better
location-specific factors in the African homelands with lower-cost production and division of labour.
48The legal and financial dimensions of these are discussed in Chapter 2, starting on p. 37.
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1.3 ARCHIVAL SOURCES & DATA
As I previously highlighted, inaccessible or embargoed archival sources have limited
South African economic history research.49 The sheer scale of apartheid bureaucracy
and the ensuing secrecy during sanctions have been blamed for this.50 This was further
compounded by the fragmentation of African homelands into unitary nation states with
a proto-bureaucracy, requiring me to consult multiple archives in South Africa and its
former homelands. In this section I therefore provide an overview of the data used in
each of the analytical chapters. My intention is to familiarise readers with how and why
archival data were assimilated and then summarise each source.
1.3.1 Regional Industrial Decentralisation Data
Beginning with Chapter 2, I examine the chronological evolution of the Regional Industrial
Development Programme (RIDP). Over the course of forty years, sixty-three industrial
estates, which were also known as RIDP zones were constructed in South Africa. The
distribution of these estates is shown in Figure 1.3 below.
	
Figure 1.3: Geographic distribution of the sixty three RIDP zones
49The preservation of South Africa’s homeland archives has become a research topic in its own right.
This will be discussed in the following subsections (1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3 and 1.3.4) of this chapter.
50Fourie and Schirmer (2012, p. 3) noted how “a large part of the South African twentieth century
economic history remains terra incognita.”
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 13
In providing context to this category of data, it is important to note how the creation of
an African bureaucracy and industrial decentralisation were closely linked as a means to
give the homelands legitimacy. Evans (1997) discusses how F.R. Tomlinson, the visionary
behind industrial decentralisation, proposed to justify the homelands by means of a
“native administration”.51 Large administrative boards provided a political structure and
sense of economic autonomy, but also created disparate data sources that have not been
exploited in prior studies. Furthermore, one possible explanation for the scarcity of data
has been the lack of record keeping or academic interest in these historical themes after
the fall of the apartheid government. Ally (2014) comments on how the “Archive of
Bantustan rule”52 has hindered research into the role of homeland bureaucracies and by
association, the RIDP due to poor archival management in the former homelands.
As a result of this bureaucratic and administrative fragmentation, I faced complex
challenges in gathering data for each of the RIDP zones. This stemmed from the growth
of state departments which administered the project over its forty-year evolution. In
his study, Evans (1997) explains how the enlargement of existing bureaucracies and
the creation of new ones were indicative of the state’s growing reach into all economic
spheres.53 During the apartheid period, the industrial transformation of South Africa’s
homelands was conducted through centralisation of industrial policy at the political core
in Pretoria, but in turn was implemented by a multitude of regional boards, development
companies or finance corporations. Produced by the 14 organs of state, the industrial
decentralisation policies were therefore devised and administered by a number of different
bodies. Each of these was then responsible for a different homeland, geographic area or
industry, making the collecting of data more challenging.
Successive industrial decentralisation programmes relied on an increasingly intricate
bureaucracy. As a result. regional development of the homelands now spanned multiple
state departments and is best demonstrated by a schematic diagram in Figure 1.4 on
the following page, showing the complex bureaucracy which oversaw the final Regional
Industrial Development Programme. By the 1980s when industrial incentives were
escalating, the number of oversight and interrelated departments was perplexing. To this
end Posel (2011) noted how “South Africa’s apartheid [RIDP] system was enormously
costly and ultimately collapsed because of the inefficiencies created by apartheid policies,
which escalated as the economy changed.”54
51Evans (1997, p. 237)
52Ally (2014) uses this as the title of a paper in which the decay of the homeland archives is documented.
The archives were a vestige of apartheid state control and Bantustan formality, yet in democratic South
Africa they have been forgotten or neglected.
53Evans (1997, p. 56)
54Posel (2011, p. 432)
Figure 1.4: A graphic representation of the Government Departments, Ministries and implementation bodies responsible for the design and
application of RIDP incentives from 1980.
KEY: Black segments denote the government Ministries. Secondary policy contributors in purple and operational implementers are represented in red.
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Referring to Figure 1.4, at the highest level, four organs of state intervened in industrial
decentralisation policy; namely the (1) Department of Co-operation and Development,
(2) Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, (3) Department of Commu-
nity Development, (4) Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism. Declassified
archival records from these four bodies have been consulted in piecing together the
transition of decentralisation during apartheid. The Department of Co-operation and
Development and the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism contained the
more useful sources, all of which are housed at the Library of Parliament in Cape Town.
Conceptually, the Department of Co-operation and Development was the main protagonist
in policy formulation, with a substantial archive of policy documents detailing the
introduction of the RIDP in 1980 identified as the Good Hope Plan. Below this were three
functional arms of policy administration and co-ordination. The Industrial Development
Corporation had oversight and financed large-scale investment within the borders of
South Africa, thus excluding capital allocation to the homeland development zones.
The Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI) had primary oversight of the
implementation of decentralisation policies from 1972 through until 1992. The archival
sources for this institution have resided in multiple locations, with the principal collection
recently declassified by the National Archive in Pretoria. Supplementary sources of data
pertaining to the BDI, such as annual reports and policy documents have been collected
from the Government Publications Library at the University of Cape Town and The
Cullan Library at the University of the Witwatersrand. Under the BDI, two financing
divisions existed, namely the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) which
had a mandate of less than R800,000 - while the larger and more ubiquitous were the eight
Homeland Development Corporations (formerly the single Bantu Investment Corporation,
then the TDC, XDC, CNDC, KFC, QDF and CED). These Corporations administered
the funding, application and regulation of decentralised (domestic and Taiwanese) man-
ufacturing firms within the Bantustans. In this regard, archival sources from former
apartheid homeland archives were consulted. These included the Orange Free State
Development Corporation (QDF at QwaQwa), The Transkei Development Corporation
(TDC at Mthatha) and the KwaZulu Finance Corporation (KFC at Pietermaritzburg).
Data from the RIDP sources is widely used across my thesis, forming the core of Chapter
2 and Chapter 5. In Chapter 2, I use chronological financial data from the RIDP to
quantify how the homeland policies changed in South Africa as different political and
funding pressures came to bear down on fiscal spending. This data includes the quantity
of infrastructure spending over forty years, the number of employment opportunities
created by investment subsidies and the total number of firms operating in the homelands.
This data is important to our understanding of how the policies were implemented and
presents financial evidence as opposed to the published political rhetoric of the apartheid
state.
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The RIDP data in Chapter 5 focuses mainly on the category, quantity and geographic
variation of subsidies used to attracted foreign investment to South Africa and its
homelands during the period of diplomatic isolation and trade sanctions. A summary
of the incentive schedule across all zones is highlighted in Table F.1 of Data Appendix
F. Using financial disbursements data assembled into a time series allowed me to argue
whether it was incentives, economic geography or ethnic networks that may have accounted
for the Taiwanese agglomeration effect during apartheid. The RIDP data is not in itself
sufficient to provide the evidence for a variation in incentives. This was therefore combined
with wage data, demographic data, and firm level data which I discuss next.
1.3.2 Homeland Wage Data
In Chapter 5, I propose that Taiwanese firms were relocating to the lowest-wage des-
tination with the greatest level of RIDP subsidies. Using new data from the annual
reports of the RIDP, I am able to estimate the level of subsidies, but not the level of
wage disparity between Zones. African manufacturing wages during the apartheid period
have been contentious, and one of the most challenging data series to construct. The
secondary literature ostensibly agreed on the importance of low wages to manufacturing
firms in South Africa, but there was limited data. For example, Hofmeyr (1995) conceded
that South African economists and economic historians have found themselves at a
disadvantage in regional wage comparisons to their counterparts in major industrialised
countries. With Fourie and Schirmer (2012) highlighting how “there is at present only
sparse information on African wages during apartheid.”55 Industrial agreements between
industries and white trade unions neglected to record the wages paid to African workers,
and the 1970 census did not record African salaries despite recording those of Whites,
Coloureds and Indians.56 Homeland manufacturing wages were also outside of any
bargaining agreements, and statistical agency sources prove even sparser.57 As such,
wage data from the former homelands and peripheral South African industrial zones
was inadequately collected in the national censuses. The consequence of this is that the
policy-maker often had to work largely in the dark, without an adequate empirical basis
for comprehending the labour market implications.58 These challenges have required a
degree of innovation in the methods and sources of data collection. For this reason, the
formulation of wage estimates for the rural homelands makes a contribution not only to
Taiwanese firm agglomeration, but to future research on wages and the persistence of
inequality resulting from apartheid policies. A point also acknowledged by Fourie and
Schirmer (2012) explaining how this “can provide a start to the creation of an African
wage series - an ambitious project, but probably the most important future contribution
of work on the post Second World War South African economy.”59
55Fourie and Schirmer (2012, p. 5)
56For further examples see Banerjee et al. (2008).
57For further examples see Bhorat (2004).
58Hofmeyr (1995, p. 547)
59Fourie and Schirmer (2012, p. 4)
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Wage data constraints are evident in the existing labour market literature. A notable
study of apartheid-era labour markets by Mariotti (2012) used official census data to
examine the changes to occupational attainment in the labour markets rather than being
restricted by inconsistent wage data. Focusing on the racial change in composition of
the formal urban sectors, Mariotti noted that the lack of African wage data is not an
overriding constraint in her study. She goes on to explain that “the 1970 census does
not contain any data on African earnings, but since the study focuses on occupational
attainment rather than wages the lack of African income data is not a constraint.”60
The second important study by Leibbrandt (2011) dealt with the restructuring of the
labour market in the 1980s. Facing similar data challenges, he noted that “there [was] no
national data series which adequately [covered] all of the homelands [...].”61 To overcome
these challenges, Leibbrandt selected two area case studies. These provided adequate
migration and wage labour data. Emphasising the restrictions placed by a lack of wage
sources, he goes on to note how it was a “pity that data stretching further into the 1980s
is not available [...] for Natal’s Durban/Pinetown metropolitan complex [. . . ] South
Africa’s fastest growing metropolitan area in the 1980s both in terms of population and
in terms of economic activity.”62 Finally, using formal wage statistics in South Africa,
Hofmeyr (1995) noted how officially reported data have been particularly inconsistent.
The most comprehensive sources of wage data have been the population censuses between
1970 and 1985 however they contained “patchy African manufacturing and wage data.”63
Over and above these challenges catalogued above, the 1970 census omitted a number of
African commuter townships previously enumerated in prior historical censuses. Lipton
(1972) highlights how these areas were simply reclassified and counted as part of the
homelands, neglecting to capture further demographic data on the impact of the apartheid
states. What’s more, Mariotti (2012) explains that manufacturing labour statistics for
unskilled Africans during the period had predominately been sourced from the mining or
manufacturing sector in the major metropolitan areas, thus restricting our understanding
to these urban regions.64 These wage source difficulties were further compounded with
changes to data collection as the mining industry ceased to provide a breakdown of wages
according to racial classification from 1985. Labour statistics compiled after 1979 by the
newly established Manpower Commission omitted the Transkei, Venda, Ciskei and BOP
states.65 These homelands were granted ‘independence’ and therefore became statistically
semi-autonomous creating further challenges in data assimilation and collation. In 1980,
60Mariotti (2012, p. 1110)
61Leibbrandt (2011, p. 106)
62Leibbrandt (2011, p. 108). Interestingly this area became a focused location for Taiwanese investment
and thus further contributes to the body of literature on wages.
63 Hofmeyr (1995, p. 551)
64Appendix E Figure E.2 demonstrates how census data was restricted to the 27 enumeration areas
around the metropolitan centres, thus excluding the homelands.
65Kooy (1979). After the Wiehahn Commission the apartheid government started recognising African
trade unions in 1979. In the same year, the National Manpower Commission was established with
representatives from labour, business, and government, to advise policy makers on labor issues. This
agency collected data on the labour market in South Africa from 1980.
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the four ‘independent states’ conducted their own censuses, while five separate homeland
censuses were conducted in 1985. Leibbrandt (2011) also explains that the homelands
census in turn did not capture adequate wage information with a high percentage of
the recorded labour force working in the newly formed African bureaucracy skewing
data collection. Alternative sources such as the regional manufacturing census contain
wages, but this data is restricted by a lack of racial classifications. This research thus
avoids making assumptions based on highly inaccurate ratios of African workers to other
workers in each region.66
The limitations discussed above required a degree of innovation in the methods and
sources of wage data collected for the agglomeration analysis. The following section
discusses these sources and methods for the compilation of African wages in the homeland
RIDP zones. It reports interregional manufacturing wages within the 63 homeland RIDP
zones.67 This extends the number of census enumeration areas from the 27 highlighted
in the Data Appendix F Figure F.1, thus increasing the wage data to a further 52 areas.
Importantly, these now include both the peri-urban and rural periphery.
This additional data was collected through the triangulation of a variety of sources. By
combing a range of historical sources, both official and anecdotal, a broader overview
of manufacturing wages in the homeland RIDP and South Africa can be gleaned. The
categories are composed as follows: (i) Published newspaper sources, (ii) RIDP almanac
and RIDP Trade publications, (iii) Officially sanctioned wages estimates from the
Carnegie Commission on poverty and Government published reports. Each of these
sources is discussed next.
(i) Published Newspaper Sources: The inconsistency of census data and scarcity of
reported African wage data required the utilisation of previously unexploited ‘publicly
cited’ sources. Archived newspapers have proven to be a valuable alternative measure of
interregional wage estimates with a breadth of regional data pertaining to African wages.
Due to the scale of the RIDP programme during the 1970s and 1980s, archival newspaper
clippings and financial periodical clippings have produced a wealth of alternative wage
data within the homelands.68 Over a 25-year period, clippings from a number of major
English-language newspapers were categorised in the archive.69 Prior research from Wood
(2000) also notes the importance of the clippings archive and its breadth of data.70 Using
this source, a broad collection of primary and publicly reported wage estimates have
been categorised per development region. Where possible they have been recorded at the
lowest disaggregated geographical level, industry, gender, skill grade and year. These
data have then been compiled into a series for each of the eight development regions.
66Email from Martine Mariotti, November 2013.
67A map of the 63 Zones can be seen in Appendix E, Figure E.1
68 The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape
Town has yielded much of this data.
69The collection has grown to over a million clippings.
70Wood (2000) cited in the SALDRU Archive explains how the archive represents “an astonishing data
set” and has been “consulted on a regular basis by scholars in various disciplines from all over the world.”
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 19
Although not exhaustive, 57 out of the 63 development sites have unskilled wages cited
in articles or advertised in a financial publication.
(ii) RIDP Almanac and Secondary Reports: To test the wage estimates cited
above and substitute for missing data, a second category of published archival data
has been compiled. This includes homeland trade periodicals, the RIDP almanac, and
secondary homeland literature sources. The trade periodicals were published in magazine
format and distributed to diplomatic missions as an advertisement for zones incentives.
In essence they were an apartheid propaganda instrument to attract manufacturing
firms to the homelands. Printed between 1978 and 1994, the Transkei (Zone D) and
KwaZulu (Zone E) were leading proponents of these trade publications.71 Released
quarterly, they were brimming with politically motivated ‘advertorials’ offering a wealth
of quantitative wage data but also qualitative accounts of Taiwanese firms that had
invested in these zones.72 However all these sources need to be treated with caution.
The development magazines in particular, had a very clear agenda. There is a distinct
apartheid-era aesthetic to their marketing, economic agenda and factual presentation.
For example Appendix E, Figure E.3 provides an example of one such publication, in
which the Transkei Development Corporation advertised the construction of the world’s
largest chopstick factory.
To test the external validity of the archival data, the unofficial estimates are corroborated
with official wage estimates and a well-cited body of secondary academic sources. The
most notable example of this literature stems from Tomlinson and Krige (1997). They use
both wage and subsidy data, collected while assessing the social and economic consequence
of apartheid forced removals.73 Referring to the abuse of the incentive payments allocated
for the employment of unskilled labourers, they explain that Taiwanese investors were
paid “quarterly tax-free grants per worker equal to R110 per month” while citing reports
that “male workers earn R 55 while female works R 45 per month.”74 This data can
be traced to a single example in Addleson, Pretorius and Tomlinson (1985) and is thus
an example of how wage labour data has suffered from a scarcity of sources. Another
example in the secondary literature is cited by Hirsch (1986). He quotes the financial
director of a Taiwanese footwear factory in Dimbaza (Zone D) as “paying an average
wage of R0.50 per hour.”75 However wage ranges vary widely between zones when these
examples are corroborated with the new data in both the SALDRU and RIDP archive.
The lowest of the zones reported R 25 per month for female unskilled labour and R
65 per month for unskilled male labour. This is further evident in the 1985 Transkei
Development almanacs that note that trade unions are outlawed resulting in “unofficial
71Zone D was titled “Transkei Topics” while KwaZulu’s publication was simply called “Development”.
72Specific reference is made of Taiwan and Hong Kong in their distribution. Preaching the benefits
and endowments of their RIDP zones these publications provided both images and incentive information
distributed in an attempt to attract future would-be investors.
73As discussed in Chapter 2, from 1960 to 1983, the apartheid government forcibly moved millions of
black South Africans to implement the Group Areas Act.
74Tomlinson and Krige (1997, p. 694)
75Hirsch (1986, p. 191)
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de facto minimum wage is roughly R0.35 per hours in 1985.”76 This would have equated
to R 56 per month, consistent with wage estimates by Pickles and Woods (1989). As
such, the secondary and primary sources provide sufficient evidence of regional wages,
but need to be carefully considered in conjunction with further evidence from formal
sources.
(iii) Formally Authorised Sources: Officially sanctioned data is used to further test
the validity of the sources in the unofficial wage category and those reported in homeland
trade periodicals and the RIDP almanac. The first source is from an archival report
prepared by the Bureau for Economic Research: Bantu Development (1976). The second
is from a regional series compiled by Gottschalk (1977), the first author to survey wages
in these zones. This data is then combined with a third source: officially sanctioned
studies of five homelands obtained from The Second Carnegie Report on poverty in South
Africa compiled by Wilson and Ramphele (1989). Merging this data with the first two
categories (i & ii) achieves two aims. Firstly, it provides wage data estimates for RIDP
zones that have been neglected in the unofficial sources. Secondly, it establishes which
zones were officially reported by the government or development corporations as offering
the lowest unskilled rural wages.
The first official wage data source is an archival report from The Bureau for Economic
Research.77 The report contains minimum and maximum unskilled male and female
wages from 1971 through to 1975 in peri-urban areas as a proxy for RIDP zones. To
corroborate these estimates they are then combined with Gottschalk (1977) who surveyed
wages in eighteen RIDP zones and peri-urban growth points between 1974 and 1975.
These are finally collated with the officially sanctioned reports archived at SALDRU and
produced for the Carnegie Report on poverty in South Africa.
The Carnegie Commission conducted field and survey research in the early 1980s. Three
hundred researchers presented findings at Cape Town in 1984, which were finally published
in 1989.78 However the resulting commission produced a number of primary working
reports from the fieldwork. Five of these archive reports are used in the compilation
of the wage estimates for the early 1980s. Namely Thomas (1984) who focused on
the Eastern Cape region (Zone D) and Abedian (1983) who illustrated problems with
official data in the same region. This is complemented by Ardington (1984) who focused
on KwaZulu (Zone E) region while Bank (1984) examined QwaQwa (Zone C). Finally
McCarthy (1984) aggregated the potential employment effects across all RIDP regions.
The benefit of using these unpublished reports is that they include both the autonomous
TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei) and non-independent homelands.
76Transkei Development Corporation, April 1985. Mthatha Archive.
77Bureau for Economic Research: Bantu Development (1976)
78Wilson and Ramphele (1989) summarised the results in “Uprooting Poverty: The South African
Challenge.”
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Impartially funded, the working papers “published a good deal of information about
poverty during the 1980s [...]. Indeed a number of Carnegie working papers attempted
to examine issues of poverty within these four TBVC homelands areas as well as in the
rest of South Africa.”79
The three categories are combined in Table F.2 of the Data Appendix F and the aggregate
wages (all years) are visualised in Figure 1.5 below. This represents the most recent
and complete attempt to provide an overview of the homeland wages during Taiwanese
investment. The results illustrate that wages were higher in the RIDP zones closer to
the urban areas in Zone H (i.e. PWV) and Zone A (i.e. Western Cape). While zones
along the coast (i.e. Port Elizabeth and East London) have lower aggregate wages, they
are still higher than those in northern parts of the country. These inter-zone wages will
be used in Chapter 5 to analyse how the average homeland wages differed to the wage
incentives, and thus contributed to Taiwanese agglomeration.
Figure 1.5: Aggregate monthly wages in sixty-three of South Africa’s RIDP zones, (1978 - 1992).
Source: Assembled from Table F.2 of the Data Appendix F
79Feinstein (2005, p. 67)
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1.3.3 Demographic Data
Building on the new homeland wage data for Chapter 5, I also needed to consider whether
a demographic imbalance across the homeland RIDP zones may have had an impact on
the patterns of homeland industrialisation and agglomeration. The homelands of South
Africa were constituted by a high percentage of working-age African females because
of historical migrant labour demands from the mining industries and agriculture.80
Although these apartheid demographic trends have been well documented, insufficient
empirical evidence has been forthcoming to compare the inter-homeland (RIDP Zone)
labour imbalances. For similar reasons to those cited in the wage data section (1.3.2),
census data has been insufficient to examine the demographic variation across homelands.
(i) Labour Pool: As a result of this scarcity, the labour pool data set has been
constructed from the concatenation of multiple-census sources. Censuses counting the
homelands were conducted in 1951; 1960; 1970; 1980; 1985. However, data collected in
the apartheid era was generally unreliable and skewed official statistics, underestimating
the number of black Africans in rural areas.81
To overcome these challenges, I firstly assembled the enumeration areas from the 1980
South African census for each of the RIDP zones that was adjacent to a homeland.
Second, I was forced to used additional statistical sources because the 1980 national
census excluded two of the four independent homelands.82 Combining these regional
census data with the BENSO Economic Review reports thus allowed me to substitute
demographic data for the homelands that were excluded from the national census.83
Third, the RIDP zone enumeration areas from the 1980 five percentage African census
that included the non-independent homelands were selected and combined into a single
dataset for each RIDP zone. Finally, for the purpose of demographic comparison the
enumeration areas from each of the three data sources were merged and then GIS matched
to their respective development zone (A-H). Using a more complete data set thus enables
a demographic estimation between RIDP Zones.
The results show a high prevalence of immobile female labour, which may have been
attractive to labour-intensive industrialists. To demonstrate this, the aggregate gender
imbalance of female labour across all homelands RIDP zones is represented in Figure
1.6. Extrapolating the labour pool data set further, Figure 1.7 disaggregates the RIDP
zones area into four age-cohort bands which represent the ILO (International Labour
Organization) labour force participation scale to highlight the prevalence of working-age
female labour: (1) 13 to 18 years as a youth baseline, (2) 19 to 29 years, (3) 30 to 39
and (4) 40 to 59.84
80This will be discussed in Chapter 2 but is well documented by Bonner (2011, p. 457).
81Especially with regards to the African population residing in the independent homelands.
82Areas of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana were excluded.
83‘Transkei Development and Independence Report’, African population statistics table, page 136 - 178.
(TAB-8768/02) and Bophuthatswana BENSO Man Power study (TAB 4568-876.)
84Data Appendix F, Figure F.2 extrapolates all ILO labour force participation age cohorts, providing
a demographic baseline for later analysis of trends in demographic imbalances between homelands.
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Figure 1.6: Percentage gender imbalances between homeland RIDP zones across all age bands.
Source: The 1980 census and 1980 five per cent African census, and the BENSO man power
study of the BOP. 1980 & 1985 compiled by Statistics South Africa and digitised by the South
African Data Archive (SADA), Central Statistics Service Report No. 02-80-02. 1980. Population
Census, 1980. Pretoria. BENSO manpower study, National Archive, Pretoria, TAB 4568-876.
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Figure 1.7: Gender imbalances between homeland RIDP zones disaggregated into the main ILO
working age band: (1) 13 to 18 years, (2) 19 to 29 years, (3) 30 to 39 years and(4) 40 to 59.
Source: Same as Figure 1.6 above.
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The graphs demonstrate two significant findings. Firstly that the working age female
population materially exceeded that of men in the RIDP zones (Figure 1.6.) except the
Western Cape (Zone A). Given the mining labour migration regime for the remainder of
the country, this is to be expected. However, the magnitude is noteworthy, with female
labour exceeding males by to up 50 % in ‘Band 2’. Secondly, there are variations in the
gender imbalances between homeland RIDP zones with the gender disequilibrium of men
to women declining further in the prime employment working age ‘Band 2’ and ‘Band
3’ (Figure 1.7). This data will therefore be used in Chapter 5 to analyse the possible
impact of female labour participation on Taiwanese firm clustering.
1.3.4 Trade and Migration Data
Chapter 4 examines the links between trade flows and Taiwanese migration in South
Africa from 1975 to 1995. During sanctions, access to classified trade statistics were
restricted, forcing a reliance on estimates or interpolation. In order to question the
possibility of a link between migration and trade required me to construct a new bilateral
trade series with unclassified data. In addition, estimates for the number of Taiwanese
migrants to South Africa was also a challenge and is detailed in this section.
(i) Trade Data: The bulk of the new data (1984 - 1992) was manually digitised and
transcribed from new archival sources. This is a first in the construction of a continuous
series in South African bilateral trade. For this reason the analysis uses a country sample
selection based on two factors: firstly, South Africa conducted a large proportion of its
bilateral trade with OECD countries (mainly Western Europe, North America and Japan,
as demonstrated in Data Appendix F, Table F.3). Take 1979 as an example: five major
trading countries accounted for 64% of South African total trade - Germany (16%), US
(13.5%), UK (13.4%), Japan (10.6%) and Switzerland (10.5%).85 Distinguishing between
exports and imports further reduces the sample when gold is removed, as Switzerland was
the largest buyer of the precious metal and thus France enters the sample of countries
at number five with 9% of exports. Secondly, access to original data and the volume
of archival sources was prohibitive. Transcribing all bilateral trading countries would
have yielded marginal additional information and consumed considerable resources. As
such, a selected sample of South Africa’s five leading trade partners in 1975 with the
addition of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Garner (1994) speculated that trade may have been
redirected from Japan.86 Hong Kong is therefore selected as a proxy for this possibility of
growing Asian trade, but also because archival evidence suggests that Taiwanese business
interests in South Africa extended to the territory.87
85Similar results are found in Geldenhuys (1991) when comparing South Africa’s isolation in the early
1980s which provides external validity for the accuracy of the underlying data.
86Garner (1994, p. ii) claims that they “were unable to ascertain whether the change [in bilateral
trade] reflected the activity of Taiwanese-owned firms or switching activity from other trade partners,
specifically Japan.”
87Hart (1998, p. 347) found that in the mid-1980s, established connections in Asia (mainly Taiwan
and Hong Kong) lured approximately 65 industrialists and their families to South Africa.
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From 1975 until 1985 the bilateral data is compiled using the official international
trade statistics series.88 These official records captured trade between South Africa and
all its trading partners. The trade data was segmented according the Sections of the
Harmonised System for 23 product categories.89 Between 1986 and 1992 the Department
of Trade stopped publishing trade statistics at the country level altogether. Garner
(1994) noted that researchers had to turn to other sources as a result of a data embargo,
and doubted the accuracy of any publicly available data. This limitation has had an
impact on migration and trade research, as it was during these rigid years of sanctions
that growth in Taiwanese trade could have accounted for the reorientation. To estimate
the years 1986 - 1992, Garner used an alternative series. These sources included revised
estimates from the UN, IMF and OECD adjusting it with data in the Sanction Report
produced by Hanlon and Omond (1987). However Garner noted that the IMF Direction
of Trade Statistics were “a misleading set of figures on partner countries with South
Africa. [...] They were calculated by scaling up or down figures from the base year in
1985 across all countries by a uniform percentage”90 Nonetheless, the IMF’s interpolated
Direction of Trade Statistics database was useful as it recorded aggregate regional data
from where a baseline for the new data could be established and contrasted.
To overcome the access limitations and data constraints imposed during the years of
sanctions, I have recreated the bilateral trade series with additional, declassified trade
statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry. These were reported in annual
returns held at the Parliamentary Library in Cape Town. Although these statistics should
therefore have created a complete series, I nevertheless found it necessary to validate their
accuracy. As such these are further supplemented with regional and national estimates
reported in Garner to compare the official reports with IMF partner country data and
South African data. Trade data from 1992 until 1995 was obtained from the South
African Revenue Services (SARS) balance of trade database.91 This contained monthly
and annual trade flows with all South Africa’s trading partners. 1995 is chosen as the end
date for the study, as it is four years after the US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act92
was repealed and EU Sanctions93 were lifted. This provides sufficient post-sanctions data
to examine whether the Taiwanese diversification in exports was merely a reaction to
isolationism or a permanent feature of the export trade partnership.
88 Hardcopy trade statistics were digitised from original archival records held at the National Treasury,
the National Archive in Pretoria and the University of Cape Town government publications library.
89The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) is a system for classifying industries by a four-digit
code. South Africa used this system until 1988, after which it shifted to the Harmonised Commodity
Description and Coding System, also known as the Harmonised System (HS) of tariff nomenclature
developed and maintained by the World Customs Organisation (WCO). SIC codes have been mapped to
HS codes using the standard four-digit methodology to keep consistency across all years.
90Garner (1994, p. ii)
91Head of Data Archives, Annemarie van der Walt, SARS email
921st of July, 1991
9315th of April, 1991
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The sample of bilateral trade data is visualised in Figure 1.8 below, and represents 68%
of South Africa’s total 1975 bilateral trade. By 1995 the selected countries had declined
to 59% of South Africa’s total foreign trade,but still represents a significant sample over
the 20 years of analysis and is therefore sufficient for purpose of my trade and migration
study.
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Figure 1.8: Total Bilateral World Trade (all country pairs) versus Sample country
bilateral trade (1975 - 1995)
Source: Foreign Trade statistical series assembled from Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985,
with supplementary statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry, Garner (1994) and
IMF (DOTS) direction of trade statistics (1986 - 1990). South African Revenue Services using
HS codes provided the years 1991 - 1995.
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(ii) Migration Data: The exact quantum of Taiwanese citizens residing in South
Africa is difficult to gauge and remains contentious. A conservative estimate of Taiwanese
migration and population series was assembled from the Board for the Decentralisation of
Industry’s business license applications almanac.94 Using the business license applications,
Table 1.1 below shows the total number of immigrants in each of the years.
Examination of official emigration and immigration statistics is challenging as the South
African government only recorded race “Asian” for all immigrants from Asia between 1950
and 1990. A total of 100,000 Taiwanese individuals were estimated to have immigrated
and emigrated between the two countries. However Grimm et al. (2014) noted that at
the height of this relationship, 50,000 Taiwanese people resided permanently in South
Africa. This estimation proves the most accurate and is corroborated by similar accounts
as no official RSA statistics have been located on the full extent of Taiwanese migration.
The upper bound of Taiwanese immigration estimated by Grimm et al. is useful,
however an annual migration series is required for this study. To gain a measure of
the annual inbound flow of Taiwanese immigrants I therefore had to turn to the Board
for the Decentralisation of Industries (BDI) as a proxy, which granted business license
applications. Administering the eight development regions, the BDI was the overarching
statutory body.95 The BDI recorded the country of origin and the number of immigrants
that were accompanying the business licence applications. These are tabulated below
(1.1) and visualised in Chapter 4, Figure 4.2 on page 108.
Between 1980 and 1991, a total of 11,036 business licenses were granted across all eight of
the development zones. From the BDI records, it appears that only 37 % of those licenses
were actually taken-up. However examining the ROC company records, it appears that
the conversion ratio was significantly higher for this migrant cohort, with an average
take-up of 77.48 %. The earlier period (1979 - 1981) had a lower conversion rate of
42 %. Therefore an annual aggregate estimate of Taiwanese entrepreneurs across both
African homelands and South African metropoles could be established. These represent
the official residence permits issued to ROC nationals, and is lower than either the ROC
directorate96 or Grimm et al.. However I believe it is more prudent to use business
license applications as they could be converted into South African citizenship after five
years and thus represent permanent immigration. Further contextualising the Taiwanese
immigration, I have also collected the total European immigration statistics from South
Africa’s former colonial and OECD partners as a benchmark.97 Data Appendix F, Figure
94National Archive, Pretoria, RSA. 1,036 business licenses were granted to ROC companies over the
period, however it appears that only 30% of those licenses were taken-up. This is consistent with the
totals found by Pickles and Wood (1989) for the earlier period where they found only 91 of the 300
business licenses were taken up.
95Board for the Decentralisation and its operational methods are discussed in Chapter 2.
96ROC Embassy Estimates.
97Although these are not necessary to the analysis, they are useful to contextualise the long-term effect
of trade networks, market preferences and migration in South Africa. Figure 3.1 on page 78 of Chapter 3
shows annual European flows and will be discussed in that analysis.
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F.4 tabulates total European immigration as a proxy for OECD trade ties against which
to measure the Taiwanese case study.98
!"24"!""
Business'License'Applications'
Business'
Licenses'
Total'
Approved'
Established'
!No!!!!!!!!!!!!%!
ROC'
Approved'
Established'
!!!No'''''''''''%'
Residence'
Permits'" " " " " " " "1980" 680" 247" 36%" 27" 11" 40%" 1,387"1981" 798" 355" 44%" 31" 14" 45%" 4,067"1982/1983" 777" 384" 49%" 27" 20" 74%" 1,890"1983/1984" 1,190" 578" 48%" 17" 14" 82%" 3,876"1984/1985" 1,216" 452" 37%" 29" 21" 72%" 278"1985/1986" 1,243" NA" 0" 27" 22" 81%" 490"1986/1987" 1,027" NA" 0" 51" 42" 82%" 7,907"1987/1988" 1,080" NA" 0" 55" 51" 92%" 900"1988/1989" 1,042" NA" 0" 78" 63" 80%" 876"1989/1990" 893" NA" 0" 31" 24" 77%" 20"1990/1991" 1,090" 470" 43%" 19" 14" 73%" 657"" " " " " " " "
TOTAL' 1,1036' 4,181' 37%' 382' 296' 78%' 23,137'
'
TABLE' 2:'RIDP"Business" License"Application" (1980" –" 1991)" for" the"whole"RIDP" project" (RHD)" and" the" total"number"Taiwanese"applicants"(LHS)."The"results"show"the"difference"between"approved"and"established."""
SOURCE:"Board"for"the"Decentralisation,"business"license"applications"(National"Archive,"Pretoria,"RSA)."""""
Table 1.1: RIDP Business License Application (1980 - 1991) for the whole RIDP project (RHD)
and the total number Taiwanese applicants (LHS). The results show the difference between
approved and established.
Source: Board for the Decentralisation, business license applications (National Archive,
Pretoria, RSA).
1.3.5 Taiwanese Firm Level Data
The final variable assembled for this thesis is Taiwanese firm level data. This data is
used extensively in Chapter 5 which investigates firm agglomeration in the RIDP zones
because of integrated business networks. As such the following new firm level data was
assembled: (1) Geocoded location of Taiwanese firms across all the RIDP zones to firstly
quantify the degree of agglomeration. (2) Secondly, the industrial sectors in which the
Taiwanese cohort invested is categorised using the business almanac. Finally, (3) the
chronological pattern of investment is examined to test for period specific increases of
Taiwanese FDI to the RIDP zones.
98In contrast to the Asian population, African migration was transitory, travelling back and forth
between urban centres and their rural homes in search of employment and higher wages. As such, these
are excluded from the study.
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The data employed in this section was sourced from declassified reports pertaining to
the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), and is supplemented with the
African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC).99 These records capture
the geographic location (telephone prefix), year of RIDP application and commencement,
in addition to the industry sector. The variable used to test Taiwanese agglomeration
is the total number of firms in all sectors and RIDP zones in 1992, which was the final
year of the Good Hope RIDP incentive programme. By this year, 306 Taiwanese firms
were operating across South Africa and its African homelands. The Taiwanese cohort
represented approximately 10 % of all manufacturing firms (both international and
domestic) operating under the revised RIDP regime. This is a meaningful sample, as the
policy of decentralisation had been in place from the 1960s, while the Taiwanese cohort
of firms established operations from 1979. Thus, in the space of 13 years, one in 10 firms
operating in South Africa’s decentralisation programme were of Taiwanese origin.100
(1) Taiwanese Agglomeration Data: The geocoded location of all Taiwanese firms
are assembled to establish the degree of firm agglomeration. This variable is summarised
in Figure 1.9 which shows the aggregate of all Taiwanese firms by development zone.
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Figure 1.9: Aggregated Taiwanese firms by development Zone, (1992).
Note: Taiwanese firms operated in Zone A and Zone B, but ceased RIDP incentives in 1985.
Source: ATCC & BDI archival sources as cited above, or see Appendix F, Table F.3.
99ATCC annual reports for the year 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990. Provided by the Taiwanese
Representative Office Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
100Data Appendix F, Table F.3 summarises the zone distribution Taiwanese and domestic South African
investment in 1992.
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 30
(2) Industrial Sector Data: Exploring the possibility of industrial complexes, the
industrial sector variable measures the extent to which Taiwanese firms in the same
industry or supporting industry’s may have clustered in each of the RIDP zones. This
variable is summarised in Figure 1.10 which shows the aggregated of all Taiwanese firms
by industry type.
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Figure 1.10: Summary of Taiwanese firms in South Africa by industry sector.
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), National Archives, Pretoria, South
Africa, TAB 9879/987. The African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC), Taipei
Liaison Office, (formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Johannesburg, RSA.
(3) Chronological Pattern of Investment Agglomeration: The chronological start
date of each firm investment is assembled from the BDI investment application data.
The purpose of this is two-fold. Firstly to quantify whether there were specific time
periods of intensified Taiwanese firm formation. Secondly, to test whether zones in
which Taiwanese firms invested first, then later attracted greater numbers of supporting
Taiwanese firms. Thus the earlier Taiwanese firms (i.e. first- mover Taiwanese production
networks) would have made it more attractive to relocate in subsequent periods, achieving
a lasting competitive advantage. This self-reinforcing agglomeration effect may have
important implications for the choice of RIDP zones around which Taiwanese investors
later clustered. To investigate this proposition, Table 1.2 below demonstrates the
chronological investment flow for each of the RIDP zones.
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CHRONOLOGICAL*INVESTMENT*FLOWS*
Development*
Zone*
1979* 1980* 1981* 1982* 1983* 1984* 1985* 1986* 1987* 1988* 1989* 1990* 1991* 1992*
Zone*A* 0! 1! 2! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0!
Cumulative* 0! 1! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3!
Zone*B* 0! 0! 0! 2! 0! 2! 0! 2! 3! 3! 2! 0! 0! 0!
Cumulative* 0! 0! 0! 2! 2! 4! 4! 6! 9! 12! 14! 14! 14! 14!
Zone*C* 0! 0! 2! 2! 2! 3! 9! 11! 14! 19! 8! 9! 4! 11!
Cumulative* 0! 0! 2! 4! 6! 9! 28! 39! 53! 72! 80! 89! 93! 104!
Zone*D* 1! 0! 1! 9! 4! 4! 4! 8! 7! 5! 3! 1! 1! 1!
Cumulative* 1! 1! 2! 11! 15! 19! 23! 31! 38! 53! 56! 57! 58! 59!
Zone*E* 1! 2! 1! 4! 3! 8! 7! 13! 17! 22! 7! 2! 2! 9!
Cumulative* 1! 3! 4! 8! 11! 19! 26! 39! 56! 78! 85! 87! 89! 98!
Zone*F* 1! 2! 0! 1! 2! 1! 0! 6! 6! 4! 2! 1! 0! 1!
Cumulative* 1! 3! 3! 4! 6! 7! 7! 13! 19! 23! 25! 26! 26! 27!
Zone*G* 0! 0! 1! 0! 1! 2! 1! 1! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0!
Cumulative* 0! 0! 1! 1! 2! 4! 5! 6! 6! 6! 6! 6! 6! 6!
Zone*H* 6! 6! 7! 2! 2! 1! 1! 1! 4! 10! 2! 1! 0! 1!
Cumulative* 6! 12! 19! 21! 23! 24! 25! 26! 30! 40! 42! 43! 43! 44!
TOTAL* 9* 11* 14* 20* 14* 21* 22* 42* 51* 63* 24* 14* 7* 23*
Table 1.2: Number of Taiwanese firms beginning operation in each of the years 1979 - 1992 per RIDP Zone.
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1.4 OUTLINE
This thesis consists of four closely linked, but self-contained chapters followed by conclud-
ing remarks. Following this Introduction (1), Chapter 2 catalogues the origin and
evolution of regional industrial development through three phases of growth, stagnation
and decline of the apartheid economy. In my assessment of the financial costs and
outcomes of industrial decentralisation, I demonstrate how the policies shaped apartheid
economic geography, and evolved into special economic zones which then attracted
Taiwanese investment.
In Chapter 3 I examine the international relations of isolation and how this had an
impact on each country’s growth and investment during the late-apartheid period. By
reassessing the political economy of Taiwanese - South African relations, I demonstrate
that the alliance was not solely driven by diplomatic necessity, but by complementary
shifts in the underlying structure of both economies. Challenging prior research, my
findings suggest that Taiwanese investors may have had greater risk tolerance as measured
by the class of assets held in South Africa. From this I conclude that implicit and explicit
protection of property rights, contract enforcement and investment promotion may help
account for greater investment inflows.
Chapter 4 quantifies the changes to South Africa’s international trade flows during
sanctions. The 1980s witnessed South Africa entering into a crisis as its traditional trade
and capital partners withdrew, yet exports to Taiwan were growing. I argue that as a
result of the industrial decentralisation programme, Taiwanese entrepreneurs increased
trade by forming business networks and supply chains linking them to Asian markets.
Known as the migrant trade effect, my analysis provides cogent evidence of how the
migration may have altered the intensive (volume) and extensive (complexity) margins
of trade.
Using an economic geography and business history approach Chapter 5 assesses the
spatial distribution and agglomeration of Taiwanese foreign direct investment in the
homeland zones. Employing a location choice framework it examines the factors that
may have contributed to Taiwanese manufacturing firms selecting specific homelands.
Challenging prior research, I conclude that a variation in regional incentives and economic
geography interacted with co-ethnicity to generate the agglomeration.
Chapter 6 concludes by highlighting the major findings, future research and contempo-
rary significance of these apartheid case studies.
Chapter 2
FIELDS INTO FACTORIES
“Regional industrialisation [...] is the beginning of a scheme of social engineering
of Russian proportions. It is designed to keep the population of the independent
Black states anchored where they are [...]. It will depend on the decentralisation of
industry to take the jobs to the people and not vice versa.”1
Dr. Pieter (Piet) Koornhof,
Minister of Co-operation and Development,
1978 - 1984
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The rise in manufactured exports to Taiwan can be seen as part of a larger, internal
reorganisation of the South African economy to decentralise and then attract foreign
labour-intensive manufacturing to the black homelands. The creation of decentralised
industrial zones evolved over 40 years into the Regional Industrial Decentralisation
Programme (RIDP). Delving into these chronological changes will allow me to provide
long-run context for the industrial policies and incentive used to “Push and Pull”2
Taiwanese investment to specific homelands.
What has struck me, is how remarkable this period was for both the scale of the project
to industrialise the homelands, but also the divisiveness under which it was implemented.
To emphasise the transformation, the chapter title is derived from a 1975 apartheid-era
advertisement that exclaimed how the rural areas were turned from “Veld [fields] into
factories within two short years”.3 Demonstrating the extent of rural infrastructure
construction, Figure 2.1 on the following page shows QwaQwa, a Sesotho homeland,
where fields were turned into RIDP factories.
1South African Parliamentary Hansard, April 13th 1978, pg. 1785. Library of Parliament, Cape Town.
2Bell (1997, p. 14 - 15) explained that “financial incentives may have pushed the process of industrial
dispersal” while “the attractive pull of low-wage sites” and infrastructure also had an impact on RIDP
industries.
3 Government RIDP almanac advertorial in Appendix B, Figure B.1
33
Chapter 2. Fields into Factories 34
Figure 2.1: RIDP Zone at QwaQwa in Zone C, circa 1975. Standardised factories were built in
a uniform layout within close proximity to large urbanising homeland townships with railways
through the centre of the zone. e.g. See the town planning schematic in Appendix B, Figure B.4.
Source: Free State Development Corporation, QwaQwa Archive, Puthadajchaba, South Africa.
In this chapter I make three contributions: Principally I focus on the origin and evolution
of decentralisation. Subdividing the programme into three distinct time periods allows
me to examine new archival data on incentives, employment, wages and infrastructure
from the programme’s inception (1952) through to its termination (1992). In doing so,
I demonstrate how industrial incentives, infrastructure and legislation were constantly
revised as the programme encountered political and economic challenges. Because of
data scarcity, this chapter is the first attempt to holistically quantify the financial costs,
and estimate the employment outcomes of the decentralisation programme over the long
run.4 This allows me to demonstrate how the historical roots of decentralisation and
the chronological changes were essential for Taiwanese foreign investment in the final
phase (1979 - 1992), when political isolation spurred economic desperation.5 As such,
Taiwanese investment during the third and final phase of decentralisation cannot be
observed in isolation of earlier planning and political policies employed to industrialise
the homelands.
4Bell (1986, p. 277) examined the first twenty years of the RIDP noting “a remarkable paucity of
comprehensive data on trends in the past quarter century”.
5Jones (2002, p. 12 -14) used the term ‘economic desperation’ to summarise the 1980s.
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Secondly, the chapter contributes to the historical debate on industrialising “Open
Fields”6 by revising earlier conclusions about the ideological motivation and demographic
impact of decentralisation. The repercussions are still visible, and can be seen in the long-
term persistent inequality of the homelands, which continues to affect the labour mobility
of South Africa’s population today.7 Addressing South Africa’s economic geography, it
finally makes a policy contribution to the current use of growth poles. For example,
Special Economic Zones, similar to those created by the decentralisation policies are
being proposed as a solution to underdeveloped and former homeland areas. However,
no contemporary research has examined the policies that established the original RIDP
zones, how they changed during apartheid, or why Taiwanese firms dominated them in
the 1980s.
2.1.1 Periodisation of Decentralisation
At the core of this chapter is a new periodisation of apartheid, in which I examine the
different phases of the RIDP. From the 1950s, until the late 1970s, the apartheid state set
about reconfiguring and partitioning South Africa.8 Regional decentralisation of industry
from urban centres to peripheral homelands was a key policy in the economic reconfig-
uration. As the opening Hansard quote succinctly summarises: regional development
was designed to anchor the blacks and take industry to the homelands. By promoting
the relocation of industrial plants to the homeland and border areas, the RIDP tried
to separate black people and disperse industrial activity to maintain the economic and
political status quo. The programme’s intentions were thus to reduce African influx to
white cities by creating wage labour employment in the homelands, once subsistence
agriculture and migrant labour reached saturation.
To undertake this project of decentralisation, large industrial estates in isolated African
homelands were systematically constructed.9 Although they had an abundance of
trapped, unskilled labour, these African homeland zones lacked any natural industrial
agglomeration that would have attracted private investment. As political and economic
conditions changed, so did the apartheid policies towards these zones. Three discrete
phases of apartheid regional policies can be distilled from the industrial decentralisation
historiography. Posel (2011) also noted that “the development of apartheid cannot be
read teleologically [...] rather, apartheid evolved through three distinct phases, marked
by successive efforts to manage its internal contradictions and the effects of external
pressures.”10 These are traced out against the per capita GDP in Figure 2.2 and will be
analysed in Section 2.4.
6Page (1966, p. 3) first wrote about this industrial transformation in the Transvaal bushveld.
7King and McCusker (2007) discuss the geographic costs, while Ramutsindela (2001, p. 175) examines
the “bitter harvest” which “[...] left imprints that cannot be wished away.”
8Louw (2004, p. 49) summarises the four key policies of racial partition as: (1) Self-governing
Homelands, (2) Migration control, (3) Decentralisation, and (4) Urbanisation.
9Figure 2.1 was representative of the very large standardised industrial zones, starkly contrasted
against the open bushveld savannah.
10Posel (2011, p. 320)
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Using GDP as a representative proxy for the chronological progression of these ‘contra-
dictions and pressures’, the graph highlights the industrial development programmes’
links to the broader political economy and the business cycles of South Africa. The
intensity and ambition of apartheid regional development can therefore be interpreted
and linked to both internal and external factors which are summarised next.
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Figure 2.2: Three phases of the decentralisation programmes transposed over per capita GDP
in 2000 Rands and Madison Dollars (1990 Int. GK$)
Source: South African Reserve Bank, The Madison Project, and Seekings and Nattrass (2005).
Phase one has been dubbed ‘Grand Apartheid’, which runs from 1952 until 1969 and
was characterised by the formalisation of the homelands and grand schemes of apartheid
social and spatial engineering. The second phase has been described as ‘Benevolence
and Growth’, ending in 1979, discernible by more pragmatic policies during the upward
industrial and mining output of the period.11 The final phase has been labelled ‘Desper-
ation’, and is a new interpretation enhancing the existing historical nomenclature. This
period begins with the 1979 oil crisis, which is prolonged by United Nations sanctions
during the 1980s. It finally ends in 1996 with the termination of the Regional Industrial
Development Programme and political integration of the homelands.
11See Chapter 3, page 87 where I discuss the vacillation of mining output and gold price increases
which offset external crises.
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Examining the phases of industrial decentralisation, the following chapter is framed within
four sections. Beginning with the late colonial period, Section 2.2 is a contextual overview
of industrial and land use policies. Section 2.3 summarises the existing historiography
and provides an overview of the archival sources. Section 2.4 presents an empirical
analysis from the three periods of homeland industrial incentive policies. The chapter
concludes with Section 2.5 which discusses the long-term outcomes of decentralisation.
2.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The phases of industrial decentralisation are closely linked with South Africa’s long-run
economic history. While apartheid is often made the culprit when explaining an unequal
distribution of economic activity, the colonial period created all the elements required
for territorial separation, and its division came into sharp focus at the turn of the 20th
century.12 The starting point for this form of social engineering using spatial policies
was the Lagden Commission.13 This commission recommended the enactment of the
Native Reserve Locations Act in the Cape (1902), The Native Locations Act in Natal
(1904) and the Orange Free State Municipal Ordinance (1903). These acts were imposed
before Union in 1910 as the government tightened urban segregation, giving “the native
location [homeland] regular status on the South African landscape.”14 However, the
most infamous legislative innovation of the new Union government was the Land Act
of 1913.15 The Act is placed in its historical importance with a quote from the black
intellectual Sol Plaatje:
“[...] awakening on Friday morning, June 20th, 1913, the South African
Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his
birth.”16
The 1913 Land Act is widely held as the catalyst for racial segregation in the towns
and native reserves of South Africa, and therefore fundamental to the policy analysis of
regional development during apartheid. It designated exclusive usage to white Europeans,
while the systematic imposition of influx controls was deployed to administer the numbers
of black Africans in the cities. By preventing natural migration, the native reserves
swelled beyond their capacity for agricultural subsistence provoking politicians into
tighter controls or reforms to the Land Act.17
12Parliament of South Africa (2013, p. 2) explains how colonial policies were the cornerstone.
13Freund (2011, p. 241)
14Davenport (1991, p. 2) notes that this commission formalised the African reserves before apartheid.
15Prohibiting Africans from buying or hiring land in 93 % of South Africa.
16Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje, (9 October 1876 -19 June 1932). Cited in Tatz (1962)
17Butler, Rotberg and Adams (1977, p. 122)
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Growing urbanisation and industrial concentration required a solution following World
War II. On the eve of the Nationalists coming to power in 1948, another government
commission, the Fagan Commission, found that “large-scale urbanisation of black South
Africans was an irreversible social phenomenon.”18 This conclusion was however contested
by the National Party in the subsequent Sauer Commission which favoured even stricter
segregation laws. Prime Minister D.F. Malan maintained that territorial and racial
segregation was necessary, and this resulted in the policies of Grand Apartheid.
However, population growth and declining homeland agriculture meant that the gov-
ernment needed to find alternative means of employment for Africans in the homelands
if policies of segregation were to be sustained. This would involve the “comprehensive
reorganisation of rural society [homelands], [...] significant reductions of stock, the fencing
of lands [...] and concentrated settlements.”19 As discussed in Chapter 1, the Group
Areas Act would be the legislative tool to bring about this reorganisation.
An important tenet of the new African resettlement policies was the proposal to shift
industry from the metropolitan areas to locations on the urban periphery, or to less
developed regions, using industrial decentralisation. This task was approached from
two angles, through both push-and-pull factors which changed over time. The first
was to restructure the existing urban labour market in accordance with an “urban
labour preference principle.”20 These formed the Push Factors that restricted urban
employers’ access to black labour recruited from rural areas, giving preference to an
existing ‘detribalised’ urban African population, which could not be relocated to the
homelands.21 The second measure involved creating growth poles by means of industrial
decentralisation and deconcentration zones.22 The Pull Factors included broad- ranging
incentives to ameliorate for the lack of agglomeration and localisation economies by
attracting industries to the homelands.
These Push-and-Pull policies, then combined with rigid labour mobility laws, created a
unique spatial distribution, trapping much of the African population behind economically
artificial homeland borders. To demonstrate this, the demographic map in Figure 6.1 on
page 186 shows population density within the former homeland borders in 2001. As a
result of colonial, post-colonial and apartheid-era economic geography, spatial inequality
persists in South Africa, and can be better understood through the historical analysis of
decentralisation with the long-term consequences discussed in Chapter 6.
18Suzman (1948, p. 18). Cited in a digest of the native laws (Fagan) Commission.
19Verwoerd cited in Nugent (2012, p. 135)
20Dubow (2000, p. 128 - 129)
21By limiting African recruitment, the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act (1967)
limited employment access in certain industries and areas.
22The latter were located within homelands or their border areas, while the former were located on the
urban or industrial periphery, representing a compromise between business and government.
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2.3 LITERATURE & ARCHIVAL DATA
The historiography of industrial decentralisation in South Africa reflects wider disagree-
ments about apartheid-era policies. The policy’s importance to the apartheid project
was well documented,23 with both scholars and politicians broadly agreeing that it was
intended to increase the proportion of Africans resident in the homeland areas.24 Yet
divisions within both groups meant that there has been little agreement on the outcomes
or the consequences.25 This has resulted in a large, but fragmented body of literature,
making the forthcoming review challenging.
On the one hand this was due to the political climate influencing the research agenda.
Posel (2011) explains that “the historiography of apartheid has tended to be rather more
insular and inward-looking in the past, particularly in the thick of the anti-apartheid
struggle, when the specificities of the South African experience dominated both the
analytical and the political agenda of debate.”26 This was compounded by limitations
in the available archival evidence, especially evident during the later phases of political
isolation and sanctions. During my research I encountered, and overcame, similar data
challenges which were discussed in the data section (1.3.1) of Chapter 1. Trevor Bell
(1986) also notes this obstacle, commenting, “there has been a remarkable paucity of
comprehensive data on these trends [...] which are essential to our understanding of the
decentralisation policies.”27 For example, records in the national archives were often
restricted by closed period files or incomplete data series. This required application for
special-access permission previously not available to scholars, and then a triangulation
of multiple sources to verify the accuracy of data, which had often been exaggerated
by apartheid propaganda. As such, the new data series which I’ve assembled for this
chapter contributes to both the historical consequences of separate development, and
also to the current debates on industrial policy and special economic zones.
Before beginning with the chronological analysis, the existing literature and archival
sources are briefly summarised. Broadly grouped, the first category of scholarship
pertained to the wider political rationale of decentralisation within the context of
apartheid statecraft and was mostly critical of “the state as drivers of large-scale social
and economic change.”28 Best (1971) notes how “South Africa [...] combined many
of the elements of regional planning of Britain and Russia, but [was] done so within a
framework of separate development [apartheid].”29
23Louw (2004, p. 49) notes that it was a central pillar in partitioning South Africa.
24Dr Simon Brand (former Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister) demonstrates this political and
academic agreement, stating in an interview with Zille (1983, p. 175): “[ the purpose of decentralisation
was to] give sufficient economic content to the policy of homeland development so that the governments
which are created are not simply fictitious governments, but that they have an economic base to create
their own sources of tax revenue”.
25Reference to the Liberal vs. Radical debates on apartheid in Chapter 1 on page 11.
26Posel (2011, p. 319)
27Bell (1986, p. 276)
28Posel (2011, p. 330)
29Best (1971, p. 329)
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The second body of literature is more applicable and was thematically focused. These
studies examined specific policy applications, regions or industries. However a weakness
was that they rarely intersected between the three time periods of the programme. The
earliest empirical studies on the industrial rationale began with Houghton (1956) who
summarised the Tomlinson Commission’s findings. In a follow-up analysis, Houghton
(1972) then questioned how Grand Apartheid’s “idealism versus the economic reality
would unfold in an effort to industrialise the homelands.”30 Bell (1973a), the most
prolific of the decentralisation scholars, picked up from Houghton with his treatise titled
“Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa” that examined the outcomes from the 1955
- 1970 period. This work providing the only in-depth account, using industrial census
data during the earlier parts of the second phase of Growth and Benevolence. Wellings
and Black (1986a,b) deal with the later parts of the decentralisation programme in
more general terms. Their chronological and geographic surveys both agreed that the
policy was an overall failure during the final Desperation phase. However there was
little consensus on industrial decentralisation, and the empirical outcomes were widely
contested. In fact Bell (1986) later became an advocate of the policy, arguing that
Wellings and Black “displays a curious ambivalence on the central issue of whether [...]
a spontaneous tendency towards a geographical decentralisation of industry in South
Africa, [...] was a result of international competitiveness.”31 At the close of apartheid
Addleson, Pretorius and Tomlinson (1985) concluded that “industrial decentralisation
policy may have had serious economic consequences [...] but may nevertheless have a
continued role to play in the ongoing political development of the country.”32
The 1990s witnessed a trend toward regionally based field research to establish the
effects of decentralisation. Black (1990) critiques decentralisation in the Ciskei; Luiz
and Waal (1997) use case studies from Brits and Nkowankowa; while Phalatse (2000)
examines Mogwase in the North West province of South Africa. However Scott (2003)
has disputed these prior analyses and called for a “re-examination of the growth and
development of South Africa through an engagement with international theoretical
debates.”33 She explained that decentralisation had been dominated by ideological
apartheid discourse “where race is applied as the key explanatory variable.”34 A possible
cause for this was the political climate at the start of democracy, but also a lack of
available archival data pertaining to the RIDP. Rare exceptions were Fairhurst and
Phalatse (1999) or Hart and Todes (1997) who critiqued the “neo-liberal collusions of
30Houghton (1972, p. 2)
31Bell (1986, p. 1291)
32Addleson, Pretorius and Tomlinson (1985, p. 37)
33Scott (2003, p. 235)
34Scott (2003, p. 236)
Chapter 2. Fields into Factories 41
[RIDP] failure as unfounded”35, making an important contribution after the programme
ended. Nevertheless, it is surprising how limited the archival evidence on the extent
and effectiveness of the incentives has been in prior scholarship. A further cause for the
scarcity was political sanctions and data secrecy.36 This was especially apparent during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, which Bell (1986) notes, “resulted in an introspective
analysis of decentralisation”37. As such, the following chronological analysis is a new
contribution to the historiography of apartheid.
2.4 CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
The chronological analysis begins in 1948 when South Africa officially ushered in the
political period of apartheid under a Nationalist Government. As political and economic
conditions changed, so did the decentralisation policies. Addressing the data challenges
and literature shortfalls, the next section disentangles the racial, industrial and policy
complexities over the full 40 years of the programme.
2.4.1 PHASE 1: Grand Apartheid (1948 - 1969)
Distinctive to the 1950s and 1960s, the term Grand Apartheid became synonymous
with nationalist ambitions, such as the removal of African people from white areas and
the creation of African homelands. Posel (2011) notes how from the beginning, the
project was “animated by a hankering for rigorous and uncompromising social, economic
and political order, which entailed a process of institutional refashioning.”38 Given
the ambitious objective of the first Nationalist period, the following section examines
the initial intentions and subsequent outcomes from the first phase of decentralisation.
Grand Apartheid is thus the stylised title attributed to the period but also a form of
comprehensive racial segregation which accompanied industrial decentralisation.
The Origin of Decentralisation
The first phase of decentralisation had a substantive, long-lasting effect on South Africa’s
economic structures. It is therefore necessary to examine the political ethos of the
period, and also the individuals who conceived of the initial programme.39 The first
decentralisation programme revealed the new government’s obsession with “commission
35Hart and Todes (1997, p. 33) conducted field research in KwaZulu Natal, while Fairhurst and
Phalatse (1999) did the same in Ga-Rankuwa, in the former homeland of Bophuthatswana.
36Pickles and Woods (1989) and Rogerson (1987) have highlighted this in their work. They use this
fact to explain how “Taiwanese investment in South Africa during the late apartheid period was veiled in
secrecy, resulting in a paucity of data and research.”
37Bell (1986, p. 176)
38Posel (2011, p. 346)
39It created the homeland industrial policy, while subsequent phases cemented the path dependent
spatial distribution over the course of 40 years.
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expertise”.40 For example D.F. Malan, the first nationalist Prime Minister established
17 special commissions when first coming to office.41
In 1950, the government appointed the largest of the commissions by sheer volume
of archival documents, named ‘The Commission for the Socio-Economic Development
of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa’.42 Eponymously referred to as
the Tomlinson Commission after its Chairman, Professor F.R. Tomlinson, who was a
Stellenbosch agricultural economist, and an acquaintance of D.F. Malan.43 Tomlinson
and Malan had briefly known each other when attending Stellenbosch University, however
Tomlinson went on to complete his PhD at Cornell (1933) in the United States. It was
here that his vision of “grand planning through modern demographics and statistics was
influenced by the Great Depression and subsequent New Deal programmes from 1933
- 1935”.44 Tomlinson, when approached by the newly elected National Party, eagerly
accepted the appointment and proposed permanent members to the commission.45 In
a letter to his department, he proudly advertised that he was to conduct “the most
comprehensive factual survey ever undertaken on rural conditions, farming systems and
practices and financial results in these resource-poor and densely populated areas of
South Africa.”46 It is this initial “factual survey” that the Nationalists would exploit,
justifying the economic creation of homelands based on industrial decentralisation.
Tomlinson had an ambitious, yet pragmatic approach, and believed that only with
substantial investments in schools, irrigation, agriculture and hospitals would the indus-
trialisation of the homelands be possible.47 As such, the nominations for the committee
reflected both his scientific and ideological desire.48 These objectives appear to be tightly
intertwined when the resume´s and portfolios of the nominees are examined in detail. The
panel consisted of five carefully selected academics, albeit with a significant complement
of state functionaries.49
Three of the men held professorships at Stellenbosch University and were closely affiliated
40Nattrass and Seekings (2011, p. 526) explained how “the obsession with expertise extended to the
appointment of commissions of enquiry into economic matters (as the British state had long been doing).”
41National Archive Catalogue, Pretoria, RSA.
42National Archive Catalogue, Pretoria, RSA. Records contain approximately 27,000 artefacts.
43An image of Tomlinson can still be seen hanging at the University of Pretoria and is shown in
Appendix B, Figure B.2. Koorts (2014, p. 118).
44Lyne (2014, p. 2) considered Tomlinson as the father of agricultural economics in South Africa.
45Letter cited in Pretorius (1986, p. 37)
46Excerpted from Tomlinson, Frederick Rothman. “Die denke agter die verslag van die Tomlinson
kommissie.” Acta Academica, Series B, no. 12 (1979): 5-13.
47 This was revealed by Harter (2012, p. 38) who details private conversations in his biography.
48Tomlinson 1979, 6; DT 25/11/50 cited in Pretorius (1986, p. 13).
49Pretorius (1986, p. 25) explains how a twenty-member panel was selected, of which only five academics
were permanent appointees.
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with the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA), an initiative of the Afrikaner-
Broederbond50 formed to provide an alternative to the liberal South African Institute of
Race Relations (SAIRR). During the 1950s, SABRA had an influential impact on the
development of National Party policy of which the Tomlinson Commission was its largest
undertaking.51
Of specific interest was C.H. Badenhorst, selected to enumerate the mission stations
under the broad ambit of education and health. The wide-ranging enumeration of
missionary education and missionary competence was central to the Commission’s concept
of “a Christian coalition of paternal elites.”52 Badenhorst was a fervent supporter of
missions and the deployment of mission institutions for the development of the African
homelands.53 Tomlinson himself was convinced that Afrikaners were “in Africa for God’s
purpose. [...] that we have important missionary work to do.”54 Badenhorst later
recalled, “I saw the Commission Report as part of my work, as part of my Christian
duty.”55 From the commission report, it is interesting to note the the vast underpinning
of missionary institutions within the homelands.56 For example, the commission recorded
13,655 missionaries teaching in 2,499 homeland schools. However, the Bantu Education
Act (1953) severely undermined the provision of education.57 This may have come as a
warning to Tomlinson, that his grand plan for the homelands would be compromised for
ideological reasons.58
Charged with an agricultural census was F.X. Laubscher, a renowned agronomist and
geneticist.59 With a high profile career in the Nationalist Government, Laubscher was
also responsible for the maize board, and was also a pivotal researcher in designing the
statistical data methods of African agriculture.60 The third influential member of the
Commission was J.H. Bisschop, a veterinary specialist who in 1936 was appointed as
Professor of Zootechnics at Onderstepoort, a leading institute, known for tropical disease
research. Involved in many advisory activities, including secondments to Swaziland,
Kenya, Uganda and Bechuanaland (Botswana), Bisschop was selected for his experience
in “Black Africa and skills in assessing the disease burden and carrying capacity of
50Afrikaner Calvinist organisation dedicated to the advancement of Afrikaner interests.
51Pretorius (1986, p. 13)
52Elphick (2012, p. 121) uses this term to describe the religious ideology of the committee.
53Pretorius (1986, p. 27)
54Pretorius (1986, p. 28)
55Elphick (2012, p. 304)
56For sheer interest, these are highlighted in Appendix B, Table B.2
57Christopher (1994: 150) explains that funding and administration of ‘Native’ education was transferred
from mission schools to the state since the missions were “fostering ideas, such as equality, which could
not be encouraged”.
58Beinart (1994, p. 156) noted that in Nationalist eyes, mission schools had an academic training with
too much emphasis on English and “dangerous liberal ideas”.
59He held a doctoral degree in agriculture and later agricultural genetics from Stellenbosch. (Click
here for online access to reference source.)
60Tomlinson (1979, p. 3)
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pastoral lands within the Bantustans.”61 Importantly for the international recognition
of the Commission, he was a world recognised expert on the indigenous cattle breeds of
Africa and their resistance to tropical diseases. The final academic assignment was given
to J.H. Moolman who would become the Chairman of the South African Geographical
Journal, and later the president of the Soil Science Society of South Africa. The final
report presented in 1954, covered 18 volumes over 51 chapters. Comprising 3755 pages,
it was the origin for all future industrial decentralisation in South Africa.
The Grand Plan
Although not adopted in its entirety, the Tomlinson Commission created the framework
for regional industrial policy that would come to shape the apartheid incentive hierarchy
between private capital and homeland industrialisation. Broadly framed, the commission
was composed of five parts, which are summarised in the Appendix B Figure B.3. For the
purpose of this chapter I will focus on Part 3: The Recommendations, which summarised
the findings.
The first recommendation stated, “[that] the people of South Africa will have to make
a clear and definite choice between the alternatives of the complete integration or
their separate development.” Regrettably the report found “that [the] middle course is
unlikely to be satisfactory” referring to industrial integration and suggested after “careful
consideration [...] separate development be adopted [...] as the only possible solution.”62
This recommendation set the policy agenda for industrial decentralisation as opposed to
natural migration and industrial agglomeration in urban areas at the core.
The second recommendation was a development strategy for the homelands by means
of “a fully diversified economy promising primary, secondary and tertiary economic
activities.” The industrial incentives aimed at achieving this included the formation
of a “true Bantu farming class [...] large enough to ensure a fair living from the land.”
The post facto development method proposed in the fourth recommendation came to
represent industrial decentralisation by “removing those who cannot obtain subsistence
on the land into a true urban population.” This final recommendation was intended
to create “large-scale urban developments [...] on sound economic foundations [...] to
absorb both surplus agricultural population within the Bantu areas and a part of the
natural increase domiciled in the European areas.”63
The commission proposed “a grand project, of which no other independent African country
has undertaken”.64 It required tremendous capital from both the state and privately
directed industrial investments. The commission forecasted “costs of £ 104,000,000,
61National Department of Agriculture. (Click here for online access to reference source.)
62Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (1955, p. 120)
63Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (1955, p. 125)
64Tomlinson (1979, p. 3)
Chapter 2. Fields into Factories 45
of which £ 55,000,000 is of a private nature and £ 49,000,000 is of a social-economic
nature.”65 Because of the scale, Tomlinson had proposed the investments be rolled out
over 12 years. However, the nationalist government “rejected the [proposed] white capital
and control within Bantu areas, and adopted instead the policy of industrialisation at
selected white areas that strategically bordered the homelands.”66 The programme fell
far short, receiving only £ 48,000,000, or an equivalent R 79,735,000 of the £ 104,000,000,
none of which came from the private the sector.67 A financial analysis is summarised
in Table 2.1 from annual Permanent Committee reports. The financial shortfall had a
long-lasting impact, which is explored next.
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Source: P rmanen Committee for the Location of Industry (1969, p. 4 - 6). The National
Archive, Pretoria, RSA, TAB 62657 - ZA87.
Tomlinson appeared to have been deeply offended by the lack of implementation. This was
not entirely unexpected as the recommendations created ideological dissent amongst the
commission members and Nationalist party loyalists.68 Surprisingly Tomlinson revealed
to John Harter, form r CIA agent and US diplomat to Pretoria, that Africans could
65Commission f r the Socio-Economic Developm n of the Bantu Ar as (1955, p. 129)
66Government of South Africa: Decisions on the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas
within the Union of South Africa (1956, p. 154)
67South Africa decimalised from Pounds into Rands in 1961 and hence previous estimates had been
calculated in Pounds. Two Rand = 1 Pound 10 shillings.
68Lazar (1960) cited in Elphick (2012, p. 319) found antagonism between the visionaries [Tomlinson
Commission] and the Verwoerdians [Nationalist Party members in favour of total apartheid] was endemic.
Evans (1997, p. 239) noted that “Verwoerd intensely disliked Tomlinson.”
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never be completely removed from urban areas. He explained that the South African
government couldn’t tax its voters sufficiently to justify the costs of implementing the
full plan.69
When allocating the development funding to industries applying for relocation, the
programme appeared to “have limited concern or desire of private capital.”70 The
homeland poles were selected for political reasons, on the basis for their African labour
potential in “the immediate vicinity and also the prospect of attracting industrialists with
due regard to the economic and social aspects.”71 Bell (1973b) explains this outcome,
noting that the “primary objective of government policy in South Africa is to increase
the proportion of the African population resident in the Bantu areas.”72
An analysis of annual financial reports from the Permanent Committee for the Location
of Industry (1969) shows how the majority of deployed funds (R 49,298,000) found their
way to new peri-urban peripheral areas (i.e. later called de-concentration points) with
significant funding directed to the expansion of state-owned monopolies.73 As such,
manufacturing organically grew alongside large state monopoly industries and not the
rural homeland zones. A later Permanent Committee report in 1971 used this rapid
growth to justify the the lack of homeland investment.
“[...] growth was concentrated in manufacturing and therefore benefited from
state spending in peripheral towns such as Vereeniging. Why would we then
direct our financial assistance to the homelands where capital returns would
be lower?”74
Noting this weakness, Bell (1973a) concluded that this had had an impact on the
programme’s effectiveness by crowding out private capital destined for the homelands.
This was also evident in the Permanent Committee reports, which detailed how the state
was subsidising large industries such as ESKOM, the electricity monopoly and synthetic
fuel and chemical producer SASOL rather than new industries in the homelands.75 As
such, the African private sector never received any of the financial assistance subsidies
budgeted for the homelands. Interestingly, the Permanent Committee for the Location
of Industry (1969) showed dissatisfaction with the lack of investment, explaining how
69Harter (2012, p. 38 - 39) noted “the costs would be humongous!” and “Parliament only approved
one-twentieth of the minimum investment Tomlinson deemed necessary to accomplish that end.”
70Bell (1973b, p. 187)
71Government of South Africa: Decisions on the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas
within the Union of South Africa (1956, p. 176)
72Bell (1973b, p. 188)
73Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry (1969, p. 7)
74Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry (1971, p. 11 ). The National Archive, Pretoria,
RSA, TAB 62657 - ZA87.
75Nattrass and Seekings (2011, p. 546) also note that “generous investment subsidies and tax breaks
and [...] State investment in large-scale capital-intensive projects such as the South African Coal, Oil
and Gas Corporation (SASOL) energy parastatal exacerbated this trend.”
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private enterprises received only 30 % or £ 16 million of the designated financial aid for
“rural development while the state monopolies received £ 32 million in 1968.”76
Paradoxically, a challenge in implementing the Tomlinson programme appears to have
been rapid economic growth in the 1960s. As a result, African employment rose by
75% between 1958 and 1968. This negated the government’s urgent need for homeland
development as urban remittances rose, which in turn supported a decline in homeland
subsistence agriculture.77 South Africa’s economy (Figure 2.2) had been growing by
more than 5 % a year during this phase. Private capital to the homeland zones was
deterred by any financial or operational need to decentralise in pursuit of lower costs,
subsidies or labour. Instead, manufacturing had been shielded by import protection,
which compounded the problems of the Tomlinson programme. For example, Best (1971)
explained that a doubling of foreign direct investment through the 1960s was partly to
blame for the lack of homeland investment.78
As such, the rapid growth in the 1960s had an unintended consequence. This came in
the form of “much-feared black influx displaced to huge African dormitory towns near
the historical urban centres”.79 The influx from African homelands was the primary
socio-political concern which the RIDP was designed to prevent.80
Bell (1973a) notes that this was an inevitable symptom with little industrial growth in the
homelands, and compounded by slowing economic growth in the latter parts of the 1960s.
Addressing this rising trend, the first hint of apprehension became perceptible in 1969
when the government allowed white industrialists the first opportunity to move directly
into the homelands on an agency basis.81 This was against the recommendations of the
Tomlinson Commission which contested that only African industrialists, in conjunction
with homeland development boards be allowed to operate in the homelands.82 This
however did not materialise, and homeland investors had lacked financial support or the
foreign investment seen in the Republic. Even after the Economic Development Board
and The Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) were established in 1959, little financial
assistance was available for the homelands. In 1960, the BIC was limited to R 1 million
in share capital.83 Furthermore, the functions of the BIC were initially restricted to
76Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry (1969, p. 376)
77Nattrass, May and Peters (1987, p.245) note that circulating rural-urban migration has both positive
and negative effects. A direct increase in living standards resulted from remittances in cash by the
migrants, however agricultural output fell at a critical moment.
78Best (1971, p. 343) explains that the “geographer will find the analysis of these and future patterns
[of decentralisation] particularly difficult since the government is the principal factor affecting the extent
of investment.”
79Lodge (2011, p. 411)
80Sauer Commission (1948) upon which decentralisation was originally proposed stated that “migration
into and from the cities should be controlled by the state which will enlist the cooperation of municipal
bodies.”
81In a publication by the Bantu Investment Corporation (1975, p. 5), the directors acknowledged a
shortage of capital invested in the homeland zones and that in the initial plan, Tomlinson had granted
permission to white industrialists.
82Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (1955, p. 125)
83Bantu Investment Corporation (1975, p. 5)
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“financial assistance to African entrepreneurs and to the mobilisation of capital”.84 Best
(1971) noted that this policy had been discredited by the state planners. Following this,
from 1969 white entrepreneurs were permitted to “assist in the development of national
states by erecting factories at selected growth points.”85
A financial analysis of the Economic Development Board and The Bantu Investment
Corporation supports the claim by Best (1971), recording how these state bodies began
administering financial and regulatory concessions granted to white industrialists.86
Bantu Investment Corporation (1975) archives show that a “total 127 factories at a cost
of more than R59 million had been established on an agency basis. Of this, R30 million
was contributed by the private sector.”87 This coincided with increased capitalisation
of both organisations, further demonstrating a sense of homeland urgency, and it also
represented the transition to the second phase of decentralisation policy.
Outcomes from Phase 1
The results from the first concerted phase of industrial decentralisation are difficult to
measure in aggregate terms. Records from the financing agencies listed above suggest that
during this phase decentralisation created 107,404 permanent jobs in which 85,554 Bantu
and 11,203 Asiatic or Coloureds were permanently employed.88 Subsequent analysis
from new archival records provides further evidence of the volume and scope of the
early decentralisation schemes. In 1969, the Permanent Committee for the Location
of Industry recorded that the number of industries was approximately 769 within the
African homelands.89 Lodge (2011) noted how most of these small-scale entrepreneurs
had no government assistance and employed only 76,000 African labourers.
However of significance is the expansion from a low industrial employment base. The
Permanent Committee minutes and archival records reflect a slow but upward trajectory
in employment levels to 117,000 by 1968.90 This represented an annual increase of 5,400
additional unskilled employment opportunities per year. This was well below Tomlinson’s
projected growth rate of 9,000 unskilled jobs needed to absorb the population growth
in the homelands.91 In response, Simon S. Brand, the Economic Adviser to the Prime
Minister, defended the government’s position, explaining that “the performance of the
84Bantu Investment Corporation (1975, p. 5)
85Bantu Investment Corporation (1975, p. 5)
86Bantu Investment Corporation (1975, p. 5) notes that share capital of the BIC and development
boards was increased from R1 million in 1960 to R32.5 million in 1970 and finally R123 million in 1974
demonstrating a swift, desperate change in policy.
87Bantu Investment Corporation (1975, p. 6)
88Bantu Investment Corporation (1975, p. 11)
89Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry (1969, p. 74)
90Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry (1969, p. 76)
91Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (1955, p. 112). An important
caveat to these totals is that they only captured the results from four growth points.
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decentralisation policy during the 1960s was clearly a disappointing one, even if ample
allowance is made for such teething problems as inevitable delays in providing the physical
infrastructure, [...] and the understandable reluctance of most industrialists to pioneer
such a new concept as decentralisation. [...] Without wishing to indulge in wishful
thinking, there would appear to be some reason to expect the decentralisation policy to
have a more significant impact in the 1970s than in the 1960s. ”92 Whether this was to
be believed is examined in the next phase.
In summary, Phase 1 of the decentralisation project resulted in very little industrial
growth or employment within the homelands. This was because of a number of factors,
but principally a dislike for the policies, and growth in the economy making the incentives
undesirable. Yet, on the eve of 1970, the growth pole programme was expanded to the
remainder of the country and the decentralisation base extended from four to a further
twenty-three locations with the expansion of infrastructure.93 The impact of this will be
examined next.
2.4.2 PHASE 2: Growth and Benevolence (1970 - 1979)
The period of Growth and Benevolence sees “a somewhat more pragmatic and cau-
tious approach to racial social and economic engineering.”94 To this end, the Bantu
Investment Corporation explained how the 1970s was a challenging decade for industrial
decentralisation, introducing “coercive legislation in several ways besides relocation incen-
tives.”95A change in tone from the Board of Decentralisation hints at how a “structural
revision of the state’s involvement in the process of decentralisation needs to evolve from
grandiose schemes to the reality of business needs and political necessity.”96 However an
archival report in the national accounts of the Bantu Homeland Development Corporation
summarises the nexus of challenges faced by the government in the 1970s.
“Eleven million of the fifteen million Africans resided in homelands, while the
urbanisation of African dormitory towns on the industrial periphery continued
unabated.”97
This rapid influx was counter to the primary intentions of the decentralisation programme,
but were overlooked due to the economic growth experienced in the previous decade.98
92S.S. Brand cited in Bell (1973a, p. 218)
93Board for the Decentralisation of Industry, Annual Reports (1971). National Archive, Pretoria, RSA.
TAB - 8769N.
94Posel (2011, p. 320)
95Bantu Investment Corporation (1975, p. 11)
96Introductory remarks from the Chairman of the BDI, 1971. National Archives, Pretoria, RSA.
97South African Bureau of Statistics (1969, p. xxi)
98See Appendix B, Table B.1 which shows the African Homeland and Urban Population trend.
Chapter 2. Fields into Factories 50
Forced industrial decentralisation could not be mandatory without threatening urban
manufacturing firms whose output had risen to 24 % of GDP.99
Following the strong manufacturing growth in the first period of decentralisation (1955
- 1969), symptoms of significant cyclical and structural weaknesses appeared.100 From
the 1970s there was a “drastic deterioration in [economic] performance.”101 These are
discussed in Chapter 3 on page 86, but of specific relevance was an appreciable slowing of
new foreign investments. Only 15 % of foreign investments were directed towards mining
by the early 1970s. Other sectors, such as manufacturing or financial and business services,
increased their share, and received 40 % and 25 % of the FDI stock respectively.102 This
had implications for the oscillating migration patterns which had evolved around growing
mineral output. Mining was the main source of migrant employment for homeland
residents, however urban Africans increasingly undertook relatively skilled work. Urban
manufacturers were demanding more skilled African labourers than could be supplied by
the existing dormitory system without an increase in decentralisation.103
However, during Phase 1 the main policy lever was a system of incentives to pull industries
towards various declared growth points. With the failure to stem African urban influx,
we observe the introduction of coercive, “push”-styled employment legislation. Maasdorp
(1990) notes how “a stick was added to the carrot, when in 1968 the Physical Planning and
Utilisation of Resources Act was passed.”104 This coercive legislation forced industries
to decentralise by limiting manufacturing firms from expanding their operations in the
existing urban industrial core, in the hope of driving future expansion to the homeland
periphery. Section III of the Physical Planning Act reduced the “allowable Bantu-White
ratio in the controlled areas to 2:1.”105 Davenport (1987, p. 525) notes that this combined
the earlier positive incentives such as tax holidays, tariff rebates and the prospect of
cheaper labour with negative constraints, such as the ban on the enlargement of black
labour forces if they elected to remain in the existing areas of industrial concentration.
In 1975, an amended Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act severely limited
any additional employment of Africans in manufacturing in three of the four metropolitan
regions, i.e. Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Triangle (PWV) region the Western Cape, Port
Elizabeth-Uitenhage region - only Durban-Pinetown escaped unscathed. Wellings and
99Schneider (2000, p. 419) notes that after 1970, South African manufacturing did not increase its
share of GDP, indicating a failure to continue the remarkable development seen in the prior two decades.
100Gelb and Black (2007, p. 177) explain that “there was a shift in the composition of international
capital flows from direct to portfolio investment, but more importantly, foreign investors in South Africa
were increasingly subject to political pressures in their home countries by the growing international
campaign against apartheid.”
101Feinstein (2005, p. 143)
102Statistics South Africa (1975)
103Crankshaw (2002, p. 48 - 98) notes that skilled job reservation for whites and the exclusion of blacks
from apprenticeships severely affected the availability of labour in manufacturing.
104Maasdorp (1990, p. 128)
105Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act (1968): Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Triangle
(PWV) region, the Western Cape, Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage
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Black (1986a) noted that reactions were characterised by “consternation, confusion and
protest”106 as the legislation prevented labour-intensive industrialists from expanding
existing operations. Archival reports from the industry groupings such as the South
African Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) exemplify this sentiment:
“The Federated Chamber is concerned about the government’s policy of in-
dustrial decentralisation: The cost of government intervention in industrial
location to the industrial sector as a whole may exceed its benefits to the
individual industries, or to the industrial sector as a whole through its ef-
fect on the allocation of resources. Industrial concentration results from the
working market forces’; industries concentrate in specific areas because of the
multiplier effect of investment and the attraction of agglomeration economies.
[...] Only voluntary decentralisation should be considered.”107
In addressing these concerns the concept of ‘Benevolence’ and ‘Growth’ is illustrated
by government policies and tax laws. The government demonstrated benevolence by
means of the privileges extended to manufacturing firms in the RIDP. These included
incentives for de-concentration zones near existing industrial areas, while still allowing
further growth in the decentralisation programme which also extended tax concessions.
The FCI highlighted in an archival report how “much of the costs in decentralisation
were misleading, because most incentives were in the form of tax concessions.”108 This
result is borne out by a financial analysis of the Board for decentralisation of Industries’
(BDI) published annual reports represented in Table 2.2.
Contrary to Wellings and Black (1986a), who claimed that rising incentive distribution
was the main driver of decentralisation, Table 2.2 demonstrates that disbursements of
incentives during the second phase were approximately flat.109 Instead of expanding
incentives (i.e Pull Factors), growth in decentralisation may have been driven by an
expansion of infrastructure to substitute for missing agglomeration. Debates in Parliament
explained how, “[...] the failure of decentralisation came from a failure to provide benefits
of agglomeration.”110 The same report cited a need for “rail transport, communication,
telephone and other tools industrialists require to compete on a global basis.”111
106quote excepted from Dewar, Todes and Watson (1984, p. 8)
107Federated Chamber of Industries, archival report on the decentralisation of industry, (1972). IDC
Archives, Sandton. No reference number. IDC barcode 011490
108See the Federated Chamber of Industries archival report on the decentralisation of industry, (1972).
IDC Archives, Sandton. IDC barcode 011490
109This finding agrees with Bell (1986, p. 290) that “financial incentives and direct controls on the
mobility and use of Black labour may have played a significantly smaller role in this process than is
commonly thought.”
110Parliament of South Africa, Hansard, 21st of June, 1972, Vol 100, p. 5079. Library of Parliament,
Cape Town.
111Parliament of South Africa, Hansard, 21st of June, 1972, Vol 100, p. 5081. Library of Parliament,
Cape Town.
		
DECENTRALISATION	INCENTIVES	AND	CONCESSIONS	
	 1971/'72	 1972/'73	 1973/'74	 1974/'75	 1975/'76	 1976/'78	 1977/'78	 1978/'79	 1979/'80		 R	'	000	 R	'	000	 R	'	000	 R	'	000	 R	'	000	 R	'	000	 R	'	000	 R	'	000	 R	'	000	
Transport	 R	3,850	 R	3,129	 R	4,198	 R	4,250	 R	3,990	 R	7,560	 R	9,440	 R	10,700	 R	13,070	
Tax	Concessions	 R	6,978	 R	7,769	 R	7,609	 R	6,734	 R	14,336	 R	30,019	 R	29,341	 R	41,949	 R	44,330	
Interest	Subsidy	 R	98,180	 R	89,109	 R	87,610	 R	94,400	 R	115,500	 R	66,500	 R	55,900	 R	66,300	 R	60,600	
Rental	Subsidy		 R	17,100	 R	9,791	 R	1,600	 R	1,600	 R	3,700	 R	9,400	 R	11,000	 R	14,200	 R	11,300	
Total	 R	126,108	 R	109,798	 R	101,017	 R	106,984	 R	137,526	 R	113,479	 R	105,681	 R	133,149	 R	129,300	
		
Table 2.2: Aggregate financial expenditure on incentives and concessions per category (1971 - 1980) in real terms (1980 Rands).
Source: Compiled from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry annual reports, (1971 - 1980). The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA. TAB 7869 - ZA.
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Reflecting on this earlier period, the Federated Chamber also noted in 1985 that an
improvement and expansion of infrastructure was incentivising its members to decen-
tralise. In a report to the Industrial Development Corporation, the FCI explained
how “decentralisation during the period appeared to have been voluntary with better
transport infrastructure and new factories attracting firms to the African homelands.”112
The expansion of large-scale infrastructure spending on the industrial periphery rather
than industrial decentralisation incentives appears to have been motivating industries to
relocate. To pursue this trend, an analysis of infrastructure expansion during this second
phase is assembled first at the (A) national level and then in (B) specific homelands.
(A) The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) published the public-sector economic
infrastructure components of South Africa’s gross fixed capital formation. This national
accounting measure includes land improvements, the construction of roads, railways and
the like.113 Based on 1960 as the reference year, Figure 2.3 shows an index of gross fixed
capital formation, which demonstrates both rapid growth until the mid-1970s in the case
of investment, and then a long-term deterioration from the 1980s.
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Figure 2.3: Public-sector economic infrastructure component of South Africa’s gross fixed
capital formation, (1960 - 1996)
Source: The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Quarterly online data series.
112Federated Chamber of Industry, archival reports on the decentralisation of industry, (1985). IDC
Archives, Sandton, Johannesburg, RSA. No reference number. IDC barcode 011510
113Including schools, offices, industrial buildings, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial
plant, machinery, and equipment purchases.
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Feinstein (2005, p. 221) notes that the average investment ratio escalated from 1963, and
swept upwards in three successive tranches. This was highlighted earlier in Phase 1 (see
page 48), with the initial increase largely due to investments in state monopolies.114 At
the peak of these three booms, public sector investment was 16 % of GDP.115 Of specific
reference to the evolution of the RIDP was the construction of sixty-three industrial
estates (shown in Figure 2.4), with roads and railways upgraded to the decentralisation
zones and ports. The scale of these projects has been underestimated in prior research.
However the Industrial Development Corporation reports estimated that the costs of
constructing this infrastructure equated to 1.5 % of GDP in each year from 1972 - 1979.116
(B) Demonstrating the extent of homeland fixed capital expansion, Appendix B, Figure
B.4 shows an original town planning schematic for Ezakheni Industrial Estate near
Newcastle. Between 1978 and 1979 eleven of these mega estates were built in Zone E
alone. Each was designed so homeland African commuters could reach the factories
during the week and then return to their rural homes on the weekend. Railway routes
were constructed centrally, linking outlying areas to ports with branch sidings. Water
and power infrastructure was upgraded and semi-autonomous investment agencies were
established to attract investors to these estates. The economic geography of these zones
will be discussed in Chapter 5 when the agglomeration of Taiwanese firms is analysed.
1921$ 4,438,774$ 2,113,778$ 1,737,995$ 587,000$ 49%$1936$ 6,595,541$ 2,962,083$ 2,491,817$ 1,141,642$ 55%$1946$ 7,882,988$ 3,115,779$ 2,914,534$ 1,852,675$ 61%$1951$ 8,560,274$ 3,307,616$ 2,924,124$ 2,328,534$ 61%$1957$ 9,535,467$ 3,651,307$ 3,261,288$ 2,622,872$ 62%$1960!a$ 10,928,264$ 5,573,415$ 5,354,849$ 49%$1970$ 15,057,952$ 6,997,179$ 8,060,773$ 54%$1986!b$ 24,901,192$ 9,698,406$ 15,202,786$ 61%$1991$c$ 27,000,000$ 11,000,000$ 16,000,000$ 59%$
a$Demographic$data$excludes$the$Ciskei$and$Transkei$b$Estimates$from$the$South$African$Institut $of$Race$Relations$$c$Official$census$was$considered$inaccurate$as$the$TBVC$conducted$a$separate$census.$$$$$$
Homeland) Main)Road) Other)Road) Total) Railways)
) Km’s$ Km’s$ Km’s$ Km’s$
Ciskei) 358$ 1,173$ 1,531$ 64$
KwaZulu) 772$ 771$ 1,543$ 79$
QwaQwa) 0$ 175$ 175$ 0$
Lebowa) 900$ 8,000$ 8,900$ 28$
Gazankulu) 1,357$ 889$ 2,246$ 54$
KaNgwane) 223$ 235$ 458$ 0$
Transkei) 752$ 8,048$ 8,800$ 209$
Bophuthatswana) 640$ 8,170$ 8,810$ 228$
Venda) 48$ 1,221$ 1,269$ 13$
Total) 5,050$ 2,8682$ 33,732$ 675$$$
Table 2.3: Length of Roads and Railways in Homelands (1976).
Source: National Archives, Pretoria, BAO, VOLUME NO 3/3558.
114SASOL, ISCOR and ESKOM. Total public investments were 45 % in 1963, and increased to 53 % in
1975.
115Statistics South Africa and Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005, p. 215)
116Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (1979)
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The map in Figure 2.4 below highlights how transport infrastructure was expanded,
connecting RIDP zones to ports and cities. Of the approximately 18,900 route kilometres
of railways in 1970, the homelands only had 70 kilometres. Although modest, Table 2.3
shows this increased to 675 kilometres, with only QwaQwa and the newly established
homeland of KaNgwane not connected to the national network by 1976.
Figure 2.4: Map depicts the major transport networks into the homelands and peripheral
industrial areas circa 1978.
Source: Digitised by the author using the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry reports and
planning commission maps. The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA
Each independent and non-independent homeland government then determined the
expenditure on physical infrastructure within the decentralisation zones. This expenditure
was either directly funded by the national government (BDI and SADT) or via the
respective development corporation (TDC, XDC, CNDC and CED) which will be analysed
in the next section. Infrastructure spending is aggregated in Table 2.4 below for each of
the years in Phase 2. It was deployed in the construction of standardised warehouse and
industrial estates such as those shown in Appendix B, Figure B.4. Unlike national fixed
capital formation which declined from 1975, RIDP expenditure in the homelands lagged,
with the peak in infrastructure spending reaching R 97,592, 000 in 1978.
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DECENTRALISATION	INFRASTRUCTURE	SPENDING	
	
1973/'74	 1974/'75	 1975/'76	 1976/'77	 1977/'78	 1978/'79	
	
R	'000	 R	'000	 R	'000	 R	'000	 R	'000	 R	'000	
Government	a	 23,690	 29,628	 40,396	 66,515	 83,308	 41,482	
SADT	 2,959	 4,256	 10,136	 10,051	 9,787	 7,542	
CED	 819	 2,471	 3,291	 6,747	 4,479	 3,689	
XDC	c	 1,431	 3,664	 6,090	 -	 -	 -	
TDC	 -	 -	 -	 6,500	 -	 -	
CNDC	 -	 -	 -	 27	 18	 -	
Total	b	 28,899	 40,019	 59,913	 89,840	 97,592	 52,713	
a	TBVC	‘Independent’	homeland	Governments	include	the	CED,	SADT,	XDC,	TDC	and	CDNC.	 
b	Other	non-independent	development	corporations	are	included	under	‘Government’.	i.e.	KZN,	QDC,	KDC. 
c	The	 Bantu	 Investment	 Corporation	 became	 the	 Corporation	 for	 Economic	Development	 (CED)	 and	 the	
Xhosa	Development	Corporation	(XDC)	was	renamed	the	Transkei	Development	Corporation	(TDC).	 
 			 	 	Table 2.4: Infrastructure Spending by Independent Homeland and respective DevelopmentCorporations, (1972 - 1979) in real terms (1980 Rands).Source: Economics and Finance in South Africa’s Black Territories, South African Government
Information Services (1979). National Archives, Pretoria. Reprint from Official Yearbook.
Outcomes from Phase 2
A register of collated BDI employment statistics indicates that a total of 1,240,978
permanent jobs were created between 1970 and 1979.117 This would unrealistically imply
that 17 % of new manufacturing employment was channelled through decentralisation of
industry at the end of 1979. However examining the declassified employment statistics
at the homeland and border zones, which were not attached to existing manufacturing
areas, reveals a more modest gain in employment.118 Excluding the peri-urban areas,
these statistics are summarised in Table 2.5 on the next page, disaggregating employment
between each of the homelands. The results show that approximately 10 % of the
decentralisation employment (i.e. 110,597 jobs) was in the homelands or adjacent zones
(i.e. border areas). These more moderate increases in employment are in contrast to the
considerable R 1,036,272,000 fixed capital investments which exemplifies the period.
Moreover, the significant growth in government employment in each of the homelands is
noticeable. The statistics record that 142,108 government employees were operating in
the homelands. Exceeding manufacturing firm employment by 20 % shows the extent to
which the African bureaucracy surrounding the RIDP was a critical factor in creating a
perceived legitimacy as claimed by Evans (1997).
117Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (1979). This aggregate total is recorded with no geographic
breakdown, and thus included both decentralisation zones and de-concentration areas near urban centres.
118South African Government Information Services (1979)
!!!
OUTCOMES(FROM(PHASE(2(
(
EMPLOYMENT( (((((((((CAPITAL(INVESTMENT(
(
Border!a( Homeland!b( Government( By(Industry( (((((((By(IDC(
!
Black! White! Black! White! Black! White! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!R!'000! !!!!!!!!!R!'000!
Transkei( !10!! !5!! !12!! !2!! !37,600!! !200!! !!!!!R!27! !R!843!!
Bophuthatswana( !22,352!! !6,545!! !8,965!! !401!! !17,337!! !473!! !!!!!!!R!247,235! !R!70,277!!
Venda( !236!! !18!! !1,008!! !15!! !7,609!! !166!! !!!!!R!1,301! !R!688!!
Ciskei( !11,481!! !1,538!! !1,467!! !75!! !14,233!! !296!! !!!!!!R!117,552! !R!59,974!!
KwaZulu( !30,395!! !3,759!! !3,335!! !171!! !25,900!! !605!! R!273,967! !R!113,139!!
QwaQWA( !1,371!! !229!! !36!! !2!! !2,300!! !65!! !!!!R!9,031! !R!3,181!!
Lebowa( !6,545!! !1,056!! !1,968!! !82!! !21,000!! !536!! R!85,124! !R!20,816!!
Gazankulu( !4,776!! !104!! !692!! !24!! !8,491!! !170!! R!12,077! !R!11,950!!
KaNgwane( !1,565!! !253!! !100!! !4!! !5,000!! !37!! R!3,766! !R!5,324!!
SubPtotal( !78,731!! !13,507!! !17,583!! !776!! !139,470!! !2,548!! R!750,080! !R!286,192!!
Total! 110,597! !!!142,018! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!R!1,036,272!
Table 2.5: Summary from Phase 2 of the RIDP showing total employment attributed to BDI funding and related capital expenditure
up until 1978. Monetary values are in nominal 1978 Rands.
Source: Compiled from the Economics and Finance in South Africa’s Black Territories, South African Government Information Services (1979). The
National Archives, Pretoria, RSA. TAB 7869 - ZA.
Note: In 1976, Transkei was the first of four territories to be declared independent. As such, the employment statistics and capital expenditure only reflect
funding by the central Board for Decentralisation and its agencies. By 1978 when the statistics were collected, industrial funding was managed internally by the
TDC. This may account for the relatively low employment and capital expenditures figures in comparison to the other homelands.
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2.4.3 PHASE 3: Desperation (1980 - 1990)
After the incentives lull of the 1970s, the government revamped industrial decentralisation
by means of greater financial concessions in a programme termed ‘The Good Hope
Plan’. Dewar, Todes and Watson (1984) explain that this was in reaction to numerous
macroeconomic challenges at the beginning of the decade, compounded by political tension.
Industrial stagnation after 1979 corresponded with three decisive factors justifying the
‘Desperation’ label. The first factor was a drop in gold production, and the associated fall
in migrant labour after deep-level mining expansion in the 1970s. Figure 2.5 highlights
the precipitous decline in mining after a high in 1979. With the rising gold price,
deeper, lower-grade ore became viable with a corresponding expansion of employment.
However the price of gold fell from $ 800 to under $ 340 an ounce in 1982, reducing mine
employment.119 The second contribution was a net outflow of capital starting in 1977,
and culminated in 1985 with a debt crisis. Declining investment and reduced global
demand for South African resources shifted the balance of payments at a time of swelling
national debt. The final, self-inflicted factor was an intensification of international
sanctions in 1980, 1982 and 1985, further reducing industrial expansion and foreign direct
investment.120
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Figure 2.5: A graphical depiction of the split in contribution of gold mining and other mining
to the South African GDP, 1960 to 1999.
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2014), South African Chamber of Mines (2008),
Industrial Development Corporation archive, Sandton, RSA and Jones (2002).
119James (1992, p. 22) notes that by 1987 one in five mines was producing gold at a price that exceeded
the market price, and reacted by introducing programmes of rationalisation.
120The balance of payment, sanctions and national debt crisis are discussed in Chapter 3.
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South Africa’s economy faced the challenge of increasing unemployment, declining labour
intensity, and a withdrawal of foreign investment. A rising labour surplus in the homelands
threatened to overrun the institutions of control.121 This is further echoed by Greenberg
(1987), noting how after two decades of increasing labour control, the 1980s necessitated
yet more control. These draconian influx control measures and low labour productivity
meant domestic industries had been replacing labour-intensive processes with capital
equipment. Appendix B, Figure B.5 shows the historical decline of labour intensity
within South African manufacturing.122
The desperation for homeland employment was also evident in the fierce debates recorded
in the Hansard. The Minister of Co-operation is quoted as saying “the only road to labour
stability and African development is the support for labour-intensive manufacturing [...]
this depended on labour-intensive industry to take the jobs to the homelands, and would
require international investment in manufacturing industries.”123
The failure to attract foreign investment to the homelands was conspicuous. By 1978
there were fewer than 2,000 manufacturing jobs in foreign controlled enterprises within all
the Homeland areas. This was in stark contrast to the rest of the country. For example,
South Africa had 10 % of all British foreign direct investment, a significant statistical
benchmark before embarking on Phase 3.124 However Rogerson (1987) explained that
historically, western investment had not been channelled towards the homelands, but
rather urban areas where industry first emerged alongside mining.
Analysis of Table 2.6 below highlights the dominance of the foreign-owned manufacturing
plants. In excess of 350,000 manufacturing jobs across 1,284 plants were held by foreign
owned enterprises. This represented 25 % of all manufacturing employment in the country
at 1979.125 At the end of 1979 this equated to 59 % of all existing western inward FDI
stock invested in the country. Furthermore, this view can be supported by the recently
declassified 1980 Whitehall report on sanctions entitled “United Kingdom’s interests in
Southern Africa.”126 It estimated that 50,000 British home market jobs were directly
related to South African industry with exports to the South Africa market accounting
for £ 711 million and imports totalling £ 554 million per annum.127
121 Greenberg (1987, p. 143) explains that labour bureaus under the control of local authorities proved
insufficient. The laws and regulations were incomplete, unevenly implemented and the bureaucratic
machinery understaffed and overrun.
122Feinstein (2005, p. 245) explains that output per worker was between 50 % and 75 % of other
developing countries.
123Hansard, 1st of July, 1979, Vol 100, p. 2325, Minister of Cooperation and Development.
124Declassified Government Report:“United Kingdom’s Interests in Southern Africa”, The Secretaries,
Defence and Overseas Policy Committee: Robert Armstrong and RL Wade-Grey. Declassified Report
(1980) The National Archive, Kew, UK. Declassified in 2011.
125Industrial Development Corporation Archive, Sandton, RSA.
126The Secretaries, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee: Robert Armstrong and RL Wade-Grey.
Declassified Report (1980, p. 37 - 49)
127The Secretaries, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee: Robert Armstrong and RL Wade-Grey.
Declassified Report (1980, p. 51) These are confirmed by bilateral statistics assembled in Chapter 4.3.
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RIDP%incentives,%Western%European%investment%had%been%the%primary%source%of%capital% in% the% manufacturing% sector.% This% is% demonstrated% in% Table% 2,% which%summarises% the% longAestablished% industrial% partner’s% in% South% Africa% prior% to%rapid% stagnation% and% disinvestment% in% the% 1980’s.% Rogerson% (1987)% explained%that% historically,% western% investment% had% not% been% channelled% towards% the%homelands,%but%rather%the%main%urban%areas%where%industry%first%emerged%along%with%the%mining%sector.%The%declining%scale%of%western%investment%highlights%the%extent% to%which% Taiwanese% investment% inflows% have% been% underreported.% This%metric% is% an% important% benchmark% against% which% to% measure% the% rise% of%Taiwanese% foreign% direct% investment% inflow% through% the% period% against% the%decline%of%South%Africa’s%traditional%partners.%
!
!!!!!!!!!!EXISTING!WESTERN!INWARD!FDI!STOCK,!CIRCA!1979!
%
Enterprises! %!Per!country! Plants!
!
Employment!
United%Kingdom% 551% 59% 767% % 210,186%United%States% 228% 25% 304% % 95,818%West%Germany% 67% 7% 90% % 25,932%Switzerland% 21% 2% 36% % 9,583%France% 18% 2% 24% % 7,575%Netherlands% 15% 2% 21% % 10,409%Other% 30% 3% 42% % 17,596%!
TOTAL!
!
930!
!
100!
!
1284!
!
!
377,099!
!
TABLE!2:!A%compilation%of%the%principal% inbound%Western%investment%countries%at%the%end%of%1979,%the%same%year%Taiwanese%investment%escalates.%%%
SOURCE:! Industrial% Development% Corporation% Archive,% Sandton,% RSA% &% The% National%Archives,% Pretoria,% RSA.% Includes% estimates% from% Rogerson% (1982),% “Multinational%corporations%in%southern%Africa:%a%spatial%perspective”.%%%%%%%
Table 2.6: Inbound western investment sources at the end of 1979.
Source: Industrial Development Corporation Archive, Sandton, RSA & The National Archives,
Pretoria, RSA & estimates from Rogerson (1982).
The final period of decentralisation coincided with the political appointment of Pieter G.
J. Koornhof at the end of 1978. Koornhof was reshuﬄed to a new position as Minister
of Co-operation and Development from the Ministry of Bantu Education. An Oxford-
0educated Rhodes scholar, Koornhof was the central policy architect in revamping the
programme. Like his predecessor Tomlinson, who oversaw the creation of decentralisation,
Koornhof was a man of political and economic contradictions who would eventually
witness its demise.128 However he possessed the necessary political will to catalyse both
a financial and structural change in the last revision of a process designed to artificially
industrialise the African homelands.129
This began in 1979 at the Carlton Conference in Johannesburg with both government
and industry participating in drafting a decentralisation programme. After a two-year
process of consultation and revised legalisation, the “The Industrial Development Report
for South Africa” was released in 1982. Commonly referred to as ‘The Good Hope Plan’,
it witnesses extraordinary change in decentralisation policies which are discussed next.130
128While politically motivating for decentralisation and influx control, his doctoral dissertation at Oxford
focused on the inevitable urbanisation of black people in Africa. Mail & Guardian (11/15/2007): A Man
of Contradictions.
129Greenberg (1987, p. 389) noted how at The National Press Club in Washington, Koornhof proclaimed
that “apartheid is dead” demonstrating the political freedom he possessed to change homeland policies.
130The programme was launched at the the Good Hope Centre in Cape Town, hence its title.
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The Good Hope Plan
The revised third version of the RIDP policies advocated the creation of eight regional de-
velopment zones (A - G), depicted in Figure 2.6. In contrast to ‘separate development’131
which was exemplified by the policies of the previous phases, the government “recognised
that South Africa consisted of an integrated economic system and that economic develop-
ment needed to take place across the homelands to prevent instability.”132 Urgent change
came as decentralisation of industry transitioned to regional development, representing a
substantial shift in political rhetoric. These new policies laid the foundation for large-scale
direct investment into the homelands by both domestic and foreign firms.
Figure 2.6: Map depicts the introduction of RIDP development Zones (A - G) allowing for
individualisation of investment incentives and separate industrialisation management.
Source: Digitised by the author using the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry reports and
planning commission maps. The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA.
131Interestingly Lombard (1978, p.12) a member of the Bureau of Economic Policy at Pretoria University,
with numerous Afrikaans business and government connections noted that “separate development has
become sinking development.” He later had his office bombed by right-wing militia in 1980.
132Morris (1983, p. 273)
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Of pivotal significance was the creation of these eight development regions which
broadly reflected the provincial borders of South Africa and the independent or pseudo-
independent homelands. Dewar, Todes and Watson (1986, p. 365) note that for the first
time, the economic interdependence of the Bantustans and South Africa, and the non-
viability of the Bantustan areas was acknowledged in policy. Industrial decentralisation
was thus more actively pursued than ever before and incentives were significantly in-
creased. The magnitude and duration of each industrial subsidy were to differ depending
on the development requirement across the eight regions. A growing recognition that
the physical infrastructure ‘pull’ and legislative ‘push’ was not sufficient to decentralise
businesses. The growing focus on financial incentives was imminent and subsequently
intimated in a speech by the Minister at the University of Cape Town in 1980:
“The question of decentralisation concessions is a somewhat thorny one and
I obviously cannot go into detail now, but I want to say that the government
is looking at the question, and considering various possibilities to make the
whole concessions package more attractive to potential investors. I personally
feel that the concessions could place more emphasis hither thereto on labour-
intensive industries and dangle a really large carrot in front of businesses of
that type.”133
Between the Carlton and Good Hope conferences, the Botha government commissioned
a study group to examine the application of labour-intensive incentives. Vetted by
Koornhof, the “Panel of Experts” constituted a broad range of economic and policy
agendas. For example, the Study Group on Industrial Development Strategy (1983)
notes that they “received memoranda from a large number of bodies in the public and
private sectors. Special interviews were held with some of them including SA Federated
Chamber of Industries (FCI), the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation, the
Associated Chamber of Commerce, the Afrikaans Handelsinstituut (AHI), the Industrial
Development Corporation (IDC), ISCOR, SASOL, the SA Railways and ARMSCOR.
Certain individuals from the private sector also gave evidence before the Study Group.”134
This broader business consultation stands in contrast to prior phases. Amongst the
National Party loyalists were the Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industry, Dr
S.J. Cleu and Dr S. Brand the economic advisor to the Prime Minster, while industrial
representation came from Dr A. Hammond-Tooke, special advisor and chief economist of
the Federated Chamber of Industries.135 It is important to note the constituents of this
133“Speech by Dr, the Honourable P.G.J Koornhof at the Advanced Management Programme of the
Graduate School of Business of the University of Cape Town, January 1980. The National Archive,
Pretoria. TAB - 7658.
134Study Group on Industrial Development Strategy (1983, p. iv) in the National Archive, Pretoria,
RSA. TAB - 9876.
135Not to be confused with outspoken apartheid critic, David Hammond-Tooke, (Professor Emeritus).
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study group. They were the principal advisors recommending an expansion of incentives,
and therefore renewed industrial decentralisation policy for the homelands. The inclusion
of Hammond-Tooke was an important gesture, as prior decentralisation policy had been
extremely unpopular with existing industrialists in urban centres. The citation from the
FCI in Phase 2 testified to their contempt of the states “Push” policy during the 1970s.
The Federated Chamber of Industries represented these industries, and their commercial
interests were to be included in the revised incentive packages.
The number of industrial decentralisation points and de-concentration zones was signif-
icantly increased from 64 to approximately 150 during the final RIDP period. Many
of these were in close proximity to existing urban centres to appease the business com-
munity.136 Table 2.7 demonstrates how the classification (A) and the distribution (B),
becomes broader as an expansionary policy into the homelands was deemed a priority
to stem influx and urbanisation within the white areas. Under the new plan there were
four levels of incentive: the most favourable benefits were for industrial development
points, followed by de-concentration points, other industrial points, and ad hoc cases. 137
However the most lucrative (incentives) and attractive (labour endowments) remained
the 63 existing de-concentration and decentralisation zones constructed at great expense
during Phase 2.138
Category	of		
Zone	
White	
SA	
Self	Governing	
Bantustans	
Independent	
Bantustans	 Total	
(A)	 (B)	
Industrial	Development	Point	 24	 10	 10	 44	
Deconcentration	Point	 7	 3	 2	 12	
Other	Development	Points	 48	 10	 0	 58	
Ad	Hoc	Cases	a	 71	 0	 0	 71	
Total	 150	 23	 12	 185	
a	Due	to	political	pressure	these	sites	were	granted	RIDP	incentives	on	a	year-by-year	basis.				
Nature	of	Question	 Cape	Town	 PWV	 Durban/	Pine	Town	
Port	Elizabeth/	
Uitenhagen	 N	 %	Considering	Investment	 3	 33	 34	 5	 75	 35.7	Not	considering	investment	 23	 61	 23	 27	 135	 64.3	
Total	Sample	 26	 94	 57	 32	 210	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Potential	Location	Choice:	 	 	 	 	 	Another	urban	area	 3	 12	 11	 3	 29	 39.7	De-concentration	Point	 0	 6	 7	 2	 15	 20.5	Industrial	Development	Point	 0	 12	 14	 0	 26	 35.6	Other	 0	 2	 1	 0	 3	 4.1	
Total	 3	 32	 33	 5	 73	 -----		
Table 2.7: Number and Classification of Decentralisation and De-concentration Zones between
(1978 -1984).
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (1978 - 1984). The National Archives,
Pretoria, RSA.
136South African Institute of Race Relations (1988, p. 541) noted that limited concessions were made
available at the four main industrial centres in the country to appease existing industrial interests.
137see 1986 Survey Part 1 p42).
138The capital outlay of construction is summarised in Table 2.5.
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The urgency which had swept through parliament after the Good Hope Conference
is demonstrated by steep increases in both the financial incentives and concessions
available to industrialists. The Minister of Co-operation and Development, summarised
the generosity of incentives. He noted that “[...] on average, labour-intensive industries
are 180 % better off than previous incentives [...] capital intensive industries will see a
50 % improvement over previous incentives.”139
Compared to the tax rebates and concession expenditure of the previous RIDP period
(1972 - 1980)140 which had remained roughly static, Figure 2.7 below demonstrates a
notable structural change. This begins once the Good Hope Plan was promulgated in
1982, and sees a steep rise in total incentives paid to newly decentralised industries.141
0"
100,000"
200,000"
300,000"
400,000"
500,000"
600,000"
700,000"
800,000"
900,000"
19
74
/'7
5"
19
75
/'7
6"
19
76
/'7
8"
19
77
/'7
8"
19
78
/'7
9"
19
79
/'8
0"
19
80
/'8
1"
19
82
/'8
3"
19
83
/'8
4"
19
84
/'8
5"
19
85
/'8
6"
19
86
/'8
7"
19
87
/'8
8"
19
88
/'8
9"
19
89
/'9
0"
19
90
/'9
1"
R"
'0
00
"""
(C
on
st
an
t"1
98
0)
"
Total"Financial"Concessions""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
Figure 2.7: Total financial concessions allocated to industries in the homeland zones and
de-concentration points (Constant 1980 Rands).
Source: Collated from Board for the Decentralisation of Industry, The National Archive,
Pretoria, RSA, TAB87865. The years 1971 through to 1973 have been omitted due to issues of
reporting standardisation.
139The Minister of Co-operation and Development, RSA Hansard, 21st of April, 1982, Vol 101, pg 3245
140Phase 2 incentives are summarised in Table 2.2 on page 52.
141A lag in the distribution of incentives is seen in Figure 2.7 between 1980 and 1983. This may be as a
result of the decrease in applications in anticipation of a new programme.
Chapter 2. Fields into Factories 65
The rise in concessions and new industrial legislation appears to have provided investment
autonomy for the homeland development corporations.142 By establishing the eight de-
velopment regions, with sixty-three potential investment sites, the new RIDP programme
created “inter-zone competition.”143 Under the oversight of the Board for the Decentrali-
sation of Industry, each homeland region then attempted to attract manufacturing firms
to their decentralisation or de-concentration zones.
Wilsenach and Ligthelm (1993) attributed some of the variation in homeland investment
success to differences in the effectiveness of the marketing activities by the homeland
Industrial Decentralisation Boards. Hart and Todes (1997) go further, explaining that
“the KwaZulu Marketing Initiative played an aggressive role [...] with capitalists’ search
for low-wage sites on major transport routes.”144 An example of how this may have
influenced inward investment was found in the KwaZulu Finance Corporation (KFC)
almanac. This development corporation established a marketing office in Taipei and
hosted touring industrialists promoting specific sites in the KwaZulu / Zone E area.
Primary archival evidence from the KFC showed promotional material extolling the
industrial virtues of KwaZulu. This familiar apartheid propaganda advertisement could
be found across all the development corporations with the heading of “Your Industrial
Future is Here”145 summarising the benefits to investors as follows:
1. Factories and Sites in the Industrial Estates: The Factories and industrial
sites are available on lease. The factories are available as standard or custom-built
units. The standard factories are from 1000 m2 to 4000 m2 while custom-made
buildings can be provided to suit specific requirements.
2. Finance: KFC provides financing on a selective basis against suitable securities.
3. Labour Resources: KFC’s industrial estates are situated adjacent to large
residential areas where labour is freely available. The stability of this labour is a
proven factor.
4. Consultancy: Pre-established services. These include advice on initial feasibility,
viability studies, government liaison, marketing/financial/technical and economic
analyses, assistance with legal formalities and in-depth coverage of implementation
procedures. Post-establishment support. This covers all aspects of the administra-
tion, the management of infrastructure services (such as railway shunting services),
and provision of protection and health services within the estates.
142See Appendix B, Figure B.6 shows how each region developed a corporation marketing brand and
advertising to target investment.
143The KwaZulu Finance Corporation notes in their 1983 periodical that “we now have the necessary
financial and marketing ability to attract the best firms to our infrastructure, but need to act fast before
our incumbents get to the winners first. We expect substantial inter-zone competition.”
144Hart and Todes (1997, p. 39).
145Appendix B Figure B.7 shows an archival copy of this propaganda.
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Yet with the increased incentives and concessions there was limited evidence of the
domestic firms wishing to relocate to the decentralisation zones. As discussed in the
literature section (2.3), the majority of studies focused on specific homeland sites,
highlighting the perceived unwillingness of domestic manufacturers to relocate, regardless
of the level of incentives. Table 2.8 summarises the only national firm study across major
urban areas.
Category	of		
Zone	
White	
SA	
Self	Governing	
Bantustans	
Independent	
Bantustans	 Total	
(A)	 (B)	
Industrial	Development	Point	 24	 10	 10	 44	
Deconc ntration	Point	 7	 3	 2	 12	
Other	Development	Points	 48	 10	 0	 58	
Ad	Hoc	Cases	a	 71	 0	 0	 71	
Total	 150	 23	 12	 185	
a	Due	to	political	pressure	these	sites	were	granted	RIDP	incentives	on	a	year-by-year	basis.				
Nature	of	Question	 Cape	Town	 PWV	 Durban/	Pine	Town	
Port	Elizabeth/	
Uitenhagen	 N	 %	Considering	Investment	 3	 33	 34	 5	 75	 35.7	Not	considering	investment	 23	 61	 23	 27	 135	 64.3	
Total	Sample	 26	 94	 57	 32	 210	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Potential	Location	Choice:	 	 	 	 	 	Another	urban	area	 3	 12	 11	 3	 29	 39.7	Deconcentration	Point	 0	 6	 7	 2	 15	 20.5	Industrial	Development	Point	 0	 12	 14	 0	 26	 35.6	Other	 0	 2	 1	 0	 3	 4.1	
Total	 3	 32	 33	 5	 73	 -----		
Table 2.8: Survey of domestic South African manufacturing firms considering expansion or
relocating as result of the RIDP incentives between 1980 and 1985.
Source: Wellings and Black (1986a) compiled from an unpublished progress report in Black
(1984), “Government policy and employment creation in manufacturing industry.”
Summarised above, the Black (1984) study surveyed the industrial attitudes to the
prospect of firms relocating in the Industrial Development Point (homelands) or de-
concentration points (rural-urban periphery). The results demonstrate two important
benchmarks for furthering this research in Chapter 5. Firstly there is an underwhelming
trend for existing industrialists to relocate or expand to the decentralised zones, with
only 35 % of the sample indicating they would consider relocating between 1980 - 1985.
The second noteworthy observation is that established industrialists’ preference would
have been another urban area (39.7 %) or a de-concentration point (20.5 %). These
results exemplify the disdain for which established domestic industrial manufacturers
considered relocation options to the RIDP zones. Although not explicitly stated, the
conclusion of these results was that the RIDP incentives were designed as pull factors,
yet the established industries were clearly choosing to remain closer to existing urban
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areas regardless of their generosity. However, it provides an empirical base from which
to contrast the case of Taiwanese regional investment.
Kaempfer, Lehman and Lowenberg (1987) explain that prior to the revised RIDP
incentives, Western European investment had been the primary source of capital in
the manufacturing sector. This was demonstrated in Table 2.6 which summarised the
long-established industrial partners in South Africa prior to disinvestment in the 1980s.
Turning to new investment allies, Rogerson (1987) notes that homeland development
corporations “looked to Taiwan for investment [...] that they may succour industrial
advancement.”146
FOREIGN(MANUFACTURING(INVESTMENT(
(!!!
1980(–(1985!
RIDP(
Applications(
Capital(
Investment(
Employment(
Opportunities(
Successfully(filed( Million(US$(
(
Projected(Employment((
(
( ! ! !Taiwan! 131! 194.7! 16,293!Israel! 23! 44.8! 5,020!Hong!Kong! 10! 10.8! 2,580!Philippines! 1! 5.3! 1,410!Other!Countries! 62! 37.1! 9,980!
FDI(FOR(PERIOD( 227( 292.7( 35,283(
1986(–(1992(Taiwan! 261! 1,583! 237,929!Israel! 17! 679! 6,576!Hong!Kong! 18! 34! 2,356!
FDI(FOR(PERIOD( 296( 2,296( 246,861(
( ( ( (
TOTAL( 523( 2,588.7( 282,144(!
Table 2.9: Foreign Investment Business License Applications (1980 - 1992).
Source: Board for the Decentralisation, business license applications (National Archive,
Pretoria, RSA).
Table 2.9 records the country origin of manufacturing firms applying for the Regional
Industrial Development Programmes investment licenses. It establishes the remarkable
presence of Taiwanese foreign direct investment, which came to dominate homeland
industrialisation. Pickles and Woods (1989) called attention to this rapid increase
146Rogerson (1987, p. 136)
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between 1982 and 1985. However they found that “sources of foreign investment [are]
no longer provided by the Decentralisation Boards. The information is now considered
confidential.”147 Rogerson (1987) also noted ”that contemporary investment flows [...]
are veiled in secrecy and no official data exists.”148
Using declassified archives, Table 2.9 extends the series through the years 1985 to 1992.
This provides further evidence to the substitution effect of foreign investment from West
to East. The results show that 57 % of the RIDP applicants before 1985 were Taiwanese
industrialists. These results are demonstrable of Taiwan’s importance, growing to 88
% of the applicants by 1992.149 There are noteworthy caveats to these statistics. The
Gazette on the application of industrial financing and RIDP incentives stated that, “[...]
replacement of other sources of capital, and financing for the take-over of an ongoing
concern cannot be considered.”150 As such, the unprecedented investment inflows from
Taiwan were not used to acquire existing Western investments or capital stock which were
predominantly in metropolitan locations. They were ‘greenfield’151 industrial operations
in the homelands. This was contrary to a trend during the turbulent period of the 1980s
where established South African industrialists acquired western interests at “rock-bottom
prices”152 due to disinvestment pressures in their western home markets. Moreover, the
declining scale of western investment highlights the extent to which Taiwanese investment
inflows have been underreported. The industrial relocation from the Republic of China to
the periphery of South Africa’s homeland industrial zones became critical to the success
in the final phase of apartheid.
In 1989 an evaluation by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (1989) led to the
end of the Good Hope Programme in 1992. The major failings of the former programme
identified by the DBSA panel were the excessive number of zones, and the fact that the
location of firms was not in accordance with comparative cost advantages. The existing
scholarship has therefore argued that Taiwanese investors were only enticed by incentives.
This however will be challenged in Chapter 5 where economic geography and ethnic
production networks are examined in addition to the effects of incentive variations.
147Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 510)
148Rogerson (1987, p. 136)
149Foreign Investment Business License Applications, Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI).
National Archive, Pretoria, TAB 39149 - ZA.
150Government Gazette, National Archive, Pretoria, TAB 39847 - ZA7.
151Blonigen (2008) in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics defines Greenfield Investments as “a
project, which starts from scratch” and “a form of foreign direct investment where a parent company
starts a new venture in a foreign country by constructing new operational facilities from the ground
up. In addition to building new facilities, most parent companies also create new long-term jobs in the
foreign country. Developing countries often offer tax-breaks, subsidies and other types of incentives to
boost the countries’ human capital.”
152Kaempfer, Lehman and Lowenberg (1987) explain “financial disinvestment led to a fire sale of South
African assets, South African wealth holders will sell foreign (that is, American assets) to buy back
domestic assets. As domestic (that is, South African) asset prices are depressed, however, South Africans
will greatly enhance their rate of return on their wealth.”
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Outcomes from Phase 3
The success of Phase 3 is mixed. The revised programme’s ability to generate new
labour-intensive foreign investment in the homelands was one of the few highlights.
However I have to conclude that the overall results of the project were less impressive.
Dickman (1991) notes that as a consequence of the push-and-pull legislation directed
at the homelands, the outcome was one of job decentralisation and not job creation,
as intended. Table 2.10 below summarises the total number of investments per sector,
employment levels, and the private capital invested by these firms. Furthermore, based
on the employment levels, each new job cost the national budget R 8000 in incentives.
				TOTAL	NUMBER	OF	FIRMS	IN	RIDP	ZONES	
PRODUCT	 NUMBER	OF	FIRMS	
EMPLOYMENT	
GROWTH	
INVESTMENT	
(R	‘000)	Food:	primary	 164	 6,769	 257,180	Food:	Other	 17	 498	 27,244	Tobacco	Products	 19	 432	 25,032	Textiles	 185	 14,121	 350,687	Clothing	 757	 53,068	 858,374	Leather	and	leather	products	 17	 1,533	 27,671	Footwear	 23	 21,818	 30,731	Wood	products	 243	 9,926	 185,551	Furniture	 312	 17,058	 227,958	Paper	and	Paper	products	 134	 5,127	 176,288	Printing,	publishing,	related	industry	 60	 859	 119,925	Industrial	Chemical	 167	 8,239	 286,272	Other	Chemicals	 173	 5,320	 292,828	Other	petroleum	&	Coal	Products	 1	 20	 162	Rubber	products	 17	 448	 87,254	Plastic	products	 146	 15,707	 244,431	Pottery,	China	and	earthenware	 72	 2,741	 8,471	Glass	and	glass	products	 50	 1,012	 49,803	Non-metallic	mineral	products	 205	 5,938	 105,292	Iron	and	Steel	basic	infrastructure	 59	 1,680	 73,545	Non-ferrous	basic	metal	industries	 37	 1,601	 37,891	Fabricated	Metal	products		 913	 32,047	 1,329,021	Machinery	exc.	electrical	 53	 934	 25,560	Electrical	machinery	and	appliances	 37	 1,316	 28,880	Motor	vehicles,	parts	and	accessories	 39	 1,274	 79,533	Transport	equipment	 19	 801	 19,569	Scientific	equipment	and	instruments	 11	 304	 12,602	Other	 234	 12,803	 256,646	
Total	 4,164	 214,394	 R	5,224,401	
	
Table	6:	Summary	of	RIDP	Firms	per	sectors,	employment	level	growth	(number	of	new	job)	and	total	investment	for	the	period.		
SOURCE:	 Board	 for	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 Industry,	 1992.	 	 National	 Archives,	Pretoria.		
Table 2.10: Summary of RIDP firms per sector, employment level growth (number of new
jobs) and total private investment for the period 1980 - 1992.
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry, 1992. National Arch ves, P etoria.
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In 1992 the Good Hope incentives were terminated with 4,164 firms operating across
the country. Of this total, approximately 10 % were Taiwanese-owned. A remarkable
number, considering the short time in which they had grown to be the largest foreign
investors in manufacturing. The intention of the RIDP was to generate labour-absorbing
employment within the homelands. In this regard, the RIDP appears to have been a
failure with only 214,394 additional jobs created by 1992. This is far below the estimated
300,000 that the RIDP had projected for the Taiwanese cohort alone. In comparison to
Phase 2, the employment levels within the industrial periphery had scarcely grown from
1,240,978 to roughly 1,450,000 in 20 years. All the while, the working-age population had
increased by about 35 %, to 12 million.153 Hence the RIDP failed to employ more than 11
% of the population, even when 50 % of the population resided within the homelands. In
the final annual report, the Chairman of the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry
was more defiant in claiming the success of decentralisation during apartheid:
“When considering the families supported by the [additional] job opportunities,
it is clear that the Regional Industrial Development Programme affected the
lives of literally millions of people. This achievement is even more impressive
because the industrial sector previously employed some 1.4 million people in
South Africa”154
2.5 DISCUSSION
Decentralisation drew on the international orthodoxy of regional development via state-
led growth points.155 It was based on intrinsic advantages in which industrial clusters
could form, but the apartheid state used the principle to divide a nation. The programme
first established growth poles, and then special economic zones within the homelands,
which were decentralised from the four major urban centres, and had little existing
industrial activity. However, the apartheid regime’s spatial industrial policy needs to
be seen in the broader context of the period. For example Dewar, Todes and Watson
(1986) explained that “there are few nations in the world in which the state has not
attempted to manipulate the spatial pattern of settlement to one or other political or
economic end.”156 But Bell (1986) added the key caveat, noting how “few countries
had manipulated industrial spatial locations with such intensity to bring about racial
separation on a regional basis as the South African state.”157
153Statistics South Africa, Census 1992.
154Board for the Decentralisation of Industry, Annual Report (1991). National Archives, Pretoria.
155Using policy tools and public investment to trigger a process of establishing industrial clusters that
encourage the creation of internal and external economies of scale at a few selected growth points. See
seminal authors such as Perroux (1950) and Boudeville (1966).
156Dewar, Todes and Watson (1986, p. 311)
157Bell (1986, p. 276)
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This chapter demonstrated how over 40 years, the apartheid industrial policies gave rise
to the extensive RIDP which attracted the first labour-intensive investment from Asia
to Africa. Exhibited as three phases, it constructed a new periodisation of state-led
industrial incentives. This is the first single body of research to quantify the changes
in investment and labour-intensive employment between the different time periods and
policies. Phase One began in the late 1950s and showed how the proposed plans for
decentralisation (i.e. Tomlinson Commission) differed from those implemented by the
apartheid state. Examining the context and ethos for the early decentralisation project
offered a new perspective into Tomlinson’s survey of the homelands. Tomlinson had
suggested a total of £ 104 million, while the programme fell far short of this, spending
only £ 48 million. Major investment and business partnerships between white and black
groups never materialised. The private sector only received 30 % or £ 16 million of the
designated financial aid for ‘rural development’, while the state monopolies received £ 32
million.
The lack of private investment continued into Phase Two. Fixed capital investment for
special economic zones on the periphery was preferred over political reform. However
eleven million of the fifteen million Africans resided in homelands, while industrial growth
was limited to the urban areas. With these challenges, the government implemented
coercive legislation to “push” industries to decentralise, limiting manufacturing firms
from expanding their operations in the industrial core. The financial metrics suggest that
the bulk of central government spending during this phase of the RIDP was directed to
large-scale infrastructure, as shown by growth in gross fixed capital (Figure 2.3), rather
than industrial decentralisation incentives, which remained flat (Table 2.2).
In Phase Three a renewed sense of urgency created eight regional development zones
providing more autonomy to the homeland development corporations. State subsidies
and spending escalated as the RIDP was increasingly seen as the only solution to
reduce African influx. In a process Bell (1986) called “spontaneous decentralisation”,
improved infrastructure, changing labour preferences and international competition
“pulled” industries to the zones. Moreover, the programme attracted labour-intensive
foreign direct investment for the first time. An influx of Taiwanese firms created internal
and external economies of scale at a few selected growth points. In Chapter 5 I will
examine location and firm-specific factors generating this early agglomeration.
Chapter 3
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF ISOLATION
“The Republic of China and South Africa will be able to help each other increase
productivity, cut costs and save time in economic development [...]. A strong
consensus has emerged that close and intimate cooperation between our two countries
must be explored, pursued and acted upon with all deliberate speed, especially in the
field of economic co-operation.”1
Minister K.T. Li,
Taiwanese Minister of Finance and Minister without Portfolio,
January, 1980
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The current approaches to Taiwanese and South African relations have emphasised polit-
ical isolation and sanctions as the leading factor for greater co-operation and diplomacy.
Geldenhuys (1991) noted that entering the 1970s, both South Africa and Taiwan found
themselves on the periphery of international diplomacy, becoming increasingly dependent
on one another for political legitimacy. However, in this chapter I examine more complex
economic motives that need to be considered in conjunction with political isolation.
Undoubtedly South Africa was the most type-cast of the ostracised states in world
politics.2 Colonial racist policies had evolved into formalised ‘apartheid’ following the
election of a nationalist government in 1948. South Africa subsequently descended into
full-blown pariah status, withdrawing from the Commonwealth in 1961.3
1Minister K.T. Li’s parliamentary speech to South Africa, excerpted from Free China Times (1980).
2Geldenhuys (1991, p. 121) groups South Africa with Taiwan, Chile and Israel.
3Following the ‘Winds of Change Speech’ by Harold MacMillan, the Nationalist Government had a
pre-emptive referendum, becoming a republic in 1960. Hyam and Henshaw (2003, p. 259) noted how
MacMillan described the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth as “unhappy, painful, very
sad, tragic, disastrous [...] and harped upon his sense of grief and foreboding.”
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At the same time, Taiwan was embroiled in diplomatic warfare that stemmed from
unfinished business after the Chinese civil war, which exiled the Republican Kuomintang
to the island.4 The nation’s international and economic relations were therefore a central
component of its bid for legitimacy and recognition over the Peoples Republic of China
at the United Nations. This diplomatic battle was steadily being lost following the
loss of UN representation in 1971 and the 1978 opening up of the PRC. These trends
are highlighted in Table 3.1 below, while Appendix C Figure C.1 shows the declining
UN voting outcomes as fewer countries came to recognise the ROC’s sovereign claims.
South Africa faced a similar existential crisis when the UN General Assembly formally
denounced the institutional formation of ethnic black homelands.5
It was under these adverse conditions that an increasingly dependent economic and
political relationship emerged between two unlikely allies. Focusing on the economic
motives, this chapter contextualises three distinct factors in the rise and growth of the
ROC - RSA co-operation by examining the relationship between the two countries from
the interwar period until full diplomatic engagement in 1975. Firstly, it documents
the changing political economy of South Africa and Taiwan. Secondly, it explores the
diplomatic challenges, showing how and why bilateral trade treaties were important in
securing the confidence of Asian investors during apartheid, when long-standing racial
obstacles persisted. Finally, it assesses reserve bank data, discussing how diplomatic and
economic factors prompted Taiwanese investors to hold long-term South African assets.
It concludes that not only diplomatic protection, but also trade quotas, globalisation
of labour-intensive manufacturing and lower domestic investment yields accounted for
greater engagement. This lays the foundation for the following case studies on trade
(Chapter 4) and investment agglomeration (Chapter 5).
INTERNATIONAL)RECOGNITION)FOR)TAIWAN)(ROC))OR)CHINA)(PRC))
! Republic)of)China)(ROC)) Peoples)Republic)of)China)(PRC))
1949! 46! 16!
1950! 53! 26!
1963! 58! 42!
1966! 60! 50!
1971! 62! 59!
1973! 39! 85!
1977! 23! 111!
1988! 22! 104!
 
 
As!isolationist!states!both!South!Africa!and!Taiwan!found!themselves!on!the!periphery!of!international!
diplomacy.!By!1975,!South!Africa!was!undoubtedly!the!most!typeFcast!ostracised!state.1!After!three!
decades!of!good!international!standing!which!were!out!of!proportion!to!its!relative!power,!the!country!
emerged! as! a! deviant.! Colonial! racist! politics! evolved! into! `apartheid’!with! the! 1948! election! of! a!
nationalist! government,! and! South! Africa! descended! into! full! blow! pariah! status! after! the! 1962!
withdrawal!from!the!Commonwealth.!2!
!
In!contrast,!Taiwan!was!embroiled!in!diplomatic!warfare!that!stemmed!for!unfinished!business!of!an!
8decade!civil!war!in!China.!Its!international!relations!were!a!central!component!of!its!bid!for!legitimacy!
and!recognition!over!the!Peoples!Republic!of!China!at!the!United!Nations.3!Figure!x!shows!how!this!
diplomatic!battle!was!a!steadily!being!lost,!requiring!new!and!unusual!measure!to!shore!up!support!
after!the!1978!opening!up!of!the!PRC.!!
!
It!was!under!these!conditions!that!an!increasingly!dependent!economic!and!political!relationship!with!
Taiwan,! South! Africa! is! a! fascinating! case! study! on! foreign! investment.!With! trade! and! economic!
sanctions! intensifying! and! Western! disinvestment! intensifying,! South! Africa! sought! new! and!
innovative!means!of!replacing!foreign!investment!and!technology.!
!
However,!belying!these!changes!were!significant!political!economy!factors,!which!are!of!interest!to!
investment!promotion,!protected!property!rights!and!contract!enforcement.!This!historical!chapter!
frame! three! interwoven! facets! of! the! ROCFRSA! trade:! Firstly! it! documents! how! diplomatic! links!
emerged!showing!why!trade!treaties!were!important!in!securing!the!confidence!of!investors.!Secondly!
it! discusses! the! history! of! duel! currency! exchanges! with! Taiwan,! documenting! how! the! use! of!
international! and!domestic! exchanges! rates! affected! trade!with! East! Asia.! Finally! it! discusses!why!
investors,! prompted! by! changes! in! global! trade! quotas! relocated! overseas! in! the! globalisation! of!
labour!intensive!manufacturing.!!
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1"Geldenhuys"(1989)"
2"Wade,"R.,"(1990),"Pg."6"
3"See"Appendix"D"A"During"the"period"1950"to"1990"a"dichotomy"between"the"recognition"for"the"Republic"of"China"(ROC)"or"that"
of"People"Republic"of"China"(PRC)"dictated"the"terms"of"foreign"investment"and"diplomatic"engagement."
Table 3.1: Number of Sovereign Nations Recognising either Taiwan or China, (1949 - 1988).
Source: Assembled by author (see forthcoming text on pg. 93) and sourced from Kao (1988).
4Kuomintang (KMT or 中國國民黨) governed the Republic of China between 1927 to 1948.
5The General Assembly suspended South Africa from participating in its ork, due to internatio al
opp sition to the policy of apartheid.
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3.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT
To begin my analysis, I need to contextualise both countries building up to, and directly
following World War II. In terms of their internal historical development and external
relations, South Africa and Taiwan each faced a cross-roads in 1948. Mills (1994) explains
that before 1948, the Union of South Africa was one of the most prestigious members
of the international community. Regarded as an important link of the Commonwealth
defence coalition in Africa, the country was the most economically developed, and one of
three independent states on the continent. Despite sporadic criticism levelled at it over
its administration of South West Africa (Namibia) and the treatment of its immigrant
Indian population, it remained deeply integrated with the mainstream of international
relations.6 During the interwar period, large parts of Africa and Asia remained under
colonial rule and “white domination over the non-white peoples was generally the order of
the day.”7 It was in this era of the Pax Britannica that South Africa’s domestic policies
were overlooked in favour of deeper economic and geo-political ties.8
During the inter-war period, the Chinese Kuomintang (Nationalist) government also
formed a pivotal point in geo-politics, resisting Japanese aggression in Asia, and later as
a member of the Allied forces and Pax Americana.9 Taylor (2009) notes how Chiang
Kai-shek was heralded as “the greatest soldier-statesman of our time on the Continent
of Asia”10 attending the Cairo summit in 1943 as one of the big four, together with
Josef Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Following defeat by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang government fled
from mainland China to Taiwan. In October 1949, the CCP established the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) at Beijing, while the Republic of China (ROC) relocated its
seat of government from the the mainland to Taipei. Both sides claimed to be sovereign
independent states while maintaining their political legitimacy over one another. During
Chiang and his successors’ rule, the KMT governed Taiwan for the next forty years under
martial law.
Koorts (2014) notes in South Africa that the National Party came to power through
a narrow electoral victory in 1948 which precluded Africans from the franchise. Posel
(2011) explains how this outcome was unsurprising with the political climate dominated
by an “iconography of ‘die swart gevaar’ or ‘the black menace’, a sprawling black
mass - disaffected, restless and increasingly militant - threatening to swamp the white
minority.”11
6Dubow and Jeeves (2005, p. 236) explain how the government attempted to “prise Indians out of
sectors” in which they could compete with whites, and met with international condemnation.
7Duignan and Gann (1974, p. iv)
8As discussed later, South Africa was the largest producer of gold, the “lubricant of trade”, while
its political leaders (Smuts) had played a leading role in important international activities such as the
formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN).
9General Chiang Kai-shek (蔣中正) was the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces of the Chinese
theatre during the war years (1937 - 1948).
10Taylor (2009, p. 19)
11Posel (2011, p. 325)
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Once elected to power, the National Party set about redefining the country’s relationship
with Britain, and more broadly the West. For example, British citizenship was abolished,
while ‘God Save the Queen’ was dropped as the national anthem and the Union Jack swiftly
scrapped in favour of a tricolour Union Flag.12 This sense of independence culminated in
the creation of a republic and the withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in March
1961. The apartheid project of white Afrikaner patronage required racial domination of
the majority black population. However, Geldenhuys (1991) notes that “a new post-war
international morality created an inhospitable external environment for a domestic order
built on racial discrimination and domination.”13 This new stance was seen at the very
first session of the General Assembly of the UN which publicly censured South Africa
over its domestic racial policies and control over South West Africa.14
Taiwan’s political legitimacy had come under pressure in the 1960s. At times it practised
unorthodox diplomatic tactics bidding for recognition in a process Rich (2009, p. 165)
termed “Status for Sale” which witnessed the country courting newly independent
African nations. Highlighted in Appendix C, Table C.1, Taiwan sent an average of
eight delegations to the continent each year between 1960 and 1970. These delegations
negotiated aid and trade agreements with twenty-six African nations that were directly
dependent on recognition for the ROC over the PRC.
Not until 1971, once Taiwan was expelled from the China seat at the UN, did the
relationship between South Africa and ROC formally blossom when other African
countries had became comparatively unimportant. Lin (2001), a former Taiwanese
diplomat explains how “freed from the annual diplomatic battle for the China seat at
the UN, the ROC no longer needed the African votes. [...] This gave the ROC the
freedom and opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations with the RSA for the benefit
of economic development, trade and the supply of minerals.”15 Interestingly, the former
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chien-jen Chen, gave a brief explanation to Lin:
“After the ROC was ousted from the UN, the political consideration, that by
associating with the RSA, its apartheid policies might lead the ROC to offend
other black African countries was removed, and the ROC’s foreign policy
towards the RSA was less influenced by factors of political stance. Therefore,
we established ambassadorial-level relations with the RSA.”16
12Originally flown subordinate to the Union Jack from 1928, the flag was promoted to primacy, and
reflected the colonial predecessors - of which the basis was the royal tricolour of the Netherlands.
13Geldenhuys (1991, p. 11)
14Modern day Namibia, a former German colony captured by South Africa in 1915 during the First
World War, then subsequently refusing to allow the territory’s transition to independence.
15Lin (2001, p. 65).
16Taipei Forum, The Political Situation of South Africa and ROC Relations cited in Lin (2001, p. 66).
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3.2.1 Immigration and Control
South Africa was not always in favour of publicising its links to the breakaway Republicans
on Taiwan. The Nationalist government was concerned that any overt ties to the ROC
may have antagonised the PRC, escalating support for various liberation movements.17 In
one of the very few diplomatic studies of this period, Shinn and Eisenman (2012) explain
the tensions, finding that the USSR and PRC regarded South Africa as “a major battle
ground between communism and capitalism.”18 With the PRC supporting the breakaway
Pan African Congress (PAC), and the USSR training African National Congress (ANC)
militia, both Taiwan and South Africa became evermore suspicious of the “encroachment
of their sworn enemy.”19 As such, the diplomatic relationship between Apartheid-era
South Africa and Taiwan were “strengthened politically through the fact that both states
were vehemently anti-communist.”20
However racial discrimination imposed on South Africans of Chinese descent further
complicated diplomatic ties. Voting in support of United Nations General Assembly’s
‘anti-apartheid’ resolution (No. XVII), the Taiwanese (ROC) representative spoke out
against South Africa:
“What has made racial discrimination in South Africa particularly objection-
able is that unlike other societies where efforts are directed to rooting out
such a phenomenon, South Africa has made it an instrument of national and
official policy. It is all too clear that South Africa is moving in a collision
course with African nationalism, and as time passes by, the chances for a
compromise solution are dwindling. It is not too late for the government of
South Africa to face up to the realities of the situation and reverse a policy,
which is so glaringly out of step with the progress of mankind towards larger
freedom, and so clearly contrary to its highest self-interest.21
Ethnic Chinese had encountered discrimination well before the 1948 electoral victory and
subsequent apartheid legislation. To contextualise, the migration of Taiwanese in the
1980s requires a discussion of how immigration to South Africa had its roots in racially
discriminatory policies espoused by both the pre-apartheid and apartheid governments.
These had severely restricted the movement, settlement and property rights of non-White
individuals which created the racial and institutional environment necessary for the
formation of business groups in the RIDP zones, which are analysed in Chapter 2.
17Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 511)
18Shinn and Eisenman (2012, p. 344)
19Grimm et al. (2014, p. 25)
20Grimm et al. (2014, p. 24)
21Reports on the Proceeding in the Security Council at the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations on Questions Affecting South Africa, 1963, p.19. Also cited in Lin (2001, p. 52).
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It is often forgotten that not only African, but also indentured Chinese labourers were
involved in the large-scale industrialisation of mining in South Africa.22 Following the
the South African War (1899 - 1902), the mine owners and colonial government were
anxious for new investment to restore wartime losses.23 The continued profitability of
low-grade, deep-level ores depended on depressing the average wages of African workers
on the mines to about 50 per cent of their previous levels. However the lack of Africans
willing to engage in wage labour slowed down the pace at which the mines were able to
resume production. In turn, this affected the employment opportunities of skilled white
workers, while depressing the stock markets as well as the entire Transvaal economy.
Marks (2011) explains how the mining industry’s solution to its crisis was to search out
ever-cheaper sources of unskilled labour.
Importation of Chinese indentured mine labourers to the Transvaal gold fields provided
a solution to these geological and labour constraints. However, Chinese migration to
South Africa was brief. In the thirty-three months of recruiting in China for the South
African mines, only 63,296 men were contracted, but a considerably greater number were
actually mobilised. The practice of Asian labour was swiftly outlawed in 1906 and the
indentured Chinese migrants forcibly returned.
Furthermore, both the Boer Republics segregated Asians, and in the British-controlled
Cape they were classified as “free blacks”. In 1885, the Transvaal (Zuid-Afrikaanse
Republiek) enacted the Volksraad Law No. 3 stipulating that “persons belonging to one
of the native races of Asia” were prohibited from being “owners of fixed property.”24 The
Orange Free State passed similarly draconian legislation in 1891 that forbade Chinese,
Arabs or other Asiatic coloureds from settling in its territory.25 Deep resentment for
migrant Chinese labourers was evident in their institutional and social environment:
“The Chinese was a very different subject to the kafir. The kafir was honest,
truthful, and reliable (laughter). He was reliable, he maintained, because he
had never sought to usurp the white man’s work. The moment the yellow
man was brought into competition with themselves so soon would they break
through any stipulation that might have been imposed, and seek to oust the
whites from their position (hear, hear).” 26
The racial disdain with which the Chinese had been viewed in the late 19th century
persisted into the 20th century. Apartheid then further entrenched colonial discrimination,
and during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, ethnic Chinese remained strictly controlled in
22Richardson (1977, p. 89)
23Marks (2011, p. 169)
24Tan (2013, p. 179)
25Under Section XXXIII of 1891, the Orange Free State laws stated that “Arabier, Chinees, Koelie of
andere Aziatische kleurling” were forbidden from traversing the territory.
26“The Labour Question”, The Star newspaper (weekly edition), 4th of April 1903.
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their ability to trade, or to enforce property rights.27 They remained a very small,
quiet minority in South Africa totalling about 10,000 inhabitants with limited diaspora
linkages.28 Harris (2013) explains that during apartheid, the Chinese were “not eager to
be conspicuous, [...] remaining insular and as a result [...] relegated to the periphery of
the host society.”29
Not until Taiwanese bilateral trade and investment (BITT) emerged 80 years later did
ethnic Chinese migration, under honorary white status, begin again. Following these
diplomatic changes, Taiwanese entrepreneurs developed sophisticated trading networks
and clusters to substitute for their historical economic and social exclusion imposed by
prior racial segregation. These networks and clusters are the focus of Chapters 4 and 5.
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Figure 3.1: European and Taiwanese Migration between 1961 and 1994.
Source: European - Department of Internal Affairs, Annual Reports, The National Archive,
Pretoria, and The Government Publications Library, University of Cape Town (European:UK,
Germany, France and US). Taiwanese - Migration and population series assembled from the
Board for the Decentralisation, business license applications (National Archive, Pretoria, RSA).
In contrast, the state initiated a programme to encourage the immigration of whites
to the new republic in 1961, having previously suspended the post-war immigration
programme on the grounds that it would ‘submerge the Afrikaner’.30 The inward flows of
western immigrants from the former colonial power Britain, but also the United States,
Germany and France, ebbed and flowed over the 20th century as demonstrated in Figure
3.1 above. The post-Nationalist peak was reached in 1975 with 50,337 people of European
origin immigrating to South Africa. As such, Taiwanese migration to South Africa was a
27Chai and Li (1980, p. 48) also noted how they were denied hospital treatment, strictly restrained in
trade, education, public transport, property rights and freedom of movement.
28Harris (2013, p. 197) in the “Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora” explains how “[Chinese]
having lived out a separate existence for almost five centuries in the ill-defined economic and social spaces
that colonial, segregationist, apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa left open to them.”
29Harris (2013, p. 197)
30‘White Immigration’ was initiated by then Prime Minister Jan Smuts. Cited in Posel (2011)
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discernible outlier in the latter parts of the decade. By the downfall of apartheid, 15% of
the population was legally classified as ‘white’, of which 5% reported as being born in
Europe, while 2% reported as being born in Asia (either Taiwan or Hong Kong).31 The
basis for this comparison will become important in Chapter 4.
Following the 1971 United Nations expulsion, and unified by the perceived communist
threats, South Africa and Taiwan inevitably became pressured into a more robust
economic relationship.32 However Lin (2001) noted that the “discriminatory treatment
alienated the support of the ROC general public for developing closer links with South
Africa.”33 Yap (1996) also interviewed diplomats who were often humiliated, refused
entrance to restaurants in Pretoria and turned away from white enclosures at turf clubs.34
Political sentiment toward South Africa was also negative back home. For example, Chai
and Li (1980) explained how native Taiwanese protested the racial policies of South
Africa, because of the similar hardships they had suffered at the hands of mainlanders,
while Taiwanese scholars were also “opposed to the establishment of diplomatic links
between the ROC and the RSA.”35
3.2.2 A Strong Consensus Emerges
The first overture towards greater co-operation was the signing of a formal trade agreement
in 1975, from which a number of supplementary agreements would follow.36 Publicly
overcoming this diplomatic hurdle paved the way for regular consultations between
representatives of the two countries. In the following year (1976) the consulate of each
country was upgraded to embassy level, with trade and economic relations flourishing.
The bilateral trade agreement therefore created the conditions under which trade could
expand, ensuring that Taiwanese property rights and capital flows would be covered by
the same legal status as those of South Africa’s western trade partners, employing the
following legal wording:
“Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by either country
shall be [...] unconditionally conveyed to like goods whether those are imported
or exported as the case may [...].” The contract parties shall consult each
other in respect of any measures which either of them may recommend as a
means of expanding the trade between their respective territories or solving
any difficulties [...].37
31Population census 1996 is the closest census to the downfall of Apartheid in 1994.
32Commenting in the Business Day, December (1986), the Taiwanese Ambassador to South Africa, H.
K. Yang pointed out, “South Africa and my country are joined in the fight against communism. We are
in favour of free enterprise, democracy and freedom”. Cited in Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 511).
33Lin (2001, p. 53)
34Yap (1996, p. 360)
35Chai and Li (1980, p. 48)
36Depicted in Appendix C Figure C.2
37Articles I & V, Bilateral Trade Agreement between the governments of ROC & RSA, 26th Feb, 1975.
Chapter 3. International Relations 80
As a result of this bilateral trade and investment treaty (BITT), most-favoured-nation sta-
tus was accorded to each country, and tariffs were reduced. Moreover, annual ministerial
meetings were held in Taipei and Pretoria on an alternate basis gradually strengthening
the ROC - RSA economic relations.38 As such, the trade agreement was accompanied by
a flurry of cultural, scientific, naval and aviation agreements following a state visit by
Premier Sun to South Africa in March of 1980.39
1. Agreement on the Co-operation of ROC - RSA Defence Industries.
2. Agreement on the Reciprocity of granting Most Favoured Nation (MFA) Status in
respect of navigation and Shipping.
3. Aviation (Air Transport) Agreement.
4. Agreement of Reciprocal Exemption of the Income Tax on Aviation & Navigation.
5. Agreement on the Co-operation of Science and Technology.
6. Exchange of Personnel between the ROC National Science Council and the RSA
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).
Lin (2001) notes that the six agreements not only reduced tariffs and taxation, but
also “laid the foundation of ROC - RSA co-operation in the fields of national defence,
navigation, shipping, aviation, science, technology and economy.”40 Once again these
agreements appear like two pariahs superficially justifying one another. However, they
were also the foundation for greater trust and commercial co-operation, which was
important for both trade and migration. Moreover, as the ROC’s trade with the RSA
increased, so did political-diplomatic ties, which in turn improved prevailing public
perception of South African investments in Taiwan.41
Speaking in 1980, the Taiwanese minister of Finance proclaimed that a “strong consensus
[had] emerged” and “close and intimate co-operation must be explored.”42 Yet the
question of racial discrimination remained. At the first meeting during Premier Sun’s
state visit in 1980, the status of Chinese in South Africa was raised as a priority.43
Addressing the legalised discrimination would require wide-scale reform of the Population
Registration Act (1950) and the Group Areas Act (1950) that classified and registered
South Africans according to racial characteristics.44 However, a revision of these Acts
38Office of the Economic Counsellor of the ROC Embassy, Johannesburg, July 16th - 31st (1982, p. 1).
39Agreements catalogued by Kalley (1987) and “The ROC Embassy’s Comprehensive Report on
Premier Sun’s Visit to the RSA, pp.1-10.” Cited by Lin (2001) with the original sources located at TLO
Archives, Pretoria.
40Lin (2001, p. 88)
41Lin (2001, p. 85)
42Minister K.T. Li, Taiwanese Minister of Finance and Minister without Portfolio, January, 1980
43The ROC Embassy’s Comprehensive Report on Premier Sun’s Visit to the RSA, p.1 - 10. Taiwanese
Liaison Office Archives, Pretoria, translated by Lin (2001, p. 97).
44Harris (2010, p. 155)
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would have caused complex legal implications, especially regarding the treatment of
the ethnic Indians who numbered nearly one million.45 The South African delegation
agreed that it would address “the chronic discrimination against the Chinese through
the amendment of legislation.”46 The solution proposed was that of an “Honorary
White Status.”47 Park (2008) explained that prior to this, Chinese were considered
“displaced persons” and their “precarious position, constantly exposed them to exploitation,
eviction, and prosecution, [...] making them dependent on the goodwill of landlords and
neighbours.”48 The change in legal standing allowed Taiwanese investors to move freely
and guaranteed their property rights.
Following the legal and diplomatic changes, ROC - RSA links began to grow after 1978.
Attempting to attract Taiwanese investment, a group of more than 60 businessmen from
South Africa arrived in Taipei for a week’s visit in March 1981 which later set in place
chain migration to the homelands. This was further supported in April 1981 when R.A.
van Wezel was assigned the first South African commercial attache´ in the Republic of
China.49 In addition, South African Airways began flights to Taipei using a long-range
Boeing 747, becoming one of the few countries to have direct routes to Taiwan.50
Taiwanese investment and migration escalated in several phases which are discussed in
Chapter 4. However in certain areas discrimination persisted with “apartheid snags for
Taiwanese Businessmen.”51 A newspaper clipping by the same title noted how “Taiwanese
businessmen attracted to South Africa by efforts to encourage foreign investment are
running into apartheid tangles over housing and schooling for their children.”52 In
the Orange Free State, Van der Watt and Visser (2008) noted how the peculiarity of
former colonial and apartheid laws meant Taiwanese were granted residence permits
but were not classified by the Population Registration Act. In 1983, after a special
commission investigated legislation affecting the Chinese, they were granted the same
rights as members of the white group.53 From most accounts, Taiwanese entrepreneurs
were favourable to the prospects of migrating and investing in South Africa. Although
they were constantly perceived as outsiders and excluded from formal business alliances,
their property rights and market access were upheld by the BITTs. For example, the
MP for King William’s Town, a region with large-scale Taiwanese migration championed
the entrepreneurs concerns in Parliament. Explaining how “since 1981 when he came to
parliament he had been involved in several efforts to overcome group areas problems for
Taiwanese.”54
45Accone and Harris (2008)
46Lin (2001, p. 98)
47Park (2008) explained how for the benefit of trade, the South African government had relaxed
apartheid laws for the Japanese in the 1960s. As in the Japanese case, the Group Areas Act officially
exempted Taiwanese.
48Park (2008, p. 126)
49Taiwan Today - Events during the year of 1981. Web access.
50Crawford and Klotz (1999)
51Title of Business Day article in Appendix C, Figure C.3.
52Business Day (12/06/1982)
53Yap (1996, p. 348)
54Mr Pat Rogers, MP for King William’s Town, cited in Business Day (12/06/1982).
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3.3 The Economics of Isolation
It was not until the period of political isolation that South Africa and Taiwan began to
grow diplomatic ties. However, the underpinning of both countries’ economic motives
has been overlooked in favour of international relations. The following section therefore
traces out the long-run growth path of both countries, showing how economic and market
forces encouraged co-operation. Taiwan was liberalising its economy after many decades
of growth, legislating the offshore expansion of sunset industries, while South Africa had
failed in diversifying the export manufacturing sector from the commodities complex,
and was left reeling under the strain of capital market isolation.
3.3.1 Taiwan: An Economic Miracle
Agriculture was by far the most important sector in Taiwan in the late 1940s, accounting
for twice as much of domestic product as industry and over 90 % of exports. With
the KMT’s exile to the island, the aspirant Nationalists first turned to reforming the
countryside in a “land-to-the-tiller programme.”55 Pursuing more egalitarian landholding,
Koo (1982) explains how landlords were given land bonds in kind and stocks in public
enterprise in exchange for the compulsory divestiture of their holdings.56 As a result,
the “landlord class sank into social oblivion, [...] overnight the countryside ceased to
be oppressed [...] and became characterised by a large number of owner-operators with
extremely small holdings.”57
Surprisingly, following this upheaval, Ishikawa (1967) found that agricultural production
grew at 4.4 % a year between 1954 and 1967, faster than just about anywhere else in
Asia. Impressive rice yields reached three tons per hectare, the highest in Asia outside
of Japan.58 Agriculture could now supply export markets and generate an investable
surplus for the rest of the economy. Lacking almost all raw materials, Wade (1990) notes
how trade and exchange rate policies were then used to control external competition and
induce industrial production.59 Manufacturing as a share of GDP reached 22 % by 1960,
exceeding agricultural production for the first time in 1963.60
55Amsden (1979, p. 352) explained how the same programme had amounted to sheer rhetoric in China
during the 1930s and 1940s, because would-be expropriated landlords were stalwarts of the Nationalists.
56Wade (1990, p. 92) notes that there were monopolies owned by the former colonial administration,
including Japanese-owned shares in industrial enterprises, and Japanese-owned lands, which were then
passed to the incoming KMT government.
57Koo (1982, p. 156)
58Ishikawa (1967, p. 95)
59Wade (1990, p. 92) notes that agriculture received less in domestic currency than they would have at
an equilibrium exchange rate and acted as an export tax. On the other hand, industrialists benefited
from the overvalued exchange rate in the form of lower costs of imported inputs.
60World Bank, (1990)
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With the population growing at over 3 % a year, raising living standards required labour-
intensive manufacturing.61 This was successfully achieved by pursuing export orientation
in manufactured goods, with average annual GDP expansion reaching 8.8 % per annum
between 1953 and 1986.62 Kuo, Fei and Ranis (1981) calculated that this rapid export
expansion accounted for 60 % of the growth in employment after 1970. During the
economic transition, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) played an important
role in labour-intensive manufacturing. Moreover, export expansion was inextricably
intertwined with the proliferation of small, networked enterprises resulting from the
extensive land-reform programme and redistributive agricultural policies. Wu (1988)
explained how “in the export sector, small and medium-sized enterprises are clearly
the prime mover behind Taiwan’s rapid growth.”63 Quantifying the size of Taiwanese
industrial clusters, Buck (2000) found that Taiwan’s largest firms accounted for only 27
% of exports in 1976. In comparison, small enterprises averaged 65 % of export earnings
between 1978 & 1985.64
Prior to the 1960s, there was little foreign investment in Taiwan, amounting to only
$ 2.5 million over the preceding decade.65 However the new export-oriented policies
offered incentives to exporters, attracting foreign investment from the Western countries
and Japan, drawn by Taiwan’s political stability and its “cheap, abundant, disciplined,
and educated labour.”66 The ‘Statute for the Encouragement of Investment’ 67 with tax
holidays and the creation of three export-processing zones attracted further foreign capital
that would “make it the mainspring of the local industrial development.”68 Between
1960 and 1985, foreign investment was split between overseas Chinese, accounting for
23 %, with Japan and the United States making up a further 65 %, demonstrating the
strong links to Pax America and the Chinese diaspora.69
Following continuous growth and rising living standards, Taiwan’s meteoric success of
small-scale producers had come at a price. The model was centred on low wages and
labour-intensive production, however Hart and Todes (1997) and Pickles and Woods
(1989) note that the economic triumph generated the conditions for eventual demise.
Currency pressure, labour shortages and rising land and labour costs made it necessary
to relocate industrial activity offshore, or face closure. With the economy slowing and a
large accumulation of foreign exchange reserves during the 1970s, Mai and Shi (2001)
explain how the government actively promoted Taiwanese firms to relocate abroad.
61Ho (1980, p. 235) found that an expansion of labour-intensive manufacturing was in the textile
products, plywood, footwear, plastic articles, garments, electronic products and bicycle sectors.
62Amsden (1979, p. 351) notes how “this ‘miracle’ is considered to be primarily a result of success in
export-oriented industrialisation, one of the prime economic goals of the government.”
63Wu (1988, p. 165)
64Buck (2000, p. 252) explained rural industrialisation was much faster than that of urban areas,
largely attributable to the expansion of small, family-owned export manufacturers.
65Geldenhuys (1991, p. 356)
66Gold (1986, p. 79)
67Dobson and Chia (1997, p. 63) catalogue the impact of this legislation over 40 years.
68Fitting (1982, p. 732)
69Simon (1996) explains how this was an occurrence from USAID efforts following the WW2.
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These major structural and regulatory changes to Taiwan’s economy cannot be ignored
when explaining the inward flow of capital to South Africa. Wade (1990) noted that by
the early 1970s the economy was falling victim to its rapid success. Labour-intensive
competitiveness had come under pressure due to relative New Taiwanese dollar strength
compared to its major trading partner, especially the United States dollar.70 This was
further exacerbated following the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 1974. Under the
MFA, the United States and Europe restricted imports from developing Asian countries
in an effort to protect their own domestic industries. Each developed country was
assigned a quota or quantities of a specific item which could be exported to the United
States and European Economic Community (EEC). Signalling the end of Taiwanese
state-sponsored support for labour-intensive textile and sunset industries,71 many of
the manufacturers started to look for offshore opportunities to counter rising wages and
MFA tariff exclusion.72 Given South Africa’s low levels of exports to the US and EEC,
Taiwanese firms could take advantage of excess quota capacity by moving production to
the RIDP zones under tax-incentive legislation similar to their export processing zones.
The devaluation of the rand made investments in South Africa even more compelling,
lowering the operational costs and increasing export earnings.73 This additional monetary
variable provides further evidence of the intensity and volume of labour-intensive invest-
ment in South Africa from Taiwan. Overlooked in the prior literature was South Africa’s
weakening (dual) exchange rate vis-a`-vis the rapidly strengthening New Taiwanese $.
The impact of South Africa’s commercial and financial rand system will be addressed in
the following section on page 91, however it is necessary to examine the currency impact
on the political motives for migration and investment. These motives are also supported
by anecdotal archival accounts:
“Taiwanese investment in these areas [RIDP Zones] were business deals
arising from that country’s good [diplomatic] relationship with Pretoria. But
he said that the influx was also due to their difficulties in coping with the
strength of Taiwan’s currency. And they derive great benefits from their deals
with the homelands. The Taiwanese dollar has appreciated by 40 % against
the US dollar. As a result many businesses are relocating their plants to other
countries. The strength of the Taiwanese dollar - and the rand’s weakness -
means these entrepreneurs can produce goods in South Africa for export more
cheaply than they can manufacture them there.”74
70Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 514)
71A sunset industry is an industry in decline. For various reasons governments might choose to target
unprofitable sectors that have passed their peak or boom periods through tax and subsidy penalties.
72Free China Journal (1988) found that Taiwanese textile labour costs were five times those of Malaysia,
Thailand and the People’s Republic of China.
73Fixed operational costs, often subsidised by the Board for Decentralisation of Industry, were incurred
in rands, exports in US $, while capital was accessed in NT $
74Taiwanese immigrant George Shih quoted in the Weekly Mail (1988). See Appendix C Figure C.4
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The rapid decline of the South African rand against the New Taiwanese dollar gains
momentum between 1980 and 1982 as shown in Figure 3.2. This coincided with the
final phase of the RIDP programme that introduced lucrative incentives for foreign
investment in the homelands. As the archival quote above suggests, this influenced both
migration and foreign investment in the RIDP zones. The result of the devaluation, new
incentives and political isolation, witnesses increasing capital flows to South Africa from
Taiwan, with the Bank of Taiwan establishing a presence in Johannesburg. However
the volume and asset classes in which Taiwanese investors were deploying their capital
in South Africa have not been previously examined and will be discussed in Section
3.4. Interestingly, Standard Bank of South Africa was one of 19 foreign banks allowed
to operate in Taiwan.75 With the new-found diplomatic alignment, greater financial
engagement ensued at a time when western investors were exiting South Africa.
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Figure 3.2: Taiwanese Dollar : South African ZAR exchange rate, (1977 - 2004).
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin.
The strengthening of the Taiwanese dollar against the rand was not only a result of South
Africa’s isolation, but also of a growing current account surplus and the liberalisation of
Taiwan’s monetary policy and banking sectors.76 Although not the core findings of this
chapter, three notable events are worth mentioning to provide context to the following
analysis. Firstly, in 1979 Taiwan’s central bank moved from a fixed to a floating exchange
rate, which witnessed a gradual appreciation policy limited to 1 % per day against the US
$. Kuo and Liu (1999, p. 45) note that this appreciation reached an unsettling 38 % in
1988 placing pressure on exporters and incentivising faster offshore expansion. Secondly,
75Dwyer (2002, p. 89)
76Amsden and Wang (1992, p. 23)
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interest rates were no longer fixed by the CBOC, and the banking sector moved to a
prime lending system, thus reducing returns on accumulated NT $ savings. Chen (2001)
summarises how excessive domestic savings, low interest rates and deregulation triggered
a flow of money to higher-yielding assets. Furthermore, deregulation in the banking
industry and securities markets promoted competition among financial institutions.77 Wu
and Hu (2007) also noted how the liberalisation of lending rates set by the government
encouraged risk-taking by formal financial institutions. Finally, capital mobility controls
were lifted, and foreign banks could enter the Taiwanese market. ROC nationals could
now invest directly offshore where risk-adjusted returns abroad were higher.78 These all
contributed to the offshoring of manufacturing and financial flows into South Africa.
3.3.2 South Africa: Rise and Decline
South Africa is richly endowed with minerals and agricultural land, which immediately
differentiated it from Taiwan. Exploiting this natural advantage, industrialisation
stemmed from a symbiotic relationship that emerged amongst the state, the mining
sector and agriculture through a ‘Gold Maize Alliance’ which created a very considerable
surplus for investment.79
INTRODUCTION !!!
RATES&OF&GROWTH&IN&MANUFACTURING,&GDP& &EMPLOYMENT&
Year& Manufacturing&Output& GDP& Employment&1945!&!'50! 9.0%! 2.8%! 7.1%!1950!&!'55! 7.5%! 4.9%! 5.4%!1955!&!'60! 4.6%! 4.1%! 0.7%!1960!&!'65! 9.8%! 6.3%! 6.9%!1965!&!'70! 7.4%! 5.1%! 2.9%!1970!&!'75! 5.9%! 3.6%! 3.9%!1975!&!'80! 4.7%! 3.1%! 2%!1980!&!'85! &0.5%! 1.4%! 0.5%!1985!&!'90! 1.4%! 1.7%! 1%!1990!&!'95! 0.15%! 1.1%! &1.25%!
 
Manufacturing and GDP growth rates calculated from South African Reserve Bank data. Employment 
growth rates from Statistics South Africa (1990) and (1998) !!
Late apartheid South Africa (RSA) attracted Taiwanese (ROC) entrepreneurs, capital and 
production methods through state-led industrial policy and market distortions in labour 
intensive industries. The successes and failure of this investment episode yields valuable 
lessons for scholars of both economic history and development economics. Interest in foreign 
investment, particularly with the focus on Asian foreign direct investment in South Africa 
will provide insight to historical and future developments on the African continent. 
  
The case of Taiwanese foreign direct investment in South Africa is an outlier within the sub-
Saharan region for its scale and scope. Between 1978 and 1996 as many as 100 0001 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs migrated to South Africa. A flow of capital and footloose industries 
so large that it could have been described as the flying geese paradigm which was said to 
have spawned Asian tiger economies such as Taiwan and South Korea. Fourie and Schirmer 
(2012) in their paper “The future of South African economic history” comment that “Large 
parts of the South African twentieth century economic history remains terra incognita.” This 
study was conceived as a result of the paucity of available scholarship and data during trade, 
political and economic sanctions against South Africa that coincided with Taiwan’s 
increasing international isolation. Censorship and state secrecy during the period also lead to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Total estimation of final migration was officially recorded at approximately 14,000, obtained from an interview with 
ROC Liaison Office, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, 15th of March 2012. Examination of official emigration and 
Table 3.2: RSA Rates of Growth in Manufacturing, GDP & Employment, (1945 - 1995).
Source: Manufacturing and GDP growth rates calculated from South African Reserve Bank.
Employment rates from Statistics South Africa (1990) & (1998). Also see McCarthy (1994).
77As a result Chen (2001, p. 215) noted how monetary aggregates grew at unusually high rates (e.g.
M1 growth reached 51% between 1986:Q4 to 1987:Q1).
78Patrick and Park (1994, p. 166)
79Trapido (1971, p. 309)
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Using the advantage from mining, the government pursued an active policy of import
substitution to stimulate domestic manufacturing with state investment in key sectors.80
Growth of the manufacturing sectors was particularly striking as South Africa was
becoming a notable exporter of manufactured goods through this aggressive process of
import substitution and state-directed industrialisation.81 Feinstein (2005) cites the
example of the automotive sectors, in which the government was allowed to exploit foreign
investment in exchange for import trade credits. British, German and US manufacturers
were induced to invest in assembly plants and to provide capital and expertise to develop
a domestic industry. As Table 3.2 shows, manufacturing and GDP grew rapidly, reaching
their peaks at 9.8 % and 6.3 % during 1960 - 1965, with average annual growth rates
during the 1960s of 8.6 % and 5.7 % respectively.
Bell, Farrell and Cassim (1999) note how the economy diversified, with a shift from primary
commodities towards manufacturing. Manufacturing output also became increasingly
diversified, partly due to the levelling off of gold exports. Related to this, Bell and
Cattaneo (1997) found that manufactured exports had been determined largely by
variations in the price and volume of South Africa’s main mining exports. Summarising
the proportional share of export manufactures, Table 3.3 compares Gold, Other Mining,
Services and Agriculture. These mirror the balance of trade (Figure 3.3 below), owing
to major increases in the price of gold in 1973 - 1974 and 1979 - 1980. As such, the
percentage share of gold in South Africa’s total exports increased from 29.12 % in 1972
to 45.75 % in 1980.
-	7	-		
	
2.1 Export	Tr de	and	Prot ctionisms			Edwards	and	Lawrence	(2008)	note	how	historically	trade	protection	had	seriously	impeded	both	exports	and	imports.	From	1925	to	1973,	the	government	purs ed	an	active	policy	of	import	substitution	to	stimulate	domestic	manufacturing	with	state	investment	in	key	sectors.	However	South	Africa’s	economy	depended	on	favorable	global	 commodity	 price	 trends	 to	 avoid	 running	 into	 an	 external	 balance	 of	payments	 constraints.	 It	 developed	 a	 comparative	 advantage	 in	 capital-intensive	primary	 and	 manufactured	 commodities	 partly	 because	 of	 its	 natural	 resource	endowments	but	also	because	the	pattern	of	protection	was	particularly	detrimental	to	exports	of	non-commodity	manufactured	goods.	Since	the	early	1970s	however,	the	 ec nomy,	 along	 with	 the	 manufacturing	 tagnated.	 TABLE	 1	 um arise 	 the	proportional	share	of	export	manufacture	in	compared	to	the	other	sector,	namely	Gold,	Other	Mining,	Services	and	Agriculture.	Bell	and	Cattaneo	(1997)	highlight	that	manufacturing	had	been	determined	largely	by	variations	in	the	price	and	volume	of	mining	exports.			
COMPOSITION	OF	TOTAL	EXPORTS	BY	MAIN	ECONOMIC	SECTOR	(%)	
SECTOR	 1972	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1993	Agriculture	 8.12	 7.04	 5.25	 2.58	 2.36	 3.34	Gold	Mining	 29.12	 34.17	 45.75	 38.4	 25.7	 23.96	Other	Mining	 13.47	 12.78	 13.68	 18.02	 20.82	 25.06	Manufacturing	 33.21	 29.17	 24.87	 29.68	 37.1	 34.24	Services	 16.08	 16.85	 10.44	 11.21	 14.01	 13.39	TOTAL	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	
	
Table 3.3: Composition of South African total exports grouped by economic sector.
Source: Bell and Cattaneo (1997) for the years 1972 to 1980, thereafter South African Revenue
Services for 1985 to 1993.
80ISKOR (iron & steel), ESKOM (electricity), SAPPI (forestry & paper) and SASOL (fuels &
Chemicals).
81Schneider (2000, p. 413) noted that industrialisation in South Africa was generated by a symbiotic
relationship among the state, state corporations, and the mining sector with the creation of huge state-
owned corporations, protection of domestic industries, provision of a guaranteed local market for new
industries, and state repression of labour.
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Although manufactured exports became an increasingly larger proportion of total exports,
rising from 26.3 % in 1956 to 31.4 % in 1972, South Africa never made the transition
to export-led industrialisation.82 As Feinstein (2005) explains, there were “faults in the
foundation.”83 The small size of the domestic market for manufactured goods made
it difficult to achieve scale economies. Manufacturing remained uncompetitive, relying
on tariffs, exchange control and quotas to keep foreign competitors out of the market.
Edwards and Lawrence (2008) note how this trade protection had seriously impeded both
exports and imports. As such, South Africa developed a comparative advantage in capital-
intensive primary and manufactured commodities, partly because of its natural resource
endowments, but also because the pattern of protection was particularly detrimental to
exports of non-commodity manufactured goods.
Unlike Taiwan, this encouraged firms to adopt labour-saving techniques rather than
expand labour-intensive production envisaged by the rigid programme of industrial
decentralisation which was analysed in Chapter 2. This was evident in the widening
ratio of capital deployed in manufacturing compared to that of labour, deteriorating
even further as the 1970s progressed.84 The result was that South Africa had come
to rely on commodities and capital flows to fund imports. This meant South Africa’s
economy depended on favourable global commodity price trends to avoid running into
external balance-of-payments constraints. Leading up to the 1980s, McCarthy (1994)
found that manufacturing growth was virtually non-existent, and employment creation,
as highlighted in Table 3.2, incongruent with that of an economy now associated with a
major labour surplus. Interestingly, the comparisons between Taiwan and South Africa
with regards to labour intensity and productivity were even debated in Parliament,
hinting at the first diplomatic engagements.
“Taiwanese workers in the clothing and textiles industry are equivalent to
seven South African workers, which is a perturbing comparison. Taiwan
is a country poor in resources. To a great extent it has to import its raw
material, process them, and export them again; in other words, what is actually
happening is it is selling the labour capacity or productivity of its people. In
spite of this, its growth rate over the past 10 years has usually been equivalent
to our inflation rate, and their inflation rate corresponds to our growth rate.
From the foregoing it is clear that we will have to give attention to productivity.
These are a result of poor management, inadequate training and the almost
total disregard for productivity among unskilled labour. I call for a transfusion
from Taiwan, where, in that country, productivity is a way of life.”85
82Bell and Cattaneo (1997)
83Feinstein (2005, p. 127)
84The deterioration of the capital-to-labour ratio was highlighted in the previous chapter, and also
measured in Appendix B, Figure B.5. The capital-to-labour ratio shows whether assets were purchased
to automate labour-intensive tasks. An increase in capital-to-labor ratio signals automation.
85Minister of Commerce, cited in South African Parliamentary Hansard (April 1977, p. 3768)
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Throughout the twentieth century South Africa’s trade with its former coloniser and
related western partners had played a crucial role in the growth of the economy. In
exchange for the export of gold, diamonds and an assortment of minerals, South Africa
imported capital equipment and technology. However, by the 1970s the economy became
increasingly sluggish with export trade in minerals and manufacturing declining further.86
Figure 3.3 demonstrates a small, but growing trade deficit (1972 - 1976) which ensued as
imports of capital equipment outstripped exports during times of depressed mineral prices.
As mineral exports were the main source of foreign reserves, imports were curtailed by
means of a shortage of foreign exchange and a weakened exchange rate. The graph is
intended to highlight an inherent vulnerability, which would become more pronounced
during the hight of sanctions (1985 - 1990). The reason for this imbalance may be
two-fold. Firstly, South Africa could no longer import capital goods during the sanctions
period, but the economy was also contracting, and exports therefore continued to outstrip
imports.
$0##
$5,000##
$10,000##
$15,000##
$20,000##
$25,000##
19
72
#
19
73
#
19
74
#
19
75
#
19
76
#
19
77
#
19
78
#
19
79
#
19
80
#
19
81
#
19
82
#
19
83
#
19
84
#
19
85
#
19
86
#
19
87
#
19
88
#
19
89
#
19
90
#
19
91
#
19
92
#
N
om
in
al
#U
S#
Do
lla
rs
#($
#'0
00
00
0)
!
Total#Imports# Total#Exports#
Figure 3.3: Total South African Exports and Imports in nominal US $
Source: Trade series assembled from Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, with supplementary
statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry, Garner (1994) and IMF (DOTS) direction
of trade statistics (1986 -1990). South African Revenue Services using HS codes in 1991 - 1995.
86Jones (2002, p. 115) explains that the decline of manufacturing in the 1970s was closely related to
the output and price of gold.
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Before continuing, South Africa’s experience with financial sanctions is briefly reviewed
to contextualise the importance of foreign exchange and exchange rates to the Taiwanese
investment case study. Sanctions began to take their toll in 1974, as it became increasingly
difficult to raise offshore financing for both the private and public sectors.87 First
Switzerland imposed a cap on credit extensions to South Africa.88 This was followed by
Midland Bank in 1975, halting loans to the government or its agencies, which intensified
in 1978 to all counterparties with any South African activity. Havemann (2014) notes
that the most ominous gestures came in 1978 when a number of banks in the United
States terminated all loans. Compounding this was an IMF prohibition of loans in 1978.
As a result, western investors, fearful of growing financial and political instability, began
to withdraw funds or to move it into short-term rather than long-term investments.
When global commodity markets were weak in the late 1980s, this seriously constrained
South Africa’s growth, and dulled the response of exports as the currency weakened against
its main import partners. Moreover, manufacturing exports were an important foreign
currency export earner during periods when gold production experienced downturns.89
In the period 1980 - 1985, the export growth rates of all the main economic sectors
including manufacturing declined. This was largely due to the very marked (13.93 %
per annum) decline of gold exports. As a result, the share of manufactured exports in
total exports rose in this period, to 29.68 % in 1985 in relation to imports which were
constrained by the weak currency and lack of foreign reserves.
The 1980 to 1984 period was particularly difficult for South Africa, as economic conditions
deteriorated significantly. Of particular apprehension for foreign investors and the
government was the rapid devaluation of the currency. Figure 3.4 shows how the
commercial rand devalued substantially, with the devaluation gaining momentum in the
second half of 1984.90 The crisis came to a head in August of 1985 when then President
PW Botha gave an address, dubbed the ‘Rubicon speech’, in which he was expected to
signal the dismantling of the Apartheid state.91 However this never materialised, and
the underlying message was that the Apartheid state would remain intact. The balance
of payments rapidly deteriorated, and Havemann catalogues how increasingly desperate
measures were taken to maintain economic stability as foreign capital withdrew. The most
onerous of these was the imposition of a dual currency system, which provided for two
exchange rates for the rand. A separate currency for current account transactions using
the financial rand system (ZAL), and a second currency for capital account transactions
for non-residents, using commercial rands (ZAR). Importantly for the Taiwanese cohort
87This was noted at the United Nations Centre Against International Conference on Sanctions Against
South Africa, UNESCO House, Paris - first findings on trade embargo. See the published report - United
Nations Centre Against Apartheid (1978).
88Ovendon and Cole (1989)
89A theme that reoccurs in the personal Taiwanese investment accounts as their exports were important
sources of foreign exchange reserves.
90See Appendix C, Table C.2 for a complete table of annual exchange rates.
91Waldmeir (1998)
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was that investments made by non-residents could only be sold for financial rand, and
limitations were placed on the convertibility into commercial rands (ZAR) or foreign
currencies.
The financial rand was first enforced in January 1979 to February 1983. To cope with
capital outflows following the “standstill” on foreign debt in 1985, the South African
Reserve Bank again imposed the ZAL (Figure 3.4), and at the same time reintroduced
exchange control over non-resident equity investments in the form of the financial rand
system. With the currency devaluation, the balance-of-payments crisis intensified in 1986,
as South Africa could no longer fund its imports with foreign capital flows or debt. As a
result, through the late 1980s imports declined significantly, while all available export
earnings were used to finance external debt. After 1986, a combination of rising US $
gold exports, a weakening exchange rate, and declining imports generated the balance of
trade surplus I highlighted in Figure 3.3 on page 89. 92
!R!#!!!!
!R!1.00!!
!R!2.00!!
!R!3.00!!
!R!4.00!!
!R!5.00!!
!R!6.00!!
!R!7.00!!
!R!8.00!!
!R!9.00!!
197
2!
197
4!
197
6!
197
8!
198
0!
198
2!
198
4!
198
6!
198
8!
199
0!
199
2!
199
4!
199
6!
Commercial!Rand!(ZAR)!:!UD$! Financial!Rand!(ZAL)!:!UD$! Commercial!Rand!:!Pound!£!
Figure 3.4: Annual Aggregate South African ZAL and ZAR exchange rate relative to
US $ and GB £
Source: South African Reserve Bank
92In Figure 3.3 I compiled the balance of trade across each year to highlight how South Africa’s imports
and exports were reliant on the access to foreign currency. Although the deficit in the early 1970s was
small, it shows how a small open economy such as South Africa is significantly curtailed by a shortage of
import capacity when sanctions were imposed (1980s).
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Compounding the currency devaluation (Appendix C, Table C.2) was the withdrawal of
sizeable foreign-owned manufacturers who had been an important source of exports, and
therefore hard currency.93 In 1986, the United States Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act
limited trade and discouraged foreign investors while the European Economic Community
(EEC) banned trade and investment in their entirety. European and US investors, under
political and financial risk imposed by sanctions had become “skeptical of the domestic
institutions and the enforceability of the laws as the apartheid government repeatedly
imposed states of emergency deterring foreign investment.”94 This was evident in publicly
damaging withdrawals, such as those of IBM and General Motors, who sold their South
African operations to the management of their local subsidiaries.
Responding to the export crisis, an IDC report to parliament noted, “South Africa has
succeeded in trading its strategic minerals, gold, and coal for the goods which it needed
to develop its industries, but without further manufacturing and export diversification
the situation will become terminal.”95 To counter the outflows of foreign investment, the
government began actively urging both Taiwanese and domestic businesses to increase
exports by “whatever means possible”.96 The Minister of Regional Development, the
department responsible for recruiting Taiwanese industrialists to South Africa in the
1970s noted how “[...] the imposition of international sanctions, particularly by the
RSA’s traditional trading partners have resulted in a further need for development of
new marketing methods and new exports markets.”97 In summary, South Africa was
facing an investment precipice, isolated by its international trade partners and political
conflict growing in the homelands.
Despite these challenges, Taiwanese foreign investment in South Africa escalated on the
back of the legal and diplomatic amendments. However financial liberalisation through
the 1980s, with deregulated interest rates and exchange controls have not been previously
discussed in either of the ROC - RSA diplomatic studies conducted by Geldenhuys (1991)
or Pickles and Woods (1989). In the following section a financial analysis of Taiwanese
foreign investments in South Africa during, and after the sanctions period is a quasi-proxy
for the impact of greater diplomacy and changing economic incentives.
93Selden (1999, p. 28) also notes the important role sanctions on ARMSCOR, the nationalised weapons
company, played in foreign exchange earnings from manufacturing.
94Blanchard and Ripsman (2013) document how successive ‘States of Emergency’ cast a long shadow
over the economy. The first was declared on the 20th of July 1985, initially covering the Eastern Cape and
the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) area. In June 1988, the second declaration was implemented
on a nation-wide level. The Historical Papers at the University of the Witwatersrand note, “By the
mid-1980s, South Africa was in flames, with violent resistance and escalating insurgence from all borders,
including the ones inside the country. Rural uprisings in the desiccated countryside of South Africa’s
Bantustan homelands were met by violent demonstrations within the sprawls of South Africa’s peri-urban
townships.”
95IDC report to parliament - Hansard 1986, April sitting, pg. 2467 - 3081
96Dr Gerhard de Kock, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Address delivered to SABTA
(South Africa : Britain Trade Association) in Cape Town on 8 September 1986.
97Minister of Regional Development, (1991), The National Regional Development Programme; An
Overview, pg. 70
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3.4 INTERLINKING: Economics of ROC-RSA Diplomacy
To further understand the economic incentives, I exploit the South African Reserve Bank
(SARB) register of foreign capital liabilities (inward FDI), examining the increase of
direct and non-direct portfolio flows from Asia, and then specifically Taiwan.98 By doing
so, I will show that Taiwanese investors tended to hold longer-term investments, and
had greater risk tolerance as measured by the class of assets held in South Africa.
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Figure 3.5: Regional Foreign Liabilities of South Africa, (1979 - 1997).
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin. Foreign Liabilities, Appendix S71
Figure 3.5 above graphically summarises the changes in regional foreign liabilities of South
Africa in each year from the period under review. Between 1979 and 1992 foreign capital
liabilities were reported at the regional level, i.e. European Economic Community, the
Americas, Africa, Asia, Oceania, International Organisations and unallocated. Beginning
in 1979, the first year of direct investment in South Africa by Taiwanese investors, a
rapid increase in ‘Asian’ liabilities is recorded in the capital account. Although this
cannot be directly attributed to capital flows from Taiwan, the short-term and long-term
liabilities grew from R 465 million to R 705 million in a single year (1979 - 1980).
98While other authors such as Fedderke and Liu (2002) and Smit and Mocke (1991) address capital
flight during the period 1980 to 2000, this chapter is unique. It addresses inward capital flows to South
Africa focusing specifically on Asia and then Taiwan once the data becomes available after 1992.
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It must be noted that this was dwarfed by the investments held by European (R 12,860
million) and US investors (R 5,290 million).99 However the trend during the turbulent
1985 - 1986 debt standstill shows lower fluctuations in Asian foreign liabilities, and thus
drawdowns or capital flight, which is yet to be explored. After 1992 and the lifting of
sanctions, individual country assets with South Africa can be reconciled from the SARB
data.100
Utilising these archival sources, the annual regional change in foreign capital liabilities
provides a departure point for analysing both long-term and portfolio investments from
Asia. Relevant to this study, Table 3.4 demonstrates that Taiwan was the largest
constituent of South Africa’s liabilities in 1992 holding 58 % of the ‘Asian’ regional direct
investment.
ASIAN%FOREIGN%INVESTMENT%IN%SOUTH%AFRICA%(R%MILLIONS)%
Year% Total% Japan% HK% Taiwan% Other%
1979% R"465" &" &" &" &"
1980% R"707" &" &" &" &"
1981% R"1,155" &" &" &" &"
1982% R"1,124" &" &" &" &"
1983% R"1,604" &" &" &" &"
1984% R"2,387" &" &" &" &"
1985% R"3,054" &" &" &" &"
1986% R"3,004" &" &" &" &"
1987% R"3,100" &" &" &" &"
1988% R"3,192" &" &" &" &"
1989% R"3,227" &" &" &" &"
1990% R"4,000" &" &" &" &"
1991% R"4,333" &" &" &" &"
1992% R"5,382" "R"900"" "R"1,324"" "R"3,113"" "R"45""
1993% R"4,553" "R"1,548"" "R"1,260"" "R"988"" "R"757""
1994% R"5,537" "R"2,420"" "R"1,180"" "R"232"" "R"1,705""
1995% R"7,650" "R"4,398"" "R"1,043"" "R"1,911"" "R"298""
1996% R"12,654" "R"8,332"" "R"1,095"" "R"1,920"" "R"1,307""
1997% R"20,021" "R"12,461"" "R"992"" "R"1,236"" "R"5,332""
"
" "
"
"
"
Table 3.4: Asian Foreign Liabilities (FDI) in South Africa, (1979 - 1997).
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin. Foreign Liabilities, Appendix S71
99See Appendix C, Table C.3 for all regions and monetary values.
100Despite all attempts to extract the archival data from the SARB at the country level, only regional
foreign capital liabilities could be obtained between 1979 and 1991.
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Foreign capital liabilities were reported on an annual basis allowing for the analysis of
international investment in South Africa.101 Quarterly adjustments to the capital account
reflected net changes in ownership of national assets, and thus fluctuations in foreign
investment. Within the capital account, asset classes are sub-classified as follows:102
1. Long-Term Bonds
2. Branch and Partnership Balances
3. Debentures, Loan Stock and Similar Securities
4. Mortgage and Long-term Loans
5. Ordinary and Other Shares
6. Share Premium
7. Short-term Bonds
8. Other Short-Term Liabilities
These eight investment and capital classes fall within two principal categories: (A) Direct
investments which are numbered 1 - 4, forming longer-term capital flows with greater
permanence and lower carry trade. (B) Non-direct investments which are numbered
5 - 8, suggest shorter-term or portfolio investment flows which can be liquidated and
repatriated at short notice.103 Examples of direct investments include commercial loans
and foreign direct investment (FDI). The latter takes the form of bank loans issued to
foreign businesses or governments, while the former pertains to international investments
in which the investor obtains interests in an enterprise, buying or constructing a factory.
In contrast, examples of short-term investments are foreign portfolio investments (FPI)
which are easily traded, less permanent, and do not represent a controlling stake in an
enterprise. These include investments via equity instruments (stocks) or debt (bonds) of
a foreign enterprise, which do not necessarily represent a long-term commitment.
Using this categorisation from the Reserve Bank (SARB) capital register for Taiwan
provides insight into the form of investments that was being undertaking in South Africa
by Taiwanese nationals and banks. The results, disaggregated in Table 3.5 on the
following page, highlights that at the end of apartheid a large proportion of Taiwan’s
investments resided in longer-term assets. Given the political instability, I would not
have expected this. In the next section, I will therefore discuss these investment classes
and their interconnectedness with the political economy of ROC - RSA relations.
101Hardcopy annual and quarterly SARB reports were consulted at both the UCT government publica-
tions library and the Library of Parliament in Cape Town.
102Annual and Quarterly SARB reports.
103Categorisation of capital flows stipulated by the International Monetary Fund (2009, p. 3 - 9).
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!
ASIAN%FOREIGN%INVESTMENT%IN%SOUTH%AFRICA%(R%MILLIONS)!
Year!
Total!Asian!Investment! Total!Taiwanese!Investment! Distribution!
Direct!Investment! Non7Direct!Investment! Direct!Investment! Non7Direct!Investment! %!Direct! %!Non7Direct!
1979% R!78! R!387! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1980% R!132! R!575! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1981% R!154! R!1,001! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1982% R!236! R!888! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1983% R!227! R!1,377! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1984% R!291! R!2,096! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1985% R!304! R!2,750! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1986% R!342! R!2,600! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1987% R!350! R!2,300! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1988% R!360! R!2,389! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1989% R!254! R!2,601! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1990% R!240! R!2,200! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1991% R!262! R!4,071! 7! 7! 7! 7!
1992% R!429! R!4,688! R!410! R!2,703! 96!%! 58!%!
1993% R!868! R!3,685! R!204! R!784! 24!%! 21!%!
1994% R!790! R!4,747! R!232! R!7! 29!%! 0!%!
1995% R!1,000! R!5,700! R!542! R!1,369! 54!%! 24!%!
1996% R!2,248! R!11,533! R!306! R!1,614! 14!%! 14!%!
1997% R!5,833! R!14,188! R!877! R!26! 15!%! 0!%!
!
Table 3.5: Asian and Taiwanese Foreign Liabilities (FDI) in South Africa, (1979 - 1997).
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin. Foreign Liabilities, Appendix S71
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In 1992, the ‘Asia’ region had R 5,382 million of investments in South Africa. Interestingly,
Taiwan is found to posses R 3,113 million or 58 % of all the Asian investment in South
Africa. Of this, R 429 million is of a long-term nature, which represented 95 % of all long-
term Asian liabilities, while 58 % of non-direct short-term investments were held by ROC
nationals, companies or banks. Although the 1992 liabilities register can’t be extrapolated
across all the years from 1979, this outcome is meaningful. It demonstrates that the
majority of ROC investments had greater capital permanence, thus risk appetite for the
South African investment market. This may be a result of the significant diplomatic
amendments, which affected both the implicit and explicit protection of property rights,
contract enforcement and therefore investment promotion. Moreover, prior research
from Javorcik et al. (2011) claims that the presence of migrants can stimulate long-term
investment by promoting information flows across international borders and by serving as
a contract enforcement mechanism. Surprisingly the link between the two is a relatively
unexplored area in prior ROC - RSA literature on international relations during isolation.
Although the total value by Asian investors shows an upward trend from 1979, the growth
of these investments is borne out for the years prior to the end of apartheid. As Figure
3.6 below demonstrates, private sector investments, a sub-class of long-term investments
grew during the very turbulent 1984 - 1987 period. However from 1992, the SARB
liabilities registers once again reveals that the Taiwanese were the largest constituent of
these long-term investments, holding approximately 48 % of Asian liabilities.104
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Figure 3.6: Asian and Taiwanese Foreign Liabilities (FDI) in South Africa, (1979 - 1997).
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin. Foreign Liabilities, Appendix S71
104Annual and Quarterly SARB reports.
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Lowenberg (1997) notes how the macroeconomic environment of South Africa was
particularly volatile during the 1980s with a high current-account deficit and a growing
debt burden. Political and economic uncertainty resulted in volatile capital flows. Mohr
(1989) found that the bulk of capital inflows switched to short-term loans to the public
and banking sectors during 1975 - 1984. For example Lipton (1989) estimated that
two-thirds of South Africa’s total foreign debt of almost $ 24 billion in 1985 comprised
short-term loans. Despite the challenges, the SARB data assembled above demonstrates
that Taiwanese investors continued to invest in both long-term and short-term assets.
Furthermore, these under-utilised SARB data suggest three additional observations
complementing this chapter’s findings. Firstly the escalating investments in South Africa
coincided with financial liberalisation in Taiwan and “an expansion in credit throughout
the 1980s.”105 Secondly, lower growth and returns on capital resulted in a “search for
higher-yield investments”106 with South Africa receiving bond purchases and equity
investment by Taiwanese investors. Finally, the political and economic risks of South
Africa suggest the rise in long-term capital flows from Taiwan occurred as closer political
engagement allowed for investment and migration. Moreover, the precipitous fall of
the commercial rand in which exports were paid, versus the financial rand in which
foreign investment was conducted, offers further evidence for the inward investment by
Taiwanese industrialists seeking low-cost production centres. South Africa therefore
offered the trinity of labour-intensive incentives: cheap labour, subsidised infrastructure
and duty-free access to Taiwan’s export markets in a weak currency.107
In the following Chapter (4), I will address the rise of migration and trade between ROC
and RSA. As Javorcik et al. (2011) notes, there has been little attention devoted to
studying the effects of migrants on foreign direct investment, and my contribution will be
the first contribution in South Africa’s apartheid context. Data which I have extracted
from the SARB register of foreign liabilities, although not causal, suggests that ROC
investment in South Africa is correlated with the political economy of bilateral trade
treaties, which ensured explicit protection, but also the presence of Taiwanese migrants
that conveyed some implicit investment security. Several authors, including Lowenberg
(1997), Lipton (1989) and Lewis (1990), note that the high risk of investment in South
Africa had witnessed a persistent outflow of capital, making the country especially
vulnerable to financial sanctions. However the investment profile of South Africa was
raised by the growing diplomatic links that allowed Taiwanese investors full access to
the investments markets. Combined with political reforms that recognised Asians as
honorary whites, migration ensued, which encouraged further long-term investments,
rather than short-term portfolio flows.
105Chen (2001, p. 216)
106Leibowitz et al. (2013, p. 126 - 276)
107Puri (2007) refers to the trinity of FDI incentives.
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3.5 DISCUSSION
This chapter has charted out the long-term changes in both South Africa and Taiwan’s
economic and diplomatic relationship from 1948. Although aligned to Pax Americana,
Taiwan’s diplomatic relations remained strained, even as economic growth accelerated.
Seeking out legitimacy, it bought UN votes from newly independent countries by means
of ‘dollar diplomacy’. In contrast, South Africa had retained a key role on the global
stage until 1960, after which a steady decline in its international standing relegated it
to full-blown pariah status. Losing international recognition to the Peoples Republic of
China resulted in Taiwan’s diplomatic insecurities reverberating through all of its future
economic and political decisions. Once UN votes in Africa could no longer be bought,
Taiwan and South Africa could publicly engage in closer diplomacy without threatening
potential relations with the newly independent African states.
At the same time a convergence of economic interests between ROC and RSA gave rise
to closer diplomatic links following Taiwan’s expulsion from the UN and South Africa’s
deteriorating economic isolation.108 Forging closer co-operation, a number of pivotal
trade agreements were signed which also brought an end to formal discrimination of
Asians, thereby “improving the status of the overseas Chinese community.”109
These bilateral trade agreements created the conditions under which trade and investments
could expand, ensuring that Taiwanese property rights and capital flows would be covered
by the same legal status as those of South Africa’s western trade partners.110
However, opposition to apartheid as well as greater sanctions, had resulted in public
disinvestment, specifically in the manufacturing sectors which had become an important
export earner. In times of weak resource prices, South Africa had financed the trade
deficit through capital flows and a greater manufacturing reliance. This could no longer
be counted upon, and closer engagement with Taiwan was seen as a replacement for
western investment, while boosting labour-intensive manufacturing in the homelands.
Capital outflows and political risks heightened in the mid 1980s following the Rubicon
crisis and the imposition of a dual currency. This occurred at the same time as financial
liberalisation in Taiwan. Despite these risks, we observed accelerating foreign flows
to South Africa from the island. Exploiting new data from the SARB, an analysis of
South Africa’s liabilities (i.e inward FDI) highlights how Asian investment simultaneously
108The image shown in Appendix A, Figure A.1 highlights the peculiar nature of the relationship with
President Marais Viljoen decorating ROC Premier Sun Yun-sun, only 2 years after Chinese were officially
recognised as ‘white’ citizens.
109Taiwan Review (文章資料), 5th of January, 1980.
110Agreements were also entered into regarding civil aviation, marine transportation, tax exemption of
air and sea transport, and scientific and technological co-operation.
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expanded in very specific asset classes. Of significance, the investment flows were
constituted of long-term assets as opposed to short-term portfolios. At the same time,
western investors were moving towards short-dated debt and when the SARB instituted
a debt standstill in 1985, the capital markets collapsed. Despite this financial shock and
a deteriorating capital account, Taiwanese investors did not withdraw long-term bonds,
nor did the inward flow stop. It could therefore be interpreted that increasing diplomacy
and migration to South Africa had an impact on the risk profile of Taiwanese investors.
Unlike western investors, these migrants were actively engaged in the manufacturing
sector, and had no option of returning production to the island. Moreover, the long-dated
debt was actively invested in the real economy of South Africa, from where the additional
volatility could be compensated through increasing export trade. Building on this, the
trade-creating effects of migration and investment are examined in the next chapter.
In conclusion, the economic changes in each country cannot be divorced from the
diplomatic links. As such, the lens of diplomacy provides for a more nuanced view of
South Africa’s economic and political challenges, but also the tail of Taiwan’s growth
miracle. Monetary liberalisation, lower capital returns, and South African diplomatic
policy can’t be ignored in the processes of migration, trade and investment. The remainder
of this thesis is therefore dedicated to examining each of these topics.
Chapter 4
ISOLATED STATES, MIGRANT
NETWORKS AND TRADE
“Using their vast trading networks; businessmen, industrialists and technologists
of Chinese [ROC] extraction are playing an increasingly constructive role in the
development of a modern South Africa.”1
Minister K.T. Li,
Taiwanese Minister of Finance and Minister without Portfolio,
January, 1980
4.1 INTRODUCTION
At the start of the 1970s South Africa’s key import and export markets had maintained
their pre-eminence for many years. Three-quarters of South Africa’s bilateral trade was
with OECD countries - mainly Western Europe, North America and Japan.2 However,
in 1975 some significant changes began to occur in individual country rankings. This
was linked not only to sanctions, but also, as I will discuss, a reorientation of Asian
trade partners. Both Britain and Japan declined, and Taiwan became South Africa’s
fastest growing trade partner during the period.3 The inflow of foreign investment
and immigrants from Taiwan may have also increased the potential for manufactured
exports. To contextualise this I first examine the interdependence of South Africa’s
trade, relative to several of its larger, former ‘colonial’ and now OECD trading partners
and then the subsequent growth with Taiwan.4 Second, using RIDP migration data, I
examine the extent to which the immigration of Taiwanese investors both increased and
1Minister K.T. Li (李國鼎) notes in a parliamentary speech to South Africa that Taiwanese en-
trepreneurs have the advantage of “vast networks to expand trade which can be very constructive in
manufacturing development.” Quote excerpted from a 1980 newspaper article in the New China Times.
273 % of 1975 bilateral trade was with these countries.
3Garner (1994, p. 7) could not determine if this was a result of Taiwanese foreign investment in the
homeland RIDP zones.
4Sample Country Set: UK, Germany, France, United States, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong.
101
Chapter 4. Isolation, Trade & Networks 102
diversified trade between the two countries. Finally, using archival accounts, I discuss
the possible processes through which these changes occurred. I conclude that network
linkages helped Taiwanese investors overcome informal barriers to trade, and were able
to leverage existing business links, in turn, diversifying South Africa’s manufactured
exports.
With very few exceptions, access to reliable statistical data restricted research on these
topics during late apartheid. The quantum of bilateral trade (& migration) was classified
or omitted by government agencies as a response to UN sanctions and punitive disin-
vestment by foreign firms. Relying on estimates, prior research from Garner (1994) has
noted the methodological problems in assessing trade flows as a result of a data embargo,
and doubted the accuracy of any publicly available trade statistics during sanctions.
Using declassified trade statistics and a triangulation of two further published sources,
I assemble a new, more complete bilateral trade data series for each of the twenty-
three reported Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC)5 in the sample country set.
Exploiting this more granular SIC data, I first highlight the regional shifts in South
Africa’s trade partnerships during this period, which were underscored by the imposition,
and then later repeal, of trade sanctions. Second I categorise the change in South Africa’s
trade with Taiwan, examining the degree to which exports shifted from homogeneous
to differentiated products. With a further variable, namely an annual reconstruction
of Taiwanese migration to the homeland RIDP zones, I examine qualitative archival
accounts, questioning to what extent these migrant investors, “using their vast trading
networks”6, were able to diversify export trade from South Africa to Taiwan.
Rauch and Casella (2001) in their study of business and social networks in international
trade, explain how informal co-ethnic networks formed by migrants “like the Chinese
trading network [...] and formal business networks such as the Japanese keiretsu have
a significant impact on the volume of trade across borders.”7 This informed my thesis
chapter question, and Rauch and Trindade (2002) later used an empirical trade-flow
model to show how a network, formed by the overseas Chinese population, had a major
trade-creating effect. They found that these networks had an economically positive
impact on bilateral trade in differentiated rather than homogeneous products.8
This distinction is noteworthy. In Chapter 3, Table 3.3 on p. 87 I showed how South
Africa had historically traded homogenous, reference-price products, such as mineral
ores in global markets, while failing to develop competitive manufacturing exports.
Noting how immigrants could increase differentiated products, Rauch and Trindade
argued that the migrant effect operated through two channels. Firstly migrants reduced
information costs, as the mechanism of matching and referral services is more important
5See Appendix D, Table D.2 for the categorisation of each industrial sector in the respective groups
6Minister K.T. Li, 1980 newspaper article in the New China Times.
7Rauch and Casella (2001, p. 7)
8Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that for trade between countries with ethnic Chinese population
shares at the levels prevailing in Southeast Asia, the smallest estimated average increase in bilateral
trade in differentiated products attributable to ethnic Chinese networks is nearly 60 %.”
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for differentiated exports such as manufactured goods, which require the provision of
information regarding trading opportunities. Secondly, it improved contracting conditions
as migrant networks had an impact on trade through community enforcement or sanctions
that deterred opportunistic behaviour, and encouraged co-operation. This increased the
potential for host countries with larger migrant populations to diversify and increase trade.
Therefore could Taiwanese migrants have increased South Africa’s export trade by means
of matching sellers and improving contracting and thus making it more competitive?
Following the signing of ROC - RSA trade treaties in 1976, migration grew rapidly. As part
of a “chain migration”9, Hart (2002b) found this that large cohort of Taiwanese investors
were deeply connected to their homeland and sites across East Asia. Although not causal,
Figure 4.1 highlights how the migration to South Africa may have been accompanied by
an increase in bilateral trade between South Africa and Asia. For example, clusters of
Taiwanese-owned factories were established in a select set of the RIDP zones producing
manufactured goods for exports. These migrants brought with them product knowledge of
foreign (Asian) markets, new labour-intensive production methods, and trading networks.
Urban trading companies sprang up in major metropolitan areas to meet the raw input
demands of Taiwanese firms, and to support cross-border transactions.
Taiwanese migrant trade networks were a unique phenomenon in South Africa. Taiwanese
were easy to identify, as South Africa had previously only a very small Chinese population
before 1975, and limited bilateral trade. When official bilateral trade data was once
again published in 1994, Taiwan’s trade with South Africa was more diversified, and in
some manufacturing sectors exceeded that of its former OECD trade partners.
However, no prior research has delved into the possible causes for this shift. In one
related study, Garner (1994) noted how they “were unable to ascertain whether the
change reflected the activity of Taiwanese-owned firms, or switching activity from other
trade partners, specifically Japan.”10 At the time Garner questioned whether the change
in bilateral trade reflected the activity of Taiwanese-owned firms.11 Without the SIC
categories or country-specific volumes of trade, this research merely conjectured whether
the reorientation was a result of the RIDP firms, or merely the switching of activity from
other trade partners such as Japan. As such the combination of trade and migration
statistics can possibly provide an answer to this question.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 details the underlying
data collection and research methodology. Section 4.3 analyses the assimilated bilateral
trade data. Section 4.4 is a discussion on the evolution of trade, and the role of migrant
trade and business networks.
9MacDonald and MacDonald (1964) define this as a “movement in which prospective migrants learn
of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment
arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants.”
10Garner (1994, p. iii)
11Garner (1994, p. 6)
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Figure 4.1: Plots the growth of bilateral trade and migration between South Africa and Taiwan (1975 - 1995).
Source: Estimates of Taiwanese migration and population series assembled from the Board for the Decentralisation, business license applications (National
Archive, Pretoria, RSA). Bilateral trade is assembled from the South African Revenue Service (1975 - 1985), National Treasury (1986 - 1992), and the South
African Revenue service (1993 - 1995).
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4.2 DATA & METHODOLOGY
For this chapter I have assembled new bilateral trade and migration data for South
Africa. The collection strategy was detailed on page 24 of Chapter 1. However, I will
briefly review the methodology and importance of this new data.
Prior to 1975, South Africa mostly traded with former western and OECD trade partners
(73 % in 1975)12, with limited permanent non-European immigration. After 1980 it
experienced a very rapid increase in both Taiwanese trade and immigration. By starting
the trade data series before Taiwanese migration, this new data provides the benchmark
years to examine the possibility of a trade-creating effect of new immigrants.
Compiling estimates from statistical measures in South Africa during this time was
fraught with challenges of data availability and consistency in reporting. The changes
to bilateral trade and foreign investment were shrouded in secrecy during sanctions.
Once again Geldenhuys (1991) explained how South Africa’s financial and statistical
agencies stopped publishing trade statistics in 1986, remarking that “only a geographical
breakdown of South Africa’s international trade has been available for world zones,
namely Africa, Europe, Americas, Asia and Oceania”.13
The restrictions on trade data resulted in a skewed, but hidden view of South Africa’s
bilateral trade relationships. Annemarie van der Walt, the head of archival trade statistics
at the South African Revenue Services (SARS),14 noted in written communication, “prior
to 1992 all statistical data held by this institution referring to trade between Chinese
Taipei and South Africa is likely to be unreliable at best”.15 The reasons for this scarcity
are manifold. Certain scholars have inferred that the ‘under-reporting’ was done in
order to protect both the trading partner who sought to circumvent sanctions, or as a
direct act of data secrecy by the Nationalist Government who were under severe external
funding pressure.16 For example ? explained that much of the trade history has been
underreported with the “South African government permitting firms to withhold sensitive
data from their financial reports [...] indicating that it will not enforce international trade
practices, such as labelling the origin of goods.”17 Furthermore, much of the data has
been overlooked due to restricted access and the sheer labour intensity of reconstructing
bilateral trade series from diffuse archival documents.
12Foreign Trade Statistics 1975
13Geldenhuys (1991, p. 267)
14Institution responsible for recording bilateral trade for the purpose of tax collection.
15Per email communication dated 11/04/2013.
16See Ovendon and Cole (1989) for a synopsis on how SA circumvented sanctions.
17?, p. 276
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In addition to trade data limitations, recent migration studies have also suffered from data
availability. For example Stapleton (2015) explained how empirical research into migration
in South Africa is conspicuous in its absence. Empirical migration studies require
longitudinal data that can track individuals across time. Therefore data limitations,
especially during late apartheid have restricted any migration studies.
The Department of Internal Affairs recorded the total number of permanent residents
entering and leaving the country each month. However South Africa’s data collection was
further clouded by racial restrictions on migration and the balkanisation of homelands,
which collected their own statistics. In the aggregated national statistics, only developed
countries were recorded, while those in Africa and Asia, apart from Japan, were simply
grouped at the regional level. As such, official Department of Internal Affairs migration
statistics could not be used to quantify Taiwanese immigration. In fact Taiwanese
immigration was never recorded in the Internal Affairs statistics, which was curious, as
my research shows that they were the largest cohort of immigrants during the 1980 -
1990 period (highlighted in Figure 3.1 on page 78).18 A possible reason for this may have
been the secretive terms under which the residence permits were granted. The following
section details the sources and rationale for the trade and migration data.
The ethnic Chinese community in South Africa was a very small, silent minority prior
to 1975.19 This, however, began to change with the influx of Taiwanese investment.
South Africa was in the process of reviving the domestically unpopular decentralisation
programme during the late 1970s, which sought to shift labour-intensive industries to
the most rural African homelands.20 The RIDP attracted the attention of small-scale
Taiwanese export-oriented enterprises attempting to internationalise as a result of rising
costs and competition on the island.21 In South Africa, the Taiwanese foreign investors
offered one of the only opportunities for black homelands to attract new industries to
their zones.22 Seeking out Taiwanese investment (& immigration), successive marketing
campaigns and trade missions were sent to Taiwan and Hong Kong in an attempt to
attract capital to these RIDP zones. In doing so, South Africa revised its immigration
laws relating to residence permits and multiple-entry visas for Taiwanese. The changes
were aimed primarily at facilitating Taiwanese investment in the Republic.23
18Although South Africa had a high level of sub-Saharan migration to the mines (i.e. Mozambique,
Malawi and Lesotho) these are excluded from my statement. These were circular migratory patterns
with no permanent settlement in South Africa.
19Van der Watt and Visser (2008)
20Discussed in Chapter 2 on page 33.
21Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 510)
22Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 515) explains that virtually all of the investments were in the homelands,
while Chapter 5 of this thesis examines the agglomeration of these firms.
23Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 513)
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Demonstrating the immigration trend, Figure 4.2 graphically plots the waves of Taiwanese
migrants to South Africa against the important diplomatic, political and industrial
events. Three migration spikes corresponding to the recruitment drives and political
events can be observed. The first wave (A) followed trade missions and changes by the
KwaZulu-Natal Finance Corporation and Transkei Development Corporation (1978 -
1980), expediting visa registrations for Taiwanese enterprises. These were designed to
“welcome Taiwanese industrialists and build networks of firm collaboration between the
Development Corporation and foreign investors.”24
The second wave arrived after the announcement of the Good Hope RIDP incentives (B),
which saw a deliberate effort to increase subsidies and attract foreign investment. The
third and final large wave (C) followed the political changes in the Orange Free State
province, namely the repeal of Act XXXIII, which had prevented Chinese from settling in
the province. A marked decline in immigration (D) is seen from 1990 as RIDP subsidies
were removed in 1992 and South Africa transitioned towards democracy in 1994. The
Taiwanese population also declined due to emigration. Whether the termination of the
incentives or diplomatic links account for this is debatable.25
Although social acceptance among white South Africans towards the growing ethnic
Chinese adapted during the 1980s, a deep racial divide in business persisted.26 As a
result “boundaries and borders, both real and metaphorical, related to various Chinese
communities in southern Africa”27 Park (2008) explains that because of their small
numbers and variations in categorising Chinese, bureaucrats were often at a loss as to
what to do with the few Chinese they encountered.28
Tensions also formed between the Chinese South Africans and the newly arrived Tai-
wanese,29 while relations with the white business community remained limited to urban
areas. Van der Watt and Visser (2008) found that the Chinese were commonly perceived
to be a threat to the white small businessmen, and legal obstacles in the form of permits
and restrictions were regularly put in their way. This was not a new impediment, as the
original Chinese (Cantonese) and later Taiwanese communities in South Africa faced
a long history of institutionalised discrimination. As a result, Taiwanese immigrants
resorted to their existing transnational networks, which were important for trade and
investment.30
24The Developer, 1979, issue 2, Mthata Archives.
25The 2001 census found that the population was estimated to be 10,000 in 2012.
26Park (2008, p. 124)
27Park (2010, p. 457)
28Park (2008, p. 125) notes how “second and third generation Chinese South Africans attested to the
confusion in the day-to-day implementation of apartheid laws affecting them.”
29Park (2010, p. 457 - 458)
30Examined in further detail in Chapter 5, Hart (1996, p. 14) also demonstrated how the “original
investors were joined by small, new firms established by their own former technicians [...] who began to
subcontract to their former firms. Some of the older firms supplied credit to the new firms.”
Figure 4.2: Taiwanese annual migration and total population (broken line) between 1974 and 2000.
Source: Estimates of Taiwanese migration and population series assembled from the Board for the Decentralisation, business license applications (National
Archive, Pretoria, RSA).
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4.3 ANALYSIS
Exploiting my new, more complete trade series, the following analysis examines three
discrete elements of the changes to bilateral trade and exports.
1. First it quantifies the macro trends from 1975, highlighting regional and country
shifts, which underscored South Africa’s trade partnerships in the 1980s. This
provides the basis against which to measure OECD exports vis-a`-vis Taiwanese.
2. Second it quantifies bilateral trade with Taiwan. Using the intensive and extensive
margin of trade provides the basis for analysing the substitution effects during
sanctions.
3. Finally, using the SIC codes, it categorises the change in South Africa’s export trade
with Taiwan, examining the degree to which exports shifted from homogeneous to
differentiated products.
Each of these analysis questions build on one another. The last section then qualitatively
discusses whether the emergence of trade networks account for any observed changes to
Taiwanese exports.
4.3.1 Macro Trends
South Africa was among the leading 25 trading nations in the west.31 Direct colonial
ties with Britain, and indirect OECD ties with Germany, France and the United States
accounted for much of the export trade, which was discussed in Section 4.2. Imports
from Germany, the US, Japan and Britain accounted for 63 % of merchandise purchases
in 1975, with the remainder widely and thinly spread. As such, South Africa’s foreign
trade has been concentrated with the leading OECD states. We would therefore expect
these to persist in the export data going into the 1970s and 1980s.
It is important to note that trends in South Africa’s exports emphasise the country’s
largest export earner, namely gold (Table 4.1). Exports were highly sensitive to changes
in the price and production of gold.32 Over the the 1970s and into the 1980s, the quantity
of gold produced and exported declined. However in the 1980s, a sharp increase to $800
an ounce witnessed a windfall in the exports. Demonstrated in Appendix D, Figure D.3,
the annual nominal US $ value of South Africa’s exports to the sample group captures
these changes. However, this needs to be interpreted in the context of both a rising gold
price, mineral exports and the imposition of economic sanctions in 1985.33
31Assuming South Africa could be considered a member of the western block (Geldenhuys, 1991, p.
345)
32Annual Gold Price, Appendix D, Figure D.2
33Base metals, articles of base metal and primary mineral commodities (iron ore, coal, copper)
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Gold%and%Mineral%Exports%% Gold%Exports% Mineral%Exports% Others%Exports% Total%
1975% %30.8% % %19.8% % %49.4% % 100%%
1976% %24.0% % %29.6% % %46.4% % 100%%
1977% %29.1% % %31.9% % %39.1% % 100%%
1978% %21.2% % %29.3% % %49.5% % 100%
1979% %19.1% % %35.5% % %45.4% % 100%
1980% %25.4% % %29.5% % %45.1% % 100%
1981% %17.5% % %35.2% % %47.3% % 100%
1982% %15.8% % %36.6% % %47.5% % 100%
1983% %18.5% % %35.6% % %45.9% % 100%
1984% %11.0% % %41.3% % %47.7% % 100%
1985% %10.9% % %41.7% % %47.4% % 100%
1986% %24.2% % %31.9% % %43.9% % 100%
1987% %19.9% % %34.3% % %45.8% % 100%
1988% %20.1% % %30.9% % %49.0% % 100%
1989% %20.3% % %29.1% % %50.6% % 100%
1990% %20.4% % %27.0% % %52.5% % 100%
1991% %24.9% % %35.0% % %40.1% % 100%
1992% %24.9% % %35.0% % %40.1% % 100%
1993% %26.1% % %34.3% % %39.6% % 100%
1994% %30.0% % %27.8% % %42.2% % 100%
1995% %29.8% % %29.6% % %40.6% % 100%%
Table 4.1: Gold, Mineral and All Other Exports expressed as a Percentage of Total Exports for
the Sample Group (1975 - 2000).
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, Department of Trade and Industry, Garner
(1994), IMD direction of trade statistics (1986 -1990). South African Revenue Services (1991 -
1995).
Jones and Inggs (1994) notes how non-gold mineral exports increased in the 1970s with
the development of new mines and transport infrastructure. This is clearly observed in
Table 4.1 above. Furthermore non-gold minerals (Appendix D, Figure D.1) began to
outstrip gold exports in 1976, superseding its importance, and thus diversifying exports
further. This market diversification reduced South Africa’s vulnerability to economic
sanctions. For example, I found that that South Africa’s largest mineral market (Japan)
absorbed only 17.8 % of South Africa’s mineral exports. Geldenhuys (1991) notes that
this partly explains why sanctions were not a crippling blow to the economy when Japan,
and then the US, imposed import bans on South African commodities. A noticeable
decline of trade was observed in exports to Britain. In 1984, Britain had dropped to 3rd
place34 with the US and Japan surpassing UK exports.35
344th place if Switzerland had been included in the sample, but as they mostly received gold exports
(97 %), it was necessary to exclude the Swiss from the sample-country set.
35See Appendix D, Figure D.3 which show the nominal US $ exports to each country.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage Change in Exports to Sample Countries, Nominal US $ (1975 - 1995)
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, Department of Trade and Industry, Garner
(1994), IMD direction of trade statistics (1986 -1990). South African Revenue Services (1991 -
1995).
Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community partly explains this change, as
South Africa no longer enjoyed preferential access as a former Commonwealth member.
The US’s imports from South Africa expanded strongly just before sanctions were imposed.
However it appears that Japan’s decline in export trade with South Africa wasn’t as
pronounced as prior research from Garner (1994) had speculated. Indeed there was
a decline after 1985, but exports remained stable during the sanctions period. This
would give credence to Geldenhuys (1991) who found that a “cloak of official secrecy”
surrounded exports when Japan had not included “massive gold imports in their officially
released figure”.36
In 1975, South Africa’s annual exports to Taiwan barely reached $100 million. By 1984,
South Africa’s non-traditional Asian markets (Taiwan and Hong Kong) were becoming
increasingly important for her exports. Figure 4.3 clearly confirms the Garner (1994)
theory that Taiwan was the fastest growing trade partner and can now be accurately
estimated. It is against this backdrop that changes to Taiwanese trade is next explored.
36Geldenhuys (1991, p. 349)
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4.3.2 Bilateral Trade with Taiwan
While export trade diminished with South Africa’s traditional partners, bilateral trade
with Taiwan increased. In this section I therefore examine how exports changed by
quantifying the extensive margin (volume over time) and the intensive margin (change in
diversity). The growth in value (extensive margin), and the change in diversity (intensive
margin) could be emblematic of greater connections and deeper markets as result of
immigration. Although not causal, migration to South Africa highlights the potential
relationship between the extensive and intensive margins.
The volume of trade with Taiwan could have also have been skewed by the growth
in mineral exports and the changing US $ price of gold.37 However, to examine the
possibility that this shift in trade occurred at both the extensive and intensive margin
and not just because of minerals exports, the data is disaggregated into five main groups
using the SIC code. These categories include Agriculture & Foods, Minerals, Consumers
Goods, Capital Goods and Processed Chemicals. Confirming the hypothesis, Figure 4.4
below demonstrates the shift in export trade with South Africa, growing in all sectors.
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Figure 4.4: Exports to Taiwan, grouped by SIC codes in five primary categories.
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, Department of Trade and Industry, Garner
(1994), IMD direction of trade statistics (1986 -1990). South African Revenue Services (1991 -
1995).
37A complete table can be seen in Data Appendix F, Table F.3 which summarises all exports to the
sample group countries in nominal US $.
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Before discussing the possible causes for these changes in the next section, three trends
relating to the margin of trade can be identified. Firstly, there was continuous growth
in exports of Minerals,38 accelerating between 1986 - 1988, and again in 1990. This
is representative of the extensive margin, i.e. where trade between countries already
exists, we would expect this to continue and grow over time.39 Taiwan, prior to 1975,
had traditionally traded minerals and agricultural products in a limited quantity. We
thus observe the expansion of these export products along an extensive margin in the
trade data. However, there are sizeable shifts in the demand for mineral exports in the
periods identified above. This may suggest that other factors could account for these
shifts such as “sanction busting”40 or re-exporting41 of resources via Taiwan. Although
Taiwanese exports of minerals only represented a small percentage of total exports, the
shift is sizeable. This can also be seen in conjunction with changes to Hong Kong exports
of minerals, which could therefore support a reorientation towards Asian exports via
Taiwan during sanctions.
The second trend is a very pronounced growth in Consumer Goods42, and finally the
increase in Capital Goods, bounded between the sanction years of 1985 & 1991.43
Felbermayr and Kohler (2004) notes that when a new trade partnership is newly formed,
growth in the diversity and value of exports may accompany the newly established
relationship. It is the growth in this diversification of trade (i.e. differentiated Consumer
Goods and Capital Goods, as opposed to reference priced Minerals sold on organised
markets) that is of particular interest. As Figure 4.4 clearly demonstrates, South Africa
had very little diversified Consumer or Capital Goods exports to Taiwan prior to 1980.
Interestingly, coinciding with sanctions, only after the migration of the Taiwanese to the
RIDP zones in the 1980s, growth in these industries are observed in the trade data.
4.3.3 Trade Diversification
To quantify this second (extensive) impact I have grouped exports into two categories by
matching each Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System to a product
category: (1) differentiated goods and (2) reference-price, homogenous goods.44
For the purpose of this study, I will focus on the export side of the balance of trade as it
is the diversification from homogenous to heterogeneous that is of particular interest.45
The percentage increases in export trade is also reported against OECD ties. These are
38SIC: 5, 14 & 15 - See Appendix D, Table D.2
39Felbermayr and Kohler (2004)
40Naylor (1999) explains how various schemes to skirt South African embargoes were deployed by
strategic allies.
41Geldenhuys (1991, p. 353)
42SIC: 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 & 13 - See Appendix D, Table D.2
43SIC: 17, 18, 19, 22 & 23 - See Appendix D, Table D.2
44According to the Rauch and Trindade (2002) classification of homogenous to heterogeneous exports.
45This is detailed in the Discussion Section 4.4.
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included to provide a baseline against which the growth in a small Taiwanese population
can be compared, and are not intended to be causal. A reference price is defined as a
price that is quoted without mentioning a brand name or other producer identification.
The reason to distinguish between differentiated goods and homogenous goods is that
commodities, traded on organised exchanges, behave differently from differentiated goods.
Commodities possess reference prices in which traders can see the price differential
between two countries’ markets. However, differentiated goods carry no reference price
and therefore may hold an information premium conveyed by the possible existence of
Taiwanese production networks in South Africa. Because of South Africa’s different
economic, cultural and political environment, this information premium is expected to
be more advantageous for differentiated products, and we may then find a positive effect
for trade in differentiated goods between RSA and ROC. It is in such a case, that the
Taiwanese migrants could have engaged in a market creation for their RIDP factory
production, accounting for this growth.
!"42"!""
outweighed" the" benefits" of" accessing" the" most" industrialised" African" country." As"such"Taiwanese"trade"may"have"been"a"conduit"through"which"countries"like"Japan"accessed"their"supply"chains"located"in"So th"Africa."This"was"particularly"observ d"in" he"automotive"sector"in"which"Toyota,"GM"and"Ford"had"heavily"invest d"in"both"South"Africa"and"Taiwan.""""
PERCENTAGE)EXPORT)TRADE))
! ! %!Population!in!South!Africa!
Homogenous!
Products!
Differentiated!
Products!
1975!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA' 0.01%' 1.02%' 0.60%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries''' 2.12%' 10.86%' 43.7%'
1980!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA' 0.03%' 1.06%' 0.69%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries''' 1.95%' 6.43%' 23.69%'
1985!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA' 0.8%' 0.86%' 0.90%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries''' 1.96%' 5.49%' 17.5%'
1990!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA' 0.9%' 2.93%' 4.93%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries''' 1.82%' 7.4%' 24.98%'
1995!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA' 1.2%' 3.75%' 5.93%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries''' 1.68%' 5.98%" 26.38%"
)
TABLE) 3:) Changes" to" percentage" of" Export" trade" attributable" to" Taiwanese" migrants" and" to" former"business"and"migrants"colonial"ties."Direct"and"indirect"colonial"ties"are"grouped"as"UK,"US,"Germany"and"France."
SOURCE:) )Foreign" Trade" statistical" series" assembled" from"Foreign" Trade" Statistics" 1975" !" 1985,"with"supplementary"statistics"from"the"Department"of"Trade"and"Industry,"Garner"(1994)"and"IMD"direction"of"trade"statistics"(1986"!1990)."South"African"Revenue"Services"using"HS"codes"provided"the"years"1991"–" 1995." Estimates" of" Taiwanese" migration" and" population" series" assembled" from" the" Board" for" the"Decentralization," business" license" applications" (National" Archive," Pretoria," RSA)." Direct" and" indirect"colonial" migration" assembled" from" the" Department" of" Internal" Affairs," Annual" Reports," The" National"Archive,"Pretoria,"and"The"Government"Publications"Library,"University"of"Cape"Town"""" Examining" the" above" hypothesis" GRAPH"7" below" further" disaggregates" the"
Table 4.2: Heterogeneous & Homogenous Exports for Taiwan and to the traditional OECD
trading links (UK, US, Germany, Japan & France).
Note: Gold is excluded from homogenous commodities as exports were highly sensitive to changes
in the price and were stockpiled, skewing the analysis. Jewellery and precious stones are excluded
from the differentiated data for similar reasons, as the value outweighed the manufacturing base.
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, Department of Trade and Industry, Garner
(1994), IMF direction of trade (1986 -1990). South African Revenue Services (1991 - 1995).
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These baseline results in Table 4.2 highlight the extent to which most of South African
differentiated trade (43.7 %) in 1975 was dominated by its former OECD trade and
investment partners. However, if jewellery and precious stones are removed from the
differentiated data, this falls to 31 % in 1975 and 19 % in 1990.46
In 1975, Taiwan received 1.6 % of South Africa’s total exports, of which 1 % were
reference-price homogenous goods, such as coal and maize. While 0.6 % was considered
differentiated, of which approximately 50 % were waxes and edible oils, and 20 % were
beverages or spirits. Given that South Africa had both a large agricultural, wine and
spirit sector, we would expect this to have dominated early differentiated exports to
Taiwan, which did not enjoy the same endowments. However the extent to which these
could be considered ‘information-intensive’ and therefore preference sensitive is debatable
as wines or waxes could easily be substituted. If we move further through the time
period, the trade patterns changed in favour of Taiwanese information-intensive exports
such as electronics, textiles, footwear and specialist chemicals. Moreover, of particular
significance is how differentiated trade in traditional markets rapidly declined in the
intervening years of sanction (1980 - 1985). However, a key finding from the new data
shows that during this tumultuous timeframe, the share of total differentiated products
in South Africa’s exports escalated from 0.9 % to 4.93 % in favour of Taiwan.47
Although small in total differentiated exports, this shift is a noticeable increase. Gelden-
huys (1991) notes how by 1984, non-traditional market diversification accounted for
roughly a third of South African exports. After 1985, Taiwan appears to outstrip the
growth of all other partners, “which can hardly be coincidence that several of the countries
have also, to varying degrees experienced international ostracism.”48
A further explanation for this change could have been sanction busting, encouraged by
the complementary nature of the South Africa and East Asian economies. Taiwan and to
some extent Hong Kong were becoming re-exporters, through which other Asian nations
were receiving both differentiated and homogenous South African exports. Pickles and
Woods (1989) mentioned that Taiwan could be “a possible conduit for South African
exports in the event of comprehensive sanctions.”49 While Garner (1994) had suggested
that during these years, the risk of doing business in South Africa outweighed the benefits
of accessing the most industrialised African country. Taiwanese trade may have been a
conduit through which countries like Japan accessed their supply chains located in South
Africa. This may have particular reference to the automotive sector in which Toyota, GM
and Ford had heavily invested in both South Africa and Taiwan. The coming sections
will discuss the formation of supply-chain linkages further.
46This provides for a more conservative estimate of trade and was not removed or differentiated by
Edwards and Lawrence (2008), and is therefore a weakness of their study.
47Traditional markets were UK, US, Germany & France.
48Geldenhuys (1991, p. 353)
49Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 512)
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4.4 TRADE & MIGRATION
South-east Asia has strong ethnic business networks as part of their embedded social
capital. The links between those in East and South-east Asia have been discussed
extensively in the literature, with most attention being given to the Chinese business
networks that knit together the export manufacturing success stories in Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and parts of South-east Asia.50 Therefore, within an integrated RIDP
production network, co-ethnic Taiwanese suppliers and exporters could be regarded as
part of a broader diaspora’s social capital embedded in South Africa. Recent scholarship
has examined how these networks have also spread from Asia51 to Europe,52 the US53
and now into Africa54 Kotkin (1993) stated that “Chinese entrepreneurs remain in
essence, arbitrageurs, their widespread dispersion a critical means of identifying prime
business opportunities.”55 The South African hypothesis in therefore neatly summarised
by Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996) who noted that;
“The members of the bamboo network operate in the interstices of the trad-
ing world. They make components, manufacture for others, and perform
sub-assembly work. They are also heavily involved in wholesaling, financing,
sourcing, and transporting. The leading businessmen know each other person-
ally and do deals together, with information spreading through an informal
network rather than through more conventional channels”56
I have further disaggregated the export industries into industrial sectors in which Tai-
wanese entrepreneurs were heavily invested, exploring how Taiwanese investors con-
tributed to growth of differentiated exports. Of particular interest to this chapter is the
way that networks affect the relationship between migration and trade when the two
countries have been internationally isolated. With a further variable, namely an annual
reconstruction of Taiwanese migration to the homeland RIDP zones, I will also examine
qualitative archival accounts, questioning to what extent these migrant investors, “using
their vast trading networks”,57 were able to diversify export trade from South Africa to
Taiwan.
Migrants can provide an information bridge between two dense networks: in this case,
suppliers in South Africa and customers’ demands in established export markets such
50Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996)
51Rauch and Trindade (2002)
52Hsu and Saxenian (2000)
53Head, Ries and Swenson (1995)
54Bra¨utigam (2003)
55Kotkin (1993, p. 17)
56Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996, p. 198)
57Minister K.T. Li, 1980 newspaper article in the New China Times.
Chapter 4. Isolation, Trade & Networks 117
as Taiwan, Asia or Europe. Taiwanese migrants possessed economic, cultural and
institutional knowledge about both the home (Asian) and the host markets (Southern
Africa), in which they were able to mediate exchange, thus increasing trade above what
it would be in the absence of their migration. Although these two nations may have been
a special case, it could be argued that without migration neither would have traded to a
greater degree.
Seminal work from Gould (1994) demonstrates how immigrants’ associations to their
home country were able to foster bilateral trade linkages. These ties include knowledge
of home-country markets, language, preferences, and business contacts that have the
potential to decrease trading transaction costs, and increase market knowledge. This is
evident in the archival accounts discussed below (4.4.2). The networks themselves are
woven together with strands of information, shared contacts, sometimes finance (credit
or investment), and a degree of trust, frequently backed up by group-based sanctions. If
we conceptualise Taiwanese entrepreneurship in South Africa as “embedded in networks
of continuing social relations”58 then social capital and networks are a central tenet in
how bilateral trade expanded. The benefits derived from belonging to an ethnic-specific
group and having social ties via former employment or managerial posts facilitated trade.
South Africa was in upheaval in the 1980s. Institutionalised racism precluded migrant
Taiwanese from credit markets or domestic supply chains, while sanctions prevented access
to large export markets in Europe or North America. Greif (1994) and Dunlevy (2006)
demonstrate how private order networks substitute for weakening political institutions.
As such early migrants had to form interconnected supply chains in South Africa that
were an extension of customers in Taiwan with whom they had a relationship that could
transcend the risks associated with apartheid South Africa.
In 1981 the Taiwanese entrepreneurs in South Africa initiated their first Chamber of
Commerce (later the African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce or ATCC) to facilitate
trade and interaction between the communities. Appointing Taiwanese agents in Taipei,
the homeland development corporations also facilitated further ROC investment in the
RIDP. Hart and Todes (1997) observed that “the predominance of Taiwanese investment
in the 1980s was not just a quirk of apartheid subsidies and diplomatic ties between
pariah states, but [...] organised around familial and network forms of production.”59
The formation of network migration and investment within the RIDP zones will be
discussed next.
58Gould (1994, p. 365)
59Hart and Todes (1997, p. 36)
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4.4.1 Changes to Taiwanese Exports
The recurring findings in the literature emphasise how Taiwanese entrepreneurs provided
foreign market information to both customers and supply chains in Asia, spurring exports
in specific sectors. To explore the possibility of RIDP investors contributing to the
growth of differentiated exports, I disaggregate the export industries into the industrial
sectors in which the Taiwanese entrepreneurs operated. Table 4.3 below summarises the
percentage investment in each manufacturing sector during the RIDP zones between 1978
- 1992. Although any growth in exports cannot be directly linked to these investors60
I merely seek to observe the possibility of a pro-trade effect of RIDP investment and
exports. The possibility that Taiwanese investors may have developed as part of an
integrated supply network will then be discussed in the following section.
!"46"!"
5.1 CHANGES+TO+TAIWANESE+EXPORTS+"To"explore"how" industries" in"which"Taiwanese" investors"contributed" to"growth"of"differentiated" exports," I" have" further" disaggregated" the" export" industries" into"industrial"sectors"in"which"T iwanese"ent epreneurs"were"heavily"invested.75""
+ TABLE"4"below"summarizes"the"percentage"investment"in"each"manufacturing"sector" during" the" RIDP" fr m" 1978" –" 1992." The" results" highlighted" in" each" of" the"gra hs" below" suggest" a" n ticeable" pattern" which" follow " after" years" of" grea er"investment"and"migration76."Hence"I"graphically"observe"that"the"pro!trade"effect"of"Taiwanese" immigrants" is" possibility" greatest" for" differentiated" products" in" which"they"were"invested,"as"opposed"to"goods"sold"on"organised"markets."This"recurring"finding"in"the"literature"therefore"emphasizes"how"the"provision"of" foreign"market"information" that" the" Taiwanese" entrepreneurs" provided" to" both" customers" and"supply"chains"in"Asia"spurred"exports"in"specific"sectors.""
Manufacturer+Category+ Percentage+of+Taiwanese+Manufacturers+per+Sector+Electrical"" 11.5%"Plastics"and"Allied"Chemicals" 17.7%"Clothing"and"Knitwear" 34%"Raw"Textiles" 1.85%"Footwear" 9.62%"Packaging" 8.9%"Metal"ware" 5.5%"Furniture" 1.1%"Jewellery" 2.59%"Cosmetics"and"Toys" 1.1%"Food" 1.1%"Other" 4.81%"
+
TABLE+4:+Summary"of"manufacturing"industries"in"which"Taiwanese"firms"invested"(1978"–"1992)"
SOURCE:"Board"for"the"decentralisation"of"Industry.""National"Archive.""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""75"Jewelry"and"processed"previous"stones,"which"are"classified"as"differentiated"products"were"removed"from"the"sample"as"they"skew"the"results"due"to"the"high"value"but"low"volume.""76"Migration"demonstrated"in"GRAPH"6"
Table 4.3: Percentage Taiwanese Investment in each RIDP Manufacturing Sector (1978 - 1992)
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry. National Archive, Pretoria, South Africa.
Examining the sectors in which the Taiwanese invested and the export growth of differenti-
ated goods is particularly enlightening. For example 10 % of the Taiwanese entrepreneurs
were invested in clothing and knitwear industries. While in 1975, South Africa exported
almost none of these products (0.03 %), by 1990, 17.45 % of the exports were from
this sector. The same is observed in transport equipment (1.6 % in 1975) as Taiwanese
firms in the RIDP zones started producing OEM equipment for vehicle manufacturers.
Appendix D, Table D.5 details all sectors and exports to Taiwan over the period. Given
the possible implication of Taiwanese migration to South Africa measured in the bilateral
trade data, the next section will discuss to what extent qualitative accounts provide
additional evidence for the observed shift in trade.
60The export trade data cannot be attributed to any specific areas in the regional industrial census.
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4.4.2 Taiwanese Networks in South Africa
After the 1975 and 1978 BITTs, the Taiwanese community were racially recognised
as honorary whites, and offered the necessary private property protection under the
law. The BITTs may have created “ethnic tolerance in which the Chinese could emerge
in South Africa as a legitimate business group, free from official prejudice, protected
by trade agreement, but they were suffused in social exclusion.”61 As such, this legal
recognition did not extend to any social or commercial inclusion in the homelands or
urban centres like those in Malaysia or Hong Kong, with large Chinese populations and
Taiwanese investment.
These entrepreneurs found themselves precluded from business affiliations or social
linkages with white South Africans who dominated manufacturing and the business
communities. Furthermore, due to the deep racial divisions, entrenched by the apartheid
laws, both Chinese South Africans and Taiwanese migrants were excluded from many of
the formal manufacturing and business organisations, and prohibited from formal credit
markets. Lawrence Ting an early investor noted that:
“The industrialists initially had problems with raising finance as they were
not known to the South African banks, and by providing capital themselves
were at the mercy of South Africa’s exchange-control regulations.”62
While Charles Liao, secretary of the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce explained how
the BITTs offered little protection:
“[...] too many promises had been made to Chinese investors, and the
governments of Taiwan and South Africa could have offered industrialists
more support which meant we had to group together and find solutions”.63
This was further compounded by language and cultural divides not only between the
Taiwanese and South Africans, but also between the Chinese South Africans who in the
main originated from Cantonese-speaking areas.64 Migrants to the homelands struggled
to speak English, but had to contend with the rural settings of the RIDP zones where
Africans also spoke little English. Charles Liao summarised the early cultural and
operational challenges for new migrants in the 1970s:
61Sono and South African Institute of Race Relations (1999, p. 36)
62Yap (1996, p. 421)
63Liao C (1991), Biennial conference speech at the Chinese Association on the “The Chinese investor
in Southern Africa in retrospect and futurity”.
64Park (2010) notes that the early ancestors of today’s Chinese South Africans, were two distinct
ethnic/language groups: the Cantonese and the Hakka (or Moiyeanese), both from Guangdong Province.
These two groups settled in different parts of South Africa ,and did not mingle until well into the apartheid
period when their small numbers and apartheid laws essentially forced them to coexist. South African
Chinese did not identify at all with the Taiwanese and felt that they had given the Chinese a bad name.
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“From a densely populated Taiwan to the rural underdeveloped countryside
of the border areas, the new settlers found themselves isolated, far from
city amenities, without a place of worship and unable to purchase Chinese
provisions [...] Insufficient research on their part often led to the establishment
of factories producing goods for which there was no market in South Africa.”65
Ironically, it appears that the naivety and lack of domestic market knowledge resulted in
even greater stimulus to export their manufactured goods. The early excess production
supply, especially of textiles, could not be sold into South Africa or Africa. As such,
Taiwanese factories had to export their products back to warehouses in Asia.66 The
formation of export supply chains became the base for exports as both sanctions and
knowledge of customer preference in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan provided an easier
route to market. This began to change as they quickly adapted, or new entrepreneurs
joined the production network allowing for economies of scale producing higher-value
finished goods. The KwaZulu Finance Corporation noted in their annual reports that
many of the later entrants (after 1983) came to affiliate in domestic production networks:
“The early Taiwanese migrants who had come to the country and our devel-
opment zones had to rely on their existing home-market business relationships
to export goods. Now that hundreds more have followed, we see greater vol-
umes of finished goods being exported to markets, mostly in Asia, but also
Europe and our African neighbours. The Taiwanese export not only their
products, but customer loyalty as orders can be guaranteed from long-standing
relationships established when the island was still referred to as Formosa.”67
In later research Hart (1996) also found that the Taiwanese industrialists in Newcastle, a
small town in KwaZulu, had to rely on their existing co-ethnic business networks, using
it as an extension of factories operating in Asia. The Taiwanese immigrants leveraged
their home country (ROC) links but also links to Hong Kong, which in turn provided
export markets and enhanced bilateral trade flows between Asia and Southern Africa.
This sentiment was echoed in the minutes of the KFC annual reports, which noted how:
“Taiwanese migrants reduced both the cost and risk associated with immi-
grating to KwaZulu, increasing the net returns, and thus the probability of
more migrating to our industrial zones in Newcastle, and Indizini. They bring
not only production knowledge and capital, but customer knowledge and their
loyalty.”68
65Van der Watt and Visser (2008, p. 122)
66Yap (1996, p. 475)
67KwaZulu Finance Corporation, trade publication (1985), (check issue number in Archive records).
68KwaZulu Finance Corporation (1988) annual report, Government Publications, University of Cape
Town.
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4.5 DISCUSSION
By the end of apartheid, exports and imports (excluding services) amounted to around
40% of GDP. This was despite attempts going back as far as the UN arms embargo
of 1977, and an OPEC oil embargo in 1973 to hinder the country’s trade with the
rest of the world. During sanctions, a clearly observable increase in export trade to
Taiwan is measured in the new trade data assembled for the first time. This may merely
suggest that two nations, isolated from international relations, traded with each other
more. Building a complete trade series between Taiwan, South Africa and the traditional
export countries suggests other possibilities. This more complete data does point to the
possibility of trade, specifically homogenous reference-price commodities, inexplicably
increasing with Taiwan (& Hong Kong) and declining with traditional markets. The
homogenous exports, such as coal, iron ore and other strategic minerals partly confirm
suspicions by other authors that Taiwan was acting as a conduit for exports during
sanctions.69
However the observed increase in differentiated exports could not be accounted for by
this evidence, given that South Africa rarely produced nor traded these SIC categories
of merchandise with Taiwan, or even Asia. Exploring the possibility of Taiwanese
entrepreneurs in the RIDP zones increasing exports of differentiated goods in specific
sectors, certainly demonstrated that both investments and exports increased in tandem.
Although not causal, this suggests that Taiwanese entrepreneurs, who invested in these
sectors, were able to leverage their business links, possibly via a migrant network, and
therefore increase trade. Building on this proposition, Chapter 5, which focuses on
Taiwanese-firm agglomeration in South Africa, shows how new firms established by their
former technicians from Asia joined the earlier, original investors.
This form of pro-trade migration is indicative of the network effects suggested by the
existing economic geography literature. Similarly the existing trade literature found
a greater pro-trade effect for differentiated products amongst ethnic networks. This
suggests that Taiwanese migrants operated by providing market information across
international borders about export opportunities.
A further factor was the possibility that Taiwanese ethnic networks provided a deterrent
against opportunistic behaviour through enforcement of community sanctions. As
discussed in Chapter 3, Taiwanese entrepreneurs were very visibly outsiders in the South
African RIDP zones. Although nominally protected by the bilateral treaties and honorary
white status, institutionalised racism precluded them from engaging in formal credit or
69For example, Geldenhuys (1991) and Garner (1994) both queried the possibility of trade changing in
the eastern direction because of sanctions or Taiwanese investment.
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domestic networks. Moreover, given the unstable institutional environment in South
Africa, they operated in a close business community forming the “Taiwanese Chamber of
Commerce in Africa” thus encouraging further co-operation.
As such, it is possible that network linkages were helping to overcome the informal
barriers to trade imposed by the racial isolation and increasing risk of operating in South
Africa during a state of emergency.70 Unlike other disinvesting international firms that
could not tolerate the political or financial risks in South Africa, Taiwanese entrepreneurs
could use their co-ethnic linkages to co-operate by sharing market knowledge or credit.
This promoted an increase in exports to Taiwan, not only by signalling home market
preferences, but also by providing community enforcement that deterred violations of
contracts in a weak legal environment. For example, Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996)
noted how in Asia “if a business owner violates an agreement, he is blacklisted. This is
far worse than being sued, because the entire Chinese network will refrain from doing
business with the guilty party.”71 Similarly in South Africa, Hart (2002a) found that
some of the older Taiwanese firms in KwaZulu supplied credit to the new firms. This
would suggest a high level of trust amongst the network of suppliers and contractors in
the RIDP zones. Migrant networks not only facilitated the initial migration decision, but
also acted as a force for perpetuating migration. It became easier for potential Taiwanese
enterprises to move, given the manufacturing complex in which they were embedded,
and the trust that existed in their network. The new factories, with established links
in the migrant network, then perpetuated an ongoing virtuous cycle, linking potential
buyers and markets by means of networks.
In Chapter 5 I will now discuss how Taiwanese entrepreneurs began to subcontract to
their former firms in Taiwan, which in turn generated a unique agglomeration in South
Africa. Migrant networks therefore reduced both the cost and the risk associated with
immigration, increasing the net returns, and thus the probability of trading.
70During this period the government deployed troops, and was able to suspend and change the executive,
legislation and constitution without judicial approval, increasing instability for FDI.
71Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996, p. 36)
Chapter 5
GEOGRAPHY, INCENTIVES
OR ETHNICITY?
“We were perfect for each other. What they had [South Africa] we didn’t, and what
we had [Taiwan], they didn’t.”1
Ming Wang,
Republic of China Embassy,
Pretoria, 1983 - 1992
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I study the location choice of a large, vibrant community of Taiwanese
industrialists, which had established themselves in a select group of homeland special
economic zones. Manufacturing a wide range of consumer products for both the domestic
market and international export, these enterprises developed sophisticated export trade
networks which were examined in Chapter 4. Furthermore, these export networks
were complemented by manufacturing networks, as Figure 5.1 demonstrates, showing
that Taiwanese firms mostly clustered across 4 of the 63 available RIDP zones. The
agglomeration of Taiwanese firms reflected geographic factors, financial incentives and
cultural preferences, which is the focus of this chapter. Importantly, this first large-scale
agglomeration of integrated Asian industrialists offers many lessons for both business
historians and development economists. The opening quote therefore summarises the
central theme of this chapter, prompting the research question: Why did the Taiwanese
foreign investors cluster and what was it “that they [South Africa] had” in the former
homeland RIDP Zones?
1Quote excerpted from an interview with Mr Ming Wang, London; 2nd of February 2012. Former
Assistant Representative, Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of South Africa. Mr Wang was
a member of the Taiwanese delegation to South Africa from 1983 until 1992.
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Three hypotheses are offered by the literature. The first questions whether the economic
geography of specific industrial zones attracted this foreign investment. The second ex-
amines whether government incentives could account for these unique clusters. The third
explanation examines to what extent this agglomeration was a result of co-ethnic Chinese
business networks. This chapter assesses the relative importance of each hypothesis and
examines the interaction between them using new quantitative and qualitative data.
Figure 5.1: Concentration of Taiwanese Firms in the sixty-three zones at the end of 1992.
Source: African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce Almanac. Geocoded using area code prefix.
Failing to agree, the existing literature has surmised that either government incentives,
international competitiveness, or ethnic production networks were the leading factors
in attracting investment. For example Pickles and Woods (1989) argued that Asian
entrepreneurs made “full use of the incentives offered by the upgraded industrial decen-
tralisation policy after 1982 [...] particularly those of Taiwan.”2 While Bell (1987) noted
there was always evidence of underlying spontaneous long-term trends in decentralisation,
2Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 509)
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but “the financial inducements may have accelerated the trend.”3 Rogerson (1987) found
the “mass of Taiwanese ventures are located at Bantustan growth points, a pattern which
reflects the influence of their assiduous courting by Bantustan leaders and individual
development corporations” such as those highlighted in Chapter 2.4 He also notes “the
obvious attraction of Bantustans [...] is the lucrative package of concessions, [...] large
supplies of relatively cheap labour [...] kept in subjugated conditions.”5 However, Hart
and Todes (1997) called these earlier theses into question, explaining “the predominance
of Taiwanese investment in the 1980s was not just a quirk of apartheid subsidies and
diplomatic ties.”6 Despite sharp cuts in subsidies after 1992, Hart (1998) subsequently
found that “industries in the former Bantustans continued to grow, driven particularly by
Taiwanese investment and more recently by mainland China [...] exhibiting many features
of ideal-type flexible specialisation, namely industrial clusters, network production, and
close inter-firm co-operation, but combined with low wages, [...] and a predominately
female workforce.”7
In this chapter I make three contributions. Firstly, I argue that incentives were not the
primary determinants of agglomeration as widely cited by previous studies. While they
were important, compiling new archival data across South Africa will demonstrate that
RIDP sites with better location-specific (i.e. economic geography & market access) and
firm-specific factors, (i.e. first-mover Taiwanese production networks) conveyed these
zones with an earlier advantage in attracting foreign direct investment. Using firm level
data, I then demonstrate that manufacturing plants started clustering in Zone C and
Zone E, while firms in Zone D and Zone H formed specialised production networks in close
proximity to urban centres and export markets. Secondly, exploring further qualitative
accounts, I’ll argue that transnational network linkages interacted with firm-specific and
location-specific factors to determine the long-term locational choice of Taiwanese foreign
investment in South Africa. Finally, my results provide a more holistic industrial-policy
understanding of how these three agglomeration factors contributed to the largest cluster
of Asian manufacturing firms in South Africa.
The chapter progresses as follows: Section 5.2 provides historical context by interrogating
both empirical and theoretical literature for each of the proposed agglomeration explana-
tions. Section 5.3 then summarises the data pertaining to these agglomeration variables
and frames my location-choice methodology. Using this methodology, Section 5.4 analyses
how these variables interacted with the Taiwanese firm cohort in the homelands. Section
5.5 challenges the competing explanations for Taiwanese-firm clustering, evaluating both
the quantitative and qualitative archival accounts.
3Bell (1987, p. 1302)
4See Section 2.4.3 on page 69.
5Rogerson (1987, p. 140)
6Hart and Todes (1997, p. 39)
7Hart (1998, p. 335)
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5.2 WHAT DETERMINES CLUSTERING?
Prior studies of economic geography, industrial agglomeration and regional development
have dealt with specific explanations of firm clustering. However as I discussed in Chapter
2, the historiography of South Africa’s decentralisation is divided on its success, while
access to data on Taiwanese foreign investment has been noticeably scarce in prior
research.8 Moreover, neither of the studies mentioned in the introduction have sufficiently
dealt with the specificities of Taiwanese clustering in the African homelands. In this
section I briefly summarise the empirical and theoretical literature pertaining to the
economic geography, regional incentives, and business networks of the homeland zones.
5.2.1 Economic Geography
Economic geography considers both first- and second-order nature explanations for
firm agglomeration.9 In the case of Taiwanese investment within South Africa, the
former includes the availability of lower homeland wages, more desirable homeland
demographics, lower transport cost and better market access, while the latter examines
complementary firms. As such, advantages in first-order (i.e. location-specific) geographic
factors in certain RIDP sites may have accounted for the second-order concentration (i.e.
agglomeration economies) of firms within these zones.
On the theoretical side, early work by Marshall (1890, 1920) suggested that firm ag-
glomeration occurs because of knowledge spillovers, larger labour markets, as well as
backward and forward linkages associated with domestic markets. More recently, the-
oretical work from ‘new economic geography’ builds on the spatial concentration or
clustering of industry. Led by Krugman (1991, 1993), this new school modelled the role
of market-access, cost-of-living, and market-crowding in understanding spatial dynamics
of firms. However Sachs and McCord (2008) notes that “the precise location of firms
may be accidental. Early advantages in agglomeration can lead to a snowball effect.”10
Examining this phenomenon Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) concluded that firms in the
“same industry may be drawn to the same locations, because proximity generates positive
externalities or agglomeration effect.”11 While numerous articles by Porter (1990, 1995,
1998a,b) showed that companies in a cluster benefit from important complementarities,
this in turn can attract new business formation and clustering. However, these effects
8Rogerson (1987, p. 136), in the only work on Third World Multinational agglomeration during the
1980s notes that “information on contemporary investment flows into South Africa from the Third World
is veiled in secrecy, and no official data exists to enable researchers accurately to monitor such flows”
9 In the most recent work on the global agglomeration of multinational firms Alfaro and Chen (2014,
p. 265) grouped these variables as (i) location fundamentals (also referred to as first nature) and (ii)
agglomeration economies (also known as second nature).
10Sachs and McCord (2008) goes on to explain that “one of the striking implications of the new
economic geography is that spatial concentration arises in a homogeneous region, where there is no
fundamental geographical advantage to locating in one place or another.”
11Head, Ries and Swenson (1995, p. 224)
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cannot be separated from the economic geography of a specific region. Expanding on
this, Glaeser (2010) explained that agglomeration of industries may also arise, because
certain locations have intrinsic advantages, such as better transport links and desirable
demographic factors.
For example, these intrinsic advantages were encapsulated by debates on ‘Spontaneous
Decentralisation’ to the South African homelands. Bell (1987) argued that better location-
specific factors in the African homelands, not merely incentives, were attracting a new
swathe of investment in the 1980s. This alternative hypothesis drew on the traditional
trade theory that industries would concentrate in regions with better comparative advan-
tages in economic geography. As a result of greater international competition, industries
were relocating to the African homelands where “first order location fundamentals”12
were better than those in Taiwan. Bell summarised these factors as land cost, labour
costs and transport links, which had been contrary to the existing RIDP literature.
The Asian equivalent to spontaneous decentralisation is comparable to the ‘Flying
Geese Paradigm’ or FGP, a model for the international division of labour based on
dynamic comparative advantages.13 In this model, the production of commoditised goods
continuously moved from advanced countries (i.e. ROC) to the less advanced countries
(i.e. RSA) as comparative advantages changed. Under this definition, the homelands
therefore possessed comparative advantages, such as a larger female demographic, lower
wages and better market access for the Taiwanese firms. This would be consistent
with social, political and economic factors discussed in Chapter 3 which highlight how
international competition, rising wages in Taiwan and Phase 3 of homeland industrial
decentralisation were intrinsically linked with migration.
5.2.2 Regional Incentives
Regional variations in RIDP incentives is the second tenet of the agglomeration hypothesis.
The central question is to what extent regional variations in government incentives and
concessions were driving Taiwanese-firm agglomeration. However no comparative research
between the different RIDP zone incentives has been conducted. Yet Pickles and Woods
(1989) argued that incentives were the main driver of Taiwanese investment, being
“most lucrative [...] at industrial decentralisation points.”14 These zones were the least
developed and received greater incentives. Their qualitative research observed that
“most of the Taiwanese investment has been in the homelands, where investors qualify
for lavish incentives and benefit from the exploitative [...] at times super-exploitative
12Bell (1987). Furthermore, this is also stressed in the international trade literature. These have
consisted primarily of market access (i.e. firms choose to produce in large markets to avoid trade costs)
and comparative advantage (i.e. firms produce goods in countries with desired-factor abundance and
low-factor prices.)
13Originally proposed by Akamatsu (1962) and expanded on by Kasahara (2004).
14Pickles and Woods (1989, p. 517)
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[...] labour conditions enforced by homeland governments.” This line of argument was
compelling, with several domestic studies on the use of decentralisation policy, such
as Black, Siebrits and Van Papendorp (1991) and Addleson, Pretorius and Tomlinson
(1985) also demonstrating the importance of incentives and tax concessions for new firms
wishing to establish greenfield operations. However, a more recent international study
by Head and Ries (1996) analysed agglomeration forces in China’s special economic
zones. They showed that co-ethnic agglomeration magnified the direct financial impact
of government incentives, amplifying further investment.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the apartheid government substituted for the shortfall in
investment and industrial agglomeration within the homelands with incentive packages
and tax concessions. The dimensions of the incentives varied, depending on the nature
and classification of the development sites. More than sixty-three RIDP development
and de-concentration points were created. These are depicted in Appendix E, Figure
E.1 which demonstrates the location of the special economic zones across the eight
development regions in relation to homelands and main urban complexes.
The “excessive and expansive distribution”15 of these zones was perceived as a contributing
factor in the programme’s overall failure. Black, Siebrits and Van Papendorp (1991) also
advocated this view, noting that “South Africa’s RIDP was too fragmented to achieve
meaningful agglomeration economies.”16 While Wellings and Black (1986a,b) found
that only a fraction (35.6 %) of the surveyed industries had any interest in relocating
or establishing plants in the homelands. These survey observations may have been
representative of domestically decentralised South African industries, but there was no
data for inward foreign investment by the Taiwanese industrialist.
International studies have, however, shown the effects of incentives to be ambiguous in
the absence of the first- or second order geographic factors discussed above. Using cross-
country data, James and World Bank (2009) found that fiscal incentives were particularly
ineffective in attracting investment to countries with poor investment climates, such
as that found in South Africa during the 1980s.17 In contrast, Altshuler, Grubert and
Newlon (2000) showed that the locational decisions of international investors had become
increasingly sensitive to differential subsidy considerations during the same period as
the Taiwanese cohort was migrating. Analysing data from 14 home countries and 34
host countries showed that multinational firms had become more responsive not only
to tax incentives, but also to transport concessions, free land, and subsidised factory
space.18 Head, Ries and Swenson (1999) had similar results in their study on United
States inward- investment promotion and the subsequent investment agglomeration of
Japanese firms. They found that the provision of foreign trade zones, lower taxes, and
15Development Bank of Southern Africa (1989, p. 187)
16Black, Siebrits and Van Papendorp (1991, p. 41)
17James and World Bank (2009, p. 1 - 3)
18Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2000, p. 17)
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job-creation subsidies had statistically significant effects on the location of Japanese
investment. These studies highlight how the potential variation of RIDP concessions
may have influenced the agglomeration of Taiwanese firms evaluating South Africa in
the 1970s and 1980s.
5.2.3 Business Networks
Economic geography and variations in regional incentives cannot be examined in isolation
of the ethnic or ‘nationality-based’ agglomeration effects of the Taiwanese investors. The
importance of formal and informal business networks has been well established in long-
distance exchange, contract enforcement and trade.19 Furthermore Bloch (2008) noted
how economic geographers have recognised that informal networks based on personal
co-ethnic links helped to explain the spatial agglomeration of firms. While Ellison and
Glaeser (1999) have also found that specific industrial activities explained the emergence
of industrial districts based on these network factors. Therefore this section questions the
role of Taiwanese co-ethnicity informing zone selection, and the subsequent agglomeration
of firms in a subset of RIDP sites.
A number of international studies have pointed to the role co-ethnicity may have played
in location choice through established business networks. Most notably Head, Ries and
Swenson (1995) found a relationship between the geographical distribution of investments
in the United States and the ethnicity of the firms co-locating. Using data on Japanese
investments between 1980 and 1992 shows how these firms preferred to site their plants
in areas where they found a concentration of previous Japanese investments in the same
industry, or by Keiretsu affiliates.20 However, Bra¨utigam (2003) found that “little research
has been done on [co-ethnic] Chinese business networks in an African context.”21 As such,
the ethnographic research into Taiwanese firms co-locating by Hart (1996, 1998) and
Hart and Todes (1997) was exceptional within the historiography. Documenting the first
wave of Taiwanese investors to the RIDP site at Isetebe in the KwaZulu region “offered
a [...] rare look at the start of an investment sequence that might have represented the
early stage of the flying-geese model.”22 Focusing further on this region, Hart and Todes
(1997) found that “foreign investment, the bulk of which was Taiwanese, was concentrated
almost exclusively in Isithebe, Ladysmith/Ezakheni and Newcastle/Madadeni.”23
19These were highlighted in Chapter 4 but notable authors include Greif (1994, 2006) on long-distance
exchange, Granovetter (1983) on embedded institutions and exchange, Kranton (1996) on circular
reciprocity and Rauch (2001) on ethnicity and trade.
20Goodman (2008, p. 133) defines the Keiretsu [系列] as an informal business alliance unique to
Japan, enforced through interlocking business relationships and shareholdings. The Keiretsu maintained
dominance over the Japanese economy for the last half of the 20th century.
21Bra¨utigam (2003, p. 453)
22Bra¨utigam (2003, p. 454)
23Hart and Todes (1997, p. 34)
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Linking with economic geography, Hart and Todes, like Bell (1987) also noted how
Taiwanese industries started relocating in the 1980s in a response to structural changes
in their cost-base, forming production networks similar to those in their home market.
Although their research was limited to a single development region, they established that
Taiwanese investment was “not just the product of incentives made available through
apartheid policies, but reflects much broader tendencies in global capitalism.”24 Their
findings concluded that South Africa was an intersection in a world-wide Taiwanese
diaspora where small and medium-sized firms linked via intricate subcontracting ties.25
Finally, the role of foreign investment, competing investment incentives and shifting global
supply chains will continue to play an important role in future African industrialisation.
This chapter therefore makes a contribution to these debates. First it it calls into question
whether government incentives were the foremost contributing factor for agglomeration.
Secondly, it provides alternative hypotheses for Taiwanese agglomeration by examining
the interrelationship of economic geography and co-ethnic networks. In the following
section I will describe and assemble new archival data and propose a methodology for
the location choice of Asian firms in Africa.
5.3 DATA & METHODOLOGY
As with the previous analytical chapters, data availability and access were somewhat
challenging when I was collating archival sources from South Africa’s late-apartheid
period. In Chapter 1, the main sources of RIDP incentives (1.3.1), manufacturing wages
(1.3.2), demographic variation (1.3.3) and Taiwanese-firm level data (1.3.5) were discussed.
In this section I therefore summarise the assembled data for each of the explanatory
categories, which will then be used in Section 5.4 to analyse what impact they had on
agglomeration.
5.3.1 The Economic Geography of Industrial Zones
The variation in economic geography may have played a role by inducing Taiwanese
firms to invest in zones that provided the necessary first-order input factors. Given
the empirical studies and theories discussed in 5.2.1, the forthcoming section explores
the three geographic factors deemed to be driving Taiwanese agglomeration. These
include (A) interregional differences in homeland wages; (B) demographic distribution
of homeland labour supplies; and (C) proximity and cost of transport infrastructure.
24Hart and Todes (1997, p. 47)
25Hart and Todes (1997, p. 49)
Chapter 5. Geography, Incentives or Ethnicity 131
(A) Homeland Wages
The secondary literature ostensibly agreed on the importance of low wages to manufac-
turing firms in the RIDP zones.26 Yet African manufacturing wages during the apartheid
period have been contentious, and one of the most challenging data series to construct.
These limitations required a degree of innovation, which was discussed in the archival
and data source section (1.3.2) on 16 of the introduction. In summary, I now have
interregional manufacturing wages for 63 RIDP zones using new sources compiled from
the homelands between 1970 and 1992. Using a triangulation of data sources composed
of (i) newspapers, (ii) the RIDP almanac, (iii) and officially sanctioned wages estimates,
has allowed me to examine which RIDP zones had the lowest wages. These sources are
discussed below and wages summarised across homeland in Table 5.1 below with the
disaggregated data available in Data Appendix F, Table F.2.
(i) Published Newspaper Sources: Using newspaper sources, a broad collection of
primary and publicly reported wage estimates have been categorised per development
region. Where possible they have been recorded at the lowest disaggregated geographical
level, industry, gender, skill grade and year. This data has then been compiled into a
series for each of the eight development regions. Although not exhaustive, 57 out of the
63 development sites have unskilled wages cited in a range of financial publications.
(ii) RIDP Almanac: To test the wage estimates cited above, and to substitute for
missing data, I have included the RIDP almanac, homeland trade periodicals and other
ad hoc secondary homeland sources. The periodicals were published in magazine format
and released quarterly offering me both quantitative wage data and qualitative accounts
about Taiwanese-firm behaviour in the homelands vis-a`-vis unskilled wages.
(iii) Formally Authorised Sources: Officially sanctioned data is used to further test
the validity of the sources in the unofficial wage category, and those reported in homeland
trade periodicals and the RIDP almanac. The first source is from an archival report
prepared by the Bureau for Economic Research.27 The second is from a regional series
compiled by Gottschalk (1977). The final source comes from the Second Carnegie Report
on poverty in South Africa.28
The three categories are combined in Data Appendix F, Table F.2 showing wages for
each of the RIDP sites. However, the aggregate wages in Table 5.1 below summarise
the urban (columns 1 – 4) and regional manufacturing wages (columns 5 – 13) for the
decentralisation zones at the highest aggregate level of province or homeland. The initial
results suggest three noteworthy trends for African wages in the RIDP zones.
26Hirsch (1986) explained that the prominence of low wages in the RIDP appeared to be more significant
for the distribution of industry within homelands than in their international counterparts.
27Bureau for Economic Research: Bantu Development (1976).
28This covered five homelands and can be obtained from The Second Carnegie Report on poverty in
South Africa compiled by Wilson and Ramphele (1989).
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Firstly, semi-skilled manufacturing wages for Africans were substantially higher in urban
areas than those in the homelands or on the urban periphery. Observing the baseline
aggregate wages in 1970 demonstrates that the Transvaal (Zone H ) had a significantly
higher African manufacturing wage than the three other urban areas. On average, wages
across this complex were 50 % higher than those in the other urban areas. However, the
second trend shows that manufacturing wages escalated across the RIDP zones over time.
The escalation begins in the latter parts of the 1970s and shows signs of faster growth
than the wages in urban areas, but not in a uniform manner. This hints at the third
trend, which I think is the most important finding, namely that manufacturing may have
been displaced from urban centres to regional RIDP zones. If we refer to Figure 1.5 on
page 21, the heat map illustrates that wages were possibly higher in the RIDP zones
closer to the urban areas in Zone H (i.e. PWV) and Zone A (i.e. Western Cape). While
zones along the coast (i.e. Port Elizabeth and East London) had lower aggregate wages,
they were still higher than those in northern parts of the country. Table 5.1 is a summary
to illustrate the trend, but more granular inter-zone wages will be used in Section 5.4 to
analyse how the average wages may have had an impact on RIDP incentives, and thus
contributed to Taiwanese agglomeration.
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Real	African	Manufacturing	Wages,	(Rands	per	annum)		
REGION	
	
1970	 1980	 1985	
1	 Cape	Province	(urban)	 1275.5	 2022.3	 2459.6	
2	 Orange	Free	State	(urban)	 946.5	 1679.2	 2030.6	
3	 Transvaal	(urban)	 2314.8	 3850.5	 5147.2	
4	 Natal	(urban)	 	 1049.9	 1202.2	 1249.7	
5	 QwaQwa	
	
10.1	 700.7	 1200.5	
6	 Bophuthatswana	 475.7	 1099.9	 1239.1	
7	 Transkei	 579.2	 889.3	 1300.3	
8	 Ciskei	 209.9	 416.5	 537.3	
9	 KwaZulu	 379.8	 1200.6	 1548.9	
10	 Gazankulu	 300.4	 900.5	 1800.6	
11	 KaNgwane	 42.3	 119.5	 183.2	
12	 Lebowa	 275.6	 617.7	 806.4	
13	 Venda	 84.8	 211.3	 191.5	
14	 KwaNdebele	 34.6	 126.9	 189.4	
	 	
	
	
	
Table 5.1: Aggregate annual wages across urban and rural RIDP zones, (1970 - 1985).
Source: Wages for 1970 are reported by Gottschalk (1977). The remaining base years are
summarised from the average wages reported in Table F.2 of Data Appendix F.
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(B) The Demographics of Homeland Labour
In this section I quantify the second economic geography variable, which is the composition
of the homeland labour market. Bell (1987) explained that advantageous demographic
factors i.e. “higher concentrations of female labour at lower costs in the industrial
periphery induced decentralisation toward to the RIDP zones.”29 Hence, this data
quantifies the RIDP labour market vis-a`-vis the (i) labour-pool size between zones and
(ii) the male-to-female ratio in each zone.
The economic geography hypothesis therefore proposes that labour-intensive firms are
thought to have selected sites that had better demographic potential. A larger female
population was desirable for two reasons. Firstly, as shown above, women received lower
wages, as they could not migrate internally, and secondly, because of the nature of the
unskilled work in the RIDP zones.30 This is also supported by secondary literature.
Todes and Watson (1984) explained that “wage levels are affected by a sexual division of
labour. [...] women form the largest percentage of industrial workers while their earnings
are some 32 % - 34 % of their national [male] counterparts. Female dominance [in the
homeland labour market] must therefore be seen as contributory to overall [low] wage
levels.”31 Maasdorp (1990) confirmed this view. He noted that firms moving into the
homeland RIDP were “seeking out low-wage regions for labour-intensive industries or
for those stages of production which are labour-intensive.”32 While Ardington (1984)
recorded “marked differences between the salaries paid to men and women approaching
R 3 to R 1.”33 Hirsch (1986) found similar trends in the Ciskei with the average salary
for men being R 3,284.33 per annum whereas the comparative figures for women were
R 1,224.32 per annum.34
The homelands of South Africa were constituted by a high percentage of working-age
African females, because of historical migrant labour demands from the mining industries
and agriculture.35 Pre-eminent scholars such as First (1961) and Freund (1984) also
document the mass migration of male labour to the mines.36 This labour system, of
working age men migrating to the Transvaal and Free State mining sector, resulted in a
demographic divergence, giving rise to a high proportion of older men, women, and young
children remaining in the rural areas of the homelands.37 This led to a situation where
29Bell (1987, p. 56)
30The quantum and age distribution of the female labour base will be discussed next. However, see
Mager (1999) and Lee (2009) for a social history of women and migration in the formation of Bantustans.
31Todes and Watson (1984, p. 31)
32Maasdorp (1990, p. 77)
33Ardington (1984, p. 11)
34Hirsch (1986, p. 192)
35This was discussed in Chapter 2 but also documented by Bonner (2011, p. 457)
36Freund (1984) explains how the Witwatersrand had become the capital of an economic empire
resulting in a drain on male African labour.
37Homelands closer to the industrial core, from where the population could commute, were less
imbalanced in their demographic distributions than those on the rural periphery.
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homeland inhabitants had to rely on remittances from their family members formally
employed in the industrial or mining areas.38 Although these apartheid demographic
trends have been well documented, insufficient empirical evidence has been forthcoming
to compare the inter-homeland (RIDP Zone) labour imbalances. For similar reasons to
those cited in the wage data section (5.3.1), census data has been insufficient to examine
the demographic variation across homelands.
(i) Labour Pool: As a result of this scarcity, the labour pool data set has been
constructed from the concatenation of multiple census sources. I firstly assembled the
enumeration areas from the 1980 South African census for each of the RIDP zones
that was adjacent to a homeland. Secondly, I used additional statistical sources as the
1980 national census excluded two of the four independent homelands.39 Combining
the regional census data with the BENSO Economic Review reports thus substituted
demographic data for the homelands that were excluded from the national census.40
Third, the RIDP zone enumeration areas from the 1980 five percentage African census
that included the non-independent homelands were selected. Finally, for the purpose of
demographic comparison the enumeration areas from each of the three data sources were
merged and then GIS matched to their respective development zone (A-H).
(ii) Demographic Ratio: The aggregate gender imbalance of female labour across all
homelands RIDP zones is summarised in Table 5.2 below. A high prevalence of immobile
female labour may have been attractive to labour-intensive industrialists. In the data
section on page xxx, this was extrapolated into the four age-cohort bands which represent
the ILO labour-force participation scale: (1) 13 to 18 years as a youth baseline, (2) 19
to 29 years, (3) 30 to 39 and (4) 40 to 59.41
Seen in conjunction, Figure 1.7 on page 23 and Table 5.2 below demonstrate two significant
findings. Firstly that the working-age female population materially exceeded that of men
in the RIDP zones. Given the mining labour migration regime, this is to be expected.
However, the magnitude is noteworthy, with female labour exceeding males by to up
50 % in ‘Band 2’. Secondly, there are variations in the gender imbalances between
homeland RIDP zones with the gender disequilibrium of men to women declining further
in the prime-employment working-age ‘Band 2’ and ‘Band 3’ (figure 1.7). This data
will therefore be used in Section 5.4 to analyse the impact female-labour participation
possibility had on Taiwanese-firm clustering.
38Mager (1999)
39Areas of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana were excluded.
40‘Transkei Development and Independence Report’, African population statistics table, page 136 - 178.
(TAB-8768/02) and Bophuthatswana BENSO Man Power study (TAB 4568-876.)
41Data Appendix F, Figure F.2 extrapolates all ILO labour-force participation age cohorts, providing
a demographic baseline for later analysis of trends in demographic imbalances between homelands.
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INTER	ZONE	GENDER	IMBALANCE	AS	PER	ILO	WORKING	AGE	COHORTS	
Zone	 Gender	 <	12	years	
13	to	18	
years	
19	to	29	
years	
30	to	39	
years	
40	to	59	
years	
60	and	
older	
Total	
Population	
Zone	A	 Female	 16	%	 7	%	 10	%	 6	%	 7	%	 3	%	 49	%	Male	 17	%	 7	%	 11	%	 6	%	 8	%	 2	%	 51	%	
Zone	B	
Female	 23	%	 9	%	 10	%	 5	%	 5	%	 4	%	 56	%	
Male	 21	%	 10	%	 6	%	 2	%	 3	%	 2	%	 44	%	
Zone	C	 Female	 23	%	 10	%	 10	%	 5	%	 5	%	 3	%	 56	%	Male	 21	%	 10	%	 6	%	 2	%	 2	%	 2	%	 44	%	
Zone	D	 Female	 22	%	 9	%	 8	%	 4	%	 6	%	 5	%	 54	%	
Male	 22	%	 9	%	 6	%	 3	%	 4	%	 3	%	 46	%	
Zone	E	
Female	 23	%	 8	%	 9	%	 5	%	 7	%	 4	%	 55	%	
Male	 23	%	 7	%	 6	%	 3	%	 4	%	 2	%	 45	%	
Zone	F	 Female	 24	%	 8	%	 9	%	 5	%	 7	%	 3	%	 56	%	Male	 23	%	 7	%	 5	%	 2	%	 4	%		 2	%	 44	%	
Zone	G	 Female	 25	%	 7	%	 9	%	 6	%	 8	%	 3	%	 58	%	
Male	 24	%	 7	%	 5	%	 2	%	 3	%	 2	%	 42	%	
Zone	H	
Female	 23	%	 8	%	 9	%	 5	%	 6	%	 3	%	 55	%	
Male	 23	%	 8	%	 6	%	 3	%	 3	%	 2	%	 45	%	
	
Table 5.2: Gender imbalances between homeland RIDP zones – all age bands.
Source: The 1980 census and 1980 five per cent African census, and the BENSO man power study of the BOP. 1980 & 1985 compiled by Statistics South
Africa and digitised by the South African Data Archive (SADA), Central Statistics Service Report No. 02-80-02. 1980. Population Census, 1980. Pretoria.
BENSO manpower study, National Archive, Pretoria, RSA, TAB 4568-876.
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(C) Proximity To Transport Infrastructure
According to the third strand of the economic geography debate, homeland regions needed
preferable market access if they were to generate agglomeration. For example Glaeser
(2010) explained that “proximity to transport infrastructure facilitated agglomeration
and these benefits all ultimately come from transport cost savings.”42 However the
historical South African literature noted that “the distance from suppliers and markets
is also considered a major disadvantage of a peripheral location.”43 Many of the RIDP
sites were isolated from metropolitan regions (demonstrated in Appendix E, Figure
E.1), and poor access to transportation systems may have adversely affected industrial
competitiveness by raising the unit cost of freight in the RIDP zones.44 As discussed
in Chapter 2, in an attempt to accelerate decentralisation, transport infrastructure was
expanded, such as that shown in Figure 5.2 below. The following quotation emphasises
the importance of transport costs and infrastructure access in the success of the RIDP.
“The labour and incentive benefits of the RIDP are often outweighed by the
distance to domestic markets or exports ports. In recent years the infras-
tructure programme has been extended to ensure that the appropriate railway
transport is provided to equalise the benefits and risks to industrialists.” 45
To counter these serious disadvantages, the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry
offered railway and port incentives.46 Moreover, archival records highlight how certain
sites were “ideally situated on a transport corridor for both domestic and international
markets, ferrying in willing low-skilled labour from nearby homelands.”47 In this section I
therefore measure two factors which will be used to explain firm agglomeration. (i) Firstly,
the geographic proximity of RIDP sites to ports and domestic markets is calculated. (ii)
Secondly, using the proximity data and the associated incentive classification, the railway
transport cost variation for each of the RIDP zones is estimated.
(i) Market Proximity: The digitised railway map (Chapter 2, Figure 2.4) indicates that
after 1978, all of the potential RIDP sites had some degree of railways access. However
the railway access had different opportunity costs associated with their proximity to
markets. For example, a specific zone may be further from a port (export market), but
closer to a large city (domestic market). In calculating the transport costs, each of the
42Glaeser (2010, p. 21)
43Wellings and Black (1986b, p. 21)
44The RIDP quote summarises how these “created external diseconomies by introducing inefficiencies
and unreliability in the supply chain.”
45Board for the Decentralisation of Industry annual reports, 1978. The National Archives, Pretoria,
RSA. TAB 7869 – ZA
46Wellings and Black (1986a, p. 141) called them “exceedingly generous”.
47Transkei Development Corporation, Annual Report, 1983 pg.5
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sixty-three RIDP zones have been geocoded. The railway path distance to domestic
markets and exports markets (ports) is then calculated in kilometres (kms). Table E.1
in Appendix E tabulates the railway path distance to the nearest port from each zone.
(ii) Transport Cost Variation: Variation in transport incentives altered the cost
structure in each of the RIDP sites. The incentives are discussed in more detail in
Section 5.3.2. Briefly summarised, the most favourable benefits were for industrial
development points, followed by de-concentration points.48 To estimate the variation,
geocoded RIDP zones from above (i) and digitised infrastructure maps are combined
with a topographic overlay of South Africa, calculating the path distance to the four ports
(Durban, Cape Town, East London, Port Elizabeth).49 Using the categorical incentive
structure (i.e. “deconcentration” or “decentralisation”) an estimated cost for each of the
ports is demonstrated in Table E.2 of Appendix E while Figure E.5 shows each of the
RIDP zones on a distributed cost curve.50 This will be deployed in the analysis section
(5.4) to examine agglomeration based on geographic proximity and transport costs.
Figure 5.2: Aerial view of an RIDP site in Zone E (Itsetebe). The image demonstrates a
typical RIDP site built between railway lines with sidings servicing each arm of the complex.
As the complexes were expanded, additional railway sidings could be added.
Source: RIDP almanac, 1982. National Archive, Pretoria, South Africa. TAB - 1982/2
48“De-concentration” zones were in closer proximity to metropolitan areas, thus receiving lower
concessions. “Decentralisation” zones were in rural areas, receiving higher transport incentives.
49The Path Distance function is the primary spatial tool for comparative cost analysis in GIS. It factors
in both horizontal and vertical cost dimensions, as well as true surface distance between the RIDP zone
and the closest export port.
50These are disaggregated by “de-concentration” and “decentralisation” in standardised 8 ton container
rates.
Chapter 5. Geography, Incentives or Ethnicity 138
5.3.2 RIDP Incentives
In this section I quantify the second, and most cited element of the agglomeration thesis,
namely the variations in government investment incentives. The ’Good Hope’ Regional
Industrial Development Programme contained eight distinct subsidy and concession
variables.51 The financial incentive categories were (1) Wage subsidies, (2) Transport
rebates, (3) Interest concessions on capital and land, (4) Harbour rebates, (4) Electricity
subsidies, (6) Training subsidies, (7) Preferential tenders, and (8) a Relocation allowance.
To quantify the potential impact each of these incentives may have had on agglomeration,
the annual reports from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI) are
assembled from 1971 through to 1992.52 Unlike prior anecdotal studies,53 these reports
provide longitudinal data pertaining to the annual change in financial distributions for
each of the incentive categories. By focusing on the period of highest Taiwanese investment
(from 1982 until 1992), this data seeks to quantify the incentives and concessions offered
to Taiwanese firms. The Board for the Decentralisation was the central oversight body
for the homeland development corporations. In the absence of granular data from each
of these corporations, the annual reports thus capture the total number of firms, and
the allocation of incentives at the regional level. This builds on Chapter 2, Figure 2.7
which showed a structural break in the decentralisation programme, with a very steep
increase in financial distributions at the start of the final RIDP period. However, this
incentive data has not been exploited in prior studies, suggesting the importance of
financial inducements to the thesis of Taiwanese-firm clustering.
Collating all categories reveals that 83 % of financial incentives and concessions were
channelled into four key areas, namely (i) a wage subsidy for unskilled labour, (ii) a
transport subsidy (i.e. Rail, Road & Harbour), (iii) interest concessions on land and
capital goods, in addition to (iv) a relocation rebate. Table 5.3 below summarises
the percentage of incentives paid per category (1 - 8). Moreover, the proportion and
importance of incentives evolved over the period. For example, certain incentives were
distributed in greater proportions as the RIDP Programme shifted from capital-intensive
to labour-intensive industries. Most notably, the summary findings show that the
electricity subsidy rapidly diminished, while wage-labour subsidies escalated and the
allocation of transport concessions rose, but shifts from railway usage to road haulage.54
51Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3 quantifies and discusses the evolution from phase 2 into phase 3 of the RIDP
as the state becomes more desperate.
52Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry Annual Reports (National Archives, Pretoria -
TAB series & Government Publications, University of Cape Town). The BDI annual reports contained
the officially audited income statements for the RIDP in each of the financial years from 1970 until 1992.
53These were discussed in Section 5.2.2 above, but in summary Pickles and Woods (1989) and Black
(1990) claimed that these were the leading cause for Taiwanese and decentralisation investments.
54The transition from railways peaked in 1988 and slowly dipped into the later phase of the RIDP.
This is an important distinction, and will be discussed in detail in the following section.
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The complete schedule of financial incentives and concessions across all of the RIDP
zone is tabulated in Data Appendix F, Table F.1. This data will be used to analyse the
potential impact of RIDP incentives on agglomeration. However, in the following section
the major findings are summarised. The four leading incentive variables (i - iv) are then
discussed.
1. Wage Incentives: Wage subsidies paid to domestic and Taiwanese firms within
the RIDP were a key determinant, increasing from 2% to 22% of all disbursements.
Therefore, differences in regional wages and wage incentives are calculated to
estimate the labour attractiveness of each zones. For example, there was a variation
between RIDP zones, with the maximum wage bill refund (i.e. 80 % refund) and an
upper-wage bound (i.e R 120 pm). Interregional wages were assembled in subsection
5.3.1 and will be employed in Section 5.4 to calculate a wage-rebate index.
2. Transport Incentives: Transport subsidies constituted 45 % of the annual RIDP
budget in 1982, declining to 37 % in 1992. Rail incentives incurred 98 % of the
transport category at the beginning of the period, gradually declining as road freight
concessions were introduced as a substitute in the domestic market transport mix.
The variation in the StD, DP and IDP transport subsidies, and the economic
geography of market proximity (subsection 5.3.1) will be used to examine the
geographic attractiveness of each zone.
3. Interest Concessions: The allocation of incentive payments to companies in the
form of concessions on capital and land increased sharply. The concession lasted
10 years and grew in real terms from 3 % in 1982 to 22 % in 1991.
4. Relocation Allowance: This incentive grew from 2 % in 1982, reaching a high
of 9 % in 1990. The relocation allowance was almost exclusively paid to foreign
investors, therefore qualitative accounts are explored within this incentive category.
5. Preferential Tenders: This incentive was negligible, as it was limited to govern-
ment procurement only.
6. Electricity Rebates: The RIDP income statement demonstrates that electricity
was a significant proportion of the incentive distribution, accounting for 26 % in
1982, but rapidly decreasing to 1 % by 1986.
7. Training Rebates: Rural RIDP sites would require substantial training to develop
human capital, however only a negligible amount was utilised compared to wages
or transport. Yet qualitative accounts suggest that a select group of zones used
this incentive variable to substitute for the shortfall in African human capital. This
will require further contextual analysis in Section 5.4.
8. Harbour Subsidies: South Africa had four large commercial cargo ports, where
rebates on harbour tariffs were historically available. In comparison to other
available transport incentives or tariff concessions, the analysis of the RIDP income
statement reveals that the harbour rebates were poorly utilised. Only RIDP sites
in Zone D exploited the rebate which is discussed in Section 5.4.
!
PERCENTAGE!DISTRIBUTION!OF!ALL!RIDP!INCENTIVES!AND!CONCESSIONS!PER!YEAR!
!
CLASSIFICATION! 1982/’83! 1983/’84! 1984/’85! 1985/’86! 1986/’87! 1987/’88! 1988/’89! 1989/’90! 1990/’91!
Transport!subsidy! 45# 41# 33# 37# 42# 44# 46# 38# 37#
Electricity!concessions! 26# 14# 10# 7# 1# 1# 0# 0# 0#
Wage!Incentives! 2# 15# 23# 21# 23# 24# 24# 21# 22#
Rental!concessions!
Land!and!Building!
1# 3# 5# 7# 8# 7# 6# 7# 10#
Relocation!subsidy! 2# 5# 6# 6# 4# 4# 5# 9# 7#
Tax!Concessions! 20# 12# 7# 5# 3# 2# 1# 1# 1#
Interest!Concessions! 3# 9# 16# 18# 19# 18# 18# 22# 22#
TOTAL!(%)!of!RIDP! 100! 100! 100! 100! 100! 100! 100! 100! 100!#
Table 5.3: Aggregate RIDP incentives and concession categories represented as a percentage (%) of total incentives paid, (1982 - 1992).
Source: Compiled from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry annual reports, 1982 - 1991. The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA. TAB 7869 - ZA.
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(i) Wage Incentives: Archival evidence has suggested that lucrative RIDP wage
subsidies paid to Taiwanese firms were a valuable enticement.55 The final RIDP schedule
introduced two forms of wage subsidies: a defined maximum monthly cash payment for
each employee, and a total percentage wage bill rebate which remained constant during
Phase 3 of the RIDP project. However the effect of this has been unknown due to an
absence of quantitative evidence pertaining to unskilled homeland wages.56 Combining
the variation in incentives and the new wage data assembled in Section 5.3.1 allows us to
estimate the ‘Wage Premium Gap’ that firms would receive in each of the RIDP zones.
Although the wage data collected in Section 5.3.1 is not conclusive, it offers a first-pass
impact assessment of regional wages and wage subsidies.
The wage bill subsidy and defined cash payment differed substantially, and depended
on the level of development aid allocated by the BDI. For illustrative purposes, Table
5.4 demonstrates a sample of locations across the eight development zones (Column ii).
This highlights how the wage subsidy differed between regions and locations. Regions
refer to the border development region,while locations refer to specific RIDP sites.57
The intention of this rebate variation was to entice investors to rural areas. The lowest
subsidy was of R 30 per month in Zone H which was in close proximity to the PWV
region containing Johannesburg (i.e urban). The highest subsidy of R 110 per employee
per month was paid in Zone D, the most rural zone in the Eastern Cape Border region.
However, the extent to which regional wages and incentives determined the firm zone
selection is untested. This data will therefore be exploited further in the Analysis section
(5.4) to quantify and explain its impact on Taiwanese-firm agglomeration.
	 	 	
-	52	-	
Category	 Zone	 Name	of	S.E.Z	 %	Wage	bill	 Maximum	Rebate		
(i)	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)	Deconcentration	Point	(urban)	 A	 Atlantis	 80%	 R	70	Industrial	Decentralisation	Point	 B	 Heystekrand	 80%	 R	80	Industrial	Decentralisation	Point	 C	 Botshabelo	 95%	 R	100	Industrial	Decentralisation	Point	 D	 Dimbaza	 95%	 R	110	Industrial	Decentralisation	Point	 E	 Imbali	 80%	 R	35	Deconcentration	Point	(urban)	 F	 Nelspruit	 80%	 R	70	Deconcentration	Point	(urban)	 G	 Pietersburg	 80%	 R	90	Deconcentration	Point	(urban)	 H	 Bronkhorstspruit	 80%	 R	30	
 
TABLE	4:	Total	wage	bill	 and	wage	 rebate	 subsidies	 as	 advertised	 in	 the	 schedule	 for	 the	decentralisation	 of	 industry.	 Column	 (A)	 demonstrates	 the	 category	 of	 RIDP	 zone	 i.e.	Deconcentration	 Points	 were	 typically	 in	 semi-urban	 areas	 while	 Decentralisation	 Points	were	within	homelands	or	on	the	periphery	of	homelands.	Column	(B)	denotes	the	regional	Zone	 while	 Column	 (C)	 gives	 the	 name	 of	 the	 RIDP	 Zone.	 Column	 (D)	 stipulates	 the	maximum	wage	bill	rebate.	Column	(E)	stipulates	the	maximum	wage	rebate	per	employee	in	Rands.		
	
SOURCE:	 Compiled	 from	 the	 Board	 for	 the	 Decentralisation	 of	 Industry,	 Schedule	 of	Incentives,	 a	 publication	 advertising	 the	 new	 RIDP	 incentive	 and	 subsidy	 schedule	 (IDC	pamphlet).	The	National	Archives,	Pretoria,	RSA.	TAB	7869	–	ZA		 		 The	intention	of	this	rebate	variation	was	to	entice	investors	to	rural	areas	and	 discourage	 investment	 in	 areas	 which	 had	 suffered	 from	 over	 accumulation	and	 urban	 influx	 near	 the	 core	 of	 the	 mining	 or	 manufacturing	 sectors.91	This	concern	 encapsulated	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 rationale	 of	 the	 RIDP	 policy	planner.	 Therefore	 a	 substantial	 variation	 in	 incentives	 is	 observed	 for	 the	homeland	 RIDP	 locations	 giving	 them	 a	 distinct	 advantage,	 specifically	 in	 wages	subsidies.	This	difference	between	the	regional	wage	and	the	maximum	incentive	rebate	 for	 wages	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 determining	 the	 zone	selected	by	the	firms.	In	the	coming	section	I	will	argue	that	the	difference	between	the	 regional	 unskilled	 wages	 and	 the	 advertised	 wage	 incentives	 (Rebate	 Wage	Gap)	was	a	factor	in	the	agglomeration	of	Taiwanese	industries.	
3.2.2	 Transport	Rebates																																																										91	Rogerson,	(1987),	Decentralisation	and	the	location	of	Third	World	multinationals	in	South	Africa,	pg.		
Table 5.4: Total Wage Bill and Wage Rebate Subsidies: Column (i) demonstrates the category
of RIDP zone (i.e. Rural vs. Urban), Column (ii) enotes the regional zone. Column (iii) gives
the name of the zone. Column (iv) stipulates th maximum wage bill ebate as a percentage and
Column (v) stipulates the maximum wage ebate per employ e in 1980 Rands.
Source: RIDP Schedule of Incentives, The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA. TAB 7869 - ZA
55Hirsch (1986) noted that low wages were significant, which is explored further in the Analysis Section.
56This was discussed in the Wages Section (5.3.1).
57Appendix E, Table E.3 aggregates sixty-three RIDP investment locations, allowing for a comparison
across all the zones and regions at a finer spatial level.
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(ii) Transport Subsidy: Transport incentives constituted 45 % of the budget in 1982,
declining to 37 % of the incentive payments by 1992. However, there was a noteworthy
trend and shift in the distribution during the period related to a shift in transport mode.
Table 5.5 demonstrates how railway rebates and road transport concessions received a
significantly larger percentage of the RIDP financial assistance. Rail incentives incur
98 % of subsidies at the beginning of the period. However, this gradually declined as
road freight concessions are introduced to substitute for rail in the domestic market.
PERCENTAGE)EXPENDITURE)ON)TRANSPORT)INCENTIVES)&)CONCESSIONS)
) 1982/'83) 1983/'84) 1984/'85) 1985/'86) 1986/'87) 1987/'88) 1988/'89) 1989/'90)
Railroad( 99(%( 99(%( 90(%( 67(%( 62(%( 59(%( 52(%( 51(%(
Road(Transport( 0(%( 0(%( 9(%( 26(%( 30(%( 34(%( 41(%( 44(%(
Unworked(steel( 0.6(%( 0.7(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%(
Coastal(Shipping( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 5(%( 5(%( 5(%( 4(%( 3(%(
Harbour(charges( 0.4(%( 0.3(%( 1(%( 2(%( 3(%( 1(%( 2(%( 2(%(
Air(Freight( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%( 0(%(
(
Table 5.5: Percentage Expenditure an all Transport Incentives and Concessions, (1982 - 1990).
Based on constant 1980 Rands. Note: Rounding may result in totals 6= 100 %.
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry annual reports, extracted from the 1982 -
1991 railways almanac. The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA. Box TAB 7869 - ZA, Series 1982
-1991. Note: 1991 was not reported in separate transport categories.
Containerisation was introduced to the decentralisation schedule of incentives in 1976.
This new form of global, standardised transport technology offered additional benefits
to future RIDP investors.58 The RIDP Special Report On Transport Dynamics (1982),
notes how this form of bulk container transport had “come to dominate the railway
transportation of finished goods from the regional zones to national ports or domestic
markets. This Spoornet service, offered decentralised firms a convenient and secure means
of transportation in standardised tonnage requirements.”59 New empirical evidence from
the archived transport rebate reports corroborates these assertions. While not complete
for the entire period, the reports show that between the years 1981 and 1988, 79 % of
manufactured goods were transported by standardised 8 ton containers.60
58The KFC noted how “in Taiwan, we used containers, so now in Newcastle [Zone E], we have the
same standards which our customers in [the] USA expect.”
59Special Report On Transport Dynamics (1982), National Archive, Pretoria, ZAF - 1987/2.
60The South African Railways annual reports between 1978 and 1980, summarised in Appendix E,
Figure E.6 highlight how mineral resources, specifically coal and base metals dominated total volumes on
the railway system.
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Highlighted in the economic geography section (5.3.1) above, the railway incentives had
two dimensions. The first was the geographic location (i.e. market proximity) and
the second was the category of incentives (i.e. DP or IDP).61 Using the South African
Railways and Harbour Gazette (1980) and the path-distance data calculated in Section
5.3.1, Figure 5.3 demonstrates the estimated cost of railway transportation from the
63 regional zones in container units. The size of the bubble represents the average cost
of transporting goods to an export port from either an DP or IDP zone. This is also
detailed in Appendix E.5 using a cost curve which will test this variable in Section 5.4.
Figure 5.3: Deconcentration Point (DP = Red Bubbles) & Decentralisation Point (IDP
= Blue Bubbles) railway costs. Cost bubbles represent the Rand cost of transporting a
container from each zone to its closest shipping port. Based on constant 1980 Rands.
Source: South African Railways and Harbour Gazette (1980).
Reduced container costs were an important factor in determining the initial zone selection
for investors. Therefore using the railway cost data provides a comparable rate for the
category of RIDP location, and therefore the incentives received. Zones located in
61Deconcentration Point = DP and Decentralisation Point = IDP.
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decentralisation zones (IDP) received larger transport rebates. This is particularly
important for export-orientated firms, while domestic market manufacturers would have
been more reliant on road transport. The transport opportunity costs of locating in a
decentralisation zone or de-concentration point is discussed in the analysis (Section 5.4).
However as Figure 5.5 shows, railway incentives declined towards the latter half of the
decade in favour of road transportation, requiring further exploration of this variable.
Road transport had not been explicitly included in the RIDP incentives gazette published
after the Good Hope concessions. Examination of these financial disbursements reveals
that a discretionary incentive for road transport was introduced in 1984. This would
account for the increase and subsequent substitution effect from railways to road transport.
The Good Hope report explained that a revised rebate would “create parity amongst
the various modes of transport available to regional industrialists [...] enabling them
free choice on the most economical method of transport for their products without
being influenced by any transport rebates for which they may qualify.”62 This change
could have had a substantial effect on small businesses. Not only could the Taiwanese
industrialists access subsidised railway transport, they could also purchase a subsidised
light commercial vehicle under the new scheme. However, Taiwanese agglomeration had
already taken hold in a select group of RIDP zones before these changes were made.63
Nonetheless, it was necessary to mention the historical rise of road transport incentives.
The final transport incentive is harbour rebates. Although the disbursement of concession
rebates for harbour tariffs is small relative to those attributed to railway tariff rebates,
the data indicates that there was an upward growth trend.64 This distinct shift in the
distribution of financial incentives for harbour rebates occurred after 1984. Harbour
rebates were adapted to focus specifically on utilising excess cargo capacity from the
port of East London. Located in Zone D, this port was in close proximity to the RIDP
zones of the Transkei and Ciskei, and on the transport corridor from Zone C. According
to Fair and Jones (1991), it was hoped that revised rebates would resuscitate the port.
With the advent of containerisation, East London was effectively relegated to a secondary
port, which was reflected in the port’s traffic performance.65 Fair and Jones noted how
cargo traffic coming from the Border area (i.e. Zone D) increased port utilisation.66
Moreover, new data collected for this chapter found that RIDP Zones significantly
revived the fortunes of East London. Following Taiwanese investment, utilisation of
harbour incentives from Zone D increased in the years 1985 through to 1991, as shown
by Appendix Figure E.7.
62The Good Hope Programme (1982), Final Recommendations, National Archive Pretoria, TAB - 3678.
63In these cases, archive records often cited the importance of railways in their choice of location.
64See Appendix E, Figure E.7 demonstrating this trend growth from the port of East London.
65 Fair and Jones (1991) note that the port handled 2.7 million tons of cargo during the 1970s, falling
below 2 million tons in 1985, and slumping further to 0.8 million tons in 1988.
66The PWV (Zone C) was 1000 kms from East London, making it an unlikely gateway for cargo.
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(iii) Interest Concessions on Land and Capital Goods: The allocation of incentive
payments to companies in the form of concessions on capital and land increased sharply
during the third phase of the RIDP, as shown in Table 5.3. The concession on interest
payments, which lasted 10 years, grew in real terms, from 3 % in 1982 to 22 % of the
total incentives package paid by the RIDP across all investment zones. This category of
incentive appears to be widely acknowledged, but little is known about its importance.
For example, a Taiwanese investor remarked, “[...] your working capital is financed by
the Development Corporation at a very attractive interest rate [...].”67 However we
cannot generalise across all zones. The reader requires an understanding of the different
financing institutions and in which zones these concessions were more readily accessible.
Interest concessions were administered by three categories of financial institutions. Each
will be detailed below to provide context on how these could have supported Taiwanese
inward investment, and therefore influenced its subsequent geographic location and
agglomeration. The first institution was the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC),
a statutory body; which made finance available for the establishment of new industries
and the expansion of new industries in metropolitan as well as decentralised areas outside
the independent TBVC states and semi-autonomous homelands.68
Of relevance to the analysis of Taiwanese manufacturing firms were three caveats to the
financing requirements. First, the IDC could only fund companies established within
the borders of the Republic and not the homelands (i.e TBVC and semi-autonomous
homelands) thus excluding 37 potential locations from large-scale investment financing.
Second, only manufacturing entities could be considered and activities such as trading,
farming and mining were excluded. Furthermore, the replacement of “other sources of
finance and finance for the take-over of an ongoing concern cannot be considered.”69 These
two caveats are important later for explaining how and why the Taiwanese agglomerated
in certain zones, may be due to the IDC restriction.70 The restriction on non-homeland
investments would have reduced the attractiveness of many potential locations.
The second provider of concessionary finance was the Small Business Development
Corporation. The SBDC was responsible for industrialists requiring financial assistance
of less than R 200,000 and therefore specialising in smaller undertakings.71 Founded in
1981, just as Taiwanese investment flows were escalating, it had the specific purpose of
“developing small business amongst all population groupings within the Rand Monetary
67Interview transcript - Public Affairs Research Institute (Eddie Sun interview, PARI records, October
2013). Courtesy of Laura Phillips: laurap@pari.org.za
68TBVC = Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
69The National Archive, Pretoria, RSA, Ref: G 68 E INDU 86 MANU.
70When viewed in conjunction with economic geography of each homeland, the Taiwanese investment
would not have satisfied the IDC funding requirements.
71Republic of South Africa (1982) Department of Trade and Industry, The National Archive, Pretoria,
RSA, Ref: G 68 E INDU 86 MANU.
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Area.”72 According to their archival records, the SBDC offered a wide range of assistance,
but mostly in the fields of financing start-up capital, furnishing business sites and
providing advisory information. The Small Business Development Corporation archival
records quantified the financial assistance and subsequent distribution to the RIDP
programme. The findings show that payments were made almost exclusively (78 %)
to South African domestic firms within Zone H and G. As I show, these were areas
that experienced lower Taiwanese investment inflows. Secondly, the companies that did
receive financing had, on average, assets totalling less than R 750,000 in 1985. This
was below most of the Taiwanese investors’ requirements. As such, the Small Business
Development Corporation would have been of little service to the Taiwanese investors.
The National Homeland Development Corporations were the final category of financial
institutions to which Taiwanese industrialists could turn in order to access this category of
incentive financing. Given the evidence in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.3), this was the financial
channel through which favourable loans were granted. Ten of these centrally funded,
but semi-autonomous development financing institutions existed. Of importance to the
agglomeration hypothesis is the level of interest concessions available in each of the RIDP
sites. In addition, the marketing and recruitment activity of each development financing
institution appears to have also induced a degree of agglomeration. Interest concessions
appeared to be extended more widely in the Transkei and KwaZulu homelands, which is
not accurately reflected in RIDP income statements. From initial analysis, homeland
zones received higher concessions ranging from 50 % to 80 % of the interest payments
for the first 10 years, while de-concentration zones in or near peri-urban areas received
lower concessions ranging between 25 % and 40 %. Providing disaggregated data per
RIDP sites, Appendix E, Table E.5 tabulates the interest concessions. The impact of
these differences will be tested and discussed in Section 5.4 with the other incentives.
(iv) Relocation Allowance:
The final category of RIDP incentives pertained to the relocation allowance of plant and
machinery. These are summarised from the decentralisation gazette - “Relocation costs
were reimbursed when an industrialist moved a complete factory or part thereof as a going
concern from PWV (Zone H) or Durban-Pinetown (Zone E) areas to a decentralised area.
In the Cape peninsula (Zone A) only relocations to the Atlantis RIDP site are paid.”
However, foreign firms could select RIDP zones that were categorised as decentralisation
areas and receive higher relocation subsidies. For example, “industrialists were then able
to claim up to a maximum of R 500,000 in respect of relocation costs and an additional
20 per cent to compensate for the unquantifiable costs.”73
72The National Archive, Pretoria, RSA, Ref: G 68 E INDU 86 MANU.
73Manual on the establishment or expansion of industrial undertaking (1982), Department of Trade
and Industry, The National Archive, Pretoria, RSA, Ref: G 68 E INDU 86 MANU pg. 216
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Analysis of the RIDP income statement demonstrates that the category grew rapidly.
Figure 5.4 below demonstrates that this category of incentives grew from approximately
2 % in 1982 to 9 % of total distributions in 1990. This is also recorded in a number of
archival sources and appears to have been very useful in attracting firms, warranting
further discussion. For example, the development almanac from the Free State (Zone C)
and Lebowa (Zone H) advertise the growing demand for relocating to their respective
RIDP sites based on “sufficient relocation allowances for small enterprises, reducing the
risk and inconvenience for entrepreneurs from abroad.”74
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
3(%
)3o
f3t
ot
al
3R
ID
P3
In
ce
nt
iv
e3
Di
st
rib
ut
io
n
Relocation3Subsidy
Figure 5.4: Annual RIDP expenditure on relocation subsidies across all zones, (1982 - 1991).
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry annual reports, 1974 - 1991. The National
Archives, Pretoria, RSA. TAB 7869/ZA - Series 1971-1991.
An interview with a Taiwanese entrepreneur in Butterworth (Zone D) also highlights the
attractiveness of this incentive for the relocation of foreign firms to the homelands. He
explained, “[...] we thought the investment relocating costs are relatively attractive so
you don’t have to really outlay a lot of money to relocate your factory.” The entrepreneur
goes on to explain how these enticed investment; “[...] there were relocation incentives
so virtually the cost of shipping of your machinery from the Far East largely is being
subsidised.”75
74The Star; “Foreigner set to flock to homelands”, 15th of April, 1981: Homelands, Lebowa Labour
collection, SADLRU Clippings, 1975 - 2000, pg. 343.
75Official interview transcript - Public Affairs Research Institute (Eddie Sun interview, PARI records,
October 2013). Courtesy of Laura Phillips luarap@pari.org.za
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5.3.3 Taiwanese Business and Production Networks
The ethnic Taiwanese diasporas could have served as an important facilitator during the
agglomeration process in South Africa’s RIDP zones. Redding (1996) first found that
small and medium-sized Taiwanese firms had loose organisational structures, but strong
production networks. These highly enduring ‘relational assets’, produced commonly
understood production conventions and rules which accelerated Taiwanese firm expansion
via transnational business networks.76 Further informing this hypothesis, Chen and Chen
(1998) demonstrated that production linkages were an important determinant of location
choice for Taiwanese firms as they internationalised their investments in Southeast Asia
and China. For example industrial clusters and the small firms therein, benefited from
the production networks in which they were embedded back in Taiwan. Moreover, small
firms were more sensitive to relational linkages than large firms were in their choice of
FDI location. This distinction will become important in Section 5.4 to explore how firm
networks intersected with RIDP incentives and economic geography of specific zones.
To investigate firm agglomeration in the RIDP zones because of these integrated ethnic
networks, the following data is assembled: (1) Geocoded location of Taiwanese firms
across all the RIDP zones to firstly quantify the degree of agglomeration. (2) Secondly,
the industrial sectors in which the Taiwanese cohort invested is categorised using the
business almanac. Finally, (3) the chronological pattern of investment is examined to
test for period-specific increases of Taiwanese FDI to the RIDP zones.
The data employed in this section was sourced from declassified reports pertaining to
the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), and is supplemented with the
African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC).77 These records capture
the geographic location (telephone prefix), year of RIDP application and commencement,
in addition to the industry sector. The variable used to test Taiwanese agglomeration
is the total number of firms in all sectors and RIDP zones in 1992, which was the
final year of the Good Hope RIDP incentive programme. By this year, 306 Taiwanese
firms were operating across South Africa and its African homelands. The Taiwanese
cohort represent approximately 10 % of all manufacturing firms (both international and
domestic) operating under the revised RIDP regime. This is a meaningful sample, as the
policy of decentralisation had been in place from the 1960s, while the Taiwanese cohort
of firms established operations from 1979. Thus, in the space of 13 years, 1 in 10 firms
operating in South Africa’s decentralisation programme was of Taiwanese origin.78
76Dunning (2002) coined the term “relational asset” to describe how tangible assets and social capital
consists of resources which are embedded in networks of relationships.
77ATCC annual reports for the year 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990. Provided by the Taiwanese
Representative Office Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
78Data Appendix F, Table F.3 summarises the zone distribution of Taiwanese and domestic South
African investment in 1992.
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(1) Taiwanese Agglomeration Data: The geocoded location of all Taiwanese firms
is assembled to establish the degree of firm agglomeration. Geocoding requires the input
of the longitudinal and latitudinal co-ordinates for each of the Taiwanese firms. This data
was gleaned from two archival sources. Firstly, the annual reports of the BDI recorded
the RIDP site code. This data was then matched with the geographic co-ordinates of the
homeland RIDP zone. Second, the 1992 ATCC almanac provided the telephone numbers
for every Taiwanese firm belonging to the organisation. The prefix of the telephone
number indicated the geographic location, which in turn was mapped to the geographic
co-ordinates of the geocoded RIDP zones. Figure 5.1 on pg. 124 visually represents a
notable agglomeration of firms, and demonstrates the geographic relation to African
homelands and development regions.
Further developing the agglomeration thesis, an aggregate of Taiwanese firms across
each of the eight Development Zones is calculated, thus providing a base measure of the
investment distribution across South Africa. Beginning at the highest spatial level, Figure
5.5 below represents Taiwanese firms’ clustering. These results supplement findings by
Hart (1996) and Pickles and Woods (1989) who also noted Taiwanese firms centreing
in selected geographic areas, namely Region E. However, the new national data casts
further light on the distribution of Taiwanese firms, showing a higher proportion investing
in Development Region C. Remarkably, 94 firms clustered in Zone C, and a further
50 clustered in Zone D, while Zone E sees the second highest agglomeration with 88
firms. Disaggregating the data, Table 5.6 on the next page explores these trends further,
highlighting the percentage distribution of firms in each the specific RIDP zones.
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Figure 5.5: Aggregated Taiwanese firms by development Zone, (1992). Note: Tai-
wanese firms operated in Zone A and Zone B, but ceased RIDP incentives in 1985.
Source: ATCC & BDI archival sources. See Appendix E, Table F.3.
PERCENTAGE	DISTRIBUTION	OF	FIRMS	IN	EACH	RIDP	SITE	
Zone	
		(i)	
											Site	Name	
																		(ii)	
Taiwanese	
(iii)	
Taiwanese	%	
(iv)	
Domestic	
(v)	
Domestic	%	
(vi)	
Zone	C	 Botshabelo-	Thaba’Nchu	 69	 23	%	 54	 2	%	
Zone	E	 Newcastle	-	Madadeni	 61	 20	%	 20	 1	%	
Zone	D	 Dimbaza	 27	 9	%	 7	 0	%	
Zone	E	 Tongaat-Isthebe	 18	 6	%	 39	 1	%	
Zone	F	 KaNgwane	 15	 5	%	 0	 0	%	
Zone	H	 Ga’rankuwa	 15	 5	%	 0	 0	%	
Zone	D	 Butterworth	 11	 4	%	 0	 0	%	
Zone	D	 Umtata	 11	 4	%	 12	 0	%	
Zone	C	 Phuthaditjaba	 10	 3	%	 176	 5	%	
Zone	F	 Nelspruit	 10	 3	%	 54	 2	%	
Zone	H	 Bronkhorstspruit	 10	 3	%	 19	 1	%	
Zone	H	 Babelegi	 8	 3	%	 0	 0	%	
Zone	C	 Selosesha	 7	 2	%	 0	 0	%	
Zone	C	 Bloemfontein	 6	 2	%	 178	 5	%	
Zone	E	 Pietermartzburg	 6	 2	%	 165	 5	%	
Zone	H	 KwaNdebele	-Siyabuswa	 6	 2	%	 21	 1	%	
Zone	G	 Lebowakkgomo	 5	 2	%	 18	 1	%	
Zone	H	 Ekangala	 5	 2	%	 92	 3	%	
Zone	C	 Harrismith	 2	 1	%	 19	 1	%	
Zone	E	 Ezakeni	 2	 1	%	 99	 3	%	
Zone	F	 White	River	 2	 1	%	 26	 1	%	
TOTAL	 306	 100	%	 989	 29	%	
Table 5.6: Spatial Distribution of Taiwanese firms in 1992. Column (i) Development Zone. Column (ii) Name of RIDP Site. Column (iii)
Number of Taiwanese firms. Column (iv) Percentage of all Taiwanese firms. Column (v) Number of Domestic firms. Column (vi) Percentage
of all Domestic RIDP firms. Note: Domestic firms 6=100 %, as only sites with Taiwanese firms were included in the summary table.
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), National Archives, Pretoria, South Africa, TAB 9879/987. The African Taiwanese Chamber of
Commerce almanac (ATCC), Taipei Liaison Office, (formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
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Although this data will be used in the analysis section, results in Table 5.6 already start
to show interesting patterns of firm clustering. Firstly, two RIDP sites attracted the
overwhelming majority of Taiwanese firms. In absolute terms, 42 % of all Taiwanese
investment was situated in Botshabelo-Thaba’Nchu (Zone C) and the Newcastle-Madadeni
Complex (Zone E). The next nine most prevalent sites represent a further 42 % of
investment. As such, only 11 of the 63 RIDP sites attracted 84 % of all Taiwanese
investment with prominent location-choice agglomerations demonstrated in Figure 5.1 on
p. 124, while the same sites only attract 29 % of the domestic South African investment.
Of further importance to the business network thesis are the regional groupings of
RIDP zones that existed in close proximity to each other. For example, Botshabelo
- Thaba’Nchu and Seloshesha (Zone C) are within a 20 km circumference and form
an industrial complex accounting for 27 % of all Taiwanese firms. While the same
observations can be extrapolated to Newcastle-Madadeni and Tongaat-Isithebe (Zone E),
which in turn represents a further 26 % of firm agglomeration. The same observation
can be made for Bronkhorstspruit-Babelegi-Ekangala and Ga’rankuwa (Zone H). This
complex of RIDP sites on the outskirts of Pretoria accounted for a further 12 % of
Taiwanese agglomeration. In summary, one can consider the possibility that production
networks emerged in close geographic proximity, with three distinct industrial complexes
representing 65 % of the Taiwanese firms in South Africa. What’s more, if the Ciskei
and Transkei sites of Butterworth-Dimbaza (Zone D) are grouped around East London;
the agglomeration factor reaches 86 % in four industrial complexes.
(2) Industrial Sector Data: Exploring the possibility of industrial complexes, this
section assembles further production network data, and measures the extent to which
Taiwanese firms in the same industry or supporting industries clustered in each of the
RIDP zones. As noted in the literature section (5.2), both economic geography and firm
theory scholarship suggest that firms in the same industry cluster geographically.79 Many
of these cluster effects arise because the physical proximity of firms reduces transaction
costs. For example, buyers, suppliers, service providers and specialists can reduce search,
negotiation and contracting costs. Known as localisation economies, a concentration
of particular industries therefore increases productivity in a specific geographic area.
Examining this trend, the data is firstly grouped by sectors (Figure 5.6), and then at
the level of the individual RIDP sites (Table 5.7). Finally, the firm data is grouped by
industrial complex where integrated production links are identified (Table 5.8). The
purpose of this data is to quantify the extent of industry-sector clustering in RIDP zones,
or broader industrial complexes containing multiple zones.
79In summary, the literature examines a combination of natural endowments, sunk costs and agglom-
eration effects. In this section the latter is examined due to production networks within identifiable
industrial sectors.
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Figure 5.6: Industrial sectors from the grouped regional industrial complexes tabulated in 5.8.
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), National Archives, Pretoria, South
Africa, TAB 9879/987. The African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC), Taipei
Liaison Office, (formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Johannesburg, RSA.
The motive to cluster would not be captured by the financial incentives, but rather id-
iosyncratic factors whereby first movers migrated, and then recreated existing production
networks. For example, the initial relocation of a large manufacturer into a single RIDP
zone created a chain reaction, whereby the smaller suppliers or assemblers followed the
larger firm, reproducing the supply chain and production network. This industrial-sector
agglomeration is emblematic of the network thesis promoted by Ho (1979). He found that
Taiwanese investors organised production around networks formed in specific industries.
Figure 5.6 initially indicates that a higher proportion of firms were classified in the
electronics, plastics, clothing apparel, textiles and metal fabrication sectors. The com-
plementarity of these industries is noteworthy, providing the basis for exploring the
agglomeration effect of cluster-based input sharing in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. This data
will be used in Section 5.4 to test if production networks emerged in specific zones, thus
accounting for subsequent ethnic agglomeration.
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TAINWANESE(FIRMS(IN(EACH(INDUSTRY(SECTOR(AND(DEVELOPMENT(ZONES((
SECTOR( ZONE(A( ZONE(B( ZONE(C( ZONE(D( ZONE(E( ZONE(F( ZONE(G( ZONE(H(
Electrical(( 0" 0" 11" 5" 5" 7" 4" 2"
Plastics( 0" 0" 17" 7" 13" 0" 0" 3"
Clothing(&(Knitwear( 0" 0" 24" 14" 35" 2" 0" 2"
Textile( 0" 0" 3" 1" 6" 1" 0" 6"
Footwear( 0" 0" 15" 3" 7" 0" 0" 3"
Packaging( 0" 0" 8" 1" 9" 0" 0" 4"
Metal(ware( 0" 0" 4" 4" 1" 0" 0" 16"
Furniture( 0" 0" 0" 9" 1" 0" 0" 1"
Jewellery( 0" 0" 3" 1" 1" 0" 0" 2"
Cosmetics(&(Toys( 0" 0" 1" 1" 0" 0" 0" 1"
Food( 0" 0" 2" 1" 0" 13" 2" 2"
Other( 0" 0" 6" 2" 9" 4" 0" 2"
"
Table 5.7: Taiwanese firms by Industry sector and RIDP zones, (1992).
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
‡Bronkhorstspruit-–-Babelegi-–-Ekangala-and-Ga’rankuwa-
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! Free!State!Complex!
(Zone&C)&
Eastern!Cape!
Complex!
(Zone&D)&
KwaZulu!Natal!Complex!
(Zone&E)&
PWV$
Complex$
(Zone&H)&
SECTOR! BOTSHABELO! THABA’NCHU! SELOSHESA! CISKEI! TRANSKEI! LADYSMITHC!QWAQWA!
NEWCASTLEC
MADANENI!
TONGAAT!C!
ISITHEBE!
$$$$BBEG‡!
Electrical! 5! 1! 5! 1! 4! 0! 3! 2! 2!
Plastics! 12! 5! 0! 4! 3! 0! 11! 2! 3!
Clothing!&!Knitwear! 14! 9! 0! 8! 6! 3! 27! 5! 2!
Textile! 2! 1! 0! 0! 1! 1! 3! 2! 6!
Footwear! 9! 4! 2! 3! 0! 4! 2! 1! 3!
Packaging! 6! 0! 0! 1! 0! 0! 8! 1! 4!
Metal!ware! 1! 2! 0! 1! 3! 0! 0! 1! 16!
Furniture! 0! 0! 0! 1! 8! 0! 0! 1! 1!
Jewellery! 2! 1! 0! 1! 0! 1! 0! 0! 2!
Cosmetics!&!Toys! 1! 0! 0! 0! 1! 0! 0! 0! 1!
Food! 2! 0! 0! 0! 1! 0! 0! 0! 2!
Other! 0! 0! 0! 0! 2! 1! 6! 2! 1!
TOTAL!!
54! 23! 7! 29! 20! 10! 60! 17! 43!
84! 49! 87! 43!
Table 5.8: Taiwanese firms (1992) by industry sector, RIDP site and grouped within the regional industrial
complex: Namely Botshabelo-Thaba’Nchu and Seloshesha (Zone C); Bronkhorstspruit - Babelegi - Ekangala
and Ga’rankuwa (Zone H); Newcastle - Madadeni and Tongaat-Isithebe (Zone E); Transkei-Ciskei (Zone D).
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(3) Chronological Pattern of Investment Agglomeration: Within the broader
economic geography scholarship are chronological investment patterns inducing subse-
quent investments. In this section, the chronological investment pattern is quantified to
examine if earlier investments may have resulted in greater clustering.
To examine the possibility of this effect in the Taiwanese RIDP cohort, the chronological
start date of each firm investment is assembled from the BDI investment application
data. The purpose of this is two-fold. Firstly to quantify whether there were specific
time periods of intensified Taiwanese firm formation. Secondly, to test whether zones in
which Taiwanese firms invested first, then later attracted greater numbers of supporting
Taiwanese firms. Thus the earlier Taiwanese firms (i.e. first- mover Taiwanese production
networks) would have made it more attractive to relocate in subsequent periods, achieving
a lasting competitive advantage. This self-reinforcing agglomeration effect may have
important implications for which RIDP zone Taiwanese investors later clustered. To
investigate this proposition, Figure 5.7 below demonstrates the chronological investment
flow for each of the RIDP zones. This graph has been summarised from Table 1.2 on
page 31 of Chapter 1 and can be referred to in the following analysis.
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Figure 5.7: Number of Taiwanese firms commencing operation, (1979 - 1992).
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), National Archives, Pretoria, South
Africa, TAB 9879/987. The African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC), Taipei
Liaison Office, (formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Johannesburg, RSA.
Chapter 5. Geography, Incentives or Ethnicity 155
The assembled data in Figure 5.7 (and Table 1.2) highlights that in 1979 only nine
Taiwanese firms commenced operation in South Africa, with a noticeable increase over
time. Of the early cohort, six firms selected sites in the traditional industrial heartland of
the PWV contained in Zone H; while Zone D, E and F received one firm each respectively.
The Zone D and E firms were both textile mills, while the Zone H firms were in the
metal assembly sector.80 This already provides evidence as to the investment sequence
discussed above, with apparel assembly following textile firms. By 1982 an increase
in firm formation can be observed, possibly as a result of the new Good Hope RIDP
incentives becoming available. However, domestic Taiwanese and network factors may
have also led to this rise in FDI.
In the following years there is a significant increase in 1986, 1987 and 1988 as the number
of Taiwanese firms relocating to the RIDP started to exceed the domestic firms. After
1991 there is a drop-off, possibly as a result of political instability and the imminent
demise of apartheid. A small escalation in formations is recorded again in 1992. This
may have been a result of the incentive programme terminating, with investors seeking
to take a final opportunity to participate in the RIDP.
Within the zones, the number of firm formations started to deviate, supporting the
chronological hypothesis of earlier investments. Other empirical studies of the FDI
location decision have uncovered the importance of earlier firm formation emanating
from clusters of inter-firm linkages. One possible explanation for this agglomeration effect
is that information flows within local networks make it easy for future potential investors
to establish themselves in the local networks. In other words, earlier agglomeration
increases the possibility of linking potential investors, reducing their risk. As such, three
zones begin to receive the majority of FDI. In 1982, Zone E initially starts to show a
divergence from the others, with 10 firms locating to this region. Thereafter, Zone C
and E also start receiving more FDI than the alternative regions. By 1992, these three
zones had received 82 % of the investment, with most of this concentrated in the Free
State Complex (Zone C), Eastern Cape Complex (Zone D) and KwaZulu Natal Complex
(Zone E) as highlighted in Figure 5.7.
These early data trends may be indicative of other empirical research, which found the
ease of establishing network linkages to be a significant determinant in the geographic
choice of foreign investment, independent of other locational characteristics of the host
country.81 In the following analysis section, I will evaluate how these network linkages
and location-specific factors interacted to generate further clustering.
80See Table 5.8
81Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) modelled the location choice of Japanese manufacturing plants in
the United States, and found that industry-level agglomeration played an important role in location
decisions. In a further study Head and Ries (1996) analysed agglomeration forces in China’s special
economic zones, and found that firms from the same country had a lasting impact on agglomeration.
Co-ethnic agglomeration magnified the direct financial impact of government incentives.
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5.4 ANALYSIS
The clustering of Taiwanese firms was a dynamic process. Explanations for agglomeration
are grouped into three categories: (A) economic geography, (B) regional investment
incentives, and (C) co-ethnic business networks. In other words, were Taiwanese firms
locating as result of economic geography (i.e. endowments of the region), the regional
incentives offered by the RIDP, or were they co-locating to RIDP zones due to existing
co-ethnic business networks? As such, the three factors proposed in the agglomeration
thesis cannot be evaluated as isolated variables. Through the analysis of both quantitative
and qualitative aspects of agglomeration I will evaluate each of these explanations.
5.4.1 Wages, Wage Subsidies and Zone Location
In this section I focus on the interregional wages in each of the investment zones and the
variation in wage subsidies received by Taiwanese investors. The historical scholarship
cites how lower homeland wages, paired with larger incentives, drove inward investment.82
It would therefore follow that Taiwanese firms would cluster in zones where wage incentives
were higher than aggregate wages.
To explore whether wage incentives may have had an impact on Taiwanese-firm location
choices, a variable termed ‘Rebate Wage Gap’ is calculated (RWG). This is derived from
the maximum allowable RIDP wage rebate (compiled in Appendix E, Table E.3) and
the unskilled aggregate RIDP wages per zone.83 The Rebate Wage Gap variable thus
measures the difference between the average RIDP wages (1982- 1992) in each of the
zones and the respective RIDP incentives received in those zones. In other words, if
the RWG variable is positive, an investor received a wage incentive premium from the
decentralisation Programme, while if negative, the investors had to contribute additional
funds towards the firm’s wage bill.
The results of the wage rebate gap are summarised in Table 5.9 on the following page.
Here I have ranked each RIDP zone by the total number of Taiwanese firms in 1992
(column iii). Focusing on wages, I included the maximum wage rebate received (column
iv), the average monthly wage paid at that RIDP zone (column v) and then calculated
the rebate wage gap. The second variable is an interest rebate, which was a subsidy
paid to the investor on capital equipment loans (column vii). The final column (viii)
summarises the average cost of transporting goods to a port by railway. These two last
variables will be discussed in section 5.4.2 and 5.4.3, after I have dealt with wages.
82Amongst others, Pickles and Woods (1989) claim wages and incentives were the leading variable,
while Hart (1996) notes the importance of lower wages, especially amongst the cohort of female workers.
83This has been discussed throughout the thesis and can once again be seen in Appendix Table F.2.
ECONOMIC	GEOGRAPHY	FACTORS	
(i)	 														(ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)	 (vi)	 (vii)	
ZONE	&	NAME	 RIDP	SITE	 FIRMS	 WAGE	REBATE	 WAGES	(pm)	 RWG	 TRANSPORT	
Zone	E	 KwaZulu	 Newcastle	-	Madadeni	 61	 R	80	 R	30	 R	50	 R	167	
Zone	C	 Free	State	 Botshabelo	 40	 R	100	 R	55	 R	45	 R	245	
Zone	C	 Free	State	 Thaba'Nchu	 29	 R	100	 R	48	 R	52	 R	245	
Zone	D	 Eastern	Cape	 Dimbaza	 27	 R	110	 R	60	 R	50	 R	128	
Zone	E	 KwaZulu	 Tongaat-Isithebe	 18	 R	105	 R	60	 R	45	 R	245	
Zone	F	 Eastern	Transvaal	 KaNgwane	 15	 R	110	 R	50	 R	60	 R	128	
Zone	H	 PWV	 Ga'rankuwa	 15	 R	35	 R	96	 -R	61	 R	303	
Zone	D	 Eastern	Cape	 Butterworth	 11	 R	110	 R	40	 R	70	 R	128	
Zone	D	 Eastern	Cape	 Umtata	 11	 R	110	 R	36	 R	74	 R	187	
Zone	C	 Free	State	 QwaQwa	-	Phuthaditjaba	 10	 R	110	 R	51	 R	59	 R	500	
Zone	F	 Eastern	Transvaal	 Nelspruit	 10	 R	70	 R	50	 R	20	 R	361	
Zone	H	 PWV	 Bronhkorstspruit	 10	 R	30	 R	80	 -R	50	 R	538	
Zone	H	 PWV	 Babelegi		 8	 R	30	 R	38	 -R	8	 R	303	
Zone	C	 Free	State	 Selosesha	 7	 R	100	 R	32	 R	68	 R	361	
Zone	G	 Northern	Transvaal	 Seshogo	 7	 R	70	 R	51	 R	19	 R	128	
Zone	C	 Free	State	 Bloemfontein	 6	 R	70	 R	67	 R	3	 R	500	
Zone	E	 KwaZulu	 Pietermaritzburg	 6	 R	25	 R	62	 -R	37	 R	351	
Zone	G	 Northern	Transvaal	 Pietersburg	 6	 R	35	 R	40	 -R	5	 R	341	
Zone	H	 PWV	 Ekangala	 5	 R	35	 R	78	 -R	43	 R	283	
Zone	E	 KwaZulu	 Ezakheni	 2	 R	105	 R	59	 R	46	 R	167	
Zone	E	 KwaZulu	 Ladysmith	 2	 R	80	 R	30	 R	50	 R	128	
Table 5.9: Table ranks the concentration of Taiwanese firms in 1992 relative to four measurable economic geography factors. Column
(i) Development Zone. Column (ii) Name of RIDP Site. Column (iii) Number of Taiwanese firms. Column (iv) Maximum Wage Rebate
Receivable. Column (v) Average monthly wage paid at that RIDP zone. Column (vi) Rebate Wage Gap i.e. the incentive paid to the
investor. Column (vi) The average cost of transporting goods to a port by railway.
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), National Archives, Pretoria, South Africa, TAB 9879/987. The African Taiwanese Chamber of
Commerce almanac (ATCC), Taipei Liaison Office, (formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
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Referring to Table 5.9, one can observe that wages across the 22 zones, in which Taiwanese
investors located, varied considerably. For example, Ga’rankuwa offered the highest wages
to employees, but the lowest investment incentive. As a result, it had the widest rebate
rate, which may have discouraged investors, yet we see 15 firms established operations
in this zone. Conversely, Selosesha had the highest investment incentive and one of the
lowest aggregate wages, but only attracted half the number of Taiwanese investors (7).
On balance there does appear to be a trend towards lower wages and higher investment
incentives. If I focus on the top eight zones which account for 190 Taiwanese firms (62 %),
the average wage and wage rebate are in a very similar range. Wages ranged from R30 pm
to R50 pm, and RWG of R45 to R60 pm. This could suggest that certain investors were
attracted by lower wages, or by higher incentives. However, for investors in zones that
had higher wages or lower incentives, other factors may account for their agglomeration.
Here I’m specifically referring to distance to markets or production networks, which will
be discussed after I’ve dealt with the impact of gender and wage.
Archival evidence collected from the Transkei Development Corporation archive (1982)
makes reference to the comparable female wages in China when attempting to attract
Asian investment.84 As such, a gender dimension also existed in the zone and wage
differential, which has yet to be fully explored in prior analysis.85 For example, the
lowest-paid RIDP sites, such as Seshogo and Pietersburg were situated in Zone G, and
received a comparably small cohort of the Taiwanese investment. Yet these locations
had some of the highest wage rebate incentives, while the inverse is observed for sites in
Zone H, which reflect some of the highest wages.
This was particularly relevant for female wages, although only passing mention has
been made of their importance in prior literature. Bell (1987) note that “[...] while
the financial inducements offered by the state to industrialists in the periphery have
been central [...] other factors have also been at work.86 Wellings and Black (1986a)
suggest lower labour costs and advantageous demographic factors, especially a greater
concentration of unskilled female labour, played an important role.87
To emphasise the importance of female labour to Taiwanese investment, the same
labour-ratio technique as Butler, Rotberg and Adams (1977) is exploited.88 Using new
demographic data collected from Section 5.3.1 on page 133 highlights a deterioration in
84Transkei Development Corporation (1982), Wage Statistics in Transkei. Umtata Archive.
85For example, Pickles and Woods (1989) only mention the Eastern Cape (Zone D) referring to no
specific RIDP sites, while Hart and Todes (1997) focus solely on Newcastle-Madeni (Zone E).
86Bell (1987, p. 1291)
87Wellings and Black (1986a, p. 143) note how “a third factor accounting for extremely low wages is
the high proportion of female labour in growth-point production sites, in many of which they constitute
the majority of the industrial labour force.”
88Butler, Rotberg and Adams (1977) used these ratios to underscore KwaZulu’s greater dependence on
migrant labour and income remittances as a result of this gender imbalance.
Chapter 5. Geography, Incentives or Ethnicity 159
the Male-to-Female homeland working-age bands. Shown in Table 5.10, this simple ratio
is calculated by dividing the total number of Female and Male working-age populations.
Illustrating the male population deficit, Column D records the ratio of economically
active females to their male counterparts in the homelands. In most zones, the ratio of
females to males exceeded two to one. These results are not in themselves causal but
are nonetheless interesting. They support archival evidence that Taiwanese firms were
positioning themselves to take advantage of female labour that could be trained in the
workplace or had previously been present in the unskilled labour pool.
! ! !
"!118!"!
assess! the! impact! of! female! labour! using! the! ratios! calculated! in! Part! 2.3.! These!results!are!not!in!themselves!causal!but!are!nonetheless!interesting.!They!support!archival!evidence!cited!above!that!Taiwanese!firms!were!positioning!themselves!to!take! advantage! of! f male! labour! that! could! b ! trained! in! the! workplac ! or! had!previously!been!present!in!the!unskilled!labour!pool.!!!
RESULT'TABLE'2:'Agglomeration!by'industry!sector!(A),!representing!the!RIDP!site!in!which!the!agglomeration!occurs!(B),!sector!concentration!as!a!%!of!total!RIDP!firm!investment!and,!(D)!the!ratio!of!female!working!age!labourers!to!males!in!the!age!band!19!–!29!years.!
SOURCE:! Board! for! the! Decentralisation! of! Industry! (BDI),! National! Archives,! Pretoria,! South!Africa,! TAB! 9879/987.! The! African! Taiwanese! Chamber! of! Commerce! almanac! (ATCC),! Taipei!Liaison!Office,! (formerly!the!Taiwan!Representative!Embassy)! Archive,! Hyde! Park,! Johannesburg,!South!Africa.196!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!196!ATCC!annual!reports!for!the!year!1982,!1987,!1988,!1989,!1990,!1992,!1996,!1998,!1999,!2006,!2008,!2009.!!
SECTOR' RIDP'SITES' CONCENTRATION' FEMALE:'MALE'LABOUR'RATIO'
(A)' (B)' (C)' (D)'
Electronic'
manufacturers'and'
electrical'assemblers'
! ! !Botshabelo!–!Seloshesha!complex!!(Zone!C)! !47%!!! 2:1!!!Butterworth!(Zone!D)! 33%! 1.6:1!
'
Plastic'
manufacturers'
'
Botshabelo!"!Thaba’Nchu!(Zone!C)! 50%!' 2:1!!Newcastle!(Zone!E)! 28%! 1.7:1!
Footwear' Botshabelo!"!Thaba’Nchu!and!Seloshesha!complex.!(Zone!C)! 57%! 2:1!!
Furniture'
Manufacturing' Butterworth!(Zone!D)! 80%! 1.6:1!
Metalwork'and''
metal'fabrication'
Bronkhorstspruit"Babelegi"!Ekangala!complex!(Zone!H)! !67%! !1.8:1!!
Clothing'and'
Knitwear'
Newcastle"Madaneni!complex! 37%! 1.7:1!Botshabelo"Thaba’Nchu!complex.!(Zone!C)! 31%! 2:1!
Textile'
Babelegi!–!Ekangala!(Zone!H)! 40%! 1.8:1!!Ladysmith"QwaQwa!(Zone!E)!Newcastle"Madaneni!(Zone!E)!Tongaat!–!Isithebe!(Zone!E)! 40%! 1.7:1!
Table 5.10: Column (A) Agglomeration by industry sector. Column (B) RIDP site in which
the agglomeration occurred. Column (C) calculates the sector concentration as a % of total
investment. Column (D) shows the ratio of female working-age labourers to males in the age
band 19 – 29 years.
Source: For demographic sources see section 5.3.1 on page 133. Firm level data from the
African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC), Taipei Liaison Office, (formerly the
Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Johannesburg, South Africa.
Chapter 5. Geography, Incentives or Ethnicity 160
Furthermore, archival evidence collected in three former RIDP sites, corroborates these
findings. In 1981, the first large-scale Taiwanese electronic manufacturer, (Sunson)
entered the Transkei (Zone D), producing radios for the Southern African export market.
Sunson was an “expansion subsidiary” from the Taiwanese factory, and was managed by
a former factory technician from the Chinese parent company.89 The manager notes:
“I was very surprised and highly satisfied with the quick manner in which
the Transkei labour force managed to train in the assembly of sophisticated
electronic equipment. The workers are mainly female. They are trained from
scratch and within 6 months capable of assembling radios.”90
In 1983 a further two electronics manufacturers followed from Taiwan. The largest
of these was Senkei Speakers, also managed by a former technician from the Taipei
parent company. Senkei was established to export car speakers and portable radios. The
manager explains the importance of trained labour:
“[. . . ] we export to the United States and other world markets making use
of favourable labour conditions and trained female production-line workers,
which can ensure we have the quality needed. Initially employing 400 women,
the production facility is expected to expand as more workers can be trained
on the assembly line over 3 months, with a full production employing 3000
Transkeians.”91
The archive images below capture unique photographic evidence of African female
labourers. The first image (5.8) shows a production line utilising only female labour,
with the Taiwanese supervisor at Sunson Electronics in Umtata (circa 1981). The second
image (5.8) demonstrates a Free State Development Corporation (Zone C) fact-finding
visit to a factory at Kauchung in Taiwan, also employing only female labourers (circa
1985). Importantly, Botshabelo in Zone C would later become the largest RIDP site for
electronic assembly as shown in Column C of Table 5.10. This archival data suggest that
these firms were actively pursuing sites with adequately trained female labour.
“We came here, as we can employ more women, who are better with delicate
tasks involved in making these metal stoves [...] This place is closer to our
main customers in Pretoria and Botswana, but far from the ports. We came
here for labour and a supply of parts from our partners, not because we can
export.”92
89South African Digest in English, July (pg. 3, 1982).
90Transkei Today, Quarterly Trade publication series. (formerly Umtata, the capital of Transkei)
Archives, Volume 3, Number 2, April - March (1982).
91TDC Development periodical, Trade publication (1983). Walter Sisulu University Library, Mthatha.
92Free State Development Corporation almanac, (pg. 17, 1987). Advertorial on Taipei visit.
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Figure 5.8: Sunson Electronics in Umtata. Image demonstrates the production line utilising
only female labour, with the Taiwanese supervisor training employees on the job.
Source: Umtata Archives. Transkei Development Corporation.
Figure 5.9: Free State Development Corporation site visit to Taiwan in 1985, attempting to
attract Taiwanese firms to Zone C sites. The image demonstrates the production line utilising
only female labourers.
Source: QwaQwa Archive, (now the Free State archives), Phuthadachaba.
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5.4.2 Geography, Transport Costs and Zone Location
The second quantifiable geographic variable was differences in regional transport costs.
These varied depending on the export or domestic markets and are summarised in
Appendix E, Table E.1. The trade in goods between RIDP zones incurred railway,
harbour and road costs. As such, the economic geography literature suggests that firms
agglomerate in areas that have the lowest transport costs.93 It therefore follows that
certain RIDP sites enjoyed advantageous geographic proximity to domestic markets or
harbours (export markets), which could explain a degree of firm agglomeration.
To examine this, I have derived an RIDP transport cost curve, placing each of the zones
in their representative ranking.94 In doing so, I can then estimate the average cost of
transporting a standard container from each zone to it nearest port via rail. This is
then combined with the category of transport incentive (DP or IDP) as an input value
and the least cost route function from my GIS database.95 The results in Figures 5.10
and 5.11 on the following page, show the transport cost variation for either locating in
a De-concentration Point (DP) versus an Industrial Decentralisation Point (IDP). DP
zones were closer to urban centres and not situated in homelands, thus received lower
incentives, but incurred less geographic disadvantage, while IDP zones were brownfield
sites in the homelands, more rural and thus geographically disadvantaged, which was
then theoretically offset by higher incentives.
Referring to Table 5.9 on page 157, one can compare the transportation cost from each
zone and the concentration of Taiwanese firms. Naturally, zones closer to the coast would
incur lower port transport costs. This would be further incentivised by zones located in
IDP regions, such as the homelands, as opposed to DP zones on the urban periphery.
However, the zone with lowest average port transport costs was Ladysmith, which
only attracted two Taiwanese firms. In contrast, Bronkhorstspruit, the most expensive
transport destination, attracted 10 firms and was categorised as a DP site, which received
lower transport and wages incentives. Furthermore, isolating the location of the top
70 % of Taiwanese on the transport curve, once again shows a wide cost variation across
zones. It appears that firms were not locating to zones based solely on transport-cost
subsidies. As such, what could explain this variation? To begin, the international trade
literature notes that foreign firms co-locate based not only on reduced transport costs,
but also based on market access.96 For example, transportation costs could have induced
Taiwanese firms to locate in an ‘optimal trading distance’ between both their suppliers
and customers. In this regard, South Africa’s economic geography is unique, and the
trade-off between domestic and foreign markets will be discussed next.
93Historical literature summarised the process as “spontaneous decentralisation” (see Bell (1987)).
94Produced in Appendix E, Figure E.5.
95Methodology discussed on pg. 136: Deconcentration Point = DP and Decentralisation Point = IDP.
96Alfaro and Chen (2014, p. 265)
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Figure 5.10: DP Zones - Subsidised costs to nearest Port in 1980 Rands. Figure 5.11: IDP Zones - Subsidised costs to nearest Port in 1980 Rands.
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The primary urban and industrial market of South Africa exists in the PWV (Zone H),
and was a substantial domestic market for consumer goods produced by RIDP firms.
However, it has a geographic disadvantage, in that it is land-locked and 600 km from
the closest port. Therefore the inland position of the PWV could explain some of the
Taiwanese agglomeration in alternative RIDP zones, given the nature of the products
produced and the intermediate inputs for these products. Using further archival evidence
from the KwaZulu RIDP almanac, this possibility is explored using Figure 5.12.
Figure 5.12: Zone E Market Access, (1982).
Source: KwaZulu Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg.
The archival map highlights how certain Zone E sites had better transport links to
Bloemfontein (Zone C), PWV (Zone H), and export markets (Ports at Durban and
Richards Bay). Moreover, depending on the industry sector, lower transport costs would
have attracted investors to specific sites. For example, textile manufactures located in
Zone E were in an optimal trading distance, whereby the export markets are within reach
of the Durban port, and the large domestic markets of the PWV area. This achieved a
balance between the distance to a port and the distance to domestic markets.
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Combining these qualitative accounts with the subsidised railway costs calculated in
Figure 5.10 and 5.11 on page 163 serves as further visual references to the major industrial
cities and export ports. The size of the cost bubbles denotes the Rand ton price of
transporting goods to the closest export port for both decentralised (IDP) and de-
concentration zones (DP). Naturally zones closer to the coast or ports enjoyed lower
export transport costs, but were disadvantaged by higher domestic market costs to
the PWV region. However, certain zones offered a trade-off between domestic and
export markets. These offer some explanation of the Taiwanese clustering, and are also
corroborated by archival accounts. To explain this, I will use archival evidence from
Taiwanese firms in Zone C and Zone D. Here I investigate this notion of the optimal
trading distance between coastal ports for convenient export to international markets
and the inland domestic markets (Zone H).
Firms clustering in Zone D appear to have a propensity for labour-intensive export
industries. Column C of Table 5.10 demonstrates that furniture and wood products
tended to locate in this zone. These RIDP sites were in close proximity to the port of
East London, the only Zone to receive substantial port subsidies.97 The importance of
this was not clear in RIDP financial statements, as the harbour subsidies were trivial
in comparison to those for the railways. This becomes apparent in primary archival
evidence from the Transkei Development Corporation. In these monthly reports I have
found examples from the Chopstick Product Company. This Taiwanese firm focused
specifically on the export market, shipping its “billionth chopstick to Japan” in 1988.98
In the same year seventy-seven containers were exported from East London and the
company controlled 10 % of the Japanese market. Importantly, the owner of the company,
Kang Cheng, explains:
“ [...] the location was chosen for three reasons; proximity to the railway
and port, accessible input material from the local pine forest plantations and
female labour which could be rapidly trained as the factory added 300 workers
a year.”99
There appears to be a preference for exporting firms to locate closer to the ports. Once
again this is supported by the archival accounts from Taiwanese firms, with a furniture
manufacturer quoted as saying:
“We need to transport thousands of couches and lounge suites each year. The
cheaper trains and port subsidies allow us to export these back to Taiwan and
Hong Kong for much less than our competitors in Europe.”100
97See the incentives Section 5.3.2 on page 142.
98See Appendix E, Figure E.3.
99“Transkei factory ships its billionth chopstick to Japan“, Transkei Development Corporation publica-
tion. Q1/1988.
100Transkei Today (1985, Q2), citation from “Rising Sun Sofa Company” pg.17
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Firms clustering in Zone C show contrasting needs, with greater domestic market access,
than those cited above in Zone D. For example, the Botshabelo complex was situated on a
transport axis, midway between larger domestic markets and export ports.101 Attracting
47 % of the electronic manufacturers and electrical assemblers, these Taiwanese firms
were producing products for both domestic consumer markets and exports. As such,
it was in close proximity to Bloemfontein, the regional transport hub of Zone C. By
railway, all three urban domestic markets could be reached. Cape Town was 800 km
away; Johannesburg was 400 km and the port at East London was 500 km. This
example demonstrates the trade literature’s proposition of an optimal trading distance
for Taiwanese firms in Zone C. Archival records from Taiwanese firms operating on the
site also confirm this theory:
“The Taiwanese aim was primarily [to] export to the USA market to circum-
vent quotas imposed on exports from Taiwan. But these quotas were also sent
to Johannesburg, Pretoria and Harare, especially after 1985 when sanctions
restricted our export ability [...] This site (Zone C) is close to the railway
where we send electronics, and to the PWV and a port in East London where
we send containers.”102
The balance between economic geography and wage costs was also cited in the Transkei.
“A large enamel kitchenware manufacturer from Hong Kong has relocated to
Butterworth, despite the wages being lower in other decentralisation zones. Mr
Chong, managing director of family-owned Universal Metals, says he prefers
to be to be closer to the port in East London and customers in Southern
Africa. Butterworth is on a central transport route and has reliable electricity,
said Chong. This firm operates like a ‘family member’ of the growing Chinese
diaspora in the Border region of South Africa, employing 700 blacks with a
turnover of R4 million.”103
In conclusion, the transport and geographic location of specific RIDP sites played an
important role in determining the spatial agglomeration. The archival accounts cited
above demonstrate that low-cost wages and RIDP incentives needed to be balanced with
the unique economic geography of South Africa.
101See Appendix E, Figure E.9 which demonstrates the economic geography of Botshabelo in relation
to the transport routes and markets.
102Cited in “This is Botshabelo”, a trade publication advertorial in ATCC 1989 almanac pg. 357. Taipei
Liaison office archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg.
103Transkei Today (Q1, 1988), “Hong Kong Chinese make good in the Transkei”. Umtata Archive.
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5.4.3 Co-Ethnic Production Networks
In this final section, I discuss whether the presence of similar Taiwanese firms raised
the probability that subsequent investors selected the same RIDP location. Chen and
Chen (1998) found that Taiwanese entrepreneurs “may have stretched foreign production
networks with personal relationship linkages built upon cultural and ethnic bonds.”104
This expands on Chapter 4 where I examined the role that co-ethnic networks played
during the expansion of Asian bilateral trade. The findings in that chapter suggested
that the immigration of Taiwanese investors to South Africa increased and diversified
trade between the two countries. Elaborating on the trade results, the following section
examines how co-ethnic production networks may have also accounted for the Taiwanese-
firm agglomeration in South Africa.
In the following analysis, quantitive data from industrial sectors, firm clustering and
investment chronology is combined with qualitative archival evidence to explore my
network thesis. The theoretical literature discussed in Section 5.2.3 found that a “multi-
plicity of bridges between networked clusters and ethnic diasporas have been shown to
reinforce agglomeration”.105 For example, Rauch and Casella (2001) noted how ethnic
networks allow for the inflow of filtered (i.e. trustworthy) information and knowledge
into a localised cluster. Diaspora ties also confer a number of advantages to firms in
an industry or cluster, providing location information and consumer knowledge. This
information and knowledge has “passed social filter and screening mechanisms.”106
The disaggregated industrial-sector data in Section 5.3.3 illustrated that Taiwanese firms
were clustering around industrial and labour specialisations. For example, Table 5.8
summarised Taiwanese firms by industry sector and RIDP zones, while Table 5.7 grouped
Taiwanese firms by industry sector, and regional industrial complex. To further interpret
sector agglomeration, the graphs below again highlight each of the industries and their
corresponding RIDP zone.
These are grouped as follows - electrical manufacturers 5.13(a) ; plastics manufacturers
5.13(b); clothing assemblers 5.13(c); footwear manufacturers 5.13(d); textiles manufac-
turers 5.14(a); packaging manufacturers 5.14(b); metals fabricators 5.14(c) and furniture
manufacturers 5.14(d). Combining this sector analysis with the chronological firm mi-
gration shows that earlier investments may have attracted subsequent clustering. In
this production diaspora, entrepreneurs began to subcontract to their former firms in
Taiwan, which in turn generated a unique RIDP agglomeration. This process with
relevant examples will be discussed next.
104Chen and Chen (1998)
105Amineh (2010, p. 27)
106Rauch and Casella (2001) note how ethnic network ties can be considered more trustful conduits of
information.
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(a) Electrical Manufacturers (b) Plastics Manufacturers
(c) Clothing Manufacturers (d) Footwear Manufacturers
Figure 5.13: Taiwanese Sector Agglomeration by Sector and RIDP Zone (Electrical, Plastics, Clothing & Footwear)
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), National Archives, Pretoria, South Africa, TAB 9879/987. The African Taiwanese Chamber of
Commerce almanac (ATCC), Taipei Liaison Office, (formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
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(a) Textile Manufacturers (b) Packaging Manufacturers
(c) Metal Fabricators (d) Furniture Manufactures
Figure 5.14: Taiwanese Sector Agglomeration by Sector and RIDP Zone (Textiles, Packaging, Metal & Furniture)
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (BDI), National Archives, Pretoria, South Africa, TAB 9879/987. The African Taiwanese Chamber of
Commerce almanac (ATCC), Taipei Liaison Office, (formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
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Electronic Manufacturers and Electrical Assemblers:
• Figure 5.13(a) shows that electronic manufacturers and electrical assemblers
were dominant in Zone C (57 %) and Zone D (18 %).
Zone C, which included the Botshabelo - Thaba’Nchu and Seloshesha complex
was dominated by the electronic manufacturing and assembler industries. These
industries appeared to have been established for both domestic and international
export sales, on a prominent railway corridor. Archival records note how managers
and former employees from the Taiwanese factories in Taipei “advanced from
managing radio, lighting and electrical toy factories, establishing their own suppliers
and products in Botshabelo.”107
Zone D has better archival accounts of the electrical companies that were established
there. These were discussed in subsection 5.4.1 where a network of Taiwanese-
speaking manufacturers emerged.108 These were well acquainted with each other
from the existing factory system in Taiwan (Senkei Speakers). However, the network
of firms came to specialise in car radio speakers for the South African automotive
industry clustered around East London (Daimler-Benz) and Port Elizabeth (VW
and General Motors). As sanctions started restricting exports of speakers to
Europe and the United States, these firms diversified into the domestic automotive
sector.109
Apparel Industry Network:
• Figure 5.13(b) shows that plastics manufacturers cluster in Zone C (42 %)
and Zone E (33 %).
• Figure 5.13(c) shows that clothing and knitwear dominate Zone E (46 %).
• Figure 5.14(a) shows that textile manufacturers, are equally split between
Zone H (38 %) and Zone E (37 %).
• Figure 5.13(d) shows that footwear dominates Zone C with 57 % of manufac-
turers located in the Botshabelo - Thaba’Nchu and Seloshesha complex.
107The African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC) (1985), Taipei Liaison Office,
(formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
108Senkei and Sunson
109Transkei Development Corporation, “This is Transkei” (Q2, 1989), Umtata Archive.
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These firms (plastics, textiles, clothing and footwear) are interrelated in their
production network and agglomeration process. In an empirical study of small
and medium-sized clothing firms, Hsing (1999) found the principal sources of
agglomeration emanated from their relationships with larger textile firms.110 This
was especially evident in the apparel industry network.
Firstly, textile mills emerged producing high-volume textiles that appeared to
service numerous clothing and knitwear producers. These large firms may have
found it easier to penetrate the South African market, later bringing with them
apparels assemblers. Chen and Chen (1998) found that larger Taiwanese investors
commanded sizeable forward and backward linkages in the production process,
with suppliers modifying themselves to accommodate the needs in the process of
forming a network of their own. Therefore, the functions of a network linkage may
also depend on the size of the investor. Second, plastics manufacturing emerged to
support the textile sector. These firms can be divided into those producing parts
for assembly via extrusion or intrusion. Intrusion firms were almost exclusively
located in Zone C (7 of 18) where they moulded components for the electrical
sector, toys and shoes. The extrusion firms (11) were located in Zone E, where
plastics were formed for the textile sector. These included synthetic micro-plastic
fibres such as yarn, nylon, padding and filling materials.111 Of these firms, three
were exclusively involved in making packaging material for the clothing sector.
This further demonstrates how the large textile production network emerged in
Zone E justifying specialist-packaging producers.
These patterns of production organisations, with linked clothing and textile factories
were a common practice in Taiwan.112 Textile mills could produce custom, high-
volume fabrics for the assemblers, reducing the manufacturing and transport costs.
As discussed in Chapter 3, following the multi-fibre agreement (MFA) in 1974, many
Taiwanese clothing firms faced export restrictions.113 Taiwanese producers formed
the bulk of a textile diaspora, as South Africa was exempt from these agreements.
The almanac notes how these Taiwanese production networks fragmented, then
migrated to take advantage of favourable trade preferences. This encouraged textile
mills to relocate, bringing with them the clothing and knitwear assemblers to
manufacture garments for export.
110Hsing (1999) in the work of networks in Taiwan’s fashion shoe industry.
111The African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC) (1985), Taipei Liaison Office,
(formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
112Hsing (1999, p. 110)
113See Baldwin, Chen and Nelson (1995) for further legal details on negotiations in the area of textiles
and clothing between Taiwan and the US.
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Chen and Chen (1998) cite similar examples in the footwear industry, which are
relevant to South Africa. They showed how Taiwan’s footwear industry was export-
oriented, and the United States had been the major export market. The US buyers
and Taiwanese footwear manufacturers had developed a collaborative relationship
over the previous 20 years before wage increases and appreciation of the Taiwanese
currency in the mid-1980s rendered Taiwan’s industry uncompetitive in footwear
manufacturing. The US buyers were reluctant to switch suppliers in the face
of rising costs in Taiwan, because the collaborative relationship had created a
valuable asset of mutual obligations, trust, and understanding that reduced business
uncertainties. Instead of abandoning these relationships, the US buyers encouraged
Taiwanese suppliers to relocate to low-wage countries. Some even participated in
Taiwanese overseas investments as joint-venture partners. More importantly, the
US buyers assured Taiwanese investors of export orders to forthcoming overseas
subsidiaries, thus reducing the FDI risks for them. This internationalisation of a
production in the global apparel industry was the first to emerge in Africa as a
result of Taiwanese firms.
Metal and Metalwork Network:
• Figure 5.14(c) shows that metalwork and metals-based fabrication dominates
the Bronkhorstspruit - Babelegi - Ekangala complex in Zone H (64 %).
Metal industry production networks did not emerge across multiple sites like
apparel and electronics networks, but were rather centred around Zone H. Three
reasons are proposed for this. Firstly, the Bronkhorstspruit - Babelegi - Ekangala
complex (BBE) was situated in close proximity to Witbank, the largest iron and
steel-producing region in South Africa. Therefore access to input materials may
have determined the location choice. Secondly, the BBE complex was in close
proximity to Johannesburg and Pretoria, the largest domestic market. Thirdly,
transporting heavy, or bulky metal products to export ports may have been
prohibitively expensive. In this case, these manufacturers would have established in
zones closer to the export markets. This is also evident in the Taiwanese furniture
firms.
Furniture Network:
• Figure 5.14(d) shows that furniture manufacturing clusters in Zone D (82%).
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Like metal fabrication, furniture was almost exclusively situated in Zone D, closer
to the East London port, from where preferential tariffs were available. What was
evident in the network formation was the location of a textile mill supplying fabrics
for these firms. When examining the firm-level data, an isolated Taiwanese textile
mill in Butterworth was puzzling, given the absence of apparel manufacturers. This
textile mill, called Suntex, produced specialised nylon stretch fabric. The African
Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (1985) later revealed that these fabrics
were used exclusively for upholstering wood frame furniture.114 Suntex, and the
founder of the business, Eddie Sun, played an interesting co-ethnic role in the future
development of this furniture assembly network.115 For example, early investors
in conjunction with the development corporations, started to actively attract new
industrialists. Figure 5.15 is an example of the earlier Transkei investors returning
home to encourage further investment to Zone E.
Figure 5.15: Informal Group of Transkei Taiwanese Business Leaders, (1982).
Source: Umtata Archives.
114The African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce almanac (ATCC) (1985), Taipei Liaison Office,
(formerly the Taiwan Representative Embassy) Archive, Hyde Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.
115Interview transcript - Public Affairs Research Institute (Eddie Sun interview, PARI records, October
2013). Courtesy of Laura Phillips: laurap@pari.org.za .
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Chronological Agglomeration:
The network literature cited in Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.3 highlights how companies
in a cluster benefit from important complementarities, which in turn attracted
new business formation and clustering.116 An initial investment can therefore
induce subsequent investors in similar or linked industries to the same location. In
addition to the theoretical literature, Hart and Todes (1997) noted that “Taiwanese
industrialists do not operate as isolated individuals, but as part of intricate social
networks that stretch across the globe. Accordingly, once settlement takes hold in
a particular place, these networks generate powerful forces that draw in additional
people. This dynamic of social agglomeration operates in Newcastle and other
locations in South Africa, and has played a key role in shaping ongoing processes
of Taiwanese investment.”117 To visualise this self-reinforcing agglomeration effect,
the chronological investment data (Figure 5.7 on pg. 154) shows specific time
periods of intensified Taiwanese firm formation. In this chapter I will build on the
chronological investment effect, further archival footage (Figure 5.15) and explore
examples.
Tracing the investment timeline highlights how an early (1978) settlement of
Taiwanese firms followed a city council visit from Taipei. This visit started an
“aggressive marketing campaign to lure investors and industrialists to Bloemfontein
and the ‘black cities’ of Thaba’Nchu and Botshabelo.”118 These in turn created
connections back to Taiwan that induced further inward investment to specific
RIDP sites. Archival data collected from the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce and
the Transkei Development Corporation (TDC) found local investment bodies to be
more supportive in Newcastle and Butterworth, while a long history of Taiwanese
contacts in Bloemfontein had helped form business links. Archival accounts suggest
that early links with Taiwanese firms created longer and deeper agglomeration:
“TDC 1981: The Transkei Development Corporation has signed an
agreement with two prominent Taiwanese industrialists for the estab-
lishment of two electronic manufacturing plants. These agreements are
the direct result of a high-powered delegation visit to Taiwan last year
to invite businessmen to invest in Transkei. Taiwanese people are no
strangers to the Transkei. For many years one of the most successful
textile industries in Butterworth was established by Taiwanese. This is a
major break- through for Transkei and we are optimistic more Taiwanese
will follow”119
116 For example Porter (1990, 1995, 1998a,b).
117Hart and Todes (1997)
118Umtata Archival collections, Walter Sisulu University, formally the University of the Transkei.
119Development Transkei, 1981, MOU 689/01. Walter Sisulu University Library.
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As Hart and Todes (1997) suggested, these networks generated powerful forces.
Zone E firm data supports this claim with evidence of early investment by a single
large investor setting off a sequence of events. The textile manufacturer attracted
several yarn suppliers, which in turn attracted numerous clothing assemblers. This
proved so successful that the Transkei Development Corporation actively hired
Taiwanese business people in Taipei to recruit industries to RIDP Zones within the
homeland. The existing RIDP investors went on subsidised excursions to Taiwan
to recruit further members of their production network. An article published in
the TDC almanac demonstrates how investors were attracted to the RIDP sites:
“The TDC has appointed Mr R Lee as agent in Taiwan. Transkei
has realised that an agent in Taiwan is a great asset, a key link with
industrialists Transkei is trying to attract. Mr Lee is well qualified for the
new appointment. He is an established businessman in Taiwan and has
a clear understanding of the needs of the Taiwanese business community.
Mr Lee is also the principal shareholder in Tally Furniture (Pty) Ltd
in Butterworth. When he talks about the advantages of investment in
Transkei he does so as one who has invested here [...] Transkei is looking
for more investment, while Taiwan is looking for new areas to invest.”120
Although the network data is not causal, both the industrial sector and chronological
evidence highlights the proliferation of the Taiwanese firms, organised around a
network form of production. When considered in conjunction with the export data
from Chapter 4, the firm-clustering highlights how South Africa had become a
‘node’ in a world-wide Taiwanese diaspora. Small and medium-sized firms linked to
one another through intricate subcontracting ties that were driven by larger earlier
RIDP investment.121 Subsequent visits and marketing efforts by Taiwanese firms
in the RIDP, then encouraged additional investment by linked or complimentary
industries reinforcing the agglomeration process. Similar to the early east Asian
development models, this investment sequence also represented the early stage of the
flying geese formation. The industry-level agglomeration played an important role
in location decisions with co-ethnic agglomeration magnifying the direct financial
impact of government incentives. 122
120Development Transkei, 1981, MOU 689/01. Walter Sisulu University, formally the University of the
Transkei.
121In a 1994 survey, Hart and Todes (1997) found that in Newcastle, 70 percent of the Taiwanese firms
clustered around knitwear production; most of these firms are closely linked with one another [...] and
with a large Taiwanese acrylic yarn firm in Ezakheni.
122Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) found the same effect for Japanese manufacturing plants in the
United States.
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5.5 DISCUSSION
Although the RIDP generally failed at inducing labour-intensive homeland indus-
trialisation, there were examples of remarkable success with a vibrant production
network of labour-intensive manufacturing firms from Taiwan. Moreover, lessons
from this case study are important for a number of reasons. Not only were Taiwanese
firms the earliest and largest example of direct Asian manufacturing investment
in Africa, but the policies and impact of their investment process cast light on
the apartheid economic system. The case study therefore provides historical and
empirical evidence not only for the effects of tax incentives, global production
networks and agglomeration, but also the tragedy of the Bantustan homeland
system, which entrapped millions of people.
The current historiography of the RIDP period focused mainly on the shortcomings
of the incentives, the political motivation for decentralisation and the subsequent
lack of industrial takeoff from the project. This relegated the Taiwanese investment
to a mere quirk of isolated states. Most notably, Pickles and Woods (1989) surmised
that this wave of foreign investment was catalysed by the political isolation of
the two countries, forcing them to collaborate, and reinforced by low wages and
lucrative incentives. While Geldenhuys (1991) also observed the importance of
international relations as these two ‘pariah nations’ became increasingly isolated.
However none of these offer sufficient evidence for why they clustered in specific
zones. This relegated the economics of Asian investment to a second-order research
topic when the international community shunned apartheid South Africa. Yet there
were a number of interesting and under-appreciated variables, which contribute to
the economic history of South Africa and the business history of Special Economic
Zones. Using this opportunity, Chapter 5 has assembled primary data for (a)
economic geography, (b) regional investment incentives, and (c) co-ethnic business
networks to help explain why Taiwanese firms came to dominate the RIDP of late
apartheid South Africa.
Starting with a new African wage-data series, this chapter has demonstrated
interregional wage differences, that were exceptionally low in the homelands. Com-
bined with a wage rebate, which was higher in rural zones, this resulted in some
Taiwanese firms receiving incentives in excess of their wage bills. However new
demographic data also highlighted that regional wage variation was further influ-
enced by demographic imbalances, whereby labour-intensive firms may have moved
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into specific zones to take advantage of female labour.123 The results were not
in themselves causal, but supported archival evidence that Taiwanese firms were
positioning themselves to take advantage of female labour that could be trained in
the workplace, or had previously been present in the unskilled labour pool.
The most cited explanation for Taiwanese investment had been RIDP incentives,
yet a complete dataset of these inducements had not previously been compiled.
Concatenating BDI annual reports challenged prior anecdotal accounts with an
empirical study of how different incentive categories may have shaped the clustering
process. The BDI almanac revealed that 83 % of financial incentives and concessions
were channelled into four key areas: namely a wage subsidy for unskilled labour, a
transport subsidy, interest concessions on land and capital goods, in addition to
a relocation rebate. Delving further into these inducements exposed a number of
insights not previously considered. Wage incentives may have been important, but
primary archival data showed that they were not the principal contributor.
Transport concessions were then also interrogated with the economic geography of
the RIDP. Using the path function in GIS demonstrated the railway cost differentials
between homeland decentralisation zones and de-concentration points. Here the
economic geography of the RIDP also played a role. Reduced transportation
costs could have induced Taiwanese firms to locate in an ‘optimal trading distance’
between both their suppliers and customers. In this regard, South Africa’s economic
geography is unique, with a number of zones located at the coast and inland. In
context of the transport data, there appeared to be a preference for exporting firms
to locate closer to the ports. Once again this was supported by Taiwanese archival
accounts, and then substantiated by the assembled GIS data. Export-orientated
firms are thought to have located in closer proximity to ports, but as sanctions and
growing domestic demand changed so did the location preference. Firms appeared
to reach an equilibrium between the domestic markets of the PWV and the export
ports of Durban and East London. This again is borne out by archival accounts
and the quantitative cost data.
Finally, collating a novel firm level dataset I examined how Taiwanese business
networks influenced agglomeration. Secondary literature suggests that enduring
relational and production conventions are thought to encourage firms to agglomerate.
For example, the RIDP zones benefited from Taiwanese production networks in
123 Pickles and Woods (1989) also noted that Taiwanese domestic competitiveness had come under
pressure, finding it increasingly difficult to recruit “[...] dedicated, eager-beaver production line workers
who had made the Taiwanese miracle possible” and “[...] due to the increase in the value of the New
Taiwanese Dollar relative to the currency of other countries [...].” These were also compounded by the
variation in incentives offered for wage employees.
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which they had been embedded back in Taiwan. This ‘RIDP diaspora’ could have
served as an important facilitator in the agglomeration process. Using disaggregated
firm data showed how three zones came to dominate the project, with nine RIDP
sites specialising in specific sectors. The network motives to cluster were not
captured by the financial incentives, but rather by idiosyncratic factors, such as
marketing and site visits by former managers. For example, South Africa’s semi-
autonomous homeland development agencies established marketing and investment
offices in Taipei, seducing new Asian firms to relocate or establish new operations
in the RIDP zones. These ‘first movers’ migrated and then recreated existing
production networks. Hence, the initial relocation of a large manufacturer into a
single RIDP site or complex appeared to have created a chain reaction. Smaller
suppliers or assemblers then followed the larger firm, reproducing the supply chain
and production network. This industrial sector agglomeration is emblematic of
the network thesis promoted by Ho (1979). He found that Taiwanese investors
organised production around network forms in specific industries. This research is
the first to demonstrate these co-ethnic network mechanisms in the African context,
with the emergence of international production networks in selected industrial
zones.
In conclusion, a more complex process, which included economic geography, in-
centives and firm networks, was driving the Taiwanese firm agglomeration. By
collecting new data on wages, foreign investment and industrial incentives, this
chapter casts light upon the apartheid economy and the process of business clus-
tering. Its contribution is unique in the context of African investment promotion
showing that labour-intensive foreign direct investment can be attracted to rural
areas, but the economic geography and international competitiveness need to be
weighed with the costs of providing tax concessions and incentives.
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
My thesis has sought to identify how diplomatic isolation, sanctions, regional
industrial policies and transnational ethnic networks shaped South Africa’s trade
and investment with Taiwan. Each chapter addressed a specific research question,
drawing on sources not previously used, to identify the connected themes of trade,
investment and firm agglomeration. By doing so, I make a contribution to the
broader analysis of South Africa’s 20th century economic history. Within this, three
persistent constraints are identified. First, the examination of trade shows how the
economy failed to diversify from commodities to export-oriented manufacturing.
Continuously vulnerable to commodity prices shocks, the Taiwanese case study is a
rare example of export orientation in South Africa’s manufacturing history. Second,
the apartheid state attempted to control labour markets and internal migration by
means of regional industrial policy. Showing how this failed over a 40-year period,
the homeland system remains a blight on the economic geography of South Africa.
Yet select zones attracted foreign investment from Taiwan making these sites the
first viable manufacturing centres in the homelands. Finally, despite large-scale
infrastructure, tax incentives and low wages, only the Taiwanese firms were able to
generate sizeable scale economies, which were not solely reliant on RIDP incentives.
These outcomes are noteworthy for contemporary industrial policies which seek to
replicate special economic zones, and therefore the possibility for further research.
6.1 DISCUSSION
Although short-lived, the ROC - RSA case study builds on South Africa’s long
history of international investment and trade. The nature of its frontier economy,
at first based on agricultural commodities and then later minerals, required links
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to overseas capital, international markets and migrant skills. The discovery of gold
and diamonds in the late 19th century ushered in rapid growth, setting in place the
economic trajectory which would define the following century. Making a modern
economy rested on the subjugation of Africans, not only in terms of land tenure,
but also in the labour hierarchy, ensuring reserved employment for Europeans.
Following the elections of the Nationalist Party, South Africa moved towards the pe-
riphery of international relations as the morality of apartheid became objectionable.
Sanctions, weakening prices for commodities and low manufacturing productivity
placed strain on the economy in the latter years of the 1970s. At the same time,
South Africa and Taiwan began to mover closer, with contemporary scholarship
focusing on diplomatic necessity. However this thesis reveals the economic motives
for the greater levels of engagement. South Africa was in need of foreign investment
to stimulate manufacturing and balance trade flow. Taiwan was also in a process
of adjustment following many years of export-led growth. At this point, a curious,
yet valuable case of transnational migration, trade and investment ensued between
these countries.
6.1.1 The Role of Diplomacy, Trade and Investment
With the 1975 signing of a trade deal, ethnic Chinese were officially recognised,
following a diplomatic pivot towards Taiwan. Appendix A, Figure A.1 highlights
the peculiar nature of the relationship with President Marais Viljoen decorating
Premier Sun Yun-sun during a 1980 state visit. Neither country had any formal
diplomatic agreement a mere 10 years prior to this meeting. Yet in a few short
years, they came to depend diplomatically on one another. But more importantly,
as I have shown, they also became more economically engaged as migration grew.
This intensified period of investment, migration and bilateral trade would later
develop into a large diaspora of Asian manufacturing firms on the African continent.1
For readers familiar with the isolationism of apartheid it may appear like an
idiosyncratic episode of two pariah states’ selfish pursuit of economic and diplomatic
legitimacy. On the one hand, this superficial analysis may ring true for South
Africa, but neglects the complexity of United Nations sanctions, South Africa’s
spatial industrial policies, and the persistent economic geography of colonial and
apartheid rule. While on the other hand it fails to take into account Taiwan’s
growing trade diaspora, rising manufacturing costs in Asia and the liberalisation
of foreign direct investment.
1Although Chinese firms have begun investing directly in African countries, no evidence as measured
by number of firms or total country employment suggests that the quantity or diversity has reached that
of Taiwanese manufacturing firms in South Africa between 1975 and 1996.
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Quantifying these effects, Chapter 3 (p. 94) showed how the short-term and
long-term liabilities grew from R 465 million to R 705 million in a single year
(1979 - 1980) following Taiwanese migration. Moreover, Taiwan was the largest
constituent of South Africa’s Asian liabilities in 1992 holding 58 % of this region’s
direct investments. As such, I have argued that the majority of ROC investments
had greater capital permanence, demonstrated by the risk appetite for the South
African investment markets and bonds. This was a result of diplomatic amendments,
which affected both the implicit and explicit protection of property rights, contract
enforcement and therefore promoted Taiwanese investment in South Africa.
However, there were further economic incentives. With the ability to expand off-
shore, and exacerbated by the 1974 Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), Taiwanese firms
found a willing diplomatic and economic destination in the RIDP zones of South
Africa. Chapter 3 argued that the growth policies of export-led industrialisation
that spurred the Taiwanese miracle also created the downfall of its labour-intensive
manufacturing industries. For example sunset industries such as textiles, footwear
and clothing manufacturers began to relocate in 1978.
A wave of Taiwanese migration ensued to South Africa as the production network
constituents followed larger firms to rural RIDP zones. As migration and investment
gained momentum, an interesting change in South Africa’s trade patterns was
observed. Expanding on this, Chapter 4 (p. 101) analysed the migrant trade effect
of Taiwanese investment to South Africa.
Prior to 1975 South Africa mostly traded with former western and OECD trade
partners (73 % in 1975).2 However, the quantum of bilateral trade (& migration)
after 1975 was classified or omitted by government agencies as a response to UN
sanctions and punitive disinvestment by foreign firms. Relying on estimates, prior
research has noted the methodological problems in assessing trade flows as a result
of a data embargo, and doubted the accuracy of any publicly available trade
statistics during sanctions. Assembling a new data series from declassified trade
statistics demonstrates that the inflow of foreign investment and immigrants from
Taiwan may have increased the potential for manufactured exports. Moreover, by
disaggregating the extensive and intensive margin of trade, it is shown how South
Africa not only increased its trade volume, but more importantly, increased the
diversity of exports to Taiwan. When official bilateral trade data was once again
published in 1994, Taiwan’s trade with South Africa was more diversified, and
2Appendix D Table D.1 on pg. 213 highlights the total South African bilateral trade by geographic
region, 1975 - 1995.
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in some manufacturing sectors exceeded that of its former OECD trade partners.
These findings offer a novel perspective on the rise of export manufacturing, and
shows how migration to a small open economy such as South Africa could have a
positive impact on trade.
Although diplomacy was an important factor in migration and investment to the
RIDP, the natural endowments such as cheaper land, female labour and tax-free
incentives were an important factor in how Taiwanese firms came to agglomer-
ate. The following discussion details my findings for the economic geography of
industrialisation in the homeland RIDP zones.
6.1.2 The Impact and Efficacy of Industrial Decentralisation
On the surface, industrial decentralisation could be viewed as a scheme designed by
a visionary, i.e. Professor FR Tomlinson, a man considered to be ahead of his time.3
On the other hand, it could be seen an industrial ploy to keep the race groups
separate and superficially justify the scattered homelands through industrial policy.
Analysing the chronological changes, Chapter 2 assesses the political, economic
and industrial changes through Three Phases of the apartheid policy evolution.
Industrial decentralisation made only the smallest of inroads during Phase 1, with
very little industrial growth or employment within the homelands. The popularity
of the policy vacillated with the business cycles, however as the 1970s approached,
political necessity started to motivate for greater homeland development. It is
at this point that both ‘Push’ and ‘Pull’ policies were developed to stimulate
decentralisation from urban areas which came to define Phase 2.
With the African population trapped behind economically artificial homeland
borders, businesses were pulled to the areas by lower labour costs, but also by
better infrastructure and tax incentives. However, prior research has neglected the
impact of infrastructure on the decentralisation of industry during the second phase.
Figure 2.3 on p. 53 quantified gross fixed capital formation, which demonstrates
rapid growth until the mid-1970s in the case of this investment. Of specific reference
to the evolution of the RIDP was the construction of sixty-three industrial estates,
which are shown in Figure 2.4 on pg. 55. Using new archival data and GIS to
quantify the infrastructure of the RIDP project, the map visually highlights how
roads and railways were upgraded to the decentralisation zones and ports. The
scale of these projects has been underestimated in prior research. For example
3In an address titled ‘Will The Real Professor Tomlinson Please Step Forward’, van Rooyen (2000)
notes how “F R Tomlinson was ahead of his time in his approach towards social upliftment of the
developing (agricultural) sector.”
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new data from the Industrial Development Corporation estimated that the costs
of constructing this infrastructure equated to 1.5 % of GDP in each year from
1972 - 1979.4 Of the approximately 18,900 route kilometres of railways in 1970,
the homelands only had 70 kilometres. Although modest, this increased to 675
kilometres, with only QwaQwa and the newly established homeland of KaNgwane
not connected to the national network by 1976. As such, I have argued that the
expansion of infrastructure was more important than incentives during this phase.
At the beginning of Phase 3 we start to observe material changes in the RIDP.
Entering the 1980s, South Africa’s economy faced the challenge of increasing
unemployment, declining labour intensity, and a withdrawal of western foreign
investment. A sense of desperation swept through the Nationalist Party, and
greater decentralisation intervention was proposed as both a political solution
to unemployment, but also an economic stimulant to increase manufacturing.
Following the Good Hope Conference in 1982, steep increases in both the financial
incentives and concessions were made available to industrialists willing to relocate
to the most rural homelands.5 Despite better infrastructure or incentives, very
little domestic interest in these rural homeland zones existed.
6.1.3 Confluence of Business Networks, Ethnicity and Agglomeration
Although I showed how the decentralisation policies failed, a unique agglomeration
of Taiwanese firms emerged in select groups of RIDP zones during the 1980s.
Principally clustered in only four of the 63 available locations, I have argued
that existing business networks, financial incentives and economic geography were
interacting.6 Disentangling these factors contributes to the international debate on
special economic zones, and also considers the economic underpinning of apartheid
industrial policies. Using a location choice analysis I construct a new data set
for each explanatory variable of economic geography, investment incentives and
business networks.
Beginning with RIDP incentives, (i.e. the most cited explanation for Taiwanese
investment), I found that 83 % of financial incentives and concessions were chan-
nelled into unskilled labour, transport, interest concessions and relocation rebates.
This allowed me to empirically focus the analysis on how this interacted with the
variation in economic geography. In compiling this data, I argued that market
distance, female-labour availability and industry grouping interacted with the
4See Chapter 2, p. 53.
5The number of decentralisation zones and incentives were rapidly increased.
6See Figure 5.1 on 124 for the map showing agglomeration.
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incentives. Using GIS to measure the distance from ports or export markets
and compiling a novel wage-labour data set demonstrated these variables were
important to the agglomeration process, but needed to be considered together with
archival accounts.
By forming ‘production enclaves’ within the RIDP zones, Taiwanese firms brought
with them knowledge of foreign (Asian) markets, new labour-intensive production
methods, and global supply chains. Urban trading companies sprang up in major
metropolitan areas to meet the raw input demands of Taiwanese firms, and to sup-
port cross border transactions. Moreover, depending on the industry sector, lower
transport costs would have attracted investors to specific sites. For example, textile
manufacturers were located in proximity to export markets. Further desegregating
the data into industrial sectors and production complexes demonstrated how the
Taiwanese firms were clustering around industrial and labour specialisations. For
example, textile mills emerged producing high-volume textiles that appeared to
service numerous clothing and knitwear producers. These patterns of production
organisations, with linked clothing and textile factories, were a common practice
in Taiwan, and therefore also emerged in South Africa as the diaspora spread.
These were further reinforced by the unique racial setting of South Africa. Taiwanese
firms were precluded from formal financial markets or domestic supply chains,
therefore magnifying the impetus to collaborate amongst the small ethnic Chinese
network within the homelands. Given the unstable institutional environment in
South Africa, they operated in a close business community forming the “Taiwanese
Chamber of Commerce in Africa”, thus encouraging further co-operation. In
turn, this cycle of investment, network production and collaboration generated the
conditions for successful scale economies and agglomeration. All prior industrial
and legal incentives to stimulate domestic clustering and production spillovers had
failed, yet these Taiwanese migrants were able to successfully establish themselves.
Moreover, the co-operation contributed to the growth in Asian export trade, but
also perpetuated the policies of decentralisation, and therefore racial homeland
segregation. The RIDP had been considered an overall failure, generating very
little industrial agglomeration. Yet the findings of Chapter 5 highlight how large
international production networks emerged. Specifically, these networks have many
similarities to those that formed in Asia during the 1960s and 1970s. As such, I
have provided evidence of these networks in an African context showing that not
only tax incentives, but economic geography and firm-specific factors had an impact
on industrial policy. Historical researchers can draw lessons from these apartheid
economic zones, as the subsequent effects on bilateral trade and homeland economic
geography have contemporary relevance.
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6.2 LESSONS FOR TODAY
Apartheid and industrial decentralisation continue to reverberate through South
Africa’s society and economy. For example, influx control legislation was repealed in
1986, yet apartheid economic geography imposed by the homeland system persists
where the African population remain ‘economically trapped’ behind historical
borders.7
As demonstrated in Figure 6.1 below, the effects of the homeland system and influx
control are visible in South Africa’s economic geography today. Collinson, Kok and
Ganenne (2006, p. 3) found that the distance between the former homelands and
current urban centres is still a significant cost incurred by economic migrants. This
in turn has acted as a disincentive for migration, further hindering economic growth.
By restricting natural migration, Naude´ and Krugell (2006) have shown how these
policies contributed to both inefficient land use, and resulted in slow growth
and high-cost economic development. Recently addressing these demographic and
geographic constraints, a revised Special Economic Zones Act (2014) has once again
advocated for industrial expansion using growth poles, thereby moving industry to
the former homelands.8
6.2.1 Contemporary Spatial Policies
Given the similarities of these objectives, South Africa’s rich industrial past offers
insightful references and under-utilised empirical case studies for present and future
industrial policy. The policies of decentralisation had limited success, while the
costs and historical outcomes from special economic zones remain questionable.
Yet the current democratic government has elected to target regional development
programmes similar to those in the RIDP. In the years since democracy (1994),
successive national planning policy documents have advocated industrial expansion
on the premise of growth pole theories. For example, Special Economic Zones
(SEZ)9 or Industrial Development Zones (IDZ)10 have recently been proposed in
the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) to broaden the geographic industrial
base and stimulate employment on the regional periphery.11
7The pass laws were repealed by the Identification Act, 1986 and the influx control laws by the
Abolition of Influx Control Act, No. 68 of 1986
8Government Gazette (20014): The designation, promotion, development, operation and management
of Special Economic Zones.
9Business Day (20/12/2014): A few tweaks, and special economic zones will thrive.
10Business Day (06/08/2015): Saldanha Bay IDZ attracts ‘healthy interest’ from private sector.
11The 2014/15 - 2016/17 Industrial Policy Action Plan - IPAP identified SEZs as key contributors to
economic development. See the Industrial Development Financial Assistance (Incentives) provided by
the Department of Trade and Industry
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Figure 6.1: Concentration of the African population, represented by the measure of urban
density per km2. Darker perimeter lines surrounding the population denote the historical borders
of the homelands, demonstrating how the African population is still denser in the former homeland
areas created by the Group Areas Act.
Source: Homeland borders digitised from RIDP archival maps (National Archive, Pretoria) and
population mask circa 2001 sourced from Statistics South Africa.
Moreover, contemporary South African policy makers have once again been debating
the renewed practice of both tax and direct incentives as an apparatus for attracting
foreign investment to SEZ’s.12 In contrast to financial incentives, the apartheid
era industrialisation policies appear to have succeeded as a result of informal
transnational trade networks. As such, the dynamics that attracted Asian foreign
investment and firms in the 1980s were more complex than diplomacy and tax
breaks, while the overall success of the RIDP experience is at best questionable,
requiring further empirical study.
12In an article titled ‘SA moves to create framework for industrial decentralisation’ Terence Creamer
notes the similarities between current and historical decentralisation policies: “The South African
government is hoping its new Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Bill and policy will create the framework
for the development of new industrial nodes outside of the traditional industrial heartlands.” Engineering
News (2012/01/16)
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6.2.2 African Industrialisation
Although South Africa may have an unusual history with Taiwan, its outcome is not
unconnected from the rest of Africa. Farole (2011, p. 60) in a World Bank report
explains that SEZs are increasingly seen to be emerging in African economies as
industrial policy tools to address similar structural challenges faced by South Africa:
namely, to attract foreign direct investment; alleviate large-scale unemployment;
support economic reforms such as export orientation; and experimental laboratories
for new policies.
South Africa’s historical episode therefore reveals a number of useful empirical
precedents for current scholars and policy makers studying Africa’s industrial
development. Firstly it shows the role of state policies in labour-intensive indus-
trialisation and trade diversification. This is relevant to countries in both East
Africa and West Africa as they expand the use of industrial zones,13 manufacturing
incentives14 and trade treaties, soliciting investment from the Asian tigers and
China.15 The purpose of these new policies is an attempt to lure manufacturing
from Asian markets, while potentially diversifying their economies from natural
resources. In this regard the ROC - RSA case study has empirical significance for
current special economic zone, trade and investment policies.
6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis has contributed to the economic history of South Africa’s former
homelands, however there is still substantial work that needs to be done.16 Many
of the archives consulted in writing this thesis remain threatened or endangered.
It is my hope that I can continue to develop and share these resources with
future scholars. Business and economic history in South Africa can contribute
to the renewed interest in its industrial past, but can be analogues to current
economic themes. In the case of South Africa, the business history has tended to
be inward-facing, but developing this thesis further, I hope to publish papers on
the comparative experience of South Africa in the global context.17
13See articles such as “Ethiopia says expanding zones to become industrial hub” - Reuters 2014/07
14Bra¨utigam and Xiaoyang (2011, p. 276) write about “African Shenzhen” with the growth in China’s
special economic zones on the continent.
15Markusen and Venables (1999, p. 657) examines how foreign direct investment is a necessary catalyst
for industrial development.
16And before many of the archives are relinquished to the scrap heap.
17 I have presented each of the chapters as separate working papers at LEAP, UCT and LSE. A special
issue on African Business History is planned for the European Business History Review in early 2017,
which may be an outlet for this work.
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In the process of data collection, often in the bowels of crumbling Bantustan
administrative buildings, a treasure trove of history was discovered. Here one finds
the archive of Bantustan rule and the making of a modern South Africa, but also
the institutional roots of inequality. While amassing a personal digital archive, a
number of future research projects have been identified. A priority amongst these
projects is African education in the homelands, and a more ambitious project on
African wages.
African Education: Collecting data from the Tomlinson Report I photographed
and digitised a large survey of homeland education standards conducted in 1952.
This provides the basis for future research on education attainment before apartheid,
and the subsequent effects on human capital after the Bantu Education Act was
legislated. A glimpse into the quality and expanse of this data was presented in
Chapter 2. For example, the number of missionary schools, missionary teachers, and
the geographic distribution of these schools can be found in the Tomlinson archive
and is summarised in Appendix B, Table B.2. Using the Tomlinson education census
and the 1985 apartheid education census, statistical and demographic measurement
show how missionary education attainment was higher in the homelands bordering
South Africa, but then collapsed following the Bantu Education Act.18
African Wages: The second fertile area for future research is on African wages.
Hofmeyr (1995) conceded that South African economists and economic historians
have found themselves at a disadvantage in regional wage comparisons to their
counterparts in major industrialised countries. While Fourie and Schirmer (2012)
highlighted how “there is at present only sparse information on African wages
during apartheid.”19 Scholars such as Mariotti (2012) have made tremendous
contributions, but a complete series of African homeland wages and remittance
income could benefit future research on the persistence of apartheid inequality.
Building on the theme of African wages, a new wage series on African manufacturing
wages in the homelands is an exciting opportunity in South African research.20
African Manufacturing: Recently the rise of manufacturing in Africa has
entered the mainstream of economic history. However, sub-Saharan Africa has
the lowest manufacturing output per capita of any inhabited region on the planet.
18A conference proceeding on this data and possible research questions was presented at the XVIIth
World Economic History Congress in Kyoto, titled “Counting People, Dividing the Nation: A History of
the Tomlinson Commission in South Africa (1950 - 1954). Kerby (2015).
19Fourie and Schirmer (2012).
20A conference proceeding on “African Manufacturing Wages during Apartheid” was presented at
the African Economic History Network meeting in London (2014) and at the International Labour
Organisations historical wage seminar at the University of Arras (2015). A book chapter on African
manufacturing wages in historical perspective is planned for 2016, and a draft submitted to the Community
of the Universities of Nord-Pas-de-Calais Press. Kerby (2014a).
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Be´ne´trix, O’Rourke and Williamson (2015) examined long-run changes to man-
ufacturing in underdeveloped countries, noting how they reached a high point
between 1950 - 1973 with widespread import substituting industrialisation. Austin,
Frankema and Jerven (2015) respond to this decline, arguing that Africa failed
to supplement agricultural and extractive commodities by means of increased
productivity and therefore the creation of employment in manufacturing industries
never took off like it did in east Asia. These government policies are blamed for this
with escalating debts and conditional aid policies, which hampered independent
economic initiatives. As such, future research on manufacturing, industrial policy
and import substitution are areas that can be further explored using data collected
during this project.21
6.3.1 Limitations of Case Studies
There are clear limitations to the case study approach proposed in this thesis.
These prohibit the generalisation of the findings in different ways. Beginning
with trade and migration, many econometric studies have used fine spatial and
manufacturing census data to determine the absolute effect of immigration. Most
recently Ve´zina and Parsons (2016) used the Vietnamese boat people in the United
States as a natural experiment showing how these immigrants potentially fostered
international trade between the US and Asia, reducing trade costs and increasing
exports. Their study was very similar to the hypothesis presented in Chapter 4,
however it benefited from richer data sources. Using gravity modelling and the
distribution of Vietnamese in the US, their paper could show state-level increases
in trade. Unfortunately, the manufacturing census in South Africa only covered
enumeration areas in the republic. However, as the majority of Taiwanese export
manufacturing was conducted in the homelands, which were not enumerated, the
same spatial effects cannot be detected in this thesis.
The same constraints were seen in the location-choice analysis of Chapter 5.
Although the scale of my archival collections has attempted to overcome the lack of
data during the 1980s, the sparse distribution of wages, or census enumeration, has
limited the statistical models which have dominated the international literature.22
In future research I hope to be able to collect additional data or collaborate with
other researchers, thus allowing for more robust statistical modelling of the location
choices used in Chapter 5.
21Planned working papers include: Kerby (2014b) - “Fields into Factories”, which examines the import
substitution policies of the RIDP. Kerby (2016) - “Bamboo Shoots”, which examines the first large-scale
Asian manufacturing in Africa.
22With the current manufacturing and population census data such techniques are not possible.
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President Marais Viljoen decorates
Premier Sun. (File photo)
TR????
Premier Sun visits four African countries
Publication Date?05/01/1980
With smiles and friendly words, he 'brightens corners' in South Africa, Malawi,
Swaziland and Lesotho. Mrs. Sun also makes an impression to remember
Premier Sun Yun-suan and Mrs. Sun spent mid-March in Africa visiting four countries: the
Re ​public of South Africa, Malawi, Lesotho and Swazi ​land. The Premier exchanged views
with the leaders of all four countries, inspected the Chinese embassies in each of them, met
with Chinese overseas leaders and technicians and signed several important agreements.
In South Africa, agreements were entered into regarding civil aviation, marine transportation,
tax exemption of air and sea transport, and scientific and technological cooperation. The
Republic of China obtained 4,046 metric tons of uranium for the nuclear power plants of the
Taiwan Power Company at a cost of approximately US$400 mil ​lion. The South African
government pledged itself to carry out measures to improve the status of the overseas
Chinese community.
In Malawi, the agreement on agricultural and technical cooperation was extended for another
two years. The Republic of China will assist in the training of additional farmers and
cooperate in the development of new rice strains. Since 1965, Malawi has been helped to
carry out a training program for 7,000 farmers. Sixty-four hundred hectares of farmland have been developed, and Malawi has
become a rice exporting country.
Lesotho's development programs will be given Chinese assistance in agricultural and industrial sectors. The Republic of China
may help in the construction of an international airport.
Agricultural and industrial ties with Swaziland received new impetus. Prime Minister Prince Mbandla agreed to visit the Republic
of China this year.
Accompanying Premier and Mrs. Sun on the flight to South Africa in a 707 jetliner provided by the host government (the return
was aboard a special plane dispatched by China Airlines) were:
- K.T. Li, minister without portfolio and former minister of finance.
- Lin Chin-sheng, minister of communications.
- Admiral Soong Chang-chih, chief of the general staff.
- Y.T. Wong, vice minister of economic affairs.
- Edward Y. Kuan, vice minister of foreign affairs, and Mrs. Kuan.
- James Soong, director general of the Government Information Office.
- Liu Pang-yen, chief of protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Feng Yueh-tseng, director of African affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Wang Chin-yi, counselor, Ministry of Communications.
- Mao Ying-tsu, director general of the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
- L.K. Cheng, chairman of the board of the Taiwan Power Company.
- Wang Chi-wu, head of the International Division of the National Science Council.
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Figure A.1: RSA President Marais Viljoen decorates ROC Premier Sun Yun-sua. (1980)
Source: Taiwan Review (文章資料), 5th of January 1980.
Figure A.2: MAP OF THE TRANSITION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM PREINDUSTRIAL TO ITS TRANSITION TO INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY SHOWS
HOW AFRICAN LANDS WERE REDUCED BY THE 1913 LAND ACT.
Source: Digitised from Fair (1982)
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Figure B.1: Bantu Investment Corporation (1975), Homelands: the role of the corporations in
the Republic of South Africa.
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Figure B.2: Frederick Rothman Tomlinson - source: The Forum, Vol.5 No.2 (1956).
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Figure B.3: SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW OF THE TOMLINSON COMMISSION REPORT
Source: Summarised from Houghton (1956)
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AFRICAN'POPULATION'
'
Total'Population' Homeland'Areas' ‘White’'Rural'Areas' Urban'Areas'
Percentage'in'White'
Areas'1921$ 4,438,774$ 2,113,778$ 1,737,995$ 587,000$ 49%$1936$ 6,595,541$ 2,962,083$ 2,491,817$ 1,141,642$ 55%$1946$ 7,882,988$ 3,115,779$ 2,914,534$ 1,852,675$ 61%$1951$ 8,560,274$ 3,307,616$ 2,924,124$ 2,328,534$ 61%$1957$ 9,535,467$ 3,651,307$ 3,261,288$ 2,622,872$ 62%$1960!a$ 10,928,264$ 5,573,415$ 5,354,849$ 49%$1970$ 15,057,952$ 6,997,179$ 8,060,773$ 54%$1986!b$ 24,901,192$ 9,698,406$ 15,202,786$ 61%$1991$c$ 27,000,000$ 11,000,000$ 16,000,000$ 59%$
a$Demographic$data$excludes$the$Ciskei$and$Transkei$b$Estimates$from$the$South$African$Institute$of$Race$Relations$$c$Official$census$was$considered$inaccurate$as$the$TBVC$conducted$a$separate$census.$$
Table B.1: AFRICAN HOMELAND AND URBAN POPULATION, (1921 - 1991)
Source: South African Bureau of Statistics, South African Institute of Race Relations (1986) and Horrell (1973)
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iv) $v) Financial.$$$
Christian)Missions)
) European) Bantu)Missionaries$ Protestant$ Catholic$ Protestant$ Catholic$Ordained$$ 840$ 426$ 2079*$ 47$Un?ordained$ 32,810$Teachers$$ 13,655$Medical$Personnel$ 1,311$Total$ 51,101$Church$Buildings$$ 4,018$$ 3,269$
) ) )
) Non2Reserve)Areas) Reserve)Areas)Teachers$ 5,955$ 7,700$Nurses$ 755$ 478$Doctors$ 36$ 37$Hospitals$ 34$ 32$Beds$ 2,179$ 1,955$Primary$Schools$ 1,888$ 2,250$Secondary$Schools$ 70$ 49$Training$Schools$ 16$ 17$Agri’$Schools$ 2$ 2$Domestic$Science$$ 16$ 4$Technical$Schools$ 15$ 15$Adult$Education$ 59$ 7$
Distribution) 27,621) 23,480)S.A.$Bantu$Affairs$ N.A.$ 3,172$$ $ $$$
*Protestants$made$much$more$use$of$Bantu,$while$the$Catholics$preferred$Eurpeans.$Origin$of$Missionaries:$69%$came$from$overseas$and$31%$was$born$in$South$Africa.$$$$$$
Table B.2: TABULATION OF MISSIONARY ACTIVITY IN THE HOMELANDS AND
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, (1952)
Source: Aggregated from the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu
Areas (1955)
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Figure B.4: EZAKHENI INDUSTRIAL ESTATE. FUNDED BY THE BOARD
FOR THE DECENTRALISATION OF INDUSTRY, 11 OF THESE ESTATES WERE
BUILT IN ZONE E AROUND THE KWAZULU NATAL HOMELANDS (1978)
Source: KwaZulu Finance Corporation, Annual Reports, (1977). Pietermaritzburg Archive.
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Figure B.5: LABOUR INTENSITY WITHIN SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING. LABOUR INTENSITY IS MEASURED BY DIVIDING
THE AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EQUIPMENT AND TOTAL LABOUR FORCE IN MANUFACTURING (1911 - 1976)
Source: Kleu and Department of Industries and Commerce. (1983) Report of the Study Group on Industrial Development Strategy of South Africa.
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!
!
!
Board!for!the!Decentralisation!of!Industry!
!
Indepenedent!Bantustans! Non6Independent!Homelands!Zone!B!/!Zone!H!
!
!
!
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!!
Bophuthatswana!National!Development!
Corporation!
!
KwaZulu!Finance!Corporation!
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!
Transkei!Development!Corporation! KaNgwane!Economic!
Development!Corporation!
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QwaQwa!Development!
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Zone!F! ! !
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H!
Venda!Development!Corporation! Shangaan!Development!
Corporation!
Figure B.6: INDEPENDENT AND NON-INDEPENDENT HOMELANDS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATIONS, (1982)
Source: Development Corporations, Annual Reports, (1982)
Figure B.7: KWAZULU NATAL FINANCE CORPORATION, INVESTMENT PROSPECTUS, (1982)
Source: KwaZulu Development Corporation Archive (1982), publication No 3, p. 17. Government Publications Archive, 68 (R220).
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Figure C.1: GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE VOTING OUTCOME TO RESOLUTION 2758 IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, (1971).
Source: United Nations Resolution Bill, 1971 and image sourced from the creative commons.
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and$has$been$open$to$dual$recognition$since$1991,$the$PRC's$position$remains$unchanged$
and$this$has$prevented$the$island$from$making$any$significant$progress$in$increasing$formal$
recognition.$
$
The$closer$political$ties$between$South$Africa$and$Taiwan$were$a$reflection$of$the$increasing$
diplomatic$isolation$of$both$countries,$South$African$on$account$of$its$apartheid$policies,$and$
Taiwan$following$its$ouster$from$the$China$seat$at$the$United$Nations$in$1971.16$$Up$until$1978$
Taiwan$ had$ been$ concerned$with$ boosting$ its$ image$ in$ the$ newly$ independent$ nations$ of$
Africa.$Between$1960$and$1970$Taiwan$made$a$substantial$effort$to$gain$the$political$support$
of$Africa$governments,$sending$an$average$of$eight$delegations$a$year$to$African$countries,$
and$ negotiating$ aid$ and$ trade$ agreements$ with$ 26$ African$ nations.$ Economic$ aid$ and$
investment$was$directly$related$to$the$United$Nations$recognition$for$the$ROC$on$Taiwan$over$
the$PRC.$Table$4$below$demonstrates$ the$direct$correlation$between$economic$assistance$
and$UN$votes$for$the$ROC.$Geldenhuys$(1991)$argued$that$newly$independent$African$states$
altered$there$United$Nation$vote$as$a$direct$result$of$Taiwanese$economic$assistance$over$the$
period$1960$to$1970.$$$
$
DOLLAR&DIPLOMACY‡&
Year&
Number&of&Nations&
Recognition&for&the&R.O.C&
Number&of&Nations&Vote&
for&the&R.O.C&
Note&
1960& 8% 2% Before%Econ%Assistance%
1961& 12% 9% After%Econ%Assistance%
1962& 15% 17% After%Econ%Assistance%
1963& 19% 17% After%Econ%Assistance%
1965& 15% 10% After%Econ%Assistance%
1966& 16% 17% After%Econ%Assistance%
1967& 18% 19% After%Econ%Assistance%
1968& 19% 20% After%Econ%Assistance%
1969& 20% 21% After%Econ%Assistance%
1970& 22% 18% After%Econ%Assistance%
1971& 20% 15% After%Econ%Assistance%
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!‡!The!term!given!to!Taiwan’s!diplomacy,!gaining!UN!votes!through!economic!aid!to!African!countries.!!
$
%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
16$Pickles,$J.,$&$Woods,$J.$(1989).$Taiwanese$Investment$in$South$Africa.$African(Affairs,(88(353),$507W528.$
Table C.1: AFRICA’S SUPPORT WITH UN VOTES FOR THE ROC AFTER RECEIVING
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
Source: Tsai and Ming (1990)
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Figure C.2: ROC - RSA BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT TREATY, (1975).
Source: University of Cape Town, Government Publications.
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Figure C.3: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE CLIPPING HIGHLIGHTING THE APARTHEID CHALLENGES FOR TAIWANESE INVESTORS, (1982).
Source: Business Day, April (1982), SALDRU Clippings Collection.
			
Commercial	Rand	(ZAR)	
:	UD$	
Financial	Rand	
(ZAL)	:	UD$	
Commercial	Rand	
:	Pound	£	
New	Taiwanese	$		:	
Rand	
1972	 	R	0.70		 	-		 	R	1.84		 -	
1973	 	R	0.50		 	-		 	R	1.57		 -	
1974	 	R	0.60		 	-		 	R	1.61		 -	
1975	 	R	0.50		 	-		 	R	1.76		 -	
1976	 	R	0.80		 	-		 	R	1.45		 -	
1977	 	R	1.00		 	-		 	R	1.62		 NT$43	
1978	 	R	1.00		 	-		 	R	1.73		 NT$42	
1979	 	R	1.00		 	R	1.30		 	R	1.85		 NT$43	
1980	 	R	1.00		 	R	1.10		 	R	1.80		 NT$44	
1981	 	R	1.00		 	R	1.20		 	R	1.84		 NT$46	
1982	 	R	1.00		 	R	1.40		 	R	1.73		 NT$37	
1983	 	R	1.12		 	-		 	R	1.74		 NT$36	
1984	 	R	1.48		 	-		 	R	2.20		 NT$28	
1985	 	R	2.24		 	R	2.50		 	R	4.09		 NT$18	
1986	 	R	2.29		 	R	2.60		 	R	3.20		 NT$17	
1987	 	R	2.04		 	R	2.20		 	R	3.57		 NT$16	
1988	 	R	2.28		 	R	2.50		 	R	4.24		 NT$13	
1989	 	R	2.62		 	R	4.00		 	R	4.11		 NT$10	
1990	 	R	2.59		 	R	4.10		 	R	4.88		 NT$10	
1991	 	R	2.76		 	R	4.00		 	R	4.95		 NT$10	
1992	 	R	2.85		 	R	4.30		 	R	4.58		 NT$9	
1993	 	R	3.27		 	R	4.70		 	R	5.01		 NT$8	
1994	 	R	3.55		 	R	5.00		 	R	5.54		 NT$7	
1995	 	R	3.63		 	R	5.10		 	R	5.62		 NT$7	
1996	 	R	4.30		 	R	4.50		 	R	7.89		 NT$7	
Table C.2: AVERAGE ANNUAL SOUTH AFRICAN COMMERCIAL (ZAR) AND FINANCIAL (ZAL) EXCHANGE RATES IN
RELATION TO US $, GB £, AND NEW TAIWAN $, (1972 - 1996)
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Figure C.4: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE CLIPPING HIGHLIGHTING THE CURRENCY MOTIVATION FOR TAIWANESE INVESTORS, (1988).
Source: Weekly Mail, July 7th (1988), SALDRU Clippings Collection.
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!
!
!
TOTAL%FOREIGN%INVESTMENT%IN%SOUTH%AFRICA%
! EEC! America's! Africa! Asia! Oceania! Other! Total!
1979% !R!12,868!! !R!5,290!! !R!689!! !R!465!! !R!113!! !R!3,455!! !R!22,880!!
1980% !R!14,700!! !R!5,351!! !R!830!! !R!707!! !R!172!! !R!3,735!! !R!25,495!!
1981% !R!17,907!! !R!7,517!! !R!774!! !R!1,155!! !R!241!! !R!4,896!! !R!32,490!!
1982% !R!21,466!! !R!9,314!! !R!834!! !R!1,124!! !R!272!! !R!6,859!! !R!39,869!!
1983% !R!22,874!! !R!11,452!! !R!1,062!! !R!1,604!! !R!321!! !R!8,232!! !R!45,545!!
1984% !R!32,600!! !R!18,860!! !R!1,534!! !R!2,387!! !R!415!! !R!11,192!! !R!66,988!!
1985% !R!37,632!! !R!23,363!! !R!1,782!! !R!3,054!! !R!572!! !R!15,017!! !R!81,420!!
1986% !R!35,731!! !R!19,272!! !R!1,257!! !R!3,004!! !R!501!! !R!12,136!! !R!71,901!!
1987% !R!35,000!! !R!19,000!! !R!1,200!! !R!3,000!! !R!480!! !R!2,833!! !R!61,513!!
1988% !R!34,663!! !R!18,895!! !R!1,286!! !R!3,192!! !R!413!! !R!11,744!! !R!70,193!!
1989% !R!43,157!! !R!21,568!! !R!1,251!! !R!3,227!! !R!405!! !R!16,814!! !R!86,422!!
1990% !R!48,000!! !R!20,000!! !R!2,000!! !R!3,500!! !R!400!! !R!15,684!! !R!89,584!!
1991% !R!49,321!! !R!19,363!! !R!3,081!! !R!4,333!! !R!487!! !R!18,677!! !R!95,262!!
1992% !R!59,394!! !R!21,785!! !R!4,231!! !R!5,382!! !R!658!! !R!21,897!! !R!113,347!!
1993% !R!78,761!! !R!27,798!! !R!3,878!! !R!4,553!! !R!494!! !R!10,103!! !R!125,587!!
1994% !R!95,155!! !R!36,221!! !R!4,184!! !R!5,537!! !R!626!! !R!11,090!! !R!152,813!!
1995% !R!100,000!! !R!40,000!! !R!4,200!! !R!10,000!! !R!700!! !R!45,904!! !R!200,804!!
1996% !R!114,807!! !R!48,470!! !R!2,281!! !R!11,036!! !R!1,023!! !R!63,381!! !R!240,998!!
1997% !R!196,506!! !R!64,460!! !R!4,000!! !R!20,021!! !R!1,272!! !R!19,606!! !R!305,865!!
!
Table C.3: TOTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT GROUPED BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION, (1979 - 1997).
Source: The South African Reserve Bank, table of South African Liabilities 1979 - 1997, UCT Government Publications.
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APPENDIX(A(""
(
TOTAL(SOUTH(AFRICAN(BILATERAL(TRADE(1975(–(1995,((
(
SUMMARISED(AT(THE(REGIONAL(GROUP("
(
Africa( Europe( Americas( Asia(
1975( R"677,443,844" R"5,432,221,839" R"1,738,962,925" R"1,489,654,071"
1976( R"759,467,728" R"5,715,641,352" R"2,104,875,929" R"1,616,300,993"
1977( R"807,309,062" R"5,929,221,377" R"2,165,563,137" R"1,900,188,823"
1978( R"783,099,531" R"7,393,998,174" R"2,745,045,830" R"2,467,797,026"
1979( R"988,716,514" R"9,208,620,759" R"3,250,241,027" R"2,824,237,567"
1980( R"1,382,392,191" R"10,877,961,127" R"4,371,795,898" R"3,805,474,949"
1981( R"1,353,886,784" R"12,467,448,566" R"5,081,828,808" R"5,006,764,429"
1982( R"1,237,228,731" R"13,152,114,997" R"4,812,387,612" R"5,257,858,771"
1983( R"1,103,124,073" R"12,528,694,771" R"5,062,487,843" R"5,412,924,004"
1984( R"1,421,286,817" R"16,445,722,647" R"6,607,809,396" R"7,469,538,943"
1985( R"2,035,967,681" R"20,276,128,869" R"7,347,463,935" R"8,717,190,241"
1986( R"1,856,532,000" R"24,741,990,000" R"10,859,900,000" R"10,563,770,000"
(((1987( R"1,969,695,000" R"12,521,520,000" R"7,363,370,000" R"12,521,520,000"
1988( R"2,519,880,000" R"14,564,640,000" R"9,591,000,000" R"14,564,640,000"
1989( R"3,419,880,000" R"15,926,980,000" R"10,014,900,000" R"15,926,980,000"
1990( R"6,042,960,000" R"44,755,530,000" R"12,370,410,000" R"14,706,020,000"
1991( R"6,500,000,000" R"46,829,330,000" R"14,711,200,000" R"16,849,800,000"
1992( R"7,751,426,315" R"46,654,025,502" R"15,050,118,487" R"23,759,487,063"
1993( R"9,290,373,921" R"52,653,783,145" R"16,373,216,297" R"30,076,517,677"
1994( R"11,841,619,590" R"65,772,173,256" R"20,930,152,312" R"38,508,058,361"
1995( R"16,722,677,385" R"79,630,414,272" R"25,576,656,643" R"50,454,943,663"""""
Table D.1: TOTAL SOUTH AFRICAN BILATERAL TRADE 1975 - 1995, SUMMARISED
BY REGIONAL GROUP
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APPENDIX(B("" SECTIONS(OF(THE(HARMONISED(SYSTEM(
Section( Ref(Price( Chapter( Description(
I( YES( 1(to(5( Live"animals,"animal"products."
II( YES( 6(to(14( Vegetable"products."
III( NO( 15(
(
Animal"or"vegetable"fats"and"oils"and"their"cleavage"products;"prepared"edible"fats;"animal"or"vegetable"waxes."
IV( NO( 16(to(24( Prepared"foodstuffs,"beverages,"spirits,"and"vinegar;"tobacco"and"manufactured"tobacco"substitutes."
V( YES( 25(to(27( Mineral"products."
VI( NO( 28(to(38( Products"of"the"chemicals"or"allied"industries."
VII( NO( 39(to(40( Plastics"and"articles"thereof;"rubber"and"articles"thereof."
VIII( NO( 41(to(43(
(
(
Raw"hides"and"skins,"leather,"fur"skins"and"articles"thereof;"saddler"and"harness,"travel"articles,"handbags"and"similar"containers;"articles"of"animal"gut"(other"than"silkworm!gut)."
IX( NO( 44(to(46(
(
(
Wood"and"articles"of"wood,"wood"charcoal,"cork"and"articles"of"cork,"manufactures"of"straw,"of"esparto"or"of"other"plaiting"material,"basket"ware"and"wickerwork."
X( YES( 47(to(49(
(
Pulp"of"wood"or"of"other"fibrous"cellulosic"material;"waste"and"scrap"of"paper"or"of"paperboard;"paper"and"paperboard"and"articles"thereof."
XI( NO( 50(to(63( Textiles"and"textile"articles."
XII( NO( 64(to(67(
(
(
Footwear,"headgear,"umbrellas,"sun"umbrellas,"walking!sticks,"seat!sticks,"whips,"riding!crops"and"parts"thereof;"prepared"feathers"and"articles"made"therewith,"artificial"flowers,"articles"of"human"hair."
XIII( NO( 68(to(70(
(
Articles"of"stone,"plaster,"cement,"asbestos,"mica"or"similar"materials,"ceramic"products,"glass"and"glassware."
XIV( NO( 71(
(
Natural"or"cultured"pearls,"precious"or"semi!precious"stones,"precious"metals,"metals"clad"with"precious"metal"and"articles"thereof;"imitation"jewellery,"coins."
XV( YES( 72(to(83( Base"metals"and"articles"of"base"metal."
XVI( NO( 84(to(85(
(
(
Machinery"and"mechanical"appliances,"electrical"equipment;"parts"thereof,"sound"recorders"and"reproducers,"television"image"and"sound"recorders"and"reproducers,"and"parts"and"accessories"of"such"articles."
XVII( NO( 86(to(89( Vehicles,"aircraft,"vessels"and"associated"transport"equipment."
( NO( 90(to(92(
(
(
Optical,"photographic,"cinematographic,"measuring,"checking,"precision,"medical"or"surgical"instruments"and"apparatus,"clocks"and"watches,"musical"instruments;"parts"and"accessories"thereof."
XIX( NO( 94(to(96( Miscellaneous"manufactured"articles."
XX( NO( 97( Works"of"art,"collectors’"pieces"and"antiques."
XXI( NO( J( Other"unclassified"goods."
XXII( NO( J( Special"classification"provisions:""Original"Equipment"Components"
XXIII( NO( 98( Special"classification"provisions:""Other"Miscellaneous"OEM"Component"
Table D.2: SECTIONS OF THE STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS HAR-
MONISED SYSTEM
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!
!
Commercial!Rand!
(ZAR)!:!UD$!
Financial!Rand!
(ZAL)!:!UD$!
Commercial!
Rand!:!Pound£!
New!Taiwanese$!!
:!Rand!
1972! "R"0.70"" "!"" "R"1.84"" !"
1973! "R"0.50"" "!"" "R"1.57"" !"
1974! "R"0.60"" "!"" "R"1.61"" !"
1975! "R"0.50"" "!"" "R"1.76"" !"
1976! "R"0.80"" "!"" "R"1.45"" !"
1977! "R"1.00"" "!"" "R"1.62"" !"
1978! "R"1.00"" "!"" "R"1.73"" !"
1979! "R"1.00"" "R"1.30"" "R"1.85"" !"
1980! "R"1.00"" "R"1.10"" "R"1.80"" !"
1981! "R"1.00"" "R"1.20"" "R"1.84"" !"
1982! "R"1.00"" "R"1.40"" "R"1.73"" NT$37"
1983! "R"1.12"" "!"" "R"1.74"" NT$36"
1984! "R"1.48"" "!"" "R"2.20"" NT$28"
1985! "R"2.24"" "R"2.50"" "R"4.09"" NT$18"
1986! "R"2.29"" "R"2.60"" "R"3.20"" NT$17"
1987! "R"2.04"" "R"2.20"" "R"3.57"" NT$16"
1988! "R"2.28"" "R"2.50"" "R"4.24"" NT$13"
1989! "R"2.62"" "R"4.00"" "R"4.11"" NT$10"
1990! "R"2.59"" "R"4.10"" "R"4.88"" NT$10"
1991! "R"2.76"" "R"4.00"" "R"4.95"" NT$10"
1992! "R"2.85"" "R"4.30"" "R"4.58"" NT$9"
1993! "R"3.27"" "R"4.70"" "R"5.01"" NT$8"
1994! "R"3.55"" "R"5.00"" "R"5.54"" NT$7"
1995! "R"3.63"" "R"5.10"" "R"5.62"" NT$7"
1996! "R"4.30"" "R"4.50"" "R"7.89"" NT$7"
Table D.3: AVERAGE ANNUAL SOUTH AFRICAN COMMERCIAL (ZAR) AND FINANCIAL (ZAL) EXCHANGE
RATES IN RELATION TO US $, GB £, AND NEW TAIWAN $, (1972 - 1996)
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APPENDIX(D(""
IMMIGRATION(
( EU( Ethnic(Chinese(
Year( Immigration( EU(Cumulative( Taiwan( Chinese/Taiwanese(1961" "16,309"" "16,309"" 0" 8,000"1962" "20,916"" "37,225"" 0" 8,200"1963" "37,964"" "75,189"" 0" 8,200"1964" "40,865"" "116,054"" 0" 8,200"1965" "38,326"" "154,380"" 0" 8,200"1966" "48,048"" "202,428"" 0" 8,200"1967" "38,937"" "241,365"" 0" 8,200"1968" "40,548"" "281,913"" 0" 8,200"1969" "41,446"" "323,359"" 0" 8,200"1970" "41,523"" "364,882"" 0" 8,200"1971" "35,845"" "400,727"" 0" 8,200"1972" "32,776"" "433,503"" 0" 8,200"1973" "24,016"" "457,519"" 0" 8,200"1974" "35,847"" "493,366"" 3" 8,203"1975" "54,295"" "547,661"" 4" 8,207"1976" "16,255"" "563,916"" 8" 8,215"1977" "!"""" "563,916"" 0" 8,215"1978" "!"""" "563,916"" 127" 8,342"1979" "4,941"" "568,857"" 487" 8,829"1980" "!"""" "568,857"" 1387" 10,216"1981" "!"""" "568,857"" 4067" 14,283"1982" "24,741"" "593,598"" 1890" 16,173"1983" "22,624"" "616,222"" 3876" 20,049"1984" "15,802"" "632,024"" 278" 20,327"1985" "13,476"" "645,500"" 490" 20,817"1986" "5,035"" "650,535"" 7907" 28,724"1987" "5,436"" "655,971"" 900" 29,624"1988" "5,056"" "661,027"" 876" 30,500"1989" "4,798"" "665,825"" 20" 30,520"1990" "6,979"" "672,804"" 657" 31,177"1991" "5,076"" "677,880"" 789" 31,966"1992" "3,649"" "681,529"" 89" 32,055"1993" "4,242"" "685,771"" 326" 32,381"1994" "2,638"" "688,409"" 587" 32,968"1995" "8,000"" "696,409"" 51" 33,019"
Table D.4: EUROPEAN AND TAIWANESE MIGRATION (1972 - 2000)
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Figure D.1: GOLD AND MINERAL EXPORTS (NOMINAL US $), (1972 - 1996)
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Figure D.2: GOLD PRICE PER OUNCE US $ (1953 - 2003)
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Figure D.3: TOTAL ANNUAL NOMINAL US $ EXPORT (1975 - 1995).
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DIFFERENTIATED)TAIWANESE)EXPORTS)PER)SIC)CLASSIFICATION)(Percentage))
Year% Agriculture%and%Food%
Specialist%
Chemicals%or%
Allied%
Industries%
Plastics%
and%
Rubber%
Wood%
Manufactures%
Textiles,%
Footwear%
&%
Clothing%
Glass%and%
Glassware%
Appliances%
&%Electrical%
Equipment%
Transport%
Equipment%
Optical%&%
Photographic% Other%
1975) 70.80) 4.93) 0.17) 0.02) 0.19) 3.02) 5.18) 1.61) 0.66) 13.41)1976) 51.93) 8.24) 0.43) 0.01) 0.44) 0.38) 4.20) 11.99) 0.84) 21.55)1977) 60.03) 6.81) 0.68) 5.52) 6.20) 0.58) 14.85) 2.58) 0.36) 2.38)1978) 68.81) 2.94) 0.33) 6.21) 6.54) 0.28) 9.81) 3.31) 0.94) 0.84)1979) 57.16) 7.74) 2.06) 2.66) 4.72) 4.51) 6.98) 2.04) 1.63) 10.49)1980) 55.29) 6.93) 2.98) 5.32) 8.30) 5.42) 6.83) 0.59) 1.09) 7.24)1981) 60.14) 8.88) 3.01) 3.75) 6.76) 2.66) 5.11) 1.05) 0.50) 8.14)1982) 52.87) 9.44) 7.62) 1.73) 9.36) 1.54) 7.04) 1.02) 0.66) 8.72)1983) 44.57) 18.90) 8.45) 0.53) 8.98) 1.48) 2.46) 0.12) 1.31) 13.21)1984) 28.47) 25.91) 11.34) 1.67) 13.02) 2.14) 5.27) 0.86) 0.40) 10.91)1985) 34.16) 20.66) 11.25) 2.01) 13.27) 3.59) 5.44) 1.42) 0.30) 7.89)1986) 9.34) 9.89) 12.74) 0.74) 13.48) 1.28) 10.74) 13.99) 4.19) 23.60)1987) 6.30) 7.38) 7.46) 0.81) 8.27) 2.57) 13.40) 8.69) 9.14) 35.96)1988) 4.15) 6.25) 7.19) 0.72) 7.91) 4.40) 13.53) 9.34) 9.56) 36.94)1989) 3.42) 5.17) 6.90) 0.62) 7.52) 4.70) 14.26) 8.28) 11.96) 37.18)1990) 3.51) 4.35) 6.60) 0.62) 7.21) 5.68) 13.27) 5.74) 13.36) 39.65)1991) 17.91) 19.98) 11.18) 1.87) 13.04) 1.00) 6.73) 5.64) 0.14) 22.51)1992) 17.91) 19.98) 11.18) 1.87) 13.04) 1.00) 6.73) 5.64) 1.16) 21.49)1993) 14.21) 25.52) 5.59) 4.90) 10.50) 1.28) 6.42) 4.34) 0.18) 27.06)1994) 14.65) 34.75) 9.92) 3.09) 13.01) 1.51) 7.58) 4.84) 0.39) 10.26)1995) 11.04) 30.72) 13.32) 3.40) 16.72) 2.11) 10.74) 4.19) 0.90) 6.86)
Table D.5: SIC PERCENTAGE DIFFERENTIATED EXPORTS TO TAIWAN, AS % (1975 - 1995)
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Figure E.1: MAP REPRESENTING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 63 ZONES IN THE
FINAL RIDP PHASE, (1982).
Source: Digitised from Regional Industrial Development Programme maps, The National
Archive, Pretoria, RSA - TAB7678 - 01/79. RIDP industrial zones geocoded and recreated from
archival reports on the application and creation of new zones, The National Archive, Pretoria,
RSA TAB7678 - 01/79.
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!
Figure E.2: PROXIMITY OF THE FOUR METROPOLITAN COMPLEXES TO THE AFRICAN
RESERVES. THE CENSUS ENUMERATION AREAS (IN GREY) SURROUNDING THE URBAN
COMPLEXES SHOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE REMAINDER OF THE COUNTRY
WAS NEGLECTED IN MANUFACTURING WAGES CENSUS.
Source: Digitised from Manufacturing Census Maps, Statistics South Africa.
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Figure E.3: TRANSKEI DEVELOPMENT PUBLICATION ADVERTISING THE PRES-
ENCE OF A TAIWANESE CHOPSTICK FACTORY.
Source: Cullan Library Government Publications, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, South Africa.
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Figure E.4: AGGREGATE MALE AND FEMALE DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCE PER HOMELAND RIDP ZONE. (1978 - 1991).
Source: 1980 census and 1980 five per cent African census, and the BENSO man power study of the BOP. 1980 & 1985 compiled by Statistics South Africa
and digitised by South African Data Archive (SADA), Central Statistics Service Report No. 02-80-02. 1980. Population Census, 1980. Pretoria. BENSO man
power study, National Archive, Pretoria, RSA , TAB 4568-876.
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DISTANCE)TO)EXPORT)PORTS)RIDP)ZONE) INCENTIVE)CATEGORY) RIDP)ZONE)NAME) EXPORT)PORT) DISTANCE)(km’s))
Region)A) Industrial)Development)Point) Vredenburg) Cape)Town) 110)Region)A) Industrial)Development)Point) Upington) Durban) 989)Region)A) Industrial)Development)Point) Upington) Cape)Town) 615)Region)A) Industrial)Development)Point) Saldanha) Cape)Town) 105)Region)A) Industrial)Development)Point) George) Port)Elizabeth) 310)Region)A) Industrial)Development)Point) De)Aar) Port)Elizabeth) 364)Region)A) Deconcentration)Point) Atlantis) Cape)Town) 35)Region)B) Industrial)Development)Point) Pudimoe) East)London) 644)Region)B) Industrial)Development)Point) Mafikeng) Durban) 672)Region)B) Deconcentration)Point) Kimberley) Port)Elizabeth) 529)Region)B) Industrial)Development)Point) Heystekrand) Durban) 593)Region)C) Industrial)Development)Point) Selosesha) East)London) 396)Region)C) Industrial)Development)Point) Phuthaditjaba) Durban) 257)Region)C) Deconcentration)Point) Harrismith) Durban) 254)Region)C) Industrial)Development)Point) Bothsabelo) East)London) 397)Region)C) Deconcentration)Point) Bloemfontein) East)London) 418)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) Umtata) East)London) 165)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) Queenstown) East)London) 148)Region)D) Deconcentration)Point) Port)Elizabeth/Uitenhage) Port)Elizabeth) 25)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) Mdandtsane) East)London) 20)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) King)Williams)Town) East)London) 50)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) Ezibeleni) East)London) 143)Region)D) Deconcentration)Point) East)London) East)London) 4)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) Dimbaza) East)London) 71)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) Butterworth) East)London) 72)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) Berlin)South) East)London) 32)Region)D) Industrial)Development)Point) Berlin) East)London) 34)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Ulundi) Durban) 160)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Tongaat) Durban) 31)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Swartkop) Durban) 214)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Richards)Bay) Durban) 149)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Port)Edward)(proposed)) Durban) 144)Region)E) Deconcentration)Point) Pietermartzburg) Durban) 67)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Osizweni) Durban) 235)
Table E.1: SHORTEST RAILWAY PATH DISTANCE TO NEAREST EXPORT PORT FROM
EACH RIDP ZONE.
Source: Calculated using geocoded path distance function from each RIDP Zone.
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DISTANCE)TO)EXPORT)PORTS)(Continuted))RIDP)ZONE) INCENTIVE)CATEGORY) RIDP)ZONE)NAME) EXPORT)PORT) DISTANCE)(km’s))
Region)E) Deconcentration)Point) Newcastle) Durban) 236)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Madadeni) Durban) 235)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Ladysmith) Durban) 179)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Isithebe) Durban) 85)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Imbali) Durban) 71)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Ezakeni) Durban) 168)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Empangeni) Durban) 139)Region)E) Industrial)Development)Point) Edendale) Durban) 73)Region)F) Deconcentration)Point) White)River) Durban) 452)Region)F) Deconcentration)Point) Nelspruit) Durban) 441)Region)F) Industrial)Development)Point) Mkhuhlu) Durban) 489)Region)F) Industrial)Development)Point) KaNgwane) Durban) 439)Region)G) Deconcentration)Point) Tzaneen) Durban) 606)Region)G) Industrial)Development)Point) Thohoyandou) Durban) 689)Region)G) Industrial)Development)Point) Steelpoort) Durban) 519)Region)G) Industrial)Development)Point) Seshego) Durban) 623)Region)G) Deconcentration)Point) Potgietesrus) Durban) 599)Region)G) Industrial)Development)Point) Nkowankowa) Durban) 601)Region)G) Deconcentration)Point) Louis)Trichardt) Port)Elizabeth) 1170)Region)G) Deconcentration)Point) Louis)Trichardt) Durban) 688)Region)G) Industrial)Development)Point) Lebowakkgomo) Durban) 575)Region)G) Industrial)Development)Point) Giyani) Durban) 655)Region)H) Industrial)Development)Point) Kwandebele) Durban) 499)Region)H) Industrial)Development)Point) Garankuwa) Durban) 526)Region)H) Industrial)Development)Point) Ekangala) Durban) 477)Region)H) Deconcentration)Point) Bronhkorstspruit) Durban) 465)Region)H) Deconcentration)Point) Brits) Durban) 533)Region)H) Industrial)Development)Point) Babelegi) Durban) 527))
Table E.1.1 CONTINUED: Shortest Railway Path Distance.
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RIDP%RAILWAY%TRANSPORT%ESTIMATIONS%Region% Zone%Category% RIDP%ZONE% PORT% StD%Cost% DP%Cost% IDP%Cost%Region%A% Deconcentration%Point% Atlantis% Cape%Town% R%223% R%201% R%109%Region%A% Industrial%Development%Point% Saldanha% Cape%Town% R%306% R%279% R%128%Region%A% Industrial%Development%Point% Vredenburg% Cape%Town% R%306% R%279% R%128%Region%A% Industrial%Development%Point% George% Cape%Town% R%555% R%500% R%264%Region%A% Industrial%Development%Point% Upington% Cape%Town% R%722% R%651% R%341%Region%A% Industrial%Development%Point% De%Aar% Cape%Town% R%722% R%651% R%341%Region%B% Deconcentration%Point% Kimberley% Port%Elizabeth% R%639% R%576% R%303%Region%B% Industrial%Development%Point% Heystekrand% Durban% R%680% R%613% R%322%Region%B% Industrial%Development%Point% Pudimoe% Port%Elizabeth% R%763% R%687% R%361%Region%B% Industrial%Development%Point% Mafikeng% Durban% R%763% R%687% R%361%Region%C% Deconcentration%Point% Harrismith% Durban% R%431% R%389% R%206%Region%C% Industrial%Development%Point% Phuthaditjaba% Durban% R%431% R%389% R%206%Region%C% Industrial%Development%Point% Selosesha% East%London% R%514% R%463% R%245%Region%C% Industrial%Development%Point% Bothsabelo% East%London% R%514% R%463% R%245%Region%C% Deconcentration%Point% Bloemfontein% East%London% R%555% R%500% R%264%Region%D% Deconcentration%Point% East%London% East%London% R%223% R%201% R%109%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% Mdandtsane% East%London% R%223% R%201% R%109%Region%D% Deconcentration%Point% Port%Elizabeth/Uitenhage% Port%Elizabeth% R%223% R%201% R%109%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% Berlin%South% East%London% R%223% R%201% R%109%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% Berlin% East%London% R%223% R%201% R%109%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% King%Williams%Town% East%London% R%223% R%201% R%128%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% Dimbaza% East%London% R%265% R%239% R%128%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% Butterworth% East%London% R%265% R%239% R%128%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% Ezibeleni% East%London% R%306% R%279% R%128%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% Queenstown% East%London% R%306% R%279% R%128%Region%D% Industrial%Development%Point% Umtata% East%London% R%348% R%314% R%167%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Tongaat% Durban% R%223% R%201% R%109%Region%E% Deconcentration%Point% Pietermartzburg% Durban% R%265% R%239% R%128%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Imbali% Durban% R%265% R%239% R%128%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Edendale% Durban% R%265% R%239% R%128%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Isithebe% Durban% R%265% R%239% R%128%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Empangeni% Durban% R%306% R%279% R%128%
Table E.2: Estimated railway costs for each of the RIDP zone categories in constant Rands: (1) StD Cost = Standard Base Rate without incentives,
(2) DP Cost = Deconcentration Point & (3) IDP Costs = Industrial Decentralisation Point.
Source: Calculated using geocoded path distance function from each RIDP Zone.
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RIDP%RAILWAY%TRANSPORT%ESTIMATIONS%(Continued)%Region% Zone%Category% RIDP%ZONE% PORT% StD%Cost% DP%Cost% IDP%Cost%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Port%Edward%(proposed)% Durban% R%306% R%279% R%128%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Richards%Bay% Durban% R%306% R%279% R%128%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Ulundi% Durban% R%348% R%314% R%167%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Ezakeni% Durban% R%348% R%314% R%167%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Ladysmith% Durban% R%348% R%314% R%167%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Swartkop% Durban% R%389% R%351% R%187%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Osizweni% Durban% R%389% R%351% R%187%Region%E% Industrial%Development%Point% Madadeni% Durban% R%389% R%351% R%187%Region%E% Deconcentration%Point% Newcastle% Durban% R%389% R%351% R%187%Region%F% Industrial%Development%Point% KaNgwane% Durban% R%555% R%500% R%264%Region%F% Deconcentration%Point% Nelspruit% Durban% R%555% R%500% R%264%Region%F% Deconcentration%Point% White%River% Durban% R%597% R%538% R%283%Region%F% Industrial%Development%Point% Mkhuhlu% Durban% R%597% R%538% R%283%Region%G% Industrial%Development%Point% Steelpoort% Durban% R%639% R%576% R%303%Region%G% Industrial%Development%Point% Lebowakkgomo% Durban% R%680% R%613% R%322%Region%G% Deconcentration%Point% Potgietesrus% Durban% R%680% R%613% R%322%Region%G% Industrial%Development%Point% Nkowankowa% Durban% R%722% R%651% R%341%Region%G% Deconcentration%Point% Tzaneen% Durban% R%722% R%651% R%341%Region%G% Deconcentration%Point% Pietersburg% Durban% R%722% R%651% R%341%Region%G% Industrial%Development%Point% Seshego% Durban% R%722% R%651% R%341%Region%G% Industrial%Development%Point% Giyani% Durban% R%763% R%687% R%361%Region%G% Deconcentration%Point% Louis%Trichardt% Durban% R%763% R%687% R%361%Region%G% Industrial%Development%Point% Thohoyandou% Durban% R%763% R%687% R%361%Region%H% Deconcentration%Point% Bronhkorstspruit% Durban% R%597% R%538% R%283%Region%H% Industrial%Development%Point% Ekangala% Durban% R%597% R%538% R%283%Region%H% Industrial%Development%Point% Kwandebele% Durban% R%597% R%538% R%283%Region%H% Industrial%Development%Point% KwaNdebele%ZSiyabuswa% Durban% R%639% R%576% R%303%Region%H% Industrial%Development%Point% Garankuwa% Durban% R%639% R%576% R%303%Region%H% Industrial%Development%Point% Babelegi% Durban% R%639% R%576% R%303%Region%H% Deconcentration%Point% Brits% Durban% R%639% R%576% R%303%%
Table E.2.1 CONTINUED: Estimated railway costs for each of the RIDP zone categories.
(1) StD Cost = Standard Base Rate without incentives, (2) DP Cost = Deconcentration Point & (3) IDP Costs = Industrial Decentralisation Point.
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TOTAL%SCHEDULE%OF%INCENTIVES%AND%CONCESSION%ACROSS%ALL%RIDP%ZONES%%
Development%Region% Name%of%Area%
Rail%
Rebate%
(%)%
Total%wage%
bill%(%)%
Max%Wages%%%
R’s%per%
month%
Training%
Grant%
Rental%and%
Interest%
Subsidy%(%)%%
Housing%
Subsidy%(%%of%
interest%rate)%
Relocation%
Allowance%
Tender%
preference%
(%)%
% % ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Region'A'
% ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial+Development+Point+ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! George! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! De!Aar! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Vredenburg/Saldanha! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Walvis!Bay! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Upington! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!
Deconcentration+Points+ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! Atlantis! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 4!!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Region'B' %% !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!Industrial!Development!Point!
% ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!! Kimberley! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Heystekrand! 40! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 40! Yes! 10!BOP! Mafikeng! 40! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 40! Yes! 10!
! Pudimoe! 40! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 40! Yes! 10!!! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !' ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Region'C' !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Bloemfontein! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Harrismith!! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!QwaQwa! Phuthaditjaba! 40! 95! 110! Yes! 75! 40! Yes! 10!!! Onverwacht! 40! 95! 100! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!BOP! Selosesha! 40! 95! 100! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!!! Bothsabelo! 40! 95! 100! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!!!!!! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Table E.3: DISAGGREGATED RIDP INCENTIVES SCHEDULE PER ZONE, (1982 - 1992).
Source: Compiled from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry; pamphlet on proposed RIDP incentives (1981). The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA.
Box: TAB 7869 - ZA/09
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Development*Region* Name*of*Area*
Rail*
Rebate*
(%)*
Total*wage*
bill*(%)*
Max*Wages***
R’s*per*
month*
Training*
Grant*
Rental*and*
Interest*
Subsidy*(%)**
Housing*
Subsidy*(%*of*
interest*rate)*
Relocation*
Allowance*
Tender*
preference*
(%)*!
Region'D' ** ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Berlin! 40! 80! 100! Yes! 60! 60! Yes! 5!!! King!Williams!Town! 40! 80! 100! Yes! 60! 60! Yes! 5!!! East!London! 40! 80! 100! Yes! 60! 60! Yes! 5!!! Queenstown! 40! 80! 100! Yes! 60! 60! Yes! 5!Transkei! Butterworth! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!!! Umtata! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!!! Ezibeleni! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!Ciskei! Dimbaza! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!!! Mdansane! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!!! Berlin!South! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!Metro! Port!Elizabeth/Uitenhage! 20! no! no! No! no! no! No! no!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Region'E' ** ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Ladysmith! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!!! Newcastle! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!!! Richards!Bay! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!!! Empangeni! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!!! Port!Edward!(proposed)! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!Zululand! Isithebe! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Ulundi! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Ezakeni! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Madadeni! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Osizweni! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Verulum!(Proposed)! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!Deconcentration!Point! Pietermartzburg! 20! 80! 25! Yes! 15! 20! Yes! 4!!! Tongaat! 20! 80! 30! Yes! 20! 20! Yes! 4!!! Imbali! 20! 80! 35! Yes! 25! 20! Yes! 4!!! Swartkop! 20! 80! 35! Yes! 25! 20! Yes! 4!!! Edendale! 20! 80! 35! Yes! 25! 20! Yes! 4!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Table E.3.1 CONTINUED: Disaggregated RIDP Incentives Schedule per Zone.
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Development*Region* Name*of*Area*
Rail*
Rebate*
(%)*
Total*wage*
bill*(%)*
Max*Wages***
R’s*per*
month*
Training*
Grant*
Rental*and*
Interest*
Subsidy*(%)**
Housing*
Subsidy*(%*of*
interest*rate)*
Relocation*
Allowance*
Tender*
preference*
(%)*
! * ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Region!F! ** ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Nelspruit! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! White!River! 40! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!Gazankulu! Mkhuhlu! 40! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!Kangwane! KaNgwane! 40! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!
! * ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Region!G! ** ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Pietersburg! 50! 80! 90! Yes! 50! 50! Yes! 5!!! Louis!Trichardt! 50! 80! 90! Yes! 50! 50! Yes! 5!!! Potgietesrus! 50! 80! 90! Yes! 50! 50! Yes! 5!!! Tzaneen! 50! 80! 90! Yes! 50! 50! Yes! 5!Venda! Thohoyandou! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!Lebowa! Seshego! 50! 95! 100! Yes! 60! 50! Yes! 10!!! Lebowakkgomo! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Steelpoort! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!Ga’zankulu! Giyani! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Nkowakowa! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!Region!H!
* ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!Deconcentration!Points! Bronkhorstspruit! No! 80! 30! Yes! 20! 20! Yes! 4!!! Brits! No! 80! 30! Yes! 20! 20! Yes! 4!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!BOP! Babelegi! No! 80! 30! Yes! 20! 20! Yes! 4!!! Ga’rankuwa! No! 80! 35! Yes! 25! 20! Yes! 4!KwaNdebele! Kwandebele! ! ! ! ! 40! 20! ! !!!! Ekangala! !! !! !! !! !40! !20! !! !!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!
Table E.3.2 CONTINUED: Disaggregated RIDP Incentives Schedule per Zone.
Figure E.5: RAILWAY COST CURVE, REPRESENTING THE RAND COST OF TRANSPORTING A CONTAINER FROM EACH RIDP ZONE TO
ITS CLOSEST SHIPPING PORT (1980 - 1991).
Source: Calculated using GIS and the Railway Gazette (1980)
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Figure E.6: TONNAGE RAILED (1978 AND 1980).
Source: Compiled from the South African Railway and Harbour Annual Reports (1978 - 1980). Transnet Library & Archive Collection, Johannesburg, RSA.
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Figure E.7: ANNUAL RIDP EXPENDITURE ON HARBOUR TARIFF CONCESSIONS, (1980 - 1991).
Source: Compiled from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry annual reports, 1974 - 1991. The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA. TAB 7869 - ZA -
Series, 1971 - 1991
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Interest'and'Rental'Subsidy''
Development'Region' Name'of'Area' Rental'and'Interest'Subsidy''(%'of'interest'rate)'
Housing'Subsidy''
(%'of'interest'rate)'
' ' ! !
Region'A' ' ! !Industrial+Development+Point+ ! ! !!! George! 40! 40!!! De!Aar! 40! 40!!! Vredenburg/Saldanha! 40! 40!!! Walvis!Bay! 40! 40!!! Upington! 40! 40!
Deconcentration+Points+ ! ! !!! Atlantis! 40! 40!!! !! !! !!
Region'B' '' !! !!Industrial!Development!Point! ' ! !!! Kimberley! 40! 40!!! Heystekrand! 45! 40!BOP! Mafikeng! 45! 40!! Pudimoe! 45! 40!!! !! ! !' ! ! !
Region'C' !! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Bloemfontein! 40! 40!!! Harrismith!! 40! 40!QwaQwa! Phuthaditjaba! 75! 40!!! Onverwacht! 70! 40!BOP! Selosesha! 70! 40!!! Bothsabelo! 70! 40!!! !! ! !Region'D' '' ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Berlin! 60! 60!!! King!Williams!Town! 60! 60!!! East!London! 60! 60!!! Queenstown! 60! 60!Transkei! Butterworth! 80! 60!!! Umtata! 80! 60!!! Ezibeleni! 80! 60!Ciskei! Dimbaza! 80! 60!!! Mdansane! 80! 60!!! Berlin!South! 80! 60!Metro! Port!Elizabeth/Uitenhage! no! no!!!!!
!!!! ! !Table E.4: RIDP INTEREST AND RENTAL SUBSIDY SCHEDULE PER ZONE, (1982 - 1992).
Source: Compiled from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry; pamphlet on proposed
RIDP incentives (1981). The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA. Box: TAB 7869 - ZA/09
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Development*Region* Name*of*Area* Rental*and*Interest*Subsidy**(%*of*interest*rate)*
Housing*Subsidy**
(%*of*interest*rate)*
Region'E' ** ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Ladysmith! 45! 50!!! Newcastle! 45! 50!!! Richards!Bay! 45! 50!!! Empangeni! 45! 50!!! Port!Edward!(proposed)! 45! 50!Zululand! Isithebe! 70! 50!!! Ulundi! 70! 50!!! Ezakeni! 70! 50!!! Madadeni! 70! 50!!! Osizweni! 70! 50!!! Verulum!(Proposed)! 70! 50!Deconcentration!Point! Pietermartzburg! 15! 20!!! Tongaat! 20! 20!!! Imbali! 25! 20!!! Swartkop! 25! 20!!! Edendale! 25! 20!
' * ! !
Region'F' ** ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Nelspruit! 40! 40!!! White!River! 70! 40!Gazankulu! Mkhuhlu! 70! 40!Kangwane! KaNgwane! 70! 40!
' * ! !
Region'G' ** ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Pietersburg! 50! 50!!! Louis!Trichardt! 50! 50!!! Potgietesrus! 50! 50!!! Tzaneen! 50! 50!Venda! Thohoyandou! 70! 50!Lebowa! Seshego! 60! 50!!! Lebowakkgomo! 70! 50!!! Steelpoort! 70! 50!Ga’zankulu! Giyani! 70! 50!!! Nkowakowa! 70! 50!!! ! ! !Region'H' * ! !!! ! ! !Deconcentration!Points! Bronkhorstspruit! 20! 20!!! Brits! 20! 20!!! ! ! !BOP! Babelegi! 20! 20!!! Ga’rankuwa! 25! 20!KwaNdebele! Kwandebele! 40! 20!!! Ekangala! !40! !20!! ! ! !
Table E.5.1 CONTINUED: RIDP Interest and Rental Subsidy Schedule per Zone.
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RIDP%FIRMS%IN%THE%FINAL%YEAR%OF%THE%GOOD%HOPE%RIDP%
Region' Category% SEZ% Taiwanese% Domestic% Region' Category% SEZ% Taiwanese% Domestic%Region'A' Deconcentration*Points* Atlantis' 0' 141' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Isithebe' 0' 273'Region'A' Industrial*Development*Point* George' 0' 135' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Ladysmith' 0' 55'Region'A' Industrial*Development*Point* Saldanha' 0' 15' Region'E' Deconcentration*Points* Pietermartzburg' 6' 165'Region'A' Industrial*Development*Point* Vredenburg' 0' 30' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Port'Edward'' 0' 0'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* De'Aar' 0' 3' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Richards'Bay' 0' 80'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* Heystekrand' 0' 0' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Swartkop' 0' 0'Region'B' Deconcentration*Points* Kimberley' 0' 61' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Tongaat' 18' 39'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* Mafikeng' 0' 0' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Ulundi' 0' 0'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* Pudimoe' 0' 0' Region'F' Industrial'Development'Point' Kabokweni' 0' 39'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* Upington' 0' 23' Region'F' Industrial'Development'Point' KaNgwane' 15' 0'Region'C' Deconcentration*Points* Bloemfontein' 6' 178' Region'F' Deconcentration*Points* Nelspruit' 10' 54'Region'C' Industrial'Development'Point' Bothsabelo' 69' 54' Region'F' Industrial'Development'Point' Rocky's'Drft' 0' 12'Region'C' Deconcentration*Points* Harrismith' 2' 19' Region'F' Deconcentration*Points* White'River' 2' 26'Region'C' Industrial'Development'Point' Industriqwa' 0' 16' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Giyani' 0' 9'Region'C' Industrial'Development'Point' Phuthaditjaba' 10' 176' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Lebowakkgomo' 5' 18'Region'C' Industrial'Development'Point' Selosesha' 7' 0' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Louis'Trichardt' 0' 44'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Berlin' 0' 21' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Messina' 0' 16'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Berlin'South' 0' 0' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Mkhuhlu' 0' 21'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Butterworth' 11' 0' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Nkowankowa' 0' 87'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Dimbaza' 27' 7' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Pietersburg' 0' 115'Region'D' Deconcentration*Points* East'London' 0' 367' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Potgietesrus' 0' 80'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Ezibeleni' 0' 0' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Seshego' 0' 84'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' King'Williams'Town' 0' 34' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Steelpoort' 0' 0'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Mdandtsane' 0' 165' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Thohoyandou' 0' 0'Region'D' Deconcentration*Points* P.E./Uitenhage' 0' 259' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Tzaneen' 0' 40'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Queenstown' 0' 37' Region'H' Industrial'Development'Point' Babelegi' 8' 0'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Umtata' 11' 12' Region'H' Deconcentration*Points* Brits' 0' 46'Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Edendale' 0' 0' Region'H' Deconcentration*Points* Bronkhorstspruit' 10' 19'Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Empangeni' 0' 61' Region'H' Industrial'Development'Point' Ekangala' 5' 92'Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Ezakeni' 2' 99' Region'H' Industrial'Development'Point' Garankuwa' 15' 0'Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Imbali' 0' 0' Region'H' Industrial'Development'Point' KwaNdebele' 6' 21'
TOTAL%% %% % % % % % %% 306% 3485%
%
Figure E.8: TAIWANESE AND DOMESTIC RIDP INVESTMENT PER ZONE, (1992).
Source: Compiled from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (National Archives), and Taiwanese Trade Association almanac (ATCC).
238
Appendix E. Chapter 5 239
Figure E.9: BOTSHABELO RIDP COMPLEX
Appendix F
Appendix F - Data Appendix
240
Appendix F. Data Appendix 241
!
Figure F.1: PROXIMITY OF THE FOUR METROPOLITAN COMPLEXES TO THE AFRICAN
RESERVES. THE CENSUS ENUMERATION AREAS (IN GREY) SURROUNDING THE URBAN
COMPLEXES SHOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE REMAINDER OF THE COUNTRY
WAS NEGLECTED IN MANUFACTURING WAGES CENSUS.
Source: Digitised from Manufacturing Census Maps, Statistics South Africa.
A
p
p
en
d
ix
F
.
D
a
ta
A
p
pen
d
ix
242
TOTAL%SCHEDULE%OF%INCENTIVES%AND%CONCESSION%ACROSS%ALL%RIDP%ZONES%%
Development%Region% Name%of%Area%
Rail%
Rebate%
(%)%
Total%wage%
bill%(%)%
Max%Wages%%%
R’s%per%
month%
Training%
Grant%
Rental%and%
Interest%
Subsidy%(%)%%
Housing%
Subsidy%(%%of%
interest%rate)%
Relocation%
Allowance%
Tender%
preference%
(%)%
% % ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Region'A'
% ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial+Development+Point+ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! George! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! De!Aar! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Vredenburg/Saldanha! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Walvis!Bay! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Upington! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!
Deconcentration+Points+ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! Atlantis! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 4!!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Region'B' %% !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!Industrial!Development!Point!
% ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!! Kimberley! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Heystekrand! 40! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 40! Yes! 10!BOP! Mafikeng! 40! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 40! Yes! 10!
! Pudimoe! 40! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 40! Yes! 10!!! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !' ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Region'C' !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Bloemfontein! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! Harrismith!! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!QwaQwa! Phuthaditjaba! 40! 95! 110! Yes! 75! 40! Yes! 10!!! Onverwacht! 40! 95! 100! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!BOP! Selosesha! 40! 95! 100! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!!! Bothsabelo! 40! 95! 100! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!!!!!! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Table F.1: DISAGGREGATED RIDP INCENTIVES SCHEDULE PER ZONE, (1982 - 1992).
Source: Compiled from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry; pamphlet on proposed RIDP incentives (1981). The National Archives, Pretoria, RSA.
Box: TAB 7869 - ZA/09
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Development*Region* Name*of*Area*
Rail*
Rebate*
(%)*
Total*wage*
bill*(%)*
Max*Wages***
R’s*per*
month*
Training*
Grant*
Rental*and*
Interest*
Subsidy*(%)**
Housing*
Subsidy*(%*of*
interest*rate)*
Relocation*
Allowance*
Tender*
preference*
(%)*!
Region'D' ** ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Berlin! 40! 80! 100! Yes! 60! 60! Yes! 5!!! King!Williams!Town! 40! 80! 100! Yes! 60! 60! Yes! 5!!! East!London! 40! 80! 100! Yes! 60! 60! Yes! 5!!! Queenstown! 40! 80! 100! Yes! 60! 60! Yes! 5!Transkei! Butterworth! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!!! Umtata! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!!! Ezibeleni! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!Ciskei! Dimbaza! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!!! Mdansane! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!!! Berlin!South! 60! 95! 110! Yes! 80! 60! Yes! 10!Metro! Port!Elizabeth/Uitenhage! 20! no! no! No! no! no! No! no!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Region'E' ** ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Ladysmith! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!!! Newcastle! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!!! Richards!Bay! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!!! Empangeni! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!!! Port!Edward!(proposed)! 50! 80! 80! Yes! 45! 50! Yes! 5!Zululand! Isithebe! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Ulundi! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Ezakeni! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Madadeni! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Osizweni! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Verulum!(Proposed)! 50! 95! 105! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!Deconcentration!Point! Pietermartzburg! 20! 80! 25! Yes! 15! 20! Yes! 4!!! Tongaat! 20! 80! 30! Yes! 20! 20! Yes! 4!!! Imbali! 20! 80! 35! Yes! 25! 20! Yes! 4!!! Swartkop! 20! 80! 35! Yes! 25! 20! Yes! 4!!! Edendale! 20! 80! 35! Yes! 25! 20! Yes! 4!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Table F.1.1 CONTINUED: Disaggregated RIDP Incentives Schedule per Zone.
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Development*Region* Name*of*Area*
Rail*
Rebate*
(%)*
Total*wage*
bill*(%)*
Max*Wages***
R’s*per*
month*
Training*
Grant*
Rental*and*
Interest*
Subsidy*(%)**
Housing*
Subsidy*(%*of*
interest*rate)*
Relocation*
Allowance*
Tender*
preference*
(%)*
! * ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Region!F! ** ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Nelspruit! 40! 80! 70! Yes! 40! 40! Yes! 5!!! White!River! 40! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!Gazankulu! Mkhuhlu! 40! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!Kangwane! KaNgwane! 40! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 40! Yes! 10!
! * ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Region!G! ** ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Industrial!Development!Point! Pietersburg! 50! 80! 90! Yes! 50! 50! Yes! 5!!! Louis!Trichardt! 50! 80! 90! Yes! 50! 50! Yes! 5!!! Potgietesrus! 50! 80! 90! Yes! 50! 50! Yes! 5!!! Tzaneen! 50! 80! 90! Yes! 50! 50! Yes! 5!Venda! Thohoyandou! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!Lebowa! Seshego! 50! 95! 100! Yes! 60! 50! Yes! 10!!! Lebowakkgomo! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Steelpoort! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!Ga’zankulu! Giyani! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! Nkowakowa! 50! 95! 110! Yes! 70! 50! Yes! 10!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!Region!H!
* ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!Deconcentration!Points! Bronkhorstspruit! No! 80! 30! Yes! 20! 20! Yes! 4!!! Brits! No! 80! 30! Yes! 20! 20! Yes! 4!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!BOP! Babelegi! No! 80! 30! Yes! 20! 20! Yes! 4!!! Ga’rankuwa! No! 80! 35! Yes! 25! 20! Yes! 4!KwaNdebele! Kwandebele! ! ! ! ! 40! 20! ! !!!! Ekangala! !! !! !! !! !40! !20! !! !!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!
Table F.1.2 CONTINUED: Disaggregated RIDP Incentives Schedule per Zone.
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-	29	-		
	
RIDP	MANUFACTURING		WAGES	
RIDP	Site	
Wages:	Rands	per	month	
1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 N	 Ave’	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Z
o
n
e
	
A
	
Atlantis	 	 90	(14)	 	 90	(38)	 99.5	(31)	 	 104	(24)	 	 	 100	(31)	 	 	 	 	 5	 96.70	
George	 	 90	(14)	 	 	 99.5	(31)	 	 109.5	(24)	 	 	 	 98	(31)	 	 	 	 4	 99.25	
Saldanha	 	 89	(14)	 	 	 99	(31)	 	 94	(24)	 	 	 	 	 97	(31)	 	 	 4	 94.75	
Vredenburg	 	 89	(14)	 	 	 84	(31)	 	 92.5	(24)	 	 	 	 	 95	(31)	 	 	 4	 90.13	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Z
o
n
e
	
B
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Kimberly	 34.6	(19)	 	 	 64	(38)	 65	(39)	 65	(39)	 65	(39)	 65	(39)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6	 59.77	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Z
o
n
e
	
C
	
Thaba'Nchu	 	 	 	 	 	 48	(3)	 	 	 	 	 47	(37)	 	 	 	 2	 47.50	
Bloemfontein	 	 	 	 	 	 65	(3)	 	 	 	 	 	 68	(37)	 	 	 2	 66.50	
QwaQwa/Harrismith	 39	(19)	 	 	 57.5	(23)	 58	(23)	 60	(4)	 62	(23)	 60	(29)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6	 56.00	
Botshabelo	 	 	 34	(30)	 36	(30)	 42	(34)	 52	(4)	 56	(34)	 58	(34)	 	 	 	 52	(28)	 	 	 7	 47.14	
Selosesha	 	 	 	 	 40	(30)	 	 41	(30)	 41	(30)	 	 	 	 47	(30)	 40	(30)	 	 5	 41.80	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Z
o
n
e
	
D
	
Butterworth	 	 	 	 50.5	(21)	 52.5	(8)	 55	(7)	 57	(7)	 70	(29)	 72	(32)	 80	(7)	 82	(7)	 	 	 	 8	 64.88	
Umtata	 39	(19)	 	 43	(21)	 46	(25)	 	 43	(29)	 41	(26)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 5	 42.40	
King	Williams	Town	 35	(19)	 	 	 46	(25)	 	 42	(20)	 	 45	(20)	 	 51	(37)	 	 53	(37)	 	 	 6	 45.33	
East	London	 38	(19)	 	 	 60	(25)	 	 65	(21)	 75	(26)	 	 76	(20)	 78	(20)	 	 	 	 	 6	 65.33	
Dimbaza	 	 51	(20)	 	 55	(25)	 58	(25)	 60	(30)	 	 52	(20)	 	 	 	 	 70	(20)	 	 6	 57.67	
Mdanstane	 	 	 	 57	(25)	 	 55	(21)	 57	(26)	 	 	 50	(37)	 	 	 	 	 4	 54.75	
Berlin	 	 	 	 56	(25)	 	 	 	 60	(20)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 2	 58.00	
Queenstown	 	 	 	 	 	 	 50	(26)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1	 50.00	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table F.2: AGGREGATE HOMELAND WAGES IN EACH OF THE RIDP DEVELOPMENT ZONES, (1978 - 1991).
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RIDP%Site%
Wages:'Rands'per'month'
1978! 1979! 1980! 1981! 1982! 1983! 1984! 1985! 1986! 1987! 1988! 1989! 1990! 1991! N% Ave’%
%
(
(
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Z
o
n
e
%
E
%
Ezakheni((A)( ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 59!(1)! ! ! ! 77!(10)! ! ! 2! 68.00!
Isithebe( 35!(19)! 40!(16)! 37!(38)! ! ! ! 41!(12)! ! 40!(10)! ! 44!(15)! ! ! ! 6! 39.50!
Umlazi( ! ! ! ! 52!(2)! ! ! 58!(5)! ! ! ! ! ! ! 2! 55.00!
Isithebe( ! ! ! ! 45!(3)!(4)! ! 32!(9)! 36!(3)! ! ! ! ! 45!(27)! 43!(12)! 5! 40.20!
Ulundi( ! ! ! 60!(38)! ! ! 80!(17)! ! 67!(15)! ! 72!(12)! ! ! ! 4! 51.75!
Ladysmith( 32!(19)! 30!(12)! ! 33!(38)! 35!(18)! ! 37!(9)! ! ! 37!(9)! ! ! 37!(12)! ! 7! 34.43!
Newcastle/Madani( ! 38!(8)! 37!(11)! 32!(9)! 35!(18)! 35!(9)! 45!(13)! 38!(9)! 41!(15)! ! 39!(9)! 42!(28)! ! ! 10! 38.20!
Richards(Bay( ! ! ! ! 130!(14)! ! 300!(11)! 100!(6)! ! ! ! ! ! ! 3! 176.67!
Pietermaritzburg( ! ! ! 60!(12)! ! 63!(12)! ! ! 62!(15)! ! ! ! ! ! 3! 61.67!
% (
(
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Z
o
n
e
%
F
%
Kabokweni( ! 50!(5)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1! 50.00!
KaNgwane( ! 48!(5)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1! 48.00!
Nelspruit( ! 50!(5)! ! 53!(38)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 2! 51.50!
Rocky's(Drft( ! 50!(5)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1! 50.00!
White(River( ! 50!(5)! ! 52!(38)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 2! 51.00!
% ( !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Z
o
n
e
%
G
%
Letaba( ! ! ! ! 40!(32)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1! 40.00!
Phalaborwa( 40!(19)! ! ! ! 43.5!(32)! ! 40!(36)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 3! 41.17!
Pietersburg( 35!(19)! ! ! 50!(38)! 47.5!(32)! ! ! ! ! 60!(36)! ! ! ! ! 4! 48.13!
Potgietersrus( 32.5!(19)! ! ! ! 46!(32)! ! ! ! 51!(36)! ! ! ! ! ! 3! 43.17!
Seshogo( 39!(19)! ! ! ! 53!(32)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 2! 46.00!
% ( ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
% ( ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
% ( ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
CONTINUED: Wage Data Table F.2.2
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RIDP%Site%
Wages:'Rands'per'month'
1978! 1979! 1980! 1981! 1982! 1983! 1984! 1985! 1986! 1987! 1988! 1989! 1990! 1991! N% Ave’%
% ( ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Z
o
n
e
%
H
%
Babelegi(( 35!(19)! ! 40!(32)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 2! 37.50!
Brits( 36!(19)! ! ! ! 64!(32)! ! ! ! ! ! 90!(40)! ! ! ! 3! 63.33!
Montshiwa( 39!(19)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1! 39.00!
Bronhkorstspruit( ! ! ! 75!(38)! ! ! 89!(35)! 87!(35)! 90!(35)! ! ! 96!(35)! 101!(35)! ! 6! 89.67!
Ga’rankuwa( ! ! ! 75!(38)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1! 75.00!
Ekangala( ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 87!(35)! 90!(35)! ! ! 96!(35)! 101!(35)! ! 4! 93.50!
Siyabuswa( ! ! ! ! ! 60!(6)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1! 60.00!
(
(
Table(2:(Aggregated!RIDP!unskilled!wages,!presented!in!Rands!per!month.!!
SOURCES:(Assembled!from!the!sources!discussed!above,!and!listed!below:(((1)!“Americans%underpay%us”,!Natal!Witness,!29th!of!May!1985,!Homelands,!KwaZulu!Labour!1975!–!1994!archive,!SALDRU!clippings!collection,!pg.!11.!(2)!“New%Labour%Laws”,%Financial!Mail,!8th!of!August!1985,!Homelands,!KwaZulu!Labour!1975!–!1994!archive,!DALDRU!clippings!collection,!pg.!114!(3)!Cited!in!Financial!Mail!advertorial,!August,!1984,!Homelands!BOP!Labour!1975!Z!1994,!SALDRU!clippings!collection!1975!–!2000,!pg.!387!(4)!The!Star!24th!of!October,!1984,!Homelands!BOP!Labour!1975!Z!1994,!SALDRU!clippings!collection!1975!–!2000,!pg.!659!(5)!The!Star!9th!of!August!1979!Z!Wage!Regulation!General!1974!Z!1990,!SALDRU!clippings!collection!1975!–!2000,!pg.!2!(6)!International!Labour!Review!(1985),!“Wiehahn%and%Riekert%Revisited:%A%Review%of%Prevailing%Black%Labour%Conditions%in%South%Africa”!(7)!Jeffrey!(1986,!p.!11!Z!16),!“The%Black%homelands%of%South%Africa,%with%specific%focus%on%Transkei%and%KwaZulu”!(8)!Converted!from!hourly!rates!of!.22c!and!25c/hour.!Cited!in!Hosking!and!Haines!(1997,!p.!16)!Z!"The%Rise%and%Fall%of%Butterworth:%Development%Policy%Lessons.”!(9)!Ardington!(1984).!"Decentralised%industry,%poverty%and%development%in%rural%KwaZulu".!Carnegie!SALDRU!working!papers.!(10)!“FOSATU%warns%UK%firm%in%KwaZulu”.!Natal!Herald!15/10/1989,!Homelands!Kwazulu!Labour!1975!Z!1994!archive,!SALDRU!clippings!collection,!pg.!102!(11)!“FOSATU%also%warns%US%firm%in%KwaZulu”,!Natal!Herald!20/10/1989,!Homelands!Kwazulu!Labour!1975!Z!1994!archive,!SALDRU!clippings!collection,!pg.!110!(12)!“Conditions%and%pay%are%poor%for%women%working%in%KwaZulu”,%Mercury,%12/01/1988,!Homelands!KwaZulu!Labour!1975!Z!1994!archive,!SALDRU!clippings,!pg.!237!(13)!Wages!are!R45!per!week!across!the!border!Z!same!article!as!above.!!!
CONTINUED: Wage Data Table F.2.3
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!!(14)!“Unions%hits%at%loophole”,%Rand!Daily!Mail,!23/04/1985,!Homelands!KwaZulu!Labour!1975!Z!1994!newspaper!archive,!SALDRU!clippings!collection,!pg.!108!(15)!“It's%Half%Pay%for%KwaZulu”,!(no!date,!estimated!to!be!04/1985!)!Sunday!Tribune,!Homelands!KwaZulu!Labour!1975!–!1994,!archive,!SALDRU!clippings,!pg.!33!(16)!“Factory%Workers%Get%Slave%Wage”,!Sunday!Post,!16/09/1979!Z!Homelands!KwaZulu!Labour!1975!–!1994!archive,!SALDRU!clippings,!pg.!33!(17)!“Workers%go%back%after%pay%dispute”,!Mercury,!6/04/1984!Z!Homelands!KwaZulu!Labour!1975!–!1994!archive,!SALDRU!clippings,!pg!64!(18)!“Wage%findings%on%farm%workers”,%Natal!Mercury,!17/12/1982,!Homelands!KwaZulu!Labour!1975!–!1994!archive,!SALDRU!clippings,!pg.!64!(19)!Wages!per!month!cited!in!Gottschalk!(1977)!“Industrial%decentralization,%jobs%and%wages”!(20)!“Slave%wage%workers%dismissed”!Z!30/08/1986!Z!Homelands!Ciskei!Labour!1975!Z!1994!newspaper!archive,!SALDRU!clippings,!pg.!128!(21)!Abedian!(1983,!p.!71),!“Length%of%employment%and%average%wage%were%provided%by%the%labour%recruiting%organisations%in%Umtata”.!!(22)!Wages!per!month!in!Zone!E,!soured!from!Ardington!(1984,!p.!43),!“Decentralised%industry,%poverty%and%development%in%rural%KwaZulu”!!(23)!QwaQwa!nonZmigratory!employment,!Bank!(1984)!“Finding%a%job%in%QwaQwa:%A%study%of%employment%opportunities%in%QwaQwa”!(24)!Riley!et!al.!(1984)!“Spatial%variations%in%the%levels%of%living%in%the%cape”!!(25)!Fabricius!and!McWlliams,!(1992)%“Population%Development%Survey%of%Five%Magisterial%Districts%in%the%Republic%of%Ciskei”,!Research!Report!no.!42,!Port!Elizabeth.!(26)!Gilmour,!D.!and!Roux,!A!(1984).!“Urban%Black%Unemployment%and%Education%in%the%Eastern”,!Carnegie!Conference!Paper,!no!120,!SALDRU,!Cape!Town.!!(27)!Hart!and!Todes!(1997),!“Industrial%decentralisation%revisited”,%unskilled!wage!estimates!for!females!from!midZ1980’s,!until!1996!in!Zone!E.!!(28)!“Taiwanese%firm%goes%on%strike”,!South!African!Institute!of!Race!Relations!(1989)!pg.!458!–!wage!estimates!for!unskilled!textiles!workers!circa!1987!–!‘89!(29)!“Transkei%Special%Report”,!Rand!Daily!Mail,!25/05/1985,!sourced!from!the!LSE!government!publication!library,!!67!(903)!(30)!Manufacturing!in!Botshabelo!Decentralisation!Programme;!Outcomes!and!opportunities,!Department!of!Manpower,!National!Archive,!Pretoria,!RSA!Z!!TAB!3676Z876!(31)!Western!Cape!Regional!Report!on!RIDP!Manufacturing!(1989),!Parliamentary!Library,!Cape!Town,!CBE!367/821201!!(32)!Wilson!and!Ramphele!(1989),!“Carnegie%Commission%Enquiry”,!Final!Report,!Cape!Town.!!(33)!Bureau!of!Market!Research!(1988,!p.!17!Z!21),!estimates!of!wages!paid!by!industries!in!QwaQwa,!Unisa!Library,!MCE!7897Z09.!!(34)!Bureau!of!Market!Research!(1989),!“Minimum%living%levels%in%QwaQwa%and%Botshabelo”,!Unisa!Library,!MCE!7897Z09.!!(35)!National!Union!of!Metalworkers,!(1989),!“NQF%application%for%metal%fabrication%wage%schedule”,!Labour!Bulletin,!UCT!Special!Collections.!(36)!BENSO!(1988),!“Report%on%RIDP%in%Lebowa%and%Pietersburg”,!National!Archive,!Pretoria,!RSA,!box!TAB!6785/90!!(37)!Development!Bank!of!South!Africa!(1989)!report!on!RIDP,!“Findings%From%Panel%Of%Experts”,%National!Library,!Pretoria,!RSA.!!(38)!BENSO!Statistical!Survey!of!Black!Development,!(1981),!(a)!Self!governing!and!(b)!Independent!National!States.!Pretoria,!1981.!National!Library!Pretoria,!MC76897!(39)!Survey!of!Kimberley!deconcentration!industries,!BENSO,!(1988),!Government!Printers,!National!Archive,!Pretoria,!RSA.!!!(40)!Hall!et!al.!(1932),!“A%profile%of%poverty%in%the%PWV”;!Carnegie!Conference!Paper,!SALDRU,!University!of!Cape!Town.!!
CONTINUED: Wage Data Table F.2.4
A
p
p
en
d
ix
F
.
D
a
ta
A
p
pen
d
ix
249
23 21 23
23
24 23 22 22
25 24 23 23 23
24
22 22 23 21
16 17
10 10 8 7
8 7 9 9
7 7 8 8 7 8 8 9 9
10
7 7
10
6
9
6
9
5
8
6
9
5
9
6 9 5 8
6
10
6
10 11
5
2
5
3
5
2
4
3
6
2
5
3
5
2
5
3
5
2
6
6
5
2
7
4
7
4
6
4
8
3
6
3
7
3
6
4
5
3
7
8
3
2
4
2
3
2
5
3
3
2
3
2
3
2
5
3
4
2
3
2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male female male
Qwa	Qwa KZN KaNgwame Ciskei Gazankulu KwaNdebele Lebowa Transkei* BOP* Western	Cape*
Zone	C Zone	E Zone	F Zone	D Zone	G Zone	H Zone	G Zone	D Zone	B Zone	A
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
	
o
f
	
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
60	and	old
40	to	59	years
30	to	39	years
19	to	29	years
13	to	18	years
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Figure F.2: AGGREGATE MALE AND FEMALE DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCE PER HOMELAND RIDP ZONE. (1978 - 1991).
Source: 1980 census and 1980 five per cent African census, and the BENSO man power study of the BOP. 1980 & 1985 compiled by Statistics South Africa
and digitised by South African Data Archive (SADA), Central Statistics Service Report No. 02-80-02. 1980. Population Census, 1980. Pretoria. BENSO man
power study, National Archive, Pretoria, RSA , TAB 4568-876.
EXPORTS(YEAR( FRANCE( GERMANY( HONG(KONG( JAPAN( TAIWAN( UK( USA( Grand(Total(1975( $185,189,914( $853,662,620( $97,682,812( $974,692,110( $101,286,320( $1,807,469,914( $859,494,638( $4,879,478,328(1976( $296,630,926( $945,665,544( $99,295,048( $1,029,631,802( $101,796,450( $1,994,084,488( $913,116,274( $5,380,220,532(1977( $266,889,784( $646,195,015( $119,386,988( $801,143,891( $71,986,693( $1,643,840,281( $984,361,175( $4,533,803,826(1978( $276,436,724( $667,342,812( $151,317,996( $761,688,225( $84,882,807( $1,231,201,967( $1,349,867,103( $4,522,737,634(1979( $350,952,202( $909,893,340( $185,135,900( $949,769,274( $115,143,479( $964,081,556( $1,405,781,489( $4,880,757,240(1980( $407,148,414( $799,949,749( $223,783,748( $1,205,846,183( $167,094,454( $1,384,524,279( $1,648,013,589( $5,836,360,416(1981( $458,222,648( $775,065,068( $167,914,913( $1,409,694,766( $192,661,474( $1,193,035,434( $1,519,841,509( $5,716,435,812(1982( $450,000,924( $849,643,780( $121,493,502( $1,665,711,712( $185,871,582( $1,412,383,403( $1,320,936,765( $6,006,041,668(1983( $378,739,456( $753,401,894( $236,028,334( $1,546,704,395( $192,233,474( $1,324,099,888( $1,753,811,943( $6,185,019,384(1984( $501,560,579( $872,978,212( $416,159,751( $1,747,549,571( $184,313,265( $947,258,721( $1,880,989,708( $6,550,809,806(1985( $414,950,655( $850,273,995( $423,777,179( $1,911,541,316( $190,149,678( $1,435,520,226( $2,047,087,638( $7,273,300,687(1986( $497,628,298( $1,414,843,268( $355,721,071( $2,316,580,357( $345,951,574( $1,245,187,500( $2,507,997,205( $8,683,909,273(1987( $524,079,831( $1,118,203,640( $294,267,773( $2,170,061,135( $767,228,678( $955,860,262( $1,249,137,165( $7,078,838,484(1988( $789,719,639( $1,943,890,238( $508,740,869( $2,185,000,000( $1,267,138,848( $1,592,647,059( $1,710,532,279( $9,997,668,932(1989( $867,662,150( $1,799,596,118( $512,257,363( $2,352,254,386( $1,164,744,946( $1,697,254,386( $1,740,005,536( $10,133,774,885(1990( $742,972,251( $1,797,966,308( $381,923,756( $1,836,725,191( $1,116,980,437( $1,893,072,519( $1,671,057,097( $9,440,697,558(1991( $388,856,098( $1,161,214,911( $568,051,698( $1,452,592,253( $828,642,947( $1,746,853,432( $1,879,433,314( $8,025,644,654(1992( $353,381,507( $1,055,279,515( $516,229,438( $1,320,075,065( $753,047,450( $1,587,491,365( $1,707,976,240( $7,293,480,580(1993( $252,707,455( $942,031,533( $535,321,960( $1,334,620,851( $663,407,683( $1,449,185,348( $1,668,660,319( $6,845,935,150(1994( $298,502,009( $1,213,147,001( $443,387,420( $1,569,015,751( $513,449,725( $1,796,186,870( $1,908,408,201( $7,742,096,976(1995( $358,221,474( $1,397,755,999( $559,814,716( $1,793,365,398( $697,592,444( $2,333,912,636( $2,128,125,865( $9,268,788,532((
Table F.3: EXPORTS TO SAMPLE COUNTRIES IN NOMINAL US $ (1975 - 1995)
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RIDP%FIRMS%IN%THE%FINAL%YEAR%OF%THE%GOOD%HOPE%RIDP%
Region' Category% SEZ% Taiwanese% Domestic% Region' Category% SEZ% Taiwanese% Domestic%Region'A' Deconcentration*Points* Atlantis' 0' 141' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Isithebe' 0' 273'Region'A' Industrial*Development*Point* George' 0' 135' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Ladysmith' 0' 55'Region'A' Industrial*Development*Point* Saldanha' 0' 15' Region'E' Deconcentration*Points* Pietermartzburg' 6' 165'Region'A' Industrial*Development*Point* Vredenburg' 0' 30' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Port'Edward'' 0' 0'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* De'Aar' 0' 3' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Richards'Bay' 0' 80'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* Heystekrand' 0' 0' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Swartkop' 0' 0'Region'B' Deconcentration*Points* Kimberley' 0' 61' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Tongaat' 18' 39'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* Mafikeng' 0' 0' Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Ulundi' 0' 0'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* Pudimoe' 0' 0' Region'F' Industrial'Development'Point' Kabokweni' 0' 39'Region'B' Industrial*Development*Point* Upington' 0' 23' Region'F' Industrial'Development'Point' KaNgwane' 15' 0'Region'C' Deconcentration*Points* Bloemfontein' 6' 178' Region'F' Deconcentration*Points* Nelspruit' 10' 54'Region'C' Industrial'Development'Point' Bothsabelo' 69' 54' Region'F' Industrial'Development'Point' Rocky's'Drft' 0' 12'Region'C' Deconcentration*Points* Harrismith' 2' 19' Region'F' Deconcentration*Points* White'River' 2' 26'Region'C' Industrial'Development'Point' Industriqwa' 0' 16' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Giyani' 0' 9'Region'C' Industrial'Development'Point' Phuthaditjaba' 10' 176' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Lebowakkgomo' 5' 18'Region'C' Industrial'Development'Point' Selosesha' 7' 0' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Louis'Trichardt' 0' 44'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Berlin' 0' 21' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Messina' 0' 16'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Berlin'South' 0' 0' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Mkhuhlu' 0' 21'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Butterworth' 11' 0' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Nkowankowa' 0' 87'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Dimbaza' 27' 7' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Pietersburg' 0' 115'Region'D' Deconcentration*Points* East'London' 0' 367' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Potgietesrus' 0' 80'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Ezibeleni' 0' 0' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Seshego' 0' 84'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' King'Williams'Town' 0' 34' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Steelpoort' 0' 0'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Mdandtsane' 0' 165' Region'G' Industrial'Development'Point' Thohoyandou' 0' 0'Region'D' Deconcentration*Points* P.E./Uitenhage' 0' 259' Region'G' Deconcentration*Points* Tzaneen' 0' 40'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Queenstown' 0' 37' Region'H' Industrial'Development'Point' Babelegi' 8' 0'Region'D' Industrial'Development'Point' Umtata' 11' 12' Region'H' Deconcentration*Points* Brits' 0' 46'Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Edendale' 0' 0' Region'H' Deconcentration*Points* Bronkhorstspruit' 10' 19'Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Empangeni' 0' 61' Region'H' Industrial'Development'Point' Ekangala' 5' 92'Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Ezakeni' 2' 99' Region'H' Industrial'Development'Point' Garankuwa' 15' 0'Region'E' Industrial'Development'Point' Imbali' 0' 0' Region'H' Industrial'Development'Point' KwaNdebele' 6' 21'
TOTAL%% %% % % % % % %% 306% 3485%
%
Figure F.3: TAIWANESE AND DOMESTIC RIDP INVESTMENT PER ZONE, (1992).
Source: Compiled from the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry (National Archives), and Taiwanese Trade Association almanac (ATCC).
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APPENDIX(D(""
IMMIGRATION(
( EU( Ethnic(Chinese(
Year( Immigration( EU(Cumulative( Taiwan( Chinese/Taiwanese(1961" "16,309"" "16,309"" 0" 8,000"1962" "20,916"" "37,225"" 0" 8,200"1963" "37,964"" "75,189"" 0" 8,200"1964" "40,865"" "116,054"" 0" 8,200"1965" "38,326"" "154,380"" 0" 8,200"1966" "48,048"" "202,428"" 0" 8,200"1967" "38,937"" "241,365"" 0" 8,200"1968" "40,548"" "281,913"" 0" 8,200"1969" "41,446"" "323,359"" 0" 8,200"1970" "41,523"" "364,882"" 0" 8,200"1971" "35,845"" "400,727"" 0" 8,200"1972" "32,776"" "433,503"" 0" 8,200"1973" "24,016"" "457,519"" 0" 8,200"1974" "35,847"" "493,366"" 3" 8,203"1975" "54,295"" "547,661"" 4" 8,207"1976" "16,255"" "563,916"" 8" 8,215"1977" "!"""" "563,916"" 0" 8,215"1978" "!"""" "563,916"" 127" 8,342"1979" "4,941"" "568,857"" 487" 8,829"1980" "!"""" "568,857"" 1387" 10,216"1981" "!"""" "568,857"" 4067" 14,283"1982" "24,741"" "593,598"" 1890" 16,173"1983" "22,624"" "616,222"" 3876" 20,049"1984" "15,802"" "632,024"" 278" 20,327"1985" "13,476"" "645,500"" 490" 20,817"1986" "5,035"" "650,535"" 7907" 28,724"1987" "5,436"" "655,971"" 900" 29,624"1988" "5,056"" "661,027"" 876" 30,500"1989" "4,798"" "665,825"" 20" 30,520"1990" "6,979"" "672,804"" 657" 31,177"1991" "5,076"" "677,880"" 789" 31,966"1992" "3,649"" "681,529"" 89" 32,055"1993" "4,242"" "685,771"" 326" 32,381"1994" "2,638"" "688,409"" 587" 32,968"1995" "8,000"" "696,409"" 51" 33,019"
Table F.4: EUROPEAN AND TAIWANESE MIGRATION (1972 - 2000)
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